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ABSTRACT  
 
 
 
Environmental Transformative Justice: Responding to Ecocide 
 
 
By 
 
 
Manuel Rodeiro  
 
 
 
Advisor: Omar Dahbour  
 
My dissertation’s central objective is to normatively devise ethically appropriate 
sociopolitical and juridical responses to ecocide (i.e., grave environmental harm). More 
specifically, the work seeks to philosophically engage the ethical question of what is owed to 
human societies that are displaced due to intentional environmental destruction. 
            The motivation behind the project stems from the lack of academic research (excluding a 
pocket of recent analysis of the international community’s obligation to assist ‘climate refugees’) 
involving the question: “What ought to be afforded victims of environmental harm?” The dearth 
of scholarship is surprising, considering growing global concerns, vis-à-vis accelerating rates of 
environmental degradation, which if allowed to continue, will generate wide-ranging national 
and international environmental crises and disasters in the twenty-first century and beyond. 
The dissertation attempts to remedy this situation by bringing environmental issues under 
the purview of the philosophical species of justice known as Transitional Justice. The novelty of 
such an approach is its assertion that ‘social transformation’ rather than merely ‘correcting the 
harm done’ or ‘restoring the status quo’ is necessary for overcoming these kinds of wrongs 
because absent social change, the conditions that reinforce, entrench, and reproduce these sorts 
of injustices remain in place. 
Since the focus is on transforming communities’ relationships and interactions with their 
environment, instead of simply repairing the damage from past injuries, the dissertation offers a 
full account of what I call environmental transformative justice. To achieve this the dissertation 
establishes the context in which environmental transformative justice is operative because 
of harm suffered (i.e., social death and loss of vital interests stemming from intentional 
environmental destruction) and the manner in which the harm occurred (i.e., direct, indirect, or 
negligent state action); employs a Rawlsian constructivist theory of justice to determine its ideal 
aims; offers guidance on how to pursue these aims by exploring the relationship between 
constructivist and comparative approaches to justice (e.g., Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum); 
identifies actors’ responsibilities for pursuing these aims by developing a notion of common but 
differentiated responsibility based on Iris Young’s two-tiered model of responsibility, and 
supports the assertion that environmental transformative justice ought to be pursued from within 
a Transitional Justice framework, by demonstrating ways in which Transitional Justice 
mechanisms (e.g., criminal tribunals, truth commissions, public apologies, pardons, lustration, 
memorialization, reparations, and constitutional conventions) can assist in furthering 
environmental aims (i.e., promoting ecological sustainability, preservation, and restoration).   
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INTRODUCTION 
             Excluding a pocket of recent scholarship investigating the international community’s 
legal and ethical obligations to assist the subset of victims known as ‘climate refugees’ 
(Ferracioli 2014, Eckersley 2015, Gendreau 2017, and Herington 2017), academics have roundly 
ignored the general question of: “What ought to be afforded victims of environmental harm?” 
The theoretical neglect is so pronounced and pervasive that even prior to broaching normative 
questions (e.g., “What do these victims deserve?” and “Who ought to be responsible for assisting 
the victims?”), the basic ontological questions (e.g., “What are environmental harms?” and “Who 
are environmental victims?”) have received scarce analysis. Hence, my dissertation’s core 
aspiration is to stimulate this vital discussion by cohesively delving into the above questions 
through the domain of political philosophy, in the hope of developing a framework for 
determining normatively appropriate responses to severe environmental harms, i.e., offer a 
theory of environmental transformative justice for post-ecocide states.1  
 The goal is to provide post-ecocide communities insight and guidance on how to best 
remodel, alter, and remove (pre)existing conditions responsible for generating wrongs, while 
correcting the harms victims suffered.2 Thus, the focus is on transforming communities’ 
relationships and interactions with their environment, instead of simply repairing the damage 
                                                        
1 Transformative justice seeks to repair past harms and change relations, structures, practices, 
and institutions responsible for wrongs by making them more inclusive, fair, and less prone to 
generate harms in the future. “Transformative justice is defined as transformative change that 
emphasizes local agency and resources, the prioritization of process rather than preconceived 
outcomes and the challenging of unequal and intersecting power relationships and structures of 
exclusion at both the local and the global level” (Gready and Simon 2014: 340). 
2 Henceforth, “post-ecocide states/societies” will refer to states/societies that are in the process of 
enacting environmental transformative justice after ecocide; “ecocidal states/societies” will refer 
to states/societies that still engage in ecocidal activity, and “ecofriendly states/societies” will 
refer to states/societies that have completed the environmental transformative justice process.   
 2 
from past injuries. A justification for embracing a transformative approach lies in the fact that 
unless structures and practices are altered, the possibility of repeating wrongs in the future 
remains. Nevertheless, one may ask: “Why must we wait until after the harms have occurred to 
begin the process of social transformation?”  
 Waiting is indeed unnecessary, as, ideally, we ought to take preemptive and preventative 
action to ensure environmental harms do not occur in the first place. Ultimately, however, a 
quick glance at the litany of disasters, tragedies, and injustices of history ought to make one 
weary of our proactive ability to avoid wrongs. Furthermore, the work contends that our 
collective reactive attitudes to grave harms play a central role in furnishing the impetus to spur 
social change, i.e., without experiencing the negative consequences, there is less motivation to 
take action to alter patterns of behavior. Accordingly, the dissertation suggests that pursuing 
environmental transformative justice offers an opening for (re)examining and 
(re)conceptualizing our practices, habits, values, norms, and priorities toward nature; in that 
reparative and reconciliatory activities represent an opportunity for progressively departing from 
current destructive and exploitative treatments of nature, thereby achieving and promoting 
sustainable stewardship.3 
 The work thus proposes that focusing on the need for environmental transformative 
justice in actual post-ecocide communities provides provocation and direction for awakening 
awareness and understanding of the impact of humans on the environment and the impact of the 
environment on humans – recognizing the complex, dynamic, imbedded, and mutually-
constructing relation of man-to-nature and nature-to-man (Moore 2015). Exploring normatively 
                                                        
3 The founding figures of modern environmentalism (e.g., Thoreau, Muir, Leopold, Carson, 
Naess, and White) long emphasized the need to reimagine global industrial civilization’s 
relationship with nature; but none of these luminaries offered a concrete step-by-step method for 
undertaking this shift in social-consciousness. 
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appropriate responses to ecocide in relation to currently existing states-of-affair (through the use 
of real-world examples) has the added benefit of linking the project to insights from various 
established fields, e.g., green criminology, environmental psychology, ecotheology, 
environmental justice, etc.4 Centrally, the project aims to show how certain acts of environmental 
destruction trigger comparable normative concerns to those dealt with in the discipline of 
Transitional Justice.5    
 The first chapter will explain why environmental transformative justice ought to be 
situated within the Transitional Justice framework. It will demonstrate how ecocide is a harm 
demanding reparation (past-oriented redress of past wrongs, thereby obtaining justice for 
victims)6 and reconciliation (future-oriented restoration of civic trust and social solidarity).7 To 
achieve this aim, the chapter will proceed in five distinct sections: (1) delineate the range of 
environmental harms under consideration as ecocide; (2) provide paradigm (real-world) case 
studies that fit the criterion of ecocide; (3) analyze the case studies and offer an idealized 
                                                        
4 It is important to emphasize the positive and constructive nature of the project. The work is 
more interested in borrowing insights from other disciplines than in pursuing negative criticism. 
The reason for this is simple. In a rapidly changing world, the need for theory construction aimed 
at offering novel solutions outweighs the importance of criticizing past views that may no longer 
readily apply to present circumstances.      
5 Capitalizing the term denotes that we are discussing the discipline of Transitional Justice that 
developed in the aftermath of the atrocities of WWII and the Holocaust, gained momentum 
during decolonization, and prominence after the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, instead of the 
broader philosophical subject of transitional justice, which Charles Mills describes as the process 
of improving unjust ill-ordered societies (i.e., in the Rawlsian sense that they don’t satisfy ideal 
principles of justice) to gradually make them less unjust, while still remaining ill-ordered 
societies (Mills 2015: 66). 
6 As Pablo de Greiff states, “[reparations are] measures that may be employed to redress the 
various types of harms that victims may have suffered as a consequence of certain crimes…with 
the most general aim of a program of reparations to do justice to victims” (De Greiff 2006: 452-
455).  
7 As David Bloomfield states, “at its simplest, [reconciliation] means finding a way to live 
alongside former enemies – not necessarily love them, or forgive them, or forget the past in any 
way, but to coexist with them, to develop the degree of cooperation necessary to share our 
society with them, so that we all have better lives together than we have had separately” 
(Bloomfield 2003: 12). 
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descriptive model of the harm; (4) demonstrate that the resulting harm fits within traditional 
theories of ‘oppression,’ thus justifying the need for redress, and (5) link the causes of harm to 
comparable activities receiving Transitional Justice’s attention. Hopefully, the cumulative and 
combined success of each step sufficiently strengthens, supports, and convinces the reader of the 
thesis that Transitional Justice’s reparative and reconciliatory measures ought to apply in such 
situations of environmental destruction.    
 The first chapter focuses on Transitional Justice’s ability to provide a platform for 
conceptualizing and achieving environmental transformative justice in post-ecocide states. In this 
light, it is illustrative to offer cases of ecocide that are, at present, not traditionally considered 
matters of Transitional Justice, while concurrently exhibiting that they ought to be. The case 
studies analyzed will focus on the “cultural death” of affected communities, e.g., mountaintop 
removal mining’s impact on the Wayúu of Colombia, damming’s impact on Cree tribes in 
Quebec, and nuclear testing’s impact on the Anangu in Australia.  
 In summary, the argument of the first chapter revolves around the premise that 
oppression claims are themselves prima facie moral claims for remedy or redress. Thus, from a 
normative perspective, once a practice has been established as oppressive, the moral case for 
opposing, resisting, and correcting the wrongs has already been made. Consequently, the chapter 
will show that cases of ecocide satisfying our criteria are oppressive, then it follows that they 
require reparative and reconciliatory redress. Since the oppression results from similar practices 
(e.g., negligent state activity) and causes comparable harm (e.g., social death and loss of vital 
interests) to those within the normal purview of Transitional Justice, then it follows that our 
paradigm cases and idealized description of ecocide represent suitable candidates for garnering 
Transitional Justice’s attention, i.e., that the field ought to expand to cover the harm of ecocide 
(in these and similar cases), beyond any instrumental role the environmental destruction may 
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play in advancing genocide, ethnic cleansing, mass murder, etc. 
 After the first chapter establishes the argument for the expansion of the Transitional 
Justice framework to cover cases of ecocide that were committed intentionally (with the aim of 
benefiting the acting group) and resulted in the loss of vital interests (causing partial or complete 
social death) of non-consenting cultural groups, the second chapter will then focus on developing 
an expansive theoretical account of responsibility that can be applied to our paradigm cases of 
ecocide.  
 The objective of the second chapter is to develop an effective means of delineating and 
apportioning actors’ obligations (i.e., the necessary aims, measures, and mechanisms) toward 
achieving environmental transformative justice. The conception of responsibility under 
consideration must therefore be persuasive, politically useful, reasonably acceptable to the 
parties involved, and serve to counter misleading and obscuring narratives that disguise 
accountability (both over-inclusively and under-inclusively) for ecocide.  
 To achieve these aims, the chapter will proceed in two sections: (1) summarize the 
conception of responsibility traditionally employed in both Transitional Justice and 
environmentalism, so as to discern a common understanding of responsibility that satisfies both 
fields; and (2) offer hypothetical instances of ecocide that fulfills all our criteria (i.e., from the 
first chapter) as a means of testing a proposed theory of responsibility designed to delineate 
classes of actors answerable (morally, legally, politically) to the call for repairing and reconciling 
the harm that broadly meets the goals of both fields.  
 Essentially, the chapter aims to demonstrate that both Transitional Justice and 
environmentalism have settled on a theoretical understanding of responsibility that has three 
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central components.8 First, the requisite notion of responsibility must be both backward 
(retrospective) and forward (prospective) looking – backward looking in that it is able to hold 
actors accountable for deeds which are broadly construed to include both action and inaction; 
forward looking in that it is able to discern actors’ obligations toward particular objects, 
relations, and ends (e.g., a referee’s responsibility is to call a fair game). Secondly, the notion of 
responsibility must be socially capacious, in that the categories and kinds of social entities 
included as potential bearers of responsibility is expansive (including individuals, groups, 
collectives, corporations, agencies, communities, institutions, states, interstate organizations, and 
global networks). Finally, both disciplines benefit from utilizing a conception of responsibility 
that is able to hold actors jointly, commonly, and collectively answerable and responsive; while 
concurrently maintaining mechanisms for distinguishing and differentiating degrees, levels, and 
kinds of culpabilities, accountabilities, duties, and obligations between them.9  
  Ultimately, the chapter will argue that Iris Marion Young’s two-tiered analysis of 
responsibility (i.e., the liability model and social connection model) provides valuable insights 
for achieving the above objectives. The second half of the chapter will apply her understanding 
of responsibility to both hypothetical and real cases of ecocide, which meet our four criteria from 
the preceding chapter. 
                                                        
8 There are undoubtedly more than three points of commonality between Transitional Justice and 
environmentalism’s conception(s) of responsibility (e.g., responsibility for harms can track 
across state borders, responsibility is not wholly determined by causal proximity, etc.). The 
justification for analyzing specifically these three components is that they are important for 
devising a notion of responsibility that satisfies core aims of each field.  
9 Recently, the international environmentalist community (at least since the 1992 Rio 
Declaration) has moved toward developing and promoting a notion of ‘common but 
differentiated responsibility’ for environmental harm (Eckersley 2015). Essentially, the 
international environmentalist community has opted to embrace a conception of ‘common but 
differentiated responsibility,’ out of a desire to cast a wide net, in the hopes of maintaining the 
benefits of shared and collective responsibility, while avoiding an overly condemnatory 
framework that draws socially insensitive conclusions by blaming victims for environmental 
degradation.   
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 The third and fourth chapters will analyze the question of what is required of those 
responsible for repairing and reconciling the injustice of ecocide. In other words, the second half 
of the dissertation will work toward demonstrating the injustice of ecocide and developing a 
conception of environmental transformative justice for post-ecocide states.    
 The dissertation recognizes that an effective response to ecocide necessarily depends on 
the pre-existing values and goals of the affected community. Nevertheless, the community’s 
actions and decisions involved in the transformative component of reconciliation and reparation 
will influence, constrain, habituate, and structure its values and opportunities moving forward.10 
Additionally, an adequate response must be iterative and flexible, since any policy decision will 
influence other issues and generate unintended consequences in the treatment of the original 
problem, i.e., there is constant and continuous feedback between problem/solution and 
values/objectives.   
 Accordingly, the project is amenable to environmental transformative justice measures, 
which oscillate between working within the currently dominant neoliberal political paradigm 
(i.e., embracing free markets, private property, mass production and consumption, globalization, 
atomism, economic growth, or the sovereignty of the nation-state) and those that seek to escape 
it (i.e., embracing controlled economy, public goods, subsistence production and consumption, 
localization, communitarianism, steady-state economy, or bioregionalism). As such, the work 
prioritizes pragmatism over idealism, process over substantive conclusions, and coping with 
reality over attempting to copy some immutable Truth, thereby recognizing that there may be no 
                                                        
10 This transformative character of actions occurring at a societal level is analogous to what 
Laurie Ann Paul describes of epistemically transformative experiences, occurring on a personal 
level. She explains, “because you change dramatically, your preferences concerning the new 
outcomes can also change dramatically. If an experience irreversibly changes who you are, 
choosing to undergo it might make you care about very different things than you care for now” 
(Paul 2015: 762). 
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one-size-fits-all solution to overcoming ecocide.   
 The work contends there are two distinct approaches to articulating conceptions of justice 
in political philosophy: (1) a ‘constructivist’ approach which attempts to 
delineate ideal distributive principles and institutional structures that, if enacted with strict 
compliance in favorable conditions, would generate a  just state – e.g., John Rawls; (2) a 
‘comparativist’ approach interested in examining the actual world and asking how it can be 
made more just, by observing what lives are like and imagining what people are capable of 
achieving through comparing persons and groups – e.g., Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. 
The third and fourth chapters will respectively analyze both approaches’ insights for achieving 
environmental transformative justice; comparing their respective strengths and weaknesses as a 
means of assisting affected communities in their post-ecocide decision-making.  
The third chapter will analyze the ways in which Rawls’s theory of “justice as fairness” 
can diagnose the injustice of ecocide. The analysis aims to establish a minimum threshold of 
ecological sustainability that “well-ordered” societies must attain. A benefit of employing 
Rawlsian theory is its emphasis on the importance of respecting a social pluralism of values and 
promoting fraternity between citizens. This makes it well suited to the project of incorporating 
the interests of relatively self-sufficient communities (i.e. autarkic communities) into a broader 
society. “Justice as fairness,” as it will be presented in the chapter, requires that at least a limited 
set of natural resources be protected, in so far as they are essential for enabling certain citizens to 
pursue their own conceptions of a good life, develop their moral powers, and become 
cooperating members of society.  
A problem with relying on a traditional Rawlsian approach is that it only offers guidance 
regarding how societies ought to ideally structure themselves moving forward (i.e., it requires 
that states respect citizens basic rights, foster a system that engenders fair and equal life 
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prospects, maximally assist the downtrodden, and ensures that future generations can meet their 
needs). Such a limited conception of justice is inadequate in that it fails to sate strong intuitions, 
felt by both Transitional Justice and environmentalism, that past wrongs require specifically 
tailored forms of redress. Accordingly, the conclusion of the third chapter will argue that 
environmental transformative justice demands moving beyond a strictly future-oriented 
conception of justice.  
The final section of the third chapter will explore recent scholarship by Vaca, Espindola, 
and Mills which convincingly argues that Rawls’s ideal constructivist theory requires an 
additional principle of reparative justice (Vaca and Espindolda 2014) (Mills 2017). However, 
even after establishing the need for reparative redress, the constructivist approach to justice 
offers little guidance regarding how to combat the injustices of ecocide in the actual world.  
Thus, to overcome these real-world application problems (i.e., that knowing the ideal 
does not inform how to proceed in overcoming existing injustice), the fourth chapter will 
proceed in analyzing comparative approaches to justice (e.g., Sen and Nussbaum), which rely on 
robust methods of social evaluation based on examining the actual world and asking how it can 
be made more just, by observing what lives are like and what people are capable of achieving 
through making comparisons between persons and groups. The hope is that such an empirically 
grounded and welfare-oriented approach is better suited to providing more tangible guidelines 
for implementing responses to ecocide than constructivists’ transcendental goal of determining 
the basic structure of an ideally just society.  
Lastly, after relying on the comparative approach’s methodology to articulate social 
concerns in post-ecocide societies, the dissertation will attempt to demonstrate ways in which 
Transitional Justice mechanisms can assist post-ecocide states in coming to terms with the 
injustice of ecocide, i.e., enact environmental transformative justice. To achieve this, the 
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concluding section of the dissertation will evaluate the particular challenges and opportunities 
presented by employing Transitional Justice’s sophisticated toolkit of mechanisms and 
procedures (e.g., criminal tribunals, truth commissions, public apologies, pardons, lustration, 
memorialization, constitutional conventions, reparations, etc.) for repairing past wrongs, 
achieving forgiveness, and transforming society in order to prevent future wrongs. The central 
focus of the final section involves specifying the ways in which Transitional Justice mechanisms 
can further environmentalist ends (including habitat preservation, environmental restoration, and 
ecological sustainability) when implemented in service of justly responding to our cases of 
ecocide.  
            In conclusion, much scientific and activist work has focused on a myriad of 
environmental concerns (involving abatement, mitigation, and adaptation). However, a sustained 
political philosophical analysis of environmental harms attending to reparative and reconciliatory 
practices has not yet been attempted. This task I here take up aims at providing practical 
suggestions for assisting those affected by environmental disaster, as well as offering and 
philosophically justifying a blueprint for the transformation of society from an ecocidal state to 
an ‘eco-friendly state.’ 
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CHAPTER ONE 
What is Ecocide? Situating Ecocide as an Oppression within Transitional Justice 
 
I. Delineating Cases of Ecocide Under Consideration   
 
 The aim of the current project is to develop and analyze a framework for determining 
normatively appropriate responses to ecocide, i.e., to offer a theory of environmental 
transformative justice for post-ecocide societies.11 The hope is to provide post-ecocide 
communities insight and guidance on how to best remodel, alter, and remove (pre)existing 
conditions responsible for generating wrong(s); while correcting the harm(s) victims suffered.12  
 The objective of the current chapter is to explain why environmental transformative 
justice ought to be situated within the Transitional Justice13 framework, i.e., demonstrate that 
                                                        
11 Transformative justice seeks to repair past harm(s) and change relation(s), structure(s), 
practice(s), and institution(s) responsible for the harm by making them more inclusive, fair, and 
less prone to generate harm(s) in the future. “Transformative justice is defined as transformative 
change that emphasizes local agency and resources, the prioritization of process rather than 
preconceived outcomes and the challenging of unequal and intersecting power relationships and 
structures of exclusion at both the local and the global level” (Gready and Robins 2014: 340). 
For our purposes, the terms ‘transitional justice’ and ‘transformative justice’ can be used 
interchangeably, but for clarity and illustrative purposes the phrase ‘environmental 
transformative justice’ is favored, since avoiding the term ‘transitional’ helps highlight the fact 
that the work aims at developing a novel concept beyond the scope of the current Transitional 
Justice paradigm. Thus, at present, there is no need to articulate normative distinction(s) between 
Transitional Justice and environmental transformative justice, in fact such an undertaking is 
antithetical to the project’s goal of demonstrating that both are concerned with unequal and 
intersecting power relationships, the importance of process, broad social change, etc.  
12 The justification for focusing on ‘transformation’ rather than merely ‘correction’ (‘correcting 
the harm done’) or ‘restoration’ (‘restoring the status quo’) is that returning things to their prior 
condition might only reinforce, entrench, and reproduce the underlying systems that generated 
the harm.  
13 Capitalizing the term denotes that we are discussing the discipline of Transitional Justice that 
developed in the aftermath of the atrocities of WWII and the Holocaust, gained momentum 
during decolonization, and prominence after the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, instead of the 
broader philosophical subject of transitional justice, which Charles Mills describes as the process 
of improving unjust ill-ordered societies (i.e., in the Rawlsian sense that they don’t satisfy ideal 
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ecocide is a harm demanding reparation (past-oriented redress of past wrongs, thereby obtaining 
justice for victims)14 and reconciliation (future-oriented restoration of civic trust and social 
solidarity, i.e., seeking justice for social rehabilitation and progress).15 To achieve this aim the 
chapter will proceed in five distinct sections: (1) delineate the range of environmental harms 
under consideration as ecocide; (2) provide paradigm (real-world) case studies that fit the 
criterion of ecocide; (3) analyze the case studies and offer an idealized descriptive model of the 
harm; (4) demonstrate that the resulting harm fits within traditional theories of oppression, thus 
justifying claims for moral consideration and remedy, and (5) link the causes of harm to 
comparable activities receiving Transitional Justice’s attention, thus validating the need for 
reparative and reconciliatory redress. Hopefully, the cumulative and combined success of each 
step sufficiently strengthens, supports, and convinces the reader of the thesis that Transitional 
                                                        
principles of justice) to gradually make them less unjust, while still remaining ill-ordered 
societies (Mills 2015: 66). As Alexandra Barahona de Brito and Laurence Whitehead explain the 
discipline of Transitional Justice is made up of six main camps or approaches: “First, there is the 
work of human rights organizations. This can range from ‘moral denunciation’ to sober and 
sophisticated reports on progress (or lack thereof) with transitional justice measures, analyses of 
legal issues, reports on the violations themselves, and policy-oriented documents recommending 
appropriate action. Second, there is an immense legal-political literature, which focuses on legal 
issues and on the national and international laws that are relevant to transitional justice…Third, 
there is the literature dealing with victim trauma and recovery…The fourth strand, which was 
developed more fully with the rise of postmodern cultural studies, goes well beyond the scope of 
transitional justice and focuses on ‘the politics of memory’. The approach is more sociological 
and cultural, and it includes analyses of ‘how societies remember’ their collective past, how past 
events are memorialized (the study of memory sites), and how narratives about the past are 
constructed, including analyses of how ‘history is written’. This partly overlaps with the fifth 
strand, the work of ‘classic’ historians, mostly on the Holocaust and other, more historically 
distant, collective traumas. Finally, there is the comparative politics/political science literature, 
both conceptual and empirical” (Barahona de Brito and Whitehead 2012: 440).  
14 As Pablo de Greiff states, “[reparations are] measures that may be employed to redress the 
various types of harms that victims may have suffered as a consequence of certain crimes…with 
the most general aim of a program of reparations to do justice to victims” (De Greiff 2006: 452-
455).  
15 As Bloomfield states, “at its simplest, [reconciliation] means finding a way to live alongside 
former enemies – not necessarily love them, or forgive them, or forget the past in any way, but to 
coexist with them, to develop the degree of cooperation necessary to share our society with them, 
so that we all have better lives together than we have had separately” (Bloomfield 2003: 12). 
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Justice’s reparative and reconciliatory measures ought to apply in such situations of 
environmental destruction.    
 Essentially, the chapter focuses on Transitional Justice’s ability to provide a platform for 
conceptualizing and achieving environmental transformative justice in post-ecocide states. In this 
light, it is illustrative to offer cases of ecocide that are at present not traditionally considered 
matters of Transitional Justice, while concurrently exhibiting that they ought to be. The strategy 
for achieving this objective will be to explore the concept of ecocide broadly in the hopes of 
discerning a reasonable set of cases amenable to reparation and reconciliation.   
 
A. Prescriptive vs. Descriptive Accounts of Ecocide  
 
 Etymologically, ‘ecocide’ derives from the Greek “oikos” for home and Latin “caedere” 
for kill. In the broadest sense, ecocide is the destruction (death) of an ecosystem (place where 
organisms live).16 But the problem with such an expansive definition is that ecosystems can 
range in scale from the colonies of microbes living on my fingertip (or smaller) to the entire 
Pacific Ocean (or larger). Consequently, such a conceptualization is far too expansive to carry 
normative weight, i.e., it implies that every time I wash my hands, eat, or brush my teeth I am 
committing ecocide. Thus, to avoid reductio ad absurdum conclusions, e.g., that hand washing 
necessitates environmental transformative justice - it is important to distinguish two conceptions 
of ecocide: (1) scientifically descriptive and (2) ethically prescriptive. 
 A scientifically descriptive account of ecocide includes any and all destruction of 
ecosystems (including the act of washing my hands and annihilating the microbial habitat). 
                                                        
16 A textbook definition of ‘ecosystem’ – “is a community of living organisms in conjunction 
with the nonliving components of their environment (things like air, water and mineral soil), 
interacting as a system” (Smith and Smith 2012). 
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Whereas, an ethically prescriptive account of ecocide includes only cases of ecosystem 
destruction that are wrong; I assume it seems obvious that the act of washing hands and 
damaging microbial habitats is not in-and-of-itself morally problematic, i.e., it falls outside the 
scope of our normative concern. Hopefully, the distinction illustrates to the reader that not all 
scientifically descriptive instances of ecocide are candidates for reparation and reconciliation. 
Hence, for our purposes (i.e., situating ecocide within the Transitional Justice framework) the 
concept under consideration is necessarily of the ethically prescriptive variety.  As a result, 
delineating which cases of ecocide qualify is the central topic of exploration.   
 
B. Ecocide as Genocide  
 
 Transitional Justice is an area of practice concerned with states moving from failed socio-
political system(s) that engaged in and/or permitted grave social harms (e.g., genocide, ethnic 
cleansing, mass murder, etc.); and instead, moving towards societies that respect the rule of law; 
afford fair and equal treatment to all its citizens; engender civic connectedness, and strive to 
establish reciprocal trust both institutionally and individually. Thus, the most straightforward 
approach of situating ecocide within the Transitional Justice framework is to proffer cases of 
environmental destruction perpetrated as a means of achieving horrific wrongs (e.g., genocide, 
ethnic cleansing, mass murder, etc.) that are already accepted at the heart of the discipline.  
 Sadly, history is replete with cases of actors intentionally harming the environment to kill 
the ecosystem’s inhabitants and destroy their way of life.17 In fact, at the dawn of recorded 
history there are documented examples of intentional ecocide perpetrated during warfare, e.g., 
                                                        
17 The term ‘ecocide’ arose in the context of criticizing the U.S. tactics during the Vietnam War, 
particularly the decision to use agent “Agent Orange” and other “jungle eating” defoliants to 
diminish the Vietcong’s agricultural base and protective cover (Zeirler 2011).    
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Herodotus describes the retreating Scythian army scorching the earth, destroying food supplies, 
and poisoning wells to prevent the advance of the Persians.18  
 Scorched earth retreats and similar tactics of “defensive ecocide” have been responsible 
for countless environmental tragedies, maybe the worst of which occurred in 1938 when the 
Chinese attempted to stop the invading Japanese army by destroying the Huayuankou dike of the 
Yellow River. Ultimately, the decision to dynamite the dike resulted in flooding millions of acres 
of land over three provinces; destroying eleven cities and 4,000 villages; leaving millions 
destitute and homeless, and killing hundreds of thousands Chinese citizens (Muscolino 2015). 
Nevertheless, the motivation and intention behind these hyper-destructive defensive maneuvers 
was survival and protection - not the total annihilation of the enemy and their way of life; as 
such, they are unconvincing examples of “ecocide as genocide”. 
 “Ecocide as genocide” requires cases of environmental destruction deployed as a tactic 
intended to exterminate peoples and end their way of life. A paradigm illustration of ecocide as a 
strategy of eradication is the apocryphal tale of the Roman legions in the Third Punic War 
leveling Carthage and sowing the land with salt to prevent anything from ever growing there 
again. Tragically, not all cases of “ecocide as genocide” are legends; a vivid and contemporary 
example is Saddam Hussein’s extermination of the Ma’dan (Marsh Arabs). 
  The Ma’dan inhabited a region of marshes slightly upriver from the intersection of the 
Tigris and Euphrates (the largest wetlands in Southwest Asia) since “time immemorial” - it is 
estimated that they have lived in the region for over 5,000 years (Dellapena 2007). Over the 
millennia, the Ma’dan had developed into a distinct cultural community highly dependent on the 
marshes for their traditional way of life and continued survival.  
                                                        
18 See Herodotus’ The Histories (4:120).  
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 After the defeat of the Iraqi army in the Gulf War and spurred on by President Bush’s call 
to the Iraqi people to overthrow the Hussein Regime, the Ma’dan and other Shiite Arabs in 
southern Iraq rebelled (Dellapena 2007: 402-403). Hussein responded with overwhelming 
airpower, artillery fire, well poisoning, and electrocuting the marshes to end the rebellion and 
force the Ma’dan to abandon their ancestral home or face near certain death (Dellapena 2007: 
403). Moreover, Hussein succeeded this initial onslaught with a comprehensive project to 
destroy the habitat and prevent the Ma’dan from ever returning home. “Within months of the end 
of the revolt, the Iraqi government undertook to drain the marshes, dredging canals, constructing 
dams, and leaving about 90% of the wetlands desiccated” (Dellapena 2007: 403).  
 Draining the marshes represents a clear example of “ecocide as genocide” as it was a 
deliberate plan to destroy the environment as a means of ending the Ma’dan and their way of life. 
“It became impossible for the Marsh Arabs to survive where they were. After 1993, only a few 
thousand of the perhaps 500,000 Marsh Arabs remained” (Dellapena 2007: 403).  
 Consequently, conceptualizing the violence committed against the Ma’dan falls squarely 
within the Transitional Justice framework, i.e., it is a case of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and 
mass murder.19 As such, in this and other cases of “ecocide as genocide” there already exist well-
developed methods and mechanisms (e.g., criminal tribunals, truth commissions, public 
apologies, pardons, lustration, memorialization, reparations, etc.) for conceptualizing and 
responding to these sorts of wrongs.   
 Nevertheless, for our purposes the drawback of focusing on cases of “ecocide as 
genocide” is that it may obscure environmental component(s) of the harm. The worry is that if 
                                                        
19 The act violated the UN Genocide Convention that defines genocide as “deliberately inflicting 
on [a] group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in 
part…with the intent…to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, 
as such” (1948).  
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the analysis is limited to instances where ecocide is merely a vehicle for achieving wrongs 
already covered by Transitional Justice, then the focus will remain moored to traditional (non-
environmental) crimes against humanity. Instead, the work is proposing that Transitional Justice 
ought to expand to cover the harm of ecocide; beyond any instrumental role the environmental 
destruction may play in advancing genocide, ethnic cleansing, mass murder, etc.20   
 
C. Green Criminology and Expansion of Social Harms 
 
 Fundamentally, the current section of the chapter strives to prove that ecocide ought to be 
included as a concern of Transitional Justice regardless of whether or not the environmental 
destruction was committed in an attempt to cause traditional crime(s) against humanity. In other 
words, the wrongness of ecocide is not limited to cases in which the environmental destruction 
was committed with genocidal intent. The justification for expanding the scope of wrongs 
covered by Transitional Justice stems from a troubling insight advanced in the field of green 
criminology - “that much actual harm is perceived to be legitimate and lawful” (White 2014: 1).  
 Green criminology is a school of criminal justice that arose at the turn of the 21st century. 
The disciplines’ core tenant is that environmentally damaging activities are responsible for 
causing extensive social harm in contemporary societies; but yet, are generally legal and 
applauded.21 Rob White provides a vivid example explaining how felling old-growth forests (i.e., 
                                                        
20 Obviously, the particular insights gleaned from studying cases of ecocide in-and-of-itself 
could be subsequently applied to traditional instances of human rights violations that include 
environmental harms.  
21 As White explains, “for many green criminologists the greatest threat to environmental rights, 
ecological justice and nonhuman animal wellbeing are system-level structures and pressures that 
commodify all aspects of social existence, that are based upon the exploitation humans, 
nonhuman animals and natural resources, and that privilege the powerful over the interests of the 
vast majority” (White 2014: 6-7). Unfortunately, at present there are innumerable real-world 
examples highlighting the above concern. For instance, Kaniye Ebeku through a careful review 
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an activity that can generate irreversible ecological harm, biological diversity loss, and 
widespread disruption to the local community) remains legal in many areas of the world, 
whereas the benign activity of cultivating naturally growing hemp is often criminalized (White 
2014: 4).  
 Thus, green criminology argues that if social welfare is to be expanded, then there must 
be increased social understanding, codification, and prosecution of environmental harms as 
illegal and wrong (White 2014, Natali 2016, South 2017, and Lynch et al 2017). “A key issue is 
the weighing up of different kinds of harm and violation of rights, that involves stretching the 
boundaries of conventional criminology to include other kinds [environmental] of harm than 
those already deemed to be illegal” (White 2014: 6).   
 When applied to Transitional Justice, green criminology asks us to consider the 
possibility that the discipline as currently practiced may be blind to a full range of incidents 
responsible for causing widespread social harm (of the type the discipline is traditionally 
concerned with) over and above the class of cases currently under consideration. If this is the 
case, then Transitional Justice ought to expand its scope to cover broader cases of ecocide to 
promote social welfare.   
 In short, does Transitional Justice promote greater social justice by maintaining the 
current model of limiting the analysis of environmental harms to cases of ecocide as a means of 
                                                        
of numerous Nigerian judicial proceedings provides a vivid example, demonstrating ways in 
which Nigerian judges’ consistently favor plaintiffs and defendants from the oil industry. As 
Ebeku states, “if oil remains an important revenue earner for the country, it is doubtful if the 
courts will abandon and economic approach and move towards a more sustainable approach – 
protecting individuals, groups, and the environment itself against environmental damage arising 
from oil-development” (Ebeku 2003: 207). Hence, the goal of green criminology in this case and 
in others is to describe and alter socio-legal attitudes, norms, and practices regarding 
environmental harms. “Green criminologists generally agree that destructive and damaging 
human activities that harm environments warrant greater attention than has hitherto been the case 
within criminology” (White 2014: 1).  
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committing traditional crimes against humanity or by expanding the class of harms under 
consideration to include ecocide more generally? To begin answering this question, we must 
briefly comment on the concept of ‘genocide’ as presently accepted within the field of 
Transitional Justice.  
 
D. Social Death as Genocide 
 
 Etymologically, ‘genocide’ derives from the Greek “genos” for race, tribe, or clan and 
Latin “caedere” for kill. Thus, genocide in the broadest sense is the destruction (death) of a 
people (race, ethnicity, or culture).22 But etymology fails to capture the prevailing understanding 
that genocide must be intentionally perpetrated – “there can be no ‘accidental’ genocides” (Lang 
2010: 87).23 International law in theory, codification, and practice24 embraces the perspective 
that genocide requires mens rea (intention), e.g., Article 2 of the UN Convention on Genocide 
states: “Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or 
in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such” (emphasis added)(1948).   
 But one might question what distinguishes genocide from intentional mass death or are 
all intentionally committed mass deaths genocide? In answering this question, Claudia Card 
compellingly argues that the distinct harm committed in genocide (and not in other cases of 
intentional mass death) is severing the groups’ vital social interests (e.g., cultural identity, inter-
                                                        
22 Raphael Lemkin coined the term ‘genocide’ during his activist campaigning beginning in the 
1930 to establish an international convention to expressly outlaw the practice. But it was not 
until after the atrocities of the Holocaust that the concept entered the popular lexicon and was 
codified into international law in the United Nations Genocide Convention of 1948 (Stone 2013).    
23 For a convincing analysis supporting the view that genocide requires intention, see Hugo 
Bedau’s essay, “Genocide in Vietnam?” (1974).  
24 An unintentional genocide has never been tried in the International Criminal Court or 
prosecuted in any of the other international genocide tribunal (e.g., the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia).  
 20 
and-intra-generational connectedness, social relations, etc.).25 “In my view, the special evil of 
genocide lies in its infliction of not just physical death (when it does that) but social death, 
producing a consequent meaninglessness of one’s life and even of its termination” (Card 2003: 
73). 
 According to Card for an act to be considered genocidal requires the intentional infliction 
of social death (i.e., being stripped of controlling vital interests) upon a group because they are 
members of that group. Importantly, embracing such a definition implies that an act can be 
considered genocidal even if no group member(s) are physically killed, so long as social death is 
intended.   
 But a worry is that if Transitional Justice remains concerned only with cases of 
intentional genocide, then the vast majority of instances of social death will be excluded from 
reparatory and reconciliatory consideration. The gravity of this concern becomes pronounced 
when we consider the fact that humanity is in the midst of the greatest acceleration of cultural 
disappearance in history (UN 2012).26 Countless cultures have lost or are in the process of losing 
their cultural identity, traditional means of survival, social relations, autonomy, and connection 
to their past. Yet overwhelmingly, most of these cases of social death (via cultural 
disappearance) would not constitute genocide because they are unintentional. 
                                                        
25 Brian Barry defines “vital interests” as, “certain objective requirements for human beings to be 
able to live healthy lives, raise families, work at full capacity, and take part in social and political 
life” (Barry 1999: 97) He goes on to explain that promoting ‘vital interests’ constitutes the 
central aim of justice. As he states, “justice requires that a higher priority should be given to 
ensuring that all human beings have the means to satisfy these vital interests than to satisfying 
other desires” (Barry 1999: 97).  
26 The UN estimates that within a hundred years 90% of worlds 7,000 languages will disappear 
(UN 2012). While the loss of language does not necessarily imply the end of a culture or the 
“death of a people” it is the best indicator currently available. As Wolgang Sachs eloquently 
laments, “with the demise of languages, entire cultures are vanishing from the history of 
civilization, never to be lived again. For each tongue contains its own way of perceiving man and 
nature, experiencing joy and sorrow, and finding meaning in the flow of events…once languages 
die out, cultures falter” (Sachs 1999: 93). 
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 Upon taking a birds-eye view of the modern world, it seems uncontroversial that the 
primary driver of cultural disappearance is not intentional genocide; but instead, a steady process 
of economic growth, social development, globalization, cultural integration, etc. If this is the 
case, then the green criminologists’ critique appears credible in that currently legal activities are 
responsible for causing social harm at an accelerated rate over and above wrongs recognized, 
codified, and prosecuted as illegal in existing domestic and international law.27  
 Accordingly, if we believe that communities suffering from unintentional social death 
deserve reparatory and reconciliatory consideration, then it is necessary to expand the notion of 
wrongs covered by Transitional Justice.28 Essentially, what the work aims to prove is that one of 
the key drivers behind the accelerating rate of social death is deliberate environmental 
destruction; while emphasizing that these environmentally destructive acts are generally not 
committed in an attempt to exterminate people(s) or culture(s). It is this realization that drives the 
work’s assessment that to promote greater social welfare Transitional Justice ought to embrace 
an account of ecocide as a wrong if it causes the same effect as genocide (i.e., social death) over-
and-above any instrumental role the environmental destruction may have in intentionally causing 
traditional crimes against humanity. 
                                                        
27 A cynical, neo-Marxist, or law and economics interpretation of the global social order could 
conclude that the reason why criminal justice has not expanded to cover the activities that are 
causing the most environmental harm is because the law’s central purpose is to justify, affirm, 
and expand the existing economic model. Thus, increased regulation or prohibition of these sorts 
of activities would be anathema to the law’s underlying objective.  
28 It is important to point out that instances in which the vanishing group voluntarily participated, 
acquiesced, or assented to the cultural disappearance are not examples of social death because 
the group was not stripped of autonomy and control of their vital interests. Focusing on whether 
or not cultural changes are enacted voluntarily or involuntarily allows us to draw a helpful 
distinction between social death and social evolution. Thus, voluntary cultural disappearance 
(i.e., processes of social evolution) would not constitute wrong(s) requiring reparation and 
reconciliation (i.e., they fall outside the scope of the transitional framework).   
 22 
 It is necessary to reemphasize that this does not mean that every instance of ecocide (i.e., 
descriptive account(s) that include such activities as washing hands and brushing teeth) 
constitutes a wrong in-and-of-itself that ought to be afforded consideration from within the 
Transitional Justice framework - such a farfetched claim would require a vastly different and 
more challenging argument. Instead, what the work proposes is a prescriptive account of ecocide, 
which delineates a class of harms limited to instances of intentional environmental destruction 
responsible for unintentional cultural loss that ought to be included within the purview of 
Transitional Justice.29  
 
II. Examples of Ecocide as Driver of Unintentional Cultural Loss and Social Death  
 
                                                        
29 In this sense, the wrongness of ecocide is tethered to its role in causing unintentional social 
death. Accordingly, the work is limited to an anthropocentric conception of ecocide (unless it can 
be shown that other species besides humans are capable of comparable cultural loss), in that it is 
concerned with the impact of environmental destruction on humans and their communities, 
instead of on ecosystem loss in-and-of-itself. Nevertheless, the project has multiple motivations. 
The first motivation is the surface objective of determining the appropriate responses to ecocide, 
i.e., provide practical suggestions for assisting those affected by intentional environmental harms 
responsible for social death. But the second motivation aims deeper, its goal is to offer an initial 
step towards altering contemporary society’s perception of humanity’s place within nature. The 
founding fathers of modern environmentalism (e.g., Henry David Thoreau 1854, John Muir 
1894, Aldo Leopold, Arne Naess 1989, and Lynn White 1967) long emphasized the need to 
reimagine our relationship with nature; but none of these luminaries offered a concrete step-by-
step method for undertaking this shift in social-consciousness. This project suggests that 
pursuing environmental transformative justice provides an opening for (re)examining and 
(re)conceptualizing our practices, habits, values, norms, and priorities towards nature; in that 
reparative and reconciliatory activities represent an opportunity for progressively departing from 
current destructive and exploitative treatment(s) of nature and thereby, achieving and promoting 
sustainable stewardship. Essentially, the work hopes that focusing on the need for environmental 
transformative justice (e.g., after cases of intentional environmental destruction responsible for 
causing social death) will provoke, guide, direct, and awaken awareness and understanding of 
humans’ impact on the environment and the impact of the environment on humans, i.e., 
recognize the complex, dynamic, imbedded, and mutually-constructing relation of man-to-nature 
and nature-to-man (Moore 2015).  
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 This section will analyze real-world instances of environmental destruction in the hopes 
of demonstrating the reach and applicability of situating the wrong of ecocide within the 
Transitional Justice framework. To achieve this the work intends to explore cases that foster a 
clear intuition that group(s) affected by environmental degradation have suffered grave wrong 
(not currently covered by Transitional Justice) that ought to be afforded reparative and 
reconciliatory consideration.30 In an attempt to provide broad and compelling analysis the 
examples will be varied geographically (i.e., drawn from around the world), in victim type, and 
in the kind of activity considered.   
 In summary, for our purposes the paradigm cases31 of ecocide (i.e., those that meet the 
above standard) must satisfy four elements: (1) committed intentionally for supposed benefit of 
acting group;32 (2) without consent of impacted group;33 (3) non-instrumental in the commission 
                                                        
30 In turn, the projects by narrowly delineating cases where it seems clear that reparative and 
reconciliatory measures are required, also helps in classifying cases where it is intuitively more 
ambiguous if such obligations exist. This topic will be explored in subsequent chapters of the 
work when discussing responsibility, complicity, and consent.      
31 After the analysis of situating the paradigm cases within the Transitional Justice framework is 
complete, applying the insights gleaned to non-canonical situations (e.g. instances where the 
victims were complicit in the harm; environmental loss was unintentional; crimes against 
humanity were perpetrated alongside the ecocide, etc.) remains open. But at present providing a 
core set of examples is the aim.    
32 It is important to emphasize that the criterion covers “supposed benefits” – i.e., per the 
analysis an activity that causes an unexpected harm to the intentionally acting group is still a 
viable candidate for consideration, so long as there was an anticipated gain from the 
environmental harm. Mao’s Four Pest Campaign (i.e., exterminating rats, flies, mosquitos, and 
swallows) is a vivid example; in that the eradication of vectors of disease was supposed to 
function as a hygienic benefit to Chinese society. But instead the policy generated a self-inflicted 
socio-ecological disaster. Without the swallows, insect populations boomed and devoured rice 
and grain crops, which exacerbated the Chinese Famine of 1959-1961 that was responsible for 
20-40 million Chinese citizens starving to death (Dvorsky 2012).  
33 “Consent” as a concept has numerous meanings. But in the relevant sense under discussion, 
“consent transactions” are of a particular structure: “agent A consents to B’s φ-ing, under a 
certain description of φ-ing, whether or not the offer was initiated by B” (Kleinig 2010:6). For 
example, a community may consent to a company’s mining of their land as part of an agreed 
upon arrangement between the community and the state to receive compensation for voluntarily 
relocating.   
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of a traditional crime against humanity, and (4) undermined the vital interests of a distinct 
cultural group, i.e., caused partial or complete social death of impacted group.34 The justification 
for limiting our analysis to the above four criteria is that combined they represent minimally 
necessary elements required for situating and applying the wrong(s) of the case studies (despite 
the fact that they are currently excluded from the purview of Transitional Justice) to canonical 
theories of oppression - which will be a topic covered in subsequent sections of the chapter.  
 
A. Dams 
 
 The construction of dams has the potential to produce extensive ecological devastation. It 
is important to emphasize that dam-caused ecocide can occur when the edifice functions exactly 
as intended absent any structural failure;35 moreover, it is precisely these cases that are ideally 
suited (i.e., satisfy the above four elements) for consideration in our attempt to situate ecocide 
within the Transitional Justice framework. (1) Dams are intentionally designed to transform 
terrestrial environments to aquatic and/or aquatic environments to terrestrial, i.e., impounding the 
river floods land upstream and/or dries up lakes and ponds downstream. (2) Damming often 
occurs without the consent of the impacted community, i.e., The United Nations Environment 
Program (UNEP) World Commission on Dams (WCD) estimated that since the end of WWII 
                                                        
34 One of the benefits of focusing on these four criteria is that inverting the framework offers 
insight into the aims of environmental transformative justice: (1) preventing the intentional harm 
of the environment; (2) inclusion of affected group(s) in decision-making process(es); (3) 
restoring group autonomy and autarky (i.e., self-sufficiency), and (4) repairing ecosystem 
functioning. Balancing these potentially conflicting interests will be the focus of subsequent 
analysis.   
35 Nevertheless, accidental dam failures have been responsible for some of the worst 
environmental and human disasters in history, e.g., the collapse of the Banqiao Dam on the Ru 
River in Henan province China (1975) resulted in an estimated 171,000 deaths and over 11 
million people displaced (Osnos: 2011).  
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large-scale damming projects have been responsible for the displacement of roughly 40-60 
million people from predominately indigenous, tribal, and peasant communities (2000: XXX). 
(3) Generally, dams are built to further economic growth and development; thus, construction 
occurs without ill intent or a desire to harm the impacted community (despite the fact that as 
previously discussed there are examples to the contrary – e.g., Saddam’s assault on the Ma’dan). 
(4) But sadly, even benign damming projects have often resulted in widespread corrosion of the 
local populations’ vital interests. Thus, in the hopes of illustrating how and why damming may 
cause social death we will examine the James Bay I initiative.  
 At the end of WWII, the Quebecois government created a public utility called Quebec-
Hydro aimed at expanding the province’s hydroelectric power (Churchill 2002: 296). The utility 
grew rapidly in scope, scale, and ambition; in fact, by 1963 it was the largest employer in the 
province (Churchill 2002: 297).  
 Ultimately, Quebec-Hydro aspired to supply power to much of the Eastern Seaboard and 
began developing a plan to achieve this, dubbing it the James Bay Project (Churchill 2002: 297-
298). The scale of the project was colossal; Phase One alone was responsible for “moving 
enough earth to recreate the Great Pyramid of Cheops eighty times over” (Churchill 2002: 298).  
 The stated developmental goal was to build roads, houses, airports, and most importantly 
dams in the hopes of opening up the wilderness of James Bay to “civilization.” However, a 
problem with the plan was that there was already civilization there! The Cree had inhabited the 
James Bay region for generations and desired to keep it that way.36 Thus, as development began 
encroaching on their territory the Cree filed suit to enjoin further construction in the region.   
 Initially, the Superior Court ruled in favor of the Cree and halted further construction; but 
                                                        
36 Case in point, “the first reaction to the information…was one of disbelief, and the hydrological 
expert sent to meet with the Cree to explain the situation was nearly run out of town” (Olsson, 
Folke, and Berkes 2004: 82). 
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in 1973 the Court of Appeal overturned the injunction, stating that it was in the “interest” of the 
“greater society” to allow the development to proceed (Churchill 2002: 299). Nevertheless, the 
Court of Appeal ruled that the Cree would be entitled to sue for damages (Churchill 2002: 299). 
Consequently, the threat of future litigation drove Quebec-Hydro to attempt to settle with the 
Cree to avoid astronomical payouts down the road. But the Cree voted to reject Quebec-Hydro’s 
offer (Churchill 2002: 300).  
 In response, the Canadian government established a development-friendly committee of 
Cree (comprised of predominantly southern members of the tribe who were further integrated 
into mainstream Canadian society) called the “Grand Council of the Crees of Quebec” to 
negotiate on “behalf” of the Cree still inhabiting James Bay region (Churchill 2002: 299). This 
group had no historical precedent or traditional role in Cree culture; it did not even exist prior to 
the negotiation.  
 Ultimately, the “Grand Council of the Crees of Quebec” agreed to accept $135 million as 
compensation for use of “their” land; additionally, an annual stipend was allotted to pay Cree 
hunters who were unable to subsist on the land anymore; and finally, funds were committed to 
assist any village that needed to relocate in the event of flooding (Churchill 2002: 300).37 
However, the indigenous northern Cree still living in the James Bay region objected to the 
agreement, “not wanting to relinquish aboriginal rights to their homeland and, for the first time, 
accept ultimate federal and provincial authority over their affairs” (Churchill 2002: 301). 
 Despite indigenous protests as soon as the agreement was reached construction resumed 
post haste and by 1979 the La Grande River (third largest in Quebec) and two of its smaller 
tributaries, the Eastmain and Caniapiscau had been dammed, “transformed from free-flowing 
                                                        
37 For instance, the agreement included a provision that if families were prevented from safely 
crossing the river because the dam prevented it from freezing over, then they would be flown by 
helicopter to their ancestral hunting grounds (Olsson, Folke, and Berkes 2004: 82).  
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currents into a series of stagnant lakes and ponds incapable of supporting most life forms 
(Churchill 2002: 301). The environmental toll caused by damming the La Grande was immense, 
in total an estimated 12,000 square kilometers of forestland was inundated, resulting in the loss 
of 83,000 linear kilometers of shoreline (Churchill 2002: 305). "The rims of [the La Grande] 
reservoirs do not, and cannot, replace any of the lost wetland habitat; they are broad, lifeless 
banks of mud, rock and dead trees" (McCutcheon 1991: 98).  
 The mammals (beaver, muskrat, snowshoe hare, mink and otter) that the Cree hunted as a 
source of food and fur either migrated or died (Churchill 2002: 305). Fish stock plummeted after 
the loss of their spawning ground and migratory birds stopped returning to the area as their 
routes and target destinations disappeared (Churchill 2002: 305).38 All of these ecological 
changes proved devastating to the Cree’s traditionally broad-spectrum39 means of subsistence, 
which in turn led to rapid social deterioration: 
  As traditional life has quickly disintegrated along the La Grande, social decay has come 
 to be manifested in spiraling rates of alcoholism, glue sniffing among young people and 
 other forms of substance abuse. Concomitantly, domestic  violence, child abandonment 
 and suicide, all of them virtually unheard of among  the Cree until recently, have made 
                                                        
38 The loss of fish stock was particularly devastating in that the Cree had proven adept at 
sustainably harvesting the resource, “some years [their catch] exceeded the entire Quebec 
commercial catch and outperformed other major Canadian subarctic fisheries on a catch per unit 
effort basis” (Olsson, Folke, and Berkes 2004: 81). 
39 Broad-spectrum indicates a lifestyle dependent on using a wide variety of animal, plant, 
mineral, and aquatic resources to avoid overburdening any one source of subsistence, e.g., Kim 
Sternly defines the ‘broad-spectrum revolution’ as “the extension of the human ecological base 
to birds, fish, and grain” (Sterelny 2011: 811). A benefit of broad-spectrum subsistence practices 
stems from the reality that maintaining the ability to pursue alternative resources, aids human 
communities in the struggle to survive and flourish. Since, if a community relies overwhelming 
on a particular resource and environmental conditions change in a way that diminishes access to 
that resource, then the community will be severely resource deprived, in comparison to a 
community that can draw upon a vast array of resources to meet their subsistence needs. As 
Bruce Waller explains: “The natural world is exactly the place for an autonomy of alternative 
possibilities. Our ‘survival strategy’ has shaped us, like our mammalian relative the white-footed 
mouse, to keep our options open. We might have evolved like the insects, with rigidly 
programmed behavioral patterns. Our evolutionary process took a different tack: we are 
‘programmed’ to favor a variety of paths and to maintain such possibilities even when one path 
is the most immediately beneficial” (Waller 1998: 9-10). 
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 their ugly appearances. (Churchill 2002: 306)  
 
 Uncontrovertibly, damming the La Grande resulted in ecocide; but additionally, it seems 
indisputable that damming the La Grande was directly responsible for stripping the Cree of their 
vital interests, i.e., the Cree lost control of their homeland, their means of subsistence, their 
ancestral traditions, and meaning in their lives. As native activist Terrance Nelson informed 
Ward Churchill, “it's one thing to say they should find meaning in their lives by struggling to 
reclaim their homelands and traditions…but how are they supposed to do that when the 
homeland itself is under eighty meters of water” (Churchill 2002: 319).  
 While it is clear that the environmental harm caused social death; the stress, anxiety, and 
fear accompanying the loss of their traditional way of life without any viable replacement caused 
physical death as well, e.g., Devastation of the Cree: Final Report documents that suicide rates 
of native teens were eleven times higher than whites (1986: 97). Ultimately, as the habitat died 
so did the indigenous Cree and their way of life.    
 It appears the James Bay I project represents a clear example of ecocide that satisfies the 
four criteria: (1) La Grande dam complex was constructed intentionally under the socially 
beneficial guise of development; (2) without the consent of the local Cree; (3) yet, the developers 
harbored no ill intent towards the Cree (in fact those responsible agreed to compensate and assist 
the impacted communities); (4) nevertheless, the project was responsible for stripping the Cree 
of control of their vital interests. With these elements met, the James Bay I project is a clear 
instance of ecocide caused by damming, which fits the Transitional Justice framework. In 
subsequent sections, we will explore what reparatory and reconciliatory measures the Cree ought 
to be afforded, but for now the aim is to move on and provide additional examples of ecocide 
that satisfy the four elements.  
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B. Nuclear Weapons Testing   
 
  Every phase of nuclear weapons production from mining uranium, to developing and 
testing the weapons, to storing spent nuclear fuel involves the potential for ecocide. The fallout 
from nuclear contamination can last thousands of years40 creating “sacrifice zones” that are 
permanently ecologically impaired and foreclosed from productive use. 
 But for our purposes the testing phase appears most suited to satisfy the four elements for 
situating ecocide within the Transitional Justice framework. For one, the environmental harm 
caused in the testing phase is intentional, i.e., increasing national security by ascertaining the 
weapon’s capacity for environmental destruction is precisely the objective of the test. Whereas, 
the environmental destruction that occurs during the mining, building, or storage phase(s) is most 
likely an unintended, inadvertent, and unbeneficial consequence of working with radioactive 
material.       
 Secondly, nuclear testing has often been conducted without the consent of the impacted 
group(s) (Ruff 2015). Already at the Dawn of the Atomic Age (July 16th 1945) the detrimental 
short and long-term health and environmental effects of nuclear explosions were partially 
recognized, thus testing occurred in sparsely populated areas within the state’s contiguous 
borders or more commonly it was exported to isolated colonial territories (Ruff 2015: 777-
778).41 The decision regarding where to locate nuclear test sites clearly expresses government’s 
                                                        
40 Per the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty 
Organization, the half-life of Plutonium is 24,000 years and contact with even a miniscule 
quantity is a serious health hazard and can cause lung, bone, and liver cancer (2012).     
41 For example as Ruff explains, “the total explosive yield of US nuclear test explosions in 
Pacific locations – Bikini and Enewetak Atolls in the Marshall Islands, Johnston Atoll in the 
central Pacific, and Kiritimati (Christmas Island, lent for the purpose by the British) – at 152.8 
megatons (Mt), dwarfs the 1.05 Mt yield of atmospheric tests conducted in the continental US at 
the Nevada Test Site” (Ruff 2015: 777).  
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marked unwillingness to risk harming their majority population; consequently, the ills of nuclear 
fallout have been disproportionately distributed to marginalized minority groups (Ruff 2015: 
777-778).42 
 Obviously, the easiest way to ensure the land was available for testing was to exclude the 
marginalized indigenous inhabitants from the decision-making process. As such, the impacted 
communities seldom consented to the nuclear trials and were often unaware of the dangers the 
tests posed (Ruff 2015).    
 Nevertheless, the tests were not motivated by genocidal intent, e.g., of the over 2,000 
nuclear explosions only at Hiroshima and Nagasaki were the bombs used as weapons of mass 
destruction. In all other instances, the detonations occurred with the supposed beneficial aim of 
researching and developing weapons, i.e., making them more destructive, more compact, more 
deliverable, understanding their impact, and strategizing their use (Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute 2014). 
 While it might be true that one of the goals of nuclear testing was to study the impacts of 
radioactive exposure on humans, there is no evidence that the objective was the social death of 
the affected group, i.e., the harms were not committed with genocidal intent, but instead as a 
means of collecting data on the effect of nuclear explosions on human bodies and their habitat. 
As a British intelligence report states, “the Army must discover the detailed effects of various 
types of [nuclear] explosions on equipment, stores and men, with and without various types of 
protection” (Tubanavua-Salabula et al 1999: 15).  
                                                        
42 The US conducted tests at the Nevada Test Site on land of the Shoshone people; Soviets 
conducted tests in the remote Arctic archipelago of Novaya Zemlya, home to the Nenetz people; 
Chinese conducted tests at Lop Nur (in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region) home to the 
Uygur minority; France conducted tests in the deserts of Algeria, until the independence 
movement forced them to relocate tests to French Polynesia, home to the Maohi people, etc. 
(Ruff 2015: 777-778).   
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 Therefore, any group-level injuries that emerged were inadvertent consequences of the 
state’s often reckless disregard for these peoples’ wellbeing, but not overtly orchestrated 
attempts to cause their social death. In fact, after the tests, accountable nations responsible for the 
tests occasionally endeavored to provide care and compensation to the victims (Ruff 2015). 
 However, the above comments do not mean to imply that nuclear testing never 
undermined the vital interests of affected communities because undoubtedly in many instances it 
did. Thus, in the hopes of illustrating how and why nuclear testing may result in inadvertent 
social death, we will examine the impact of the British Maralinga nuclear testing range on the 
Anangu people.  
 According to the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban 
Treaty Organization, between 1955 and 1963 the British military conducted twelve atmospheric 
nuclear explosions at Maralinga in South Australia (2012). Prior to the tests the Anangu people 
had inhabited the land for thousands of years.43 The Anangu were a semi-nomadic hunter-
gatherer society, whose lifestyle was deeply dependent and connected with the local 
environment. As Yvonne Edwards (an Anangu survivor of Maralinga) states in her book 
Maralinga’s Long Shadow: 
 Before Maralinga the Anangu people cared for their country for generation after 
 countless generation. Their land was their being, their spirit, their life.  They knew no 
 other. They wanted no other. They loved its rockholes and red sands, its creatures great 
 and small, its trees, its bushes, its flowers, its fruits. Above all they cared for its kapi, its 
 water, its precious water, and used it wisely, walking many miles from one rockhole to 
 another, always seeking permission from Wanampi, the Rainbow Serpent, who guarded 
 each one, before they took the living water. (Mattingley and Edwards 2016: 1) 
 
 Prior to the tests the Australian government revoked the Anangu’s aboriginal reserve of 
Ooldea and forced the Anangu to relocate hundreds of miles south of their traditional range to 
                                                        
43 Archaeological evidence estimates that indigenous peoples have lived sustainably on the land 
for at least 45,000 years; and as, such Aboriginal people of Australia are one of the oldest 
documented continuous cultures on the planet (Clarkson et al 2017). 
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the Yalata aboriginal reserve (Mcpherson 2009). Yvonne Edwards, an Anangu artist and 
survivor, remembers the forced removal as, “a turbulent day of deep distress. They wept and 
wailed, and over 60 years on they still wail at the memory of the betrayal, and how they were 
forced to leave. Walking, or on the train. Or on trucks taking them from the home and heartland, 
which many would never see again” (Edwards and Mattingley 2016: 23). 
 However, since the Anangu are nomadic many of them continued to travel through their 
ancestral homeland unaware that the tests were occurring or of the risk of exposure to radioactive 
fallout (Mcpherson 2009). The Royal Commission issued a damning report denouncing the, 
“ignorance, incompetence, and cynicism” of the accountable authorities’ treatment of the 
Anangu for failing to recognize, “their special vulnerability to radioactive fallout” (1985, 194). 
One obvious mistake Ruff mentions, “[is that] warning signs in English were usually 
incomprehensible to the Aborigines” (Ruff 2015: 783). Also, the fact that, “a sole patrol officer, 
joined after 4 years by a second officer, was given the task of finding and warning all Indigenous 
people in an 80,000 square Kilometer area” is clearly evidence of the government’s rampant 
disregard for the Anangu’s wellbeing (Noonan 2016: 2).  
 Unfortunately, the trials and tribulations facing indigenous peoples that did comply with 
the order to remain off the land were often equally tragic: 
 For example, we were told of how Australian servicemen in the area instructed an 
 Indigenous nomadic family to remain on the road and not to go into the bush to hunt 
 because of poison. They had become so terrified of the ‘poison’ that they obeyed 
 instructions implicitly and 4 of the family of 6 eventually died of starvation. (Noonan 
 2016: 3)  
 
Furthermore, the reserves that the Anangu were relocated to were hotbeds of violence and 
alcohol and drug abuse.44 As Yvonne Edwards describes, “Anangu began to turn to drugs [petrol 
                                                        
44 “By 1978 the number of deaths each year at Yalata was higher than births, and the birth rate 
continued to drop while the death rate rose. In the decade between 1972 and 1982, 29 deaths 
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sniffing] and alcohol to blunt their pain, their loss, their longing, to blot out their grief at losing 
their homelands” (Mattingley and Edwards 2016: 96).  
 Tragically, the Anangu’s desire to return home prompted further suffering. In 1974 the 
Yalata Community Council was granted salvage rights at Maralinga and homesick Anangu 
jumped at the opportunity to return to their ancestral land (Mattingley and Edwards 2016: 77). 
Unfortunately, according to the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test 
Ban Treaty Organization, the initial cleanup at Maralinga was inadequate, “[involving] merely 
burying various radioactive debris, including plutonium, in pits which were covered with 
concrete” (2012). And to make matters worse, the returning Anangu were not given any warning 
of the potential dangers. Yvonne Edwards recounts wandering around barefoot through the test 
site: 
We followed bitumen road to place where bomb went off and we were all standing there 
looking – a BIG hole with a big fence around it and NO TREES FOR MILES, no green 
leaves, JUST DEAD TREES, lots of dead animals. No kangaroos…Nobody told us we 
should wear shoes. We went to have a look. We thought it was safe. But it wasn’t. We 
went back to village, told whitefellas. They said, ‘You shouldn’t have been there’ But 
nobody told us. (Mattingley and Edwards 2016: 84) 
 
 Consequently, the Anangu’s dream of reestablishing their traditional way of life in their 
ancestral home of Maralinga had become impossible, “nobody would like to live there now. The 
damage that’s been done – you can’t fix that. It’s not good to live there any more” (Mattingley 
and Edwards 2016: 198). Part of the problem was that the environmental degradation impeded 
the Anangu’s ability to subsist on the land. For instance, Yvonne Edwards recounts a journey to 
an area of Maralinga that once had abundant resources, but after the explosions now lay barren, 
“all the ladies go [there] for maku (witchetty grubs), digging them out of the ground. Walk, get 
lots, plenty there. Good soft sand for cooking maku. We were going every road, lots of roads 
                                                        
were alcohol-related, almost a third of all in the community. Between 1986 and 1991, 15 people 
died in alcohol-related road accidents” (Edwards and Mattingley 2016: 97).  
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there and we followed every road. But no trees anywhere. No grass. No maku. All dead” 
(Edwards and Mattingley 2016: 81).  
 Somberly, a further horror peculiar to radiation exposure is the ever-present anxiety of 
future illness, i.e., nuclear survivors have described themselves as feeling like ticking time 
bombs waiting for cancer and genetic mutation to strike both on a personal and intergenerational 
level. As the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty 
Organization describes: 
 Concern about transmitting genetic mutations to one’s children can all have profound and 
 long-term direct and indirect physical and mental health consequences. Especially among 
 the indigenous and traditional communities  disproportionately impacted, these effects 
 are not only individual and family, but extend to kin, communities and peoples. (2012) 
 
 But, beyond the devastating health (both mental and physical) and environmental 
consequences of nuclear testing, many affected communities are left with lingering social, 
cultural, and economic costs, e.g., the Anangu lost forever their land, means of subsistence, and 
connection to their ancestral traditions. As such, it seems uncontroversial that nuclear testing at 
Maralinga resulted in ecocide that stripped the Anangu of many of their most vital interests. 
 Thus, it appears the Maralinga nuclear tests represents a vivid example of ecocide that 
satisfies the four criteria: (1) the atomic weapons were detonated intentionally to destroy the 
environment in the hopes of further understanding, researching, and developing the device for 
the sake of national security; (2) without the consent of the local Anangu people; (3) yet, the 
British government harbored no ill will towards the Anangu (in fact those responsible agreed to 
compensate and assist the impacted communities);45 (4) nevertheless, the tests were responsible 
for stripping the Anangu of control of their vital interests. 
                                                        
45 In 1991/92 the government made a payment of $618,000 to the Anangu living around 
Maralinga for land contamination (Korff 2017). In 1995 the Anangu received $13.5 million 
dollars for the loss of their lands and as compensation for the contamination from the British 
government and additional $6 million was paid to assist in maintaining their current community 
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 The Maralinga nuclear explosions are clear instances of ecocide able to fit the 
Transitional Justice framework. Thus, in subsequent sections, we will explore what reparatory 
and reconciliatory measures the Anangu ought to be afforded. But at present we will move on to 
explore a final example of ecocide that satisfies the four elements.  
 
C. Mountaintop Removal Mining  
 
 Global supply-chains and patterns of mass production and consumption, i.e., the drivers 
of the modern world, depend on large-scale extractive activities, e.g., the procurement of raw 
materials far exceeding the subsistence needs of the local population. A troubling indictment of 
modernity is that these activities (e.g., logging, fracking, underground mining, strip-mining, 
trawler fishing, oil drilling, etc.) provide numerous examples that fit our criteria; but in an 
attempt to focus our analysis the work will explore mountaintop removal mining as 
representative of the class. 
  Mountaintop removal (or extreme strip-mining) is a form of open-pit mining that 
exposes ore and minerals (mostly coal) by removing the land above (“overburden”) to reveal 
desired seam(s). The process involves dramatic topographical alteration of the landscape, i.e., 
decapitating the mountain, hill or ridge to access desired resource(s) and filling in adjacent 
valley(s) with the excess rock and soil (“holler/valley fills”) (Burns 2007).46 Thus, mountaintop 
removal mining presents an exceptionally vivid case of environmental alteration in that the 
                                                        
of Tjuntjuntjura (Korff 2017). But yet only five of the survivors have been paid a total of 
$200,000 in compensation for their personal injuries (Korff 2017).  
46 As Shirley Burns explains, because ore and minerals usually exist in multiple stratified layers, 
the blast process can be repeated on numerous seams upon a single mountain, which increases 
the mine depth each time and often result in a vertical descent hundreds of feet into the earth 
below where the mountain once stood (Burns 2007).   
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process in days can undo millions of years of geological activity. 
 Furthermore, mountaintop removal mining projects intentionally degrade the 
environment in an escalating chronological sequence: (1) local animals are exterminated or 
relocated; (2) the land is deforested and defoliated; (3) topsoil is scraped off;47 (4) explosives are 
used to dislodge unwanted strata of overburden, and (5) the overburden is deposited in adjacent 
valley(s) (Burns 2007). Additionally, projects often cause unintended environmental harm(s) 
beyond the procedurally necessary phases mentioned above, e.g., structures containing “mine 
tailings” and “slurry” (hazardous material and waste that is left over from the extraction process) 
can leak, rupture, or burst contaminating rivers and ground water;48 avalanches, landslides, and 
mud/debris flows are occasionally triggered by the artificial seismic vibration of explosions and 
the destabilization of the mountain face;49 forest, brush, and coal seam fires may occur when 
exposed coal is struck by lightning or comes in contact with fire during mining operations;50 and 
invariably, windblown dust particles and other loosened debris settle in, disturb, and pollute local 
habitats for scores of miles.  
 Resident populations seduced by the allure of economic development, job opportunities, 
and increased wealth often consent to large-scale resource extraction -including mountaintop 
                                                        
47 In the US per the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act the top soil is supposed to be 
set aside for later reclamation (Burns 2007). However, as Burns documents this requirement is 
shirked as waivers are often provided (Burns 2007). 
48 For example, in 2015 two dams containing mine tailings from the Samarco iron ore mine burst 
killing seventeen; destroying the town of Bento Rodrigues; spreading hazardous slurry over 410 
miles and polluting the Rio Doce (Brazil’s fifth largest watershed) (BBC 2015: 12/22/2015).    
49 For example, in 2013 a landslide killed 83 miners working on the Gyama copper, gold, and 
molybdenum mining project in Tibet (Wong 2013). 
50 For example, the once thriving mining town of Centralia, Pennsylvania had to be abandoned 
when a mine caught fire in 1962 and is expected to continue burning for another 250 years 
(O'Carroll, 2010). Kevin Krajick reveals the extent of the problem, “across the globe, thousands 
of coal fires are burning. Nearly impossible to reach and extinguish once they get started, the 
underground blazes threaten towns and roads, poison the air and soil and, some say, worsen 
global warming. The menace is growing: mines open coal beds to oxygen; human-induced fires 
or spontaneous combustion provides the spark” (Krajick 2005) 
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removal mining. In subsequent chapters, while discussing the topic of responsibility the 
dissertation will investigate such cases, but for now the focus remains on instances where an 
affected population did not consent. In terms of our analysis, El Cerrejon mining project in the 
La Guajira region of Colombia offers a vivid and useful example in that two distinct cultural 
groups (the indigenous Wayúu and Afro-Colombian villages) never consented to the operation 
and their vital interests have been gravely undermined. 
 El Cerrejon mining is the largest mining project in Latin America (Boader 2013: 52). It 
consists of seven open-pit mines extending over 270 squares miles centered around Cerrejon 
Mountain in the foothills of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta and Serrania del Perija mountain 
ranges in the Guajira Peninsula of Northeast Colombia (Kline 1987: 49). Excavation of Cerrejon 
Mountain began in 1985 as a joint venture between Carbocol (a Colombian state company) and 
Intercor (a subsidiary of ExxonMobil) (Redner 2014: 54).51 The scale of the project is immense, 
i.e., according to Cerrejon Mining’s internal report from 2012; the mine has produced 509 
million tons of coal since opening (accounting for almost 5% of its global coal sales).52 But 
numerous Wayúu and Afro-Colombian residents of the region have not benefited from the 
increased economic productivity.53   
 The Wayúu are an indigenous group that has populated the Guajira Peninsula for at least 
                                                        
51 Subsequently, in 2000 the operation was fully privatized and as of 2006 has been jointly 
owned in equal share by BHP Billiton, Glencore, and Anglo American (Redner 2014: 54). 
52 Furthermore, the mine employs over 5,000 people and in 2011 it accounted for over 40% of 
Colombia’s total export revenue (Redner 2014: 57).  
53 Sadly, this is often true regarding mining in Colombia as a lack of regulation and 
accountability regularly results in widespread environmental destruction, community 
displacement, and human rights abuses. James Rochlin citing a report from the Colombian 
Government Accountability Office documents, “that over 80% of the country’s human rights 
violations occur in regions where the extractive sector is located. More particularly, extractive 
regions of the country hosted 87% of the country’s forced displacement, 78% of attacks against 
union members, 89% of human rights violations of the Indigenous, and 90% of human rights 
violations against blacks” (Rochlin 2015: 743).  
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500 years (Zapach 1997: 1). They were the pre-Columbian inhabitants of the region and never 
assimilated during Spanish colonial rule or after Colombian independence (Zapach 1997: 2). The 
Wayúu were able to maintain their traditional way of life in part because of the inhospitality of 
the terrain and the widespread belief that it held scarce economic value. As Marla Zapach 
recounts after her anthropological exploration of the region:  
 The ground is baked hard by the unyielding sun and winds that buffet the  peninsula, and 
 there is little water to alleviate the incredible heat of the desert. The ground covering is 
 almost nonexistent, the majority of vegetation being cactus or spiny bushes; and few trees 
 exist under which to find shade. The land is suitable for only the most hardy of people 
 and animals. (Zapach 1997: 1) 
 
 Thus, despite the fact that the Wayúu are the largest indigenous group in Colombia 
(numbering about 500,000 and occupying over a quarter of the national territory) they received 
minimal state interest prior to the advent of El Cerrejon (Boeder 2013: 55).  
 Historically, the Wayúu relied on natural or man-made dugouts to catch rainfall and 
facilitate ground water percolation as a means of subsisting in their exceedingly arid habitat 
(Zapach 1997: 15). Nevertheless, recurring droughts forced the Wayúu to embrace a nomadic 
lifestyle requiring, “constant movement…throughout the peninsula [to] prevent the sole 
dependence on one water source and ensure better use of available resources by utilizing all 
areas of the peninsula” (Zapach 1997: 15-16).  
 Prior to Spanish contact (1499) the Wayúu practiced a broad-spectrum subsistence-
lifestyle based on fishing along the coast, hunting, e.g., deer, rabbit, fox, turtles, iguanas, 
armadillos, turtles, and birds, gathering, and limited agriculture (consisting of mostly corn and 
yucca) (Zapach 1997: 18 and 26).  Interestingly, the Wayúu opted to modify their lifestyle and 
embrace nomadic pastoralism after the introduction of European domesticated herd animals 
(primarily shepherding goats and sheep because the region was too arid for horse or cattle 
rearing) despite the fact that they were never conquered, colonized, or assimilated into the 
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dominant culture (Zapach 1997: 22-23). Consequently, nomadic pastoralism remained the 
Wayúu’s principal mode of subsistence until mining at El Cerrejon began to disturb the region’s 
ecosystem. 
 Obviously, surviving in such an unforgiving habitat is difficult and any disruption or 
added adversity poses a dire threat. But the Colombian government and multinational 
corporations failed to adequately consider the impact of El Cerrejon on the Wayúu’s way of life. 
 In 1973 the Colombian government without assessing indigenous claims to the land, 
offering compensation for loss, or even discussing the matter with the Wayúu declared the El 
Cerrejon region a reserva especial, reserving the national government’s right to use (“mine”) the 
land (Rivera 1986). Furthermore, it was only after the arrival of international mining companies 
that a Social Impact Assessment aimed at understanding and reducing the harm of the project on 
the indigenous, mestizo, and Afro-Colombian communities of the region was undertaken (Kline 
1982). Shockingly, the report contained little mention of the Wayúu or the impact the mine 
would have on their way of life, despite the fact that they accounted for 40% of the peninsula’s 
population (Kline 1982: 34-37).  
 As Zapach citing Rivera explains one reason the Wayúu are virtually absent in the Social 
Impact Assessment is that due to their nomadic lifestyle they never permanently inhabited the 
region under investigation, “it appears that they occupied them only during times of drought” 
(Zapach 1997: 57 and Rivera 1986: 116-117). Sadly, yet predictably, the Social Impact 
Assessment failed to consider a pressing issue that during droughts bands of Wayúu dependent 
on the water and grazing land or on surrounding Cerrejon Mountain would be left with nowhere 
to turn.54  
                                                        
54 As Zapach emphasizes, “access to land is essential for Wayúu survival…flexible 
migration…is now impossible…they cannot return to the fertile area in the north, due to a 
vicious blood feud that exists to this day between clans. Therefore, they are doubly stigmatized, 
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 Problematically, when such conditions occurred, the affected Wayúu had no available 
recourse but to enter resguardos (government supported reservations) and give up their 
traditional nomadic lifestyle. “In order to literally survive and stop the onslaught of threats, they 
must choose to abandon their animals and the only lives they have known as self-sufficient 
pastoralists” (Boeder 2013: 57). As Zapach articulates, these decisions (made under duress) have 
greatly undermined Wayúu autonomy and destroyed their way of life:  
 A group once so fiercely independent and solitary is now relegated to resguardos where 
 there is insufficient land to provide for them and their families. Their lives revolve 
 around the land: and to feed oneself and one's family, one must have land on which to 
 sow and to graze one's animals. To participate in the cultural activities that mark one as 
 Wayúu, such as prestige exchanges, large families, many goats, and participation within 
 bridewealth and funeral exchanges, one must have land as the basis to provide for all of 
 this. (Zapach 1997: 55)  
 
 Thus, the environmental destruction caused by the El Cerrejon mining project is creating 
a situation in which the Wayúu, a proud and fiercely independent people that resisted conquest, 
colonization, and assimilation for hundreds of years, are increasingly reduced to a life of 
dependence, i.e., forced to rely on state assistance for survival or absorption into the dominant 
culture. But the Wayúu are not the only group affected by mining Cerrejon Mountain; the Afro-
Colombian communities inhabiting the region have been impacted as well.   
 Tabaco (formally the largest village in the El Cerrejon region) was settled hundreds of 
years ago by escaped Afro-Colombian slaves, mestizo peasants, and natives fleeing encomienda 
(the exploitative colonial system of forced labor imposed on conquered communities throughout 
the Spanish Empire) (Chomsky and Forster 2006). The community was self-sufficient and 
subsisted by growing fruits and vegetable and raising goats and chickens (Boeder 2013: 54). At 
the time of excavation Tabaco had developed into a village with running water, electricity, a 
school, police department, health center, and a population of over 700 inhabitants (Boeder 2013: 
                                                        
as they cannot return home, nor can they survive on the land granted (Zapach 1997: 55). 
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54).   
 But Tabaco sat on lucrative coal seams that the El Cerrejon conglomerate wanted to 
access. Thus, in the early 1990s representatives of the company bid to buyout villager’s land 
titles; promising that, “they would still be able to farm it or the company would reward them 
with new houses in town, job training, and higher incomes” (Boeder 2013: 54-55). Moreover, 
community activists explain that the company simply, “informed communities of their plans and 
never warned them about mining’s negative consequences” (Redner 2014: 54). As Jose Julio, a 
former resident of Tabaco explains, “a lot of people sold, because it seemed like a gift. Even 
though the price they paid was laughably low, it was like getting something for nothing” 
(Chomsky and Forster 2006). Consequently, by 2001 around 600 of the residents had 
relinquished title to the company, but over 100 still remained and refused to leave their homes, 
“[since] as farmers, they knew that if they lost their land, they would also lose their source of 
food, their history, their cultural identity, and their shared traditions” (Boeder 2013: 55).  
 Nevertheless, to quell the resistance the Ministry of Mines and Energy declared the 
region a mining reserve (authorizing an area speciously affirmed uninhabited and zoned for 
mining) despite the fact that the area was clearly populated (Boeder 2013: 55). The community 
protested the ruling and filed suit; but on August 9, 2001, a judge sided with the company 
ordering the area to be cleared and vacated. “Within hours, employees of Cerrejón, 500 soldiers, 
and 200 policemen invaded the church, forcibly evicted everyone, and bulldozed every home 
flat” (Boeder 2013: 55). 
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 A problem for our analysis is that under both Colombian55 and international law56 the 
treatment of the Tabaco villagers constitutes an indigenous rights violation. Nevertheless, to 
avoid the direct connection to indisputable indigenous rights violation(s) we could likewise 
consider smaller Afro-Colombian villages (e.g., Tamaquito, Roche, Chancleta, and Patilla) 
similarly suffering from the environmental harms (e.g., water pollution, air is laced with toxic 
dust, illness, crop failure, etc.) caused by mining Cerrejon Mountain that have (as of yet at the 
time of writing) not been forcefully evicted (Chomsky and Forster 2006). As Eder Arregoces an 
inhabitant of Chancleta (a tiny village in the area) laments:   
 What a paradox: We are surrounded by the world’s largest coal mine, and we don’t have 
 enough to eat! Most of the families here can only eat one meal a day, all because we 
 don’t have land. There is outrageous exploitation that fails to see that there are human 
 beings living here, there are black and indigenous communities. The environmental 
 situation is worse than critical. (Chomsky and Forster 2006) 
 
 Due to myriad environmental harms stemming from the mining of Cerrejon Mountain, 
these local communities have been devastated by ecocide, precipitating the dissolution of their 
traditional cultures through depletion of their means of subsistence, undermining their overall 
wellbeing.  Both Wayúu and Afro-Colombian villagers have suffered polluted water, inhalation 
of hazardous dust, malnutrition, diseases, resource scarcity, and loss of land due to the impact of 
the mine. Furthermore, both groups have had little opportunity to consent or participate in the 
decision-making processes pushing them closer to cultural and physical extinction.  
 Thus, it appears mountaintop removal mining of Cerrejon Mountain represents a vivid 
                                                        
55 Colombia ratified International Labor Organization Convention 169 into the Colombian 
Constitution in 1991, which affirms the rights of Indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities 
to consultation regarding proposed changes to their territories and traditions (Boeder 2013: 55).   
56 Colombia endorsed the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 
2009, which protects indigenous peoples’ right to give and withhold free, prior, and informed 
consent for development projects and Colombian Constitutional Court ruling have supported, 
“[t]he abstract general interest and majority vision of development cannot be imposed when such 
projects are developed in indigenous peoples’ territories” (Redner 2014: 54).   
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example of ecocide caused by large scale-extractive activities that satisfy the four criterion: (1) 
the mountain was cleared and leveled intentionally for the economic benefit of the nation 
(politically and commercially) as well as for corporate profits ; (2) without the consent of the 
local Wayúu or Afro-Colombian people; (3) yet, the government or multinational corporations 
harbored no ill will towards the groups (in fact those responsible to some extent compensated or 
attempted to assist the impacted communities); (4) nevertheless, the project was responsible for 
stripping both Wayúu and Afro-Colombian communities of control of their vital interests. 
 
III. Idealized Description of Cases of Ecocide 
 
 With the case studies completed, the goal of the remainder of the chapter will be to 
further justify integrating ecocide within the Transitional Justice framework by linking the 
harm(s) illustrated with examples of typical conceptions of oppression (e.g., Young 1990 and 
Cudd 2006). To achieve this, it will be helpful to create a descriptive model of generalized terms 
that captures the crucial elements of the aforementioned narratives. Mills defends such an 
approach, emphasizing the importance of abstracting away non-salient situational features during 
effective normative theorizing:  
 What one wants are abstractions of the ideal-as-descriptive-model kind that capture the 
 essentials of the situation of women and nonwhites, not abstract away from them. Global 
 concepts like patriarchy and white supremacy arguably fulfill this role…These terms are 
 abstractions that do reflect the specificities of group  experience, thereby potentially 
 generating categories and principles that illuminate rather than obfuscate the reality of 
 different kinds of subordination. (Mills 2005: 173)  
 
 Prudently, stripping away examples of normatively irrelevant detail(s) and producing a 
schematic depiction of what Mills calls an “ideal-as-descriptive model” affords further clarity in 
our attempt to consider and apply these contingent narratives to specific theories of oppression. 
Thus, what are the essential and generalizable features of the above examples?  
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A. Autarkic Communities vs. Roving Imperialists  
 
 All of the examples revolve around outside actors intentionally destroying the ecological 
basis of local subsistence. Accordingly, each narrative begins with two distinct groups (1) a 
highly localized population maintaining a self-sufficient lifestyle requiring deep epistemic 
connection to their environment and (2) an outsider population comfortable with their “right” to 
deplete and destroy a local habitat for their benefit.57 Ramachandra Guha and Joan Martinez-
Alier offer an insightful dichotomy discerning key distinctions between the two groups; dubbing 
(1) “‘Ecosystem peoples’ – that is, those communities which depend very heavily on the natural 
resources of their own locality and [2] ‘omnivores’, individuals and groups with the social power 
to capture, transform, and use natural resources from a much wider catchment area; sometimes 
indeed the whole world” (Guha and Martinez-Alier 1997: 12).58 
 In an effort to borrow from and constructively build upon Guha and Martinez-Alier’s 
classification, the work will employ the terms roving59 imperialists60 (for ‘omnivores’) and 
                                                        
57 These differences in geo-socio-ecological relations provide ample criteria to carve out distinct 
social groups. Since according to Ann Cudd all that is required to constitute a ‘social groups’ is a 
“collection of persons who share something that is socially significant” (Cudd 2006: 41).       
58 Guha and Martinez-Alier apply the taxonomy to India, thusly, “the first category of ecosystem 
people includes the bulk of India’s rural population: small peasants, landless laborers, tribals, 
pastoralists, and artisans. The category of omnivores comprises industrialists, professionals, 
politicians, and government officials – all of whom are based in the towns and cities – as well as 
a small but significant fraction of the rural elite, the prosperous farmers in tracts of heavily 
irrigated, chemically fertilized Green Revolution agriculture” (Guha and Martinez-Alier 1997: 
12).  
59 The use of the term ‘roving’ was inspired by Mancur Olsen and Elinor Ostrom’s iconic 
description of ‘roving bandits’ examined the behavior of, “fishing fleets that target valuable 
marine species in coastal waters, deplete local stocks, and then move on to exploit stocks located 
in other regions” (Ostrom 2007: 15184). 
60 Sachs provides a succinct account of the imperial worldview: “this vision is imperial because 
it claims the right to roam the world unhindered and to go grab whatever it fancies - exactly as if 
there were no places, no communities no nations. The mechanisms of GATT, NAFTA and the 
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autarkic61 communities (for ‘ecosystem peoples’). Per this taxonomy, the major difference 
between the two groups is that roving imperialists predominantly depend on non-local sources of 
subsistence (i.e., interregional or global supply-chains), which consequently decouples 
producer(s) from consumer(s) (i.e., separating beneficiaries from first-hand and daily experience 
of exploited areas); whereas, autarkic communities predominantly depend on engaging with the 
immediate environment for subsistence.62  
 Relying on recent terminology from Glenn Albrecht’s book, Earth Emotions: New Words 
for a New World, we can classify roving imperialists as terraphthoran (Earth destroyers) and 
autarkic communities as terranascian (Earth creators) (Albrecht 2019: 1). According, to his 
psychological analysis of peoples’ emotional orientation to the natural world roving imperialists 
suffer from ecoagnosy, a term created to describe a state of environmental ignorance or 
indifference to ecology (Albrecht 2019: 76).63 Whereas, autarkic communities have a strong 
sense of endemophilia, which he describes as “the particular love of the locally and regionally 
distinctive, manifest in the people of that place. It is what gives a particular sense of belonging, 
an endemic sense of place, as opposed to a global sense of place” (Albrecht 2019: 126).  
Hence, a recurrent cause of ecocide apparent in the case studies is roving imperialists’ 
spatiotemporal separation and removal from direct engagement with their ecosystem(s) for 
                                                        
WTO were born in the spirit of frontier demolition. They codify the world as a freely accessible 
economic arena, in which economics enjoys the right of way” (Sachs 1999: 154).  
61 Simply stated, ‘autarkic’ means a self-sufficient geopolitical entity.  
62 Keep in mind that autarkic peoples are not necessarily native inhabitants (e.g., the Afro-
Colombian villagers of Tabaco). Additionally, the use of the word ‘predominately’ emphasizes 
that the division between these two groups exists on a spectrum, i.e., autarkic peoples may 
maintain limited trade with outside communities and roving imperialists may partially rely on 
their immediate habitat for subsistence purposes.       
63 Ecoagnosy can even metastasize into “ecophobia” (i.e., David Sobel’s term to describe the 
overwhelming fear, at times hatred, of ecology or the biophysical environment) and “biophobia” 
(i.e., Stephen Kellert and Edward Wilson’s term to describe fear of life) (Sober 1996 and Kellert 
and Wilson 1993).  
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subsistence; since as these actors suffer from growing ecoagnosy and become less attuned, 
concerned, comprehending, and impacted by resulting environmental harms, they are more prone 
to commit them.64 Essentially, if actors are not dependent on a place for their survival, then they 
are incentivized to exploit, degrade, and destroy habitat(s); consequently receiving lucrative 
remunerative short-term benefits, while avoiding exacting long-term costs after moving on to the 
next place.65 As Hughes Berkes describes, “roving banditry is different from most commons 
dilemmas in that a new dynamic has arisen in the globalized world: New markets can develop so 
rapidly that the speed of resource exploitation often overwhelms the ability of local institutions 
to respond” (Berkes 2006: 1557).  
Consequently, roving imperialists pose an acute existential threat to autarkic communities 
when their lifestyles come in contact - as witnessed in the prior examples. The reason for this is 
that since autarkic communities are endemophilic and lead a deeply embedded lifestyle within a 
                                                        
64 As Sylvia Federici citing Maria Mies and Veronika Bennholdt-Thomsen’s critique of global 
capitalism eloquently explains: “For the distancing of production from reproduction and 
consumption leads us to ignore the conditions under which what we eat, wear, or work with have 
been produced, their social and environmental cost, and the fate of the population on whom the 
waste we produce is unloaded…In other words, we need to overcome the state of irresponsibility 
concerning the consequences of our actions that results from the destructive ways in which the 
social division of labor is organized in capitalism; short of that, the production of our life 
inevitably becomes a production of death for others. As Mies points out, globalization has 
worsened this crisis, widening the distances between what is produced and what is consumed, 
thereby intensifying, despite the appearance of an increased global interconnectedness, our 
blindness to the blood in the food we eat, the petroleum we use, the clothes we wear, and the 
computers we communicate with” (Federici 2010 and Mies and Bennholdt-Thomsen 1999).  
65 It is important to emphasize the placelessness of these people, i.e., their reliance on 
cosmopolitan lifestyles. Obviously, to be wholly habitatless is impossible because to some extent 
all humans are shaped by their environment. “Inhabitants, therefore cannot decide to change 
community like they change their hat. The community has at least shaped part of their habits and 
if they were to change habitation, or even to acquire new habits, the community that they have 
‘left’ would still be part of them” (Ribo 2012: 67). But the frequency, ease, and readiness with 
which roving imperialists transition from one place to another illustrates their willingness to 
transcend their current state and represents a characteristic quality that defines them.    
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long-inhabited place (“homeland”),66 they are not as readily able to adapt and move on if their 
habitat is harmed or destroyed.67 Hence from a basic subsistence perspective, they are reasonably 
and self-interestedly concerned with mitigating disruption(s) within their natural environment.68  
As such, if widespread breakdown(s) of system(s) of natural relationship(s) occur within 
an autarkic community’s habitat, such event(s) constitute failure(s) of safeguarding their most 
vital objective.69 Consequently, success for autarkic communities is maintaining homeostasis in 
their habitat by preserving the ‘commons’ for all cohabitants of the environment. Accordingly, as 
                                                        
66 Ignasi Ribo describes such people as, “a community of individuals who share a way of being, 
due to the confluence of genetically and socially acquired dispositions, as well as the set of 
strategies, practices, and institutions that allow them to adapt to a given natural environment in a 
sustainable manner, thanks to bonds of autonomy, reciprocity, and friendship” (Ribo 2012: 8). 
67 Albrecht’s concept of solastalgia offers an insightful description of a psychological state that 
members of autarkic communities likely experience after ecocide. He defines solastalgia as “the 
pain or distress caused by the ongoing loss of solace and the sense of desolation connected to the 
present state of one’s home and territory. It is the existential and lived experience of negative 
environmental change, manifest as an attack on one’s sense of place, characteristically a chronic 
condition, tied to the gradual erosion of identity created by the sense of belonging to a particular 
loved place and a feeling of distress, or psychological desolation, about its unwanted 
transformation (Albrecht 2019: 38-39).  
68 Moreover, there is often a cultural and spiritual component as well, i.e., autarkic communities 
generally presume that their habitat holds intrinsic value in-and-of-itself, independent of any 
extrinsic (material) benefits it may bestow upon them. As such, they are grateful to the habitat 
for the life sustaining assistance and services it provides; and thus, feel reciprocally responsible 
for maintaining, protecting, and giving back to the natural environment that created and 
continues to support their way of life. “They concern themselves with (and have based their 
whole world-view on) the idea of learning how to give back to Creation, rather than taking 
away” (McGregor 2004). Autarkic communities often emphasize that they live in a habitat with 
many other cohabitants (people, animals, plants, etc.) and thus, they are part of something bigger 
than themselves, i.e., the natural environment does not exist only for their use. “Humans are, 
before anything else, beings-in-the-world. Not just ‘beings with a world’ or ‘beings within the 
world’, but the constitution itself of being in a concrete, material, and temporal existence. Clearly 
humans are not the only being-in-the-world” (Ribo 2012: 45-46). Consequently, they often care 
deeply about the wellbeing and flourishing of their fellow cohabitants and desire to sustain their 
continued coexistence, and, “may also sustain their natural environment out of a sense of 
friendship, motivated by the intrinsic value of the biological community to which they belong” 
(Ribo 2012: 95). 
69 As Kyle Whyte explains, “indigenous environmentalists go further and claim that institutions 
fail when they undermine the conditions that parties such as humans and non-human entities (for 
example, water) require to carry out the mutual responsibilities they have to one another” (Whyte 
2016: 5). 
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illustrated in each of the examples, the ongoing global environmental crisis brought about by 
roving imperialism’s encroachment on native habitat(s), devastates autarkic communities’ core 
values and way of life.70   
 
B. Ecocide and Socio-Cultural Collapse: Loss of Habitat Learning 
 
Additionally, as witnessed in each of the case studies the breakdown of autarkic 
communities can transpire rapidly with little prior notice. One reason supporting this is that 
achieving long-term self-sufficiency in any local environment necessitates a broad-spectrum 
lifestyle, capable of meeting subsistence needs by utilizing a wide variety of animals, plants, 
minerals, and aquatic resources in order to avoid overburdening any one resource-component of 
the ecological community’s intricate bio-socio-cultural stability.71 Maintaining this sort of 
                                                        
70 It is important to remember that autarkic communities still make up a large portion of human 
societies. As Albrecht reminds us, “about half of the world’s population still lives in a small 
town or rural village and is mainly sustained by its hinterland. These people are already intensely 
local in their survival orientation and will be highly motivated to protect their patch should the 
need arise” (Albrecht 2019: 173). Thus, he believes that the battle lines of the 21st century have 
been drawn and humanity faces, “a war where positive Earth emotions will have to directly 
confront negative Earth emotions. Terraphthorans [roving imperialists] are out to destroy 
themselves and the Earth, while Terranascians [autarkic communities] are out to nurture 
themselves and the Earth” (Albrecht 2019: 177). Accordingly, environmental transformative 
justice is meant to respond to ecocide by assisting those impacted, replacing negative emotions; 
protecting, repairing, and revitalizing habitats, and transitioning ecocidal societies away from 
these sorts of harmful practices as a way of justly waging and winning the war for the forces of 
life.  
71 Conversely, roving imperialists are less concerned with overburdening or depleting a resource, 
since their worldview is tethered to the ‘substitution thesis’ that, “scarcity is not an immutable 
problem because capital maybe substitutable for most physical resources” (Ayres 2008: 284). 
Essentially, roving imperialists accept that if a resource becomes scarce, then technological 
innovation, efficiency gains, and increased capital will facilitate the substitution of one resource 
for another. Consequently, roving imperialists aim to monopolize a particular resource by 
facilitating its commodification as rapidly and efficiently as possible (i.e., disregarding depletion 
concerns because their increased profit will allow them to substitute the resource in the future) 
before another competitor gains access.   
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balanced lifestyle requires extensive knowledge of the systemic relationship between a local 
environment’s parts and whole. To pass on such wide-ranging and detailed knowledge requires 
autarkic communities to practice habitat learning72 whereby members of the group transmit 
knowledge about the local environment to each other.73  
But if roving imperialists disrupt the local environment, there is a chance that some of the 
habitat learning will have become obsolete for the reason that it less accurately reflects the 
current state of the habitat. Hence, as a rule, the greater the environmental disruption, then the 
greater the chance that the information-rich cognitive capital (regarding the habitat) has been 
corrupted and compromised. Consequently, the destruction of the habitat, not only leads to direct 
resource depletion, but also generates more than a few cognitive-costs that diminish the survival 
benefit of habitat learning. 
As such, once the stable functioning of the ecosystem is undermined, it becomes 
increasingly challenging for the autarkic communities to rely on habitat learning to maintain 
self-sufficiency, which represents an unfortunate consequence in each of the case studies. Also, 
troubling, is the tendency of the epistemic loss to carry over and amplify itself in the next 
                                                        
72 Habitat learning as employed in this work is coextensively linked with the concept, 
‘traditional ecological knowledge’ (TEK). Deborah McGregor defines TEK as the relations 
between, “knowledge, people, and all Creation (the ‘natural’ world as well as the spiritual) … [it 
is the] process of participating (a verb) fully and responsibly in such relationships, rather than 
specifically as the knowledge gained from such experiences. For Aboriginal people, TEK is not 
just about understanding relationships; it is the relationship with Creation. TEK is something one 
does” (McGregor 2004: 145). Simply stated, habitat learning is the method of acquiring TEK.   
73 Much of this sort of learning is cross-generational, in that children acquire skills through elder-
guided practice, tutorials, mimicry, lessons, play, and supervised trial and error. Moreover, 
Sterenly astutely emphasizes the importance of the environment itself for facilitating learning, 
“children get[ting] advice, instruction, and other information head starts from others, but they get 
this support while engaged in exploratory learning in their environment” (Sterelny 2012: 28). In 
this light, the environment itself contains an abundance of extended knowledge (i.e., information 
that exists external to the mind) created, captured, and stored by current and deceased members 
of the community engaging with the world around them.  
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generation. Such a result is likely, since henceforward, students will have relatively fewer 
models, both in terms of individual’s correctly performing/teaching habitat learning and 
exposure to a properly functioning ecosystem that is necessary for garnering the ability to 
recognize when the system is in harmony (i.e., knowledge is stored in the ecosystem itself, thus 
if the ecosystem is harmed, then this extended knowledge is corrupted as well).74  
Furthermore, habitat learning is often nontransferable to different ecosystems if autarkic 
communities are forced to abandon their home. Consequently, after ecocide, formerly autarkic 
communities that lose their habitat regularly become dependent on novel modes of subsistence 
for survival and as such are compelled to invest time, energy and resources in acquiring and 
employing nontraditional subsistence techniques. Learning, practicing, and mastering multiple 
modes of survival is a difficult undertaking, which subsequently lessens opportunities for 
traditional habitat learning.  
For all these reasons, if the harm caused by ecocide is not repaired quickly, it may result 
in cultural death, forever foreclosing viable avenues that might foster or maintain former-
autarkic communities’ traditional ways of life.75 Thus, as the examples demonstrate, after 
ecocide autarkic communities rapidly deteriorate and lose control of their vital interests.76 As Jeff 
                                                        
74 Sadly, even if the initial harm did not raise to the level of ecocide (unlike in the examples) the 
loss of richly aware and effective habitat learning increases the likelihood that autarkic 
communities in degraded environments will themselves inadvertently cause further harm and 
potentially total ecological collapse, i.e., there exists a vicious cycle in which inadequate habitat 
learning diminishes the ability to protect and maintain the local habitat, which generates greater 
environmental degradation; which in turn, makes it more difficult to acquire appropriate habitat 
learning – so on and so forth until complete ecocide occurs and the community has lost its way 
of life. 
75 For our purposes the concepts of “social death” and “cultural death” can be used 
interchangeably.  
76 In the case studies and more generally, loss of vital interests refers to the adverse impacts on a 
range of traditional activities, autonomous control of life-choices, socio-psychological well-
being, and institutional and/or individual relations that autarkic communities suffer as a result of 
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Corntassel aptly explains: 
For indigenous peoples, sustainability is intrinsically linked to the transmission of 
 traditional knowledge and cultural practices to future generations Without the ability of 
 community members to continuously renew their relationships with the natural world 
 (i.e., gathering medicines, hunting, fishing, basket-making, etc.), indigenous languages, 
 traditional teachings, family structures, and livelihoods of that community are all 
 jeopardized. (Corntassel 118: 2008) 
At this point in the narrative, once the autarkic communities collapsed and are unable to 
self-sufficiently subsist in their post-ecocide habitats - we have reached the conclusion of the 
case studies. Also, for the sake of conceptual clarity, such a result requires a new category of 
human-ecological relations so as to cover the inhabitants of post-autarkic communities. As such, 
the work will refer to people(s) living in environmentally degraded habitat(s), wherein their local 
ecological systems are unable to sustain traditional lifestyles that are not productively or 
consumptively integrated into the global supply chain(s) – as ecocide refugees.77  
Essentially, the goal of environmental transformative justice is to assist ecocide refugees 
and prevent autarkic communities from deteriorating in the first place - providing guidance for 
achieving these objectives will be a core focus of subsequent chapters. But, to further 
substantiate the need for redress for the victims of our case studies of ecocide it is helpful to 
definitively demonstrate that the resulting harm actually constitutes oppression. Since as Cudd 
states (and likely all political philosophers agree), “oppression claims are themselves prima facie 
                                                        
ecocide. “Such losses can include reductions in fishing, hunting, or trapping activity; losses of 
identity through the curtailment of these activities; reductions in health, which may be linked to 
contamination of traditional foods or adverse emotional and psychological impacts; and negative 
effects on cultural, social, and economic relations that historically were based on these altered 
activities” (Gregory and Trousdale 2009: 2).  
77 The term is comparable to Norman Myers and Jennifer Kent’s description of ‘environmental 
refugees’ as, “persons who no longer gain a secure livelihood in their traditional homelands 
because of what are primarily environmental factors of unusual scope” (Myers and Kent 1995: 
18). The major difference is that in the case of ‘ecocide refugees’ the ‘unusual scope’ is limited 
to intentional human destruction of the ecosystem.   
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moral claims for remedy [i.e., reparations] or redress [i.e., reconciliation]” (Cudd 2006: 129).    
 
IV. Ecocide as Oppression   
 
Oppression is an often-employed socio-political concept that until recently has received 
scarce analysis. As Iris Marion Young states, “while we find the term [oppression] used in the 
diverse philosophical and theoretical literature spawned by radical social movement…we find 
little direct discussion of the meaning of the concept as used by these movements” (Young 1990: 
40). Fortunately, feminist philosophers have begun to thoroughly investigate, explicate, and 
systematize theories of oppression (Frye 1983; Young 1990; Cudd 2006). As such, we will rely 
heavily on this innovative scholarship by attempting to demonstrate that our paradigm cases and 
idealized description of ecocide satisfy the conditions of two of the most canonical analyzes of 
oppression: (1) Cudd’s definition of oppression in Analyzing Oppression (2006) and Young’s 
categorization of oppression in Justice and the Politics of Difference (1990).  
 
A. Ann Cudd’s Definition of Oppression  
 
After an informative historical account canvassing the use of the term “oppression” in 
political philosophy Cudd offers a general description of the wrong designed to capture central 
features of the various usages. Ultimately, she settles on an account of “oppression” with four 
necessary and sufficient conditions: 
1. The harm condition: There is a harm that comes out of an institutional    
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 practice. 
 
2. The social group condition: The harm is perpetrated through a social   
 institution or practice on a social group whose identity exists apart from the  
 oppressive harm in (1). 
 
3. The privilege condition: There is another social group that benefits from the  
 institutional practice in (1). 
 
4. The coercion condition: There is unjustified coercion or force that brings  
 about the harm. (Cudd 25: 2006).  
 
 
    Using Cudd’s schema to prove that instances of ecocide are oppressive requires that the 
act constitutes an institutional practice harmful to the member(s) of some social group (i.e., 
reduces members’ well-being and undermines their interests), that it benefits member(s) of 
another social group (materially or psychologically), and that the harm was undeserved or unfair. 
It is crucial to emphasize that Cudd’s theory of oppression does not require intentional harm, i.e., 
for a practice to be considered oppressive privileged group(s) do not have to necessarily aim at 
harming disadvantaged group(s). “I have argued that we should define oppression by considering 
the harm done to the victim rather than the intention of the oppressor or privileged group who 
cause the harm” (Cudd 2006: 105). This is important because in seminal cases of ecocide under 
consideration the harm to the autarkic community was unintended.  
  Clearly, the idealized account and each of these key cases of ecocide include social 
group(s) that existed prior to the harm (i.e., autarkic communities - Cree, Anangu, Wayúu, and 
Afro-Colombian villagers) that suffered (i.e., loss of vital interests) and social group(s) that 
benefited (i.e., roving imperialists seeking potential benefits: Quebec-Hydro’s additional 
revenue, British citizens’ increased security, El Cerrejon miners’ employment, etc.).78 Obviously, 
                                                        
78 According to Cudd, “social groups” are defined as “collections of persons who share 
something that is socially significant,” such as “collections of individuals who face common 
constraints that are structured by social institutions” (Cudd 2006: 41 and 51). One may object 
that this conceptualization is tautological in that it includes “social” in the definition, but for our 
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the intruder’s act(s) (or institutional practices) prioritized roving imperial benefits over autarkic 
communities’ harms.  
 Nevertheless, were the practice(s) favoring roving imperial interests over autarkic interests 
coercive and unjustified? Unfortunately, in our attempt to answer this question, Cudd offers little 
guidance; since, she eschews defining “coercion” or “injustice” beyond linking her use of the 
concepts to a broadly Rawlsian notion of justice as fairness, in which social benefits and burdens 
ought to be distributed impartially (i.e., practices that violated this fairness requirement are 
unjust and coercive).79 As such, to establish that the coercion condition is met, we must 
determine if roving imperialist’s treatment(s) of autarkic communities was unfair.80  
  Generally, practice(s) and act(s) are considered “fair” in two distinct ways: (1) 
procedurally fair or (2) outcome fair. Procedural fairness focuses on the process (the means) of 
normative decision-making; whereas, outcome fairness refers to whether or not the results (the 
ends) are consistent with prevailing norms of merit, equality, desert, and need (Deutsch 1985).  
 John Thibaut and Laurens Walker’s iconic research uncovered that perception of fairness 
increase, as all parties who are possibly impacted by an act are included in the decision-making 
                                                        
purposes such a criticism is ancillary as we are simply including her definition as a means of 
illustrating how she employs the term.  
79 The dissertation’s Third Chapter will further explore and develop the ways in which Rawls’s 
constructivist theory of “justice as fairness” diagnoses the injustice of ecocide.  
80 Philosophers have struggled defining “fairness” since the term applies to a multitude of 
distinct and often-conflicting concerns oscillating between appeals to need, equality, merit, and 
desert. For instance, Aristotle recognized that there is no universal standard of fairness. Since, as 
he astutely observed determining if an act is fair requires contextualized analysis that embeds the 
act within broader social structure(s), e.g., in a democracy it is fair to distribute political office by 
lottery; whereas, in an oligarchy it is not (Aristotle The Politics: Book V, Chapter 1). As 
Amartya Sen explains, even John Rawls employs a pre-theoretical understanding of the concept. 
“In this [Rawls] approach, the notion of fairness is taken to be foundational, and is meant to be, 
in some sense, ‘prior’ to the development of the principles of justice” (Sen 2009: 53-54). 
Consequently, with these examples in mind, we can begin to grasp some of the difficulties 
involved in defining the term.  
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process (Thibaut and Walker 1975).81 Consequently, procedural fairness revolves around an 
understanding that all stakeholders potentially affected by a decision ought to be afforded the 
opportunity to provide input (i.e., express their voice) and influence the outcome (i.e., 
substantively participate to some degree) of the decision.  
 However, in reviewing the paradigm cases of ecocide, it seems clear that local inhabitants 
were offered neither an opportunity to substantively alter the outcome (i.e., stop the harm from 
occurring or mitigate the impact) nor a voice (i.e., they were excluded (Anangu), absent 
(Wayúu), and ignored (Cree and Afro-Colombian villagers)) during the decision-making process. 
Thus, it seems straightforward that norms of procedural fairness were violated as roving 
imperialists intentionally destroyed autarkic community’s habitat(s) without their input or 
involvement. 
 Moreover, roving imperialist’ acts of ecocide appear problematic from an outcome fairness 
perspective as well. Since, one can argue that the consequences of the act(s) violated prevailing 
norms of merit, equality, desert, and (most pertinently) need by allowing the lesser interests of 
the invading group (i.e., enhancing profits, acquiring non-essential knowledge, commercial 
development, etc.) to trump vital interests and needs of local inhabitants (i.e., maintaining the 
cultural survival of their traditional way of life and preserving the habitat). This idea will be 
developed in greater detail in subsequent chapters, when we demonstrate the injustice of ecocide 
through both constructivist and comparative approaches to justice.    
 But at present the work will avoid undertaking the potentially intractable challenge of 
devising a hierarchy of values and interests and instead simply highlight that there does appear to 
                                                        
81 Thibaut and Walker investigated the perceived fairness of various legal processes and systems 
using social psychological theories and methods. Their research generated the surprising 
conclusion that parties care as much if not more about how matters are resolved, then the 
ultimate outcome of the proceeding (even if it led to a worse result for the party) (Thibaut and 
Walker 1975).   
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be prevailing consensus (maybe more so in environmental philosophy) that existential needs 
(e.g., continued existence of species, ecosystems, cultures, etc.) ought to take precedence over 
non-survival related interests. As John Baird Callicott states, “having the bare necessities for a 
decent life is a stronger interest then in the enjoyment of luxuries…but livelihood and lifestyle, 
for both of which adequate substitutes can be found is a lesser interest than life itself” (Callicott 
1999: 126-128).82  
 Callicott in an attempt to further develop and apply this norm analyzes a logging dispute 
in the Pacific Northwest. He argues that from a normative perspective the old-growth forest 
ought to be preserved because the existential interest and survival needs of Strix occidentalis (a 
species of spotted owl) to inhabit the forest, takes precedence over the economic and labor 
interests of loggers to fell trees:  
  The spotted owl is threatened with preventable anthropogenic extinction –  threatened 
 with biocide, in a word – and the old-growth forest biotic communities of the Pacific 
 North-west are threatened with destruction. These threats are the environmental 
 equivalent of genocide and holocaust. The loggers, on the other hand, are threatened  
 with economic losses, for which they can be compensated dollar for dollar. (Callicott 
 1999: 128)83 
 
                                                        
82 Peter Singer accepts a similar hierarchy of interests, values, and needs regarding our moral 
obligation to assist others. “If it is in our power to prevent something bad for happening, without 
thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it…an 
application of this principle would be as follows: if I am walking past a shallow pond and see a 
child drawing in it, I ought to wade in and pull the child out. This will mean getting my clothes 
muddy, but this is insignificant, while the death of the child would presumably be a very bad 
thing” (Singer 1972: 23).  
83 Callicott in an attempt to further illustrate his perspective offers another example, in which he 
analyzes Sartre’s classic dilemma regarding a son’s decision to go to war or stay at home with 
his mother. Ultimately, Callicott determines that the son should go to war, since France’s 
existential interest outweighs the mother’s potential interest in avoiding grief and sorrow, if her 
son dies. “The very existence of France as a transorganismic entity is threatened. The young 
man’s mother has a weaker interest at stake, for, as Sartre reports, his going off – and maybe 
getting killed – would plunge her into ‘despair.’ His mother being plunged into despair would be 
terrible, but nearly as terrible as the destruction of France” (Callicott 1999: 127). 
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  Callicott’s conclusion rests on the premise that existential interests are final and 
irreplaceable (i.e. if the owls go extinct, they are gone forever), whereas lesser interests (e.g., 
financial, labor, aesthetic, recreational, etc.) are transitory and substitutable (e.g., if loggers lose 
their jobs, they can be employed in another industry). As such, if we apply the above perspective 
to the case studies, then it seems uncontroversial that allowing the economic, epistemic, and 
lifestyle interests of roving imperialists to take precedence over the existential needs of autarkic 
communities (i.e., preserving their habitat and traditional way of life) was an unfair and unjust 
result that violates prevailing norms of need.  
 Thus, at this point in our analysis three out of four (the coercion condition, the harm 
condition, and the privilege condition) of Cudd’s conditions of oppression have been 
demonstrably met. As such, all that remains is to show that the harm resulted from social 
institution(s) or practice(s) to satisfy the social group condition.      
 First, it must be noted that Cudd defines “social institutions” broadly to include, 
“government, legal systems, schools, banks, gender rules and norms, rules of etiquette, media 
outlets, stereotypical beliefs, class, caste systems, racial, or ethnic classification systems” (Cudd 
2006: 50). Therefore, per Cudd’s account, the acts of ecocide covered in the case studies 
constitute institutional practices, since they include government involvement or at least state 
sanctioning, authorization, or legal approval.    
  One might object that establishing institutional practices require enduring, systemic, 
pervasive, and recurring patterns of behavior; and therefore, the harm(s) of ecocide under 
consideration (e.g., a nuclear explosion, constructing a dam, mining a mountain, etc.) are too 
short-lived to count. But Cudd explicitly denies this claim and affirms the possibility of onetime 
events constituting institutional cases of oppression, e.g., she cites the examples of war and 
genocide, “although these are cases of oppression, they are typically not long lasting…war is an 
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acute form of oppression” (Cudd 2006: 99). Consequently, if unjust wars or genocides are 
institutional practices of oppression, then there seems to be no compelling justification for 
excluding ecocide. Thus, the paradigm cases and idealized description of ecocide satisfy Cudd’s 
four necessary and sufficient conditions for constituting oppression.    
 
B. Iris Young’s Categorization of Oppression  
 
 For Young oppressive circumstances are ones in which, “people suffer some inhibition of 
their ability to develop and exercise their capacities and express their needs, thoughts, and 
feelings” (Young 1990: 40). It is important to emphasize that Young agrees with Cudd that 
oppressive harm does not require intent, “the conscious actions of many individuals daily 
contribute to maintaining and reproducing oppression, but those people are usually simply doing 
their jobs or living their lives, and do not understand themselves as agents of oppression” (Young 
1990: 42).  Once again, the reason this is important is due to the fact that the harm in the 
propounded key cases of ecocide under consideration are largely incidental. Nevertheless, for 
Young, as with Cudd, what matters is that another group benefits from the oppression, “for every 
oppressed group there is a group that is privileged in relation to that group” (Young 1990: 42).  
 But Young, unlike Cudd, is less interested in defining a set of necessary and sufficient 
criteria that apply across all cases of oppression and instead focuses on classifying forms of 
oppression.84 Ultimately, she settles on dividing oppression into five categories: exploitation, 
                                                        
84 The reason for this is that Young is weary of accounts of oppression that reduce down to a 
common essence, which allows theorists or practitioners to prioritize consideration of one form 
of oppression over others. “There is a double problem with considering each group’s oppression 
a unified or distinct structure or system. On the one hand, this way of conceiving oppression fails 
to accommodate the similarities and overlaps of oppression between different groups. On the 
other hand, it falsely represents the situation of all group members as the same” (Young 1990: 
64).  
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marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence (Young 1990). For the 
remainder of the chapter, we will survey how the submitted key cases and idealized description 
of ecocide fits these five categories. 
 But bear in mind, according to Young for a practice to be oppressive, it only needs to 
satisfy one (not all five) of the forms. Nevertheless, for the sake of maximum conceptual 
applicability this section will attempt to demonstrate that our cases of ecocide can potentially fit 
each of the five categories of oppression. However as will become abundantly clear, some of the 
categories are much better fits (i.e., marginalization and powerlessness), than others (i.e., 
exploitation, cultural imperialism, and violence).       
 
1. Violence 
 
 Violence is probably the most glaring and overt form of oppression, as violent behavior 
constitutes a specific flagrant, direct, and immediate harm to victim(s). Young does not provide a 
definition, but Cudd defines “violence” as, “the intentional, forceful infliction of physical harm 
or abuse on one or more persons or their material or animal possessions” (Cudd 2006: 87). Cudd 
defends her decision to include injuries and damages against possessions within the scope of 
‘violence’ on psychological grounds, “it makes sense to include forceful abuse of property as a 
kind of violence because forceful abuse of one's property, especially of animals, portends or 
threatens forceful abuse of one's person. It threatens the victim through the show of force” (Cudd 
2006: 87). 
 Obviously, such a definition of ‘violence’ is helpful for our purposes since in the case 
studies harm was never intentionally inflicted upon people; nevertheless, their material and 
animal possessions (i.e., the local habitat that they depended on for survival) were directly 
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targeted for destruction. Also, pertinent for our commitments is Cudd’s insight that unintended 
displays of force can be classified as violent. As Cudd explains, what matters for determining if 
an act is violent is the psychological impact on the affected community: 
  It is important to consider the effect and not the intention here because what matters in 
 considering how violence constructs oppression is how it constrains social groups. 
 Constraints are transmitted through the perceptions of the people who would make up the 
 putative group. Thus, it is the perceptions of the affected, not the intentions of the violent 
 persons, that matter. (Cudd 2006: 88)  
 
 Accordingly, some of the examples of ecocide under consideration seem constitutive of 
violence in that members of the affected communities expressed shock, fear for their safety and 
wellbeing, and even terror from witnessing the widespread environmental destruction, e.g., 
during the Maralinga nuclear tests terrified Anangu elders thought the approaching black mist 
from the fallout, “was an evil spirit and tried to use woomera (spear-throwers) to disperse it [for 
their own and the communities protection]” (Sebag-Montefiore 2016).  
 Furthermore, one can hardly imagine autarkic communities’ sense of hopelessness and 
impotence when confronted with the prospects of challenging a force powerful enough to level 
mountains or stop rivers from flowing. As such, it seems plausible that some cases of roving 
imperialists’ intentional destruction of autarkic communities’ ecosystems may constitute 
instances of oppressive violence.    
 
2. Cultural Imperialism   
 
 Young defines “cultural imperialism” as, “the universalization of a dominant group’s 
experience and culture, and its establishment as the norm” (Young 1990: 59). Simply, cultural 
imperialism occurs when dominant group(s) render(s) oppressed group(s) cultural perspective 
invisible or obsolete. This is comparable to what occurs when roving imperialists (the dominant 
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group) alter habitats without considering, recognizing, or regarding impacts to autarkic 
communities (“the other”) way of life. In such scenarios (e.g., those covered in the sample 
seminal case studies and idealized description(s)), the autarkic communities experience rapid 
cultural loss due to their invisibility, meaninglessness, and palpable irrelevance to the dominant 
roving imperial culture.  
 In summary, roving imperialist values, goals, and achievements justify and enable the 
destruction of ecosystems, which in turn undermine, weaken, and erase the values, goals, and 
achievements of autarkic communities. “Often without noticing they do so, the dominant groups 
project their own experiences as representative of humanity as such” (Young 1990: 59).  
 A justification explaining roving imperialists’ intentional disrespect of long-established 
autarkic communities, is that by ignoring the value of such local cultures it becomes easier to 
disenfranchise, dispossess, and displace these inhabitants (i.e., non-dominant groups who are 
inconveniently dwelling upon “urgently” needed resources) from their habitat. Thus, by 
constantly denying autarkic successes, while showing little interest in preserving their unique 
way of life, autarkic habitats becomes easier to exploit both cognitively (i.e., less psychological 
guilt) and financially (i.e., current use of land is poorly appraised). Accordingly, it benefits 
intruders to feign disinterest or maintain willful ignorance of the life and culture of autarkic 
communities, i.e., cultural imperialism may serve a material purpose.  
 Furthermore, once post-ecocide autarkic communities lose their ability to sustain 
themselves through traditional cultural practices (i.e., loss of habitat learning), they assume 
subservient dependent relationships with the dominant group for survival as ecocide refugees. 
Obviously, such one-sided relationships allow the dominant group to impose their values, 
experiences, and interpretation of social life on the oppressed, while concurrently devaluing, 
denigrating, and ignoring the values, experiences, and interpretation of social life of the 
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oppressed; and at the same time, the intruder extracts from the supplicant instrumental value. 
Thus, we can clearly see ways in which the seminal cases and idealized description of ecocide 
may generate and reinforce oppressive patterns of cultural imperialism.      
 
3. Marginalization   
 
 Young argues marginalization maybe the “most dangerous form of oppression” as it 
constitutes a whole category of people being “expelled from useful participation in social life and 
thus potentially subjected to severe material deprivation and even extermination” (Young 1990: 
53). As is evident from our analysis, ecocide facilitates marginalization in that roving imperialist 
destruction of ecosystem(s) renders once self-sufficient autarkic communities unable to support 
themselves, contribute to their own wellbeing, or bolster their collapsing (or the broader) society.  
 In our case studies groups marginalized by ecocide (ecocide refugees) often become 
dependent on state welfare for survival. Young explains that while welfare programs assist in 
ameliorating the harm of material deprivation caused by marginalization, such practices may 
generate additional injuries. “First, the provision of welfare itself produces new injustices by 
depriving those dependent on it of rights and freedoms that others have. 
Second…marginalization is unjust because it blocks the opportunity to exercise capacities in 
socially defined and recognized ways” (Young 1990: 54).  
 Unfortunately, as Young forecast, ecocide refugees often remain stuck in dependent 
positions unable to gain new capacities to improve their social status, achieve autonomy, or 
promote their wellbeing. Thus, marginalized ecocide refugees are left with lives of boredom and 
uselessness and lack self-respect and social-recognition. As the Canadian government’s report, 
The Devastation of the Cree (1986), suggests such marginalized lifestyles have exceedingly dour 
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prospects, “[with their] pride and self-reliance stripped away . . . [f]rom 1985 to 1987, there were 
126 suicide attempts…[as] for the first time in centuries, band members realized there is no point 
in teaching their children the traditions of hunting and fishing” (96-97). As such, it seems clear 
that ecocide can lead to oppressive marginalization of affected group(s).   
 
4. Exploitation  
 
 Young relies on a broadened Marxist account of ‘exploitation’ that defines the concept as 
any situation, “in which the labor and energy expenditure of one group benefits another and 
reproduces a relation of domination between them” (Young 1990: 50). It is difficult to fit our 
paradigm cases of ecocide within such a framework because the examples lack an ongoing 
transfer of energy from autarkic communities to roving imperialists.85  
 Nonetheless, we can envision situations in which autarkic community’s past energy 
expenditures enhanced their habits in ways that later benefited roving imperialists.86 In such a 
scenario, the seeds (both literal and figurative) of autarkic communities’ labor to sustain, nurture, 
and develop their habitat across generations are subsequently seized and harvested by roving 
imperialists. Thus, these instances of appropriative resource-transfer, involving autarkic 
communities’ historical labor as stewards who generate, maintain, and preserve the very 
“natural” resources that roving imperialists seek to extract, can be viewed as constituting 
                                                        
85 A generalized liberal conception of exploitation that avoids Marxist baggage (i.e., the labor 
theory of value) can be expressed in Kantian terms as relationship(s) or interaction(s) that violate 
the Humanity Formulation of the Categorical Imperative: “Act in such a way that you treat 
humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means to 
an end, but always at the same time as an end.” (Kant 1785).   
86 Or, desired resources were preserved haphazardly simply because autarkic communities placed 
little or no value on those prized items or elements. 
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exploitation. 87 Since, in such situations, roving imperialist(s) benefit from extracting 
uncompensated value from labor, energy, and effort autarkic communities unwittingly supplied.   
 But a problem with such an analysis is that this form of resource exploitation, is not a 
requisite feature of the case studies (e.g., it was not a harm experienced by the Anangu during the 
nuclear tests at Maralinga). Furthermore, this sort of exploitation automatically ceases after 
ecocide has occurred, in that the labor, energy, and effort autarkic communities invested into 
their environment, which roving imperialists were taking advantage of, is lost once the habitat is 
destroyed. As such, it makes more sense to categorize these cases as one-time thefts, rather than 
instances of continuing exploitation.     
 Nevertheless, another way in which we might conceive of the case studies as related to 
exploitation is by emphasizing their role in generating conditions ripe for exploitative practices. 
To grasp the connection requires recognizing that after completing extractive project(s) (e.g., 
mountaintop removal mining) roving imperialists are left in an increasingly privileged position 
having gained wealth; but also, they have furthered their relative social dominance vis-a-vis 
destabilized autarkic communities. Hence, ecocide has generated unequal distributive outcomes 
(regarding both good(s)/benefit(s) and bad(s)/harm(s)) between autarkic communities and roving 
imperialists.  
 But more significantly as it applies to all the case studies, the environmental destruction 
ruins autarkic communities’ traditional mode of subsistence, diminishes their material capital, 
                                                        
87 Autarkic communities’ sustainable lifestyle requires the development of knowledge and 
practices able to nurture their habitat across generations (Dowie 2009). Thus, it is through 
complex human-environment interaction that these peoples have actively fashioned and 
maintained what outsiders naively assume to be “naturally” functioning ecosystems. An example 
of this is the importance of Baiga villagers in maintaining the Kanha tiger reserves in India. “It 
might surprise people to know there's evidence that tigers thrive in the zones where tribal 
villages remain - the people's small open fields encourage more tiger prey than in the enclosed 
forest…In other words, if you want happy tigers, then it's much better to leave the tribal people 
where they've always been” (Corry 2015). 
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and as such increases their risk of being pushed into dependence relations as ecocide refugees. 
Since, in such scenarios, roving imperialists have substantial negotiating leverage over ecocide 
refugees (in that roving imperialists can offer ecocide refugees means of survival; whereas, 
ecocide refugees can offer little in return) and as such, are more likely and able to take advantage 
and coerce these vulnerable people into inequitable arrangements, e.g. exploitative wage labor 
relations.   
  Thus, this sort of coercive power can lead to social relations and institutions that enable 
roving imperialists to accumulate power, privilege, and control to the detriment of ecocide 
refugees. Consequently, our case studies of ecosystem destruction produce social conditions ripe 
for subsequent exploitative oppression, even if the ecocidal activity were non-exploitative in-
and-of-itself.         
 
5. Powerlessness  
 
 Young describes the plight of the powerless as, “inhibition in the development of one’s 
capacities, lack of decision-making power in one’s life, and exposure to disrespectful treatment 
because of the status one occupies” (Young 1990: 58). Thus, from our prior analysis, it appears 
indisputable that in all of the selected key cases and our idealized description of ecocide that 
autarkic communities experience powerlessness, because they were prevented from practicing 
their cultural traditions and developing capacities necessary for preserving and sustaining their 
subsistence lifestyle. Moreover, they never consented nor were they active participants during 
the decision-making processes that led to their injury.  
 The above analysis has shown that our key examples and idealized description of ecocide 
fit (at least to some degree) each of Young’s five categories of oppression. But to reiterate as 
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Young explains, “the presence of any of these five conditions is sufficient for calling a group 
oppressed” (Young 1990: 64). Moreover, prior analysis demonstrated that our case studies met 
Cudd’s definition of oppression as well. Hence, a compelling case has been made that instances 
of ecocide (e.g., those that satisfy our criteria) are fundamentally oppressive.  
However, a response to oppression often times implies liberation (i.e., freedom from the 
oppressor), instead of the kind of reparative and reconciliatory redress that Transitional Justice is 
concerned with. Thus, to further link the harm of ecocide and the plight of ecocide refugees to 
the discipline of Transitional Justice it is necessary to justify why reparative and reconciliatory 
action is required in these situations -- which will be the focus of the final section of the chapter.  
 
V. Transitional Justice: A Response to State Oppression  
 
 The discipline of Transitional Justice represents a particular framework for understanding 
and addressing widespread oppression and human rights violations. The United Nations 
Secretary General defines Transitional Justice projects as, “the full range of processes and 
mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale 
past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice, and achieve reconciliation” (U.N. 
2004). As Louise Arbour, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights expounds, 
“transitional justice must have the ambition of assisting the transformation of oppressed societies 
into free ones by addressing the injustices of the past through measures that will procure an 
equitable future” (Arbour 2006). 
 Accordingly, based on the above descriptions of the discipline, we can summarize the 
justification for Transitional Justice as resting on two premises. First, Ruti Teitel’s insight that, 
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“legacies of state oppression do not simply go away on their accord” (Teitel 2000: 143). 
Secondly, Jeremy Waldron’s belief that reparative and reconciliatory measures can be taken in 
the present to alter relationships with the past. “There is a sense we can affect the moral 
significance of a past event. Even if we cannot alter the action itself we may be able to interfere 
with the normal course of its consequences” (Waldron 1992: 7). Thus, Transitional Justice 
maintains that to overcome past histories of state oppression necessitates reparative and 
reconciliatory redress.   
 Consequently, for the discipline of Transitional Justice to constitute a reasonably 
coherent enterprise, practitioners must establish a set of wrongs under consideration and a set of 
responses designed for moving away from these wrongs (i.e., correcting past injustices and 
deterring future harms). As previously stated, the set of wrongs Transitional Justice has 
traditionally focused on are human rights violations (e.g., genocide, ethnic cleansing, and mass 
murder). Thus, to reiterate, Transitional Justice as currently practiced, excludes our paradigm 
cases of ecocide, since they are not presently considered human rights violations.88  
 However, as previously argued, our examples result in the same harm (i.e., social death 
and loss of control over vital interests) as traditional human rights violations (i.e., genocide).89 
                                                        
88 It should be mention that there are efforts underway to include ecocide as a human rights 
violation. For instance, Polly Higgins’ proposed amendment to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court strives to make the Crime of Ecocide (i.e. “the extensive damage to, 
destruction of or loss of ecosystem(s) of a given territory, whether by human agency or by other 
causes, to such an extent that peaceful enjoyment by the inhabitants of that territory has been or 
will be severely diminished”) the fifth recognized and prosecutable Crime Against Peace under 
the International Criminal Court (the four currently covered by Article 5 of the Rome Statute are: 
The Crime of Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes, and The Crime of 
Aggression) (Higgins 2010).   
89 Environmentalists may object that limiting the analysis to these harms is too anthropocentric, 
in that it ignores environmental harms in-and-of-themselves, i.e., that instead of recognizing 
nonhuman (environmental) value(s) directly (what many environmentalists would prefer), these 
concerns only receive indirect consideration dependent on promoting human interests in 
transitional settings. At present this criticism is fair, but the goal of the project is simply to take 
the first step towards recognizing the need for environmental transformative justice. Ultimately, 
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Thus, our next step in illustrating why Transitional Justice ought to concern itself with the 
paradigm cases and similar instances of ecocide fitting our idealized description, is to 
demonstrate that the injustice under consideration results from comparable activities to those 
generating human rights violations. Essentially, the aim is to draw parallel(s) between activities 
Transitional Justice has been traditionally concerned with and the acts causing harm in our 
examples.  
 The analysis is motivated by the hope that comparable harmful activities (i.e., both in 
terms of cause and result) ought to be receptive to similar reparative and reconciliatory 
measures. In other words, it is not enough simply to show that the oppressive harm we are 
considering is of the kind that engenders state responsibility for assisting their citizenry, but to 
show that the states themselves behaved in such a way as to trigger the concerns of Transitional 
                                                        
the hope is that undertaking environmental transformative justice measures will illustrate the 
centrality of the environment in maintaining ways of life (e.g., in the case studies, environmental 
destruction caused cultural death). That may seem obvious, but modernity has traditionally 
emphasized the separation of man from nature and the social from the ecological. Accordingly, 
the work maintains that it is important to offer a framework of moral suasion designed to woo 
non-environmentalists (e.g., traditional humanists) into embracing the moral need to correct 
environmental harms. This is in part achieved by providing examples (such as the ones offered in 
the preceding sections) that violate our moral sensibilities (i.e., acts that we find indecent, 
impious, or repulsive). As Daniel Gilbert, borrowing from Hume, explains, “when people feel 
insulted or disgusted, they generally do something about it, such as whacking each other over the 
head, or voting…moral emotions are the brain’s call to action” (Gilbert 2006). Thus, in this light, 
our examples are designed to trigger a moral response in non-environmentalists (i.e., generate a 
sense of the moral wrongness of these sorts of activities), which will hopefully steer them 
towards recognizing the centrality of ecosystems in our lives. This perspective change is vital, 
since as will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters, a key feature of environmental 
transformative justice is striving to prevent such harms from occurring in the first place (e.g., 
embracing Transitional Justice’s “never again” mantra). And it will be argued that realizing this 
preventative aim, likely requires that the broader society accept an ecosocial (i.e. breaking down 
the social and ecological divide by recognizing that all societies requires an ecological base) 
understanding of communities’ relationship and place in the world. Thus, achieving 
environmental transformative justice, in many ways depends on expanding the ecosocial 
perspective to as many actors as possible (i.e., the environmental transformative justice process 
requires winning over non-environmentalists). Finally, once/if the ecosocial perspective is fully 
realized preventing ecological harm will be a matter of social concern in-and-of-itself (i.e., just 
what traditional environmentalists wanted).  
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Justice. As such, the goal is to demonstrate that case(s) of ecocide (e.g., those fitting our 
idealized narrative) are caused by the type of state activity that Transitional Justice is concerned 
with; which will hopefully, compel the discipline to involve itself in preventing, repairing, 
mitigating, and correcting for these harms.  
 Consequently, the remainder of the chapter will attempt to prove that our paradigm cases 
of ecocide are suitable candidates for Transitional Justice’s reparative and reconciliatory 
measures. The dissertation intends to achieve this by demonstrating that traditional human rights 
violations (e.g., those that represent the current focus of Transitional Justice) and injustices of 
ecocide in our examples stem from comparable harmful activities.90  
 It is important to emphasize that Transitional Justice is a discipline that embodies a 
radical departure from the history of inter-and-intrastate relations; in that for the first time there 
exists concerted global effort and widespread recognition that state actors responsible for grave 
injustices ought to be held accountable.91 Essentially, Transitional Justice’s range of concern 
(i.e., the activities actors ought to be held accountable for) centers on state oppression 
responsible for generating human rights violations.92   
                                                        
90 Thus, the argument is rather straightforward: since Transitional Justice is concerned with these 
types of state action; then situating the cases of ecocide under consideration within the 
Transitional Justice framework requires that they also involve similar practices. Ultimately, to 
assist the reader in following the argument, it is helpful to state upfront that the dissertation 
settles on negligent state oppression as the problematic activity under consideration.  
91 Vesselin Popovski and Monica Serrano rightly emphasize the paradigm shifting novelty of the 
discipline. “Transitional justice is an unprecedented enterprise. In the age of oppression, one or 
two visionaries imagined that the day of reckoning might one day come for omnipotent dictators 
and tyrants, but millions died without any shred of consolation that justice would one day be 
done to them. In previous geopolitical cataclysms, millions had also died on what Hegel – 
thinking of the French Revolution – called the slaughter-bench of history, yet no one had ever 
suggested that some kind of reparation be made to their memory and to the survivors” (Popovski 
and Serrano 2012: 4) 
92 It is conceivable to imagine scenarios that Transitional Justice is applicable, which exclude 
state oppression, e.g., when human rights violations occur in ungoverned areas or after complete 
state collapse (i.e., total breakdown of rule of law). But for present purposes, analyzing these 
sorts of examples and determining if such instances can be framed, as state oppression, is 
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 However, in canvassing the field it becomes clear that there exist various forms of state 
oppression, which in practice, have qualified as matters of Transitional Justice concern. 
Nonetheless, for the sake of conceptual clarity, we can sort the varieties of state oppression that 
Transitional Justice has considered germane into three distinct categories: (1) direct state 
oppression; (2) state sanctioned, endorsed, and sponsored oppression, and (3) negligent state 
oppression. Thus, do the acts generating ecocide in our case studies satisfy these levels of state 
oppression?93  
 
A. Direct State Oppression  
 
 Transitional Justice early in its development focused on oppression perpetrated directly 
by strong state actors. A clear example of this would be the Allies’ prosecution (e.g., the 
Nuremberg Trials) of Nazi officials responsible for orchestrating the bureaucratized and 
industrialized murder of millions during the Holocaust. Horowitz describes this sort of direct 
state oppression as, “a systemic destruction of innocent people by a state bureaucratic apparatus” 
(Horowitz 1976: 18).   
 Obviously, none of the examples of ecocide we examined include loss anywhere near the 
magnitude of state-governed tragedies like the Holocaust or Stalin’s Great Purges (1936-1938). 
Nonetheless, our research does include instances of direct state action responsible for harm. For 
instance, it seems straightforward that the wrongs experienced by northern Cree in the wake of 
the James Bay Damming Project directly resulted from state action, i.e., Quebec-Hydro is a 
                                                        
ancillary, since all of the case studies include clearly defined state actors (e.g., the Colombian, 
Australian, Canadian, and British governments).   
93 In the subsequent section, the work will definitively demonstrate that our cases of ecocide 
satisfy classic theories of oppression, but for now we will simply assume that the harms in our 
examples were oppressive. 
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public utility (i.e., a state bureaucratic apparatus) whose actions (i.e., constructing dams) directly 
caused the social death of indigenous northern Cree (i.e., systemic destruction of an innocent 
people).  
 However, Quebec-Hydro did not intend to oppress the Cree. Accordingly, it seems 
normatively hyperbolic to compare Quebec-Hydro’s activity (or the state activity in any of our 
case studies; since, our criterion excludes environmental harms committed instrumentally to 
further traditional crimes against humanity) to the atrocities committed by the Nazis or other 
intentionally perpetrated state genocides. As such, we need to discern other form(s) of state 
oppression, which Transitional Justice embraces as legitimate matter(s) of concern that better 
mirror our examples of ecocide.  
 
B. Indirect State Oppression  
 
 With this aim in mind, it is important to highlight that Transitional Justice’s scope 
extends beyond direct state action, to include indirect forms of state oppression. For instance, 
examples of Transitional Justice’s expanded focus include the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda and Gacaca courts’ prosecution of the interahamwe (i.e., Hutu civilian groups that 
killed Tutsi) after the Rwandan genocide or the International Criminal Court’s investigation of 
atrocities committed by the janjaweed (i.e., nomadic Sudanese Arabs that targeted non-Arab 
sedentary communities) in Darfur. In these and similar examples, Transitional Justice 
practitioners and institutions exhibit responsiveness and concern with injustices perpetrated by 
state sponsored militias, gangs, and civilian movements, rather than legally sanctioned state 
bureaucratic apparatuses (e.g. military, police force, officially authorized agents, etc.).   
 Such instances of indirect state wrongs are somewhat comparable in form to acts of 
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oppression in our examples. For instance, the direct cause of Wayúu suffering was El Cerrejon 
Mining (i.e., a fully privatized operation as of 2000) not the Colombian government.94 
Nevertheless, just like with the janjaweed or interahamwe the government endorsed, applauded, 
and permitted the non-state actor’s (e.g., El Cerrejon Mining) activities. Thus, the state (e.g., the 
Colombian government) had an indirect role in perpetuating oppression.  
 However, the above analysis comparing our cases of ecocide to instances of Transitional 
Justice concerned with indirect state oppression, runs into difficulty; first and foremost of which, 
is the fact that in each of the cases of ecocide under consideration, state support was not designed 
to endorse oppression, but instead, to further state interests (e.g., economic growth, development, 
security, etc.). Thus, there appears to be a clear normative difference between state sponsored 
activity deliberately planned to oppress group(s) (e.g., supporting violent militias) and accidental 
harm (e.g., cultural loss) resulting from environmental destruction (i.e., what occurred in our 
case studies). Consequently, these forms of indirect state oppression are ill suited for situating 
our paradigm cases and idealized description of ecocide within the Transitional Justice 
framework.  
 
C. Negligent State Oppression  
 
 Fortunately for our purposes, Transitional Justice concerns have expanded to include 
negligent state activity (or inactivity) responsible for failing to protect citizens from grave harm. 
For instance, a vivid example of state negligence constituting a matter of concern for 
Transitional Justice is the Casino Royale fire (2011) that left 52 people dead (Rivera 2014). 
                                                        
94 However, initially it was a joint venture between Carbocol (a Colombian state company) and 
Intercor (a subsidiary of ExxonMobil) (Redner 2014: 54). 
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 In this case, the Human Rights Commission of the State of Nuevo ruled (relying on 
Transitional Justice principles and jurisprudence from international tribunals, such as the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights) that the Mexican government did not meet its obligation to 
guard its citizens from human rights violations:95  
 The Commission arrived at the conclusion that several human rights violations had taken 
 place (particularly regarding the rights to life, personal integrity and working conditions), 
 all of which were associated with the State’s duty to protect its citizens from human 
 rights abuses, including from those at the hands of non-State actors. (Rivera 2014: 72)  
 
 The court determined that the state’s failure to follow safety protocol made the cartel’s 
illegal act of arson far more destructive than it otherwise would have been. Thus, the state did 
not satisfy its due diligence to protect its citizens. Obviously, the Mexican government did not 
intend any harm (either directly or indirectly). Nevertheless, the state was found culpable for 
injuries resulting from breeching its duty to prevent grave injustices.   
 The Commission’s determination in the Casino Royale case, describes a type of state 
injustice mirroring acts or omissions responsible for wrongs in our case studies of ecocide. For 
instance, the Afro-Colombians, Anangu, Wayúu, and Cree all suffered grave harm because their 
respective countries governments failed to consider these group’s special vulnerabilities to the 
prescribed acts of environmental destruction, e.g., the state forgetting to post warning signs in the 
indigenous group’s language; they failed to consider how ecosystem alterations might undermine 
communities’ traditional way of life and subsistence practices; they failed to conduct adequate 
surveillance to ensure all members of the community were out of harm’s way, etc.      
 Furthermore, the Commission’s response to the injustice offers insight into the range of 
                                                        
95 The harm occurred when cartel commandos set fire to Casino Royale in Monterrey, Mexico 
for not paying “protection fees” (Rivera 2014: 72). Ultimately, 52 people died in the fire from 
smoke inhalation because they were unable to escape the (Rivera 2014: 72). “Expert analysis 
later revealed that some of the emergency exits were in fact blocked and that safety measures had 
not been implemented despite having obtained the corresponding permits from the Civil 
Protection Office” (Rivera 2014: 72).  
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reparatory and reconciliatory measures suitable for combating oppressive state negligence: 
  The Commission deemed it prudent to award economic reparation for lost earnings and 
 the subsequent damage (particularly funerary costs and medical and psychological 
 expenses), rehabilitation measures (including medical, psychological or psychiatric 
 treatment), satisfaction (including the verification of the facts and issuing a public 
 apology, starting the criminal and administrative procedures against the public officials 
 and other non-State actors whose acts or omissions contributed to the human rights 
 violation, and the construction of a monument in memory of the deceased and those 
 injured in the fire) and  guarantees of non-repetition. This recommendation especially 
 focused on alleviating some of the victims’ suffering, which would be accomplished 
 through the recognition of public truth and bringing those directly and indirectly 
 responsible to justice. (Rivera 2014: 73-74)  
 
 The significance of the Commission’s recommendation in Casino Royale is that it 
emphasizes that adequate responses to instances of pervasive state negligence resulting in human 
rights violations require simultaneously confronting impunity, seeking redress, and preventing 
recurrence of wrongs, i.e., pursuing Transitional Justice. However, the Commission could have 
recommended dealing with the situation through more narrowly tailored measures (e.g., only 
pursuing criminal proceedings or welfare assistance) instead of advocating a multipronged 
approach.  
 Nevertheless, the Commission opted against implementing singular solutions because it 
rightly concluded (at least per Transitional Justice) that enacting narrow measures would 
forestall reconciliation and reparations, in that not all elements required of justice would be met 
and the community would remain vulnerable to the reoccurrence of comparable harm(s). 
Essentially, the Commission held that in cases of negligent state oppression resulting in human 
rights violations, justice compels that the state examine what happened and why (e.g., using truth 
commissions and/or social inquiries); propose plans and policy to stop similar violations from 
occurring in the future (e.g., through legislation and/or constitutional amendment); acknowledge 
the violations as a means of restoring socio-political commitment to important societal values 
(e.g., undertaking public apology and/or memorialization); hold those responsible to account 
 75 
(e.g., pursing criminal proceedings, lustration, public censure, etc.), and aid victims (e.g., 
providing social services, compensation, and/or welfare assistance). 
 Accordingly, it seems plausible to conclude that similar responses mirroring the 
Commission’s recommendation in Casino Royale are appropriate to our and similar cases of 
ecocide, since the acts causing harm are comparable (i.e., negligent state oppression) and the 
resulting harm is of equivalent magnitude (i.e., social death and loss of vital interests). For 
instance, it seems uncontroversial that just as in the Casino Royale case, our victims (e.g., Afro-
Colombians, Anangu, Wayúu, and Cree) deserve reconciliatory redress: i.e., compensation for 
harms suffered to (re)affirm their dignity as human beings; exploration into why massive social 
death was allowed to occur; assurance that actions are underway to prevent such harms from 
happening in the future (i.e., a commitment to the safety of all citizens); retribution that negligent 
actors (i.e., those that failed to meet their duty of care) are held to account, and assistance to 
overcome trauma and resulting difficulties (i.e., losing their way of life and means of 
subsistence).96  
 Consequently, after reviewing the above list of goals, it is easy to grasp why singularly 
focused approaches (e.g., criminal proceedings or welfare assistance) would be inadequate for 
achieving justice in our examples. For instance, focusing strictly on retributive censure of 
negligent actors obscures the fact that the environmental harm(s) under consideration were 
intentional, i.e., that the state (and more broadly mainstream society) tolerates and promotes 
ecosystem destruction. Hence, such a limited response ignores the need to alter the root cause of 
the problem (i.e., prevailing norms, values, and everyday practices) and realistically guarantees 
that comparable harm(s) will occur in the future. Thus, only repudiating select actors for failing 
                                                        
96 Exactly, what each of these measures entails will be explored in subsequent chapters. 
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to meet their duty of care, while acquiescing and accepting environmental loss as “business as 
usual” undermines Transitional Justice’s “never again” mantra.   
 Likewise, if practitioners were to take another narrow approach and focus strictly on 
providing material aid to victims (i.e., ensuring survivors have adequate food, water, clothes, 
shelter, medical care, etc.), then we can readily see that key components of justice will be 
ignored. Obviously, victims should not be left destitute and starving in their ruined habitat, but 
justice also requires considering why they are in this position in the first place.  
 Instead of simply alleviating immediate suffering and treating problematic symptoms, 
justice entails understanding past mistakes and averting future complications, i.e., failing to 
consider broader social structures may obscure effective means of mitigating, abating, and 
correcting harms. Furthermore, social policy limited to material aid, treats victims as passive, 
ignores their agency, and offers them little role in overcoming their difficulties, which may 
further denigrate their autonomy and sense of self-respect.97  
 Nevertheless, determining the best course of action for navigating these various concerns 
presents innumerable challenge. But at least at present, Transitional Justice offers the most 
theoretically well developed and successfully employed paradigm for considering, 
implementing, and balancing the above reparative and reconciliatory interests in the wake of 
grave social wrongs. Consequently, there are prudential and substantive benefits validating the 
                                                        
97 Thomas Shelby in his work, Dark Ghettos, offers a powerful critique against social policies 
limited to material assistance (Shelby 2016). He argues that justice necessitates moving beyond 
the medical model of “fixing” social ills (i.e., a technocratic approach that takes, “the background 
structures of society as given and focuses only alleviating burdens…[in which sufferers] are 
regarded as passive victims in need of assistance”) and instead must consider, recognize, and 
alter, “the numerous ways in which the advantaged unfairly benefit from an unjust social 
structure [to the disadvantage of the victims]” (Shelby 2016: 2-3). 
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claim that Transitional Justice offers the most effective framework for responding to the injustice 
of ecocide, i.e., achieving environmental transformative justice.  
  Fortunately, the Commission’s determination in Casino Royale that human rights 
violations produced through state negligence, require a multipronged reparative and 
reconciliatory response, offers compelling support to the thesis that the Transitional Justice 
framework can reasonably be applied to the types of state activity (or inaction) that led to harm 
in our case studies. In fact, since our cases of ecocide lack a supervening malevolent actor (e.g., 
the cartel), it seems even easier to justify drawing a connection between negligent state activity 
and resulting harms.   
 
D. Conclusion 
 
 The chapter has attempted to illustrate that there are instances of ecocide that occur 
independently from the commission of intentional crimes against humanity, which nonetheless, 
are comparable in normatively relevant ways to established, recognized, documented, and 
accepted subjects of Transitional Justice concern; in that the acts causing the harm are 
comparable (i.e., negligent state oppression) and the harm itself is comparable (i.e., social death 
and loss of vital interests). Consequently in achieving this aim, a strong case has been presented 
that to further justice (i.e., overcome injustice), victims of these and similar instances of ecocide 
ought to receive reparatory and reconciliatory attention from within the Transitional Justice 
framework.98 At least, it seems the burden of proof has shifted, so that those who wish to deny 
                                                        
98 Since, the Commission’s response to unjust state negligence in the Casino Royale case, 
demonstrates that Transitional Justice’s measures can (and ought to) assist in repairing and 
reconciling oppression in our (and similar) cases of ecocide. Illustrating how Transitional 
Justice’s reparative and reconciliatory measures (e.g., criminal tribunals, truth commissions, 
public apologies, pardons, lustration, memorialization, reparations, constitutional change, etc.) 
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including our paradigm cases and idealized description of ecocide within the Transitional Justice 
framework need to provide justification for the exclusion. 
 In summary, here is the argument thus far. As Young, Cudd, and likely all political 
philosophers agree, “oppression claims are themselves prima facie moral claims for remedy or 
redress” (Cudd 2006: 129). Thus, normatively, once a practice has been established as 
oppressive, the moral case for opposing, resisting, and correcting the wrongs has already been 
made. Moreover, since the oppression results from similar practices (e.g., negligent state 
activity) and causes comparable harm (e.g., social death and loss of vital interests) to traditional 
topics of Transitional Justice, then it follows that our paradigm cases and idealized description of 
ecocide represent suitable candidates for garnering Transitional Justice’s attention, i.e., that the 
discipline ought to expand to cover the harm of ecocide (e.g., in these and similar cases); beyond 
any instrumental role the environmental destruction may play in advancing genocide, ethnic 
cleansing, mass murder, etc. 
 But before we can begin analyzing how Transitional Justice mechanisms can be enlisted 
to repair and reconcile the injuries of ecocide (i.e., delineate the aims and methods for achieving 
environmental transformative justice); we must first discuss the topics of responsibility, 
culpability, and complicity to delineate who is morally obligated to contribute, assist, and further 
post-ecocide environmental transformative justice. As such, exploring these topics will be the 
subject of analysis in the next chapter.        
 
 
 
                                                        
can be applied in our examples will be the topic of analysis in subsequent chapters, but for now I 
hope it seems plausible that such mechanisms can assist victims of ecocide.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
Who is Responsible for Ecocide? Conceptualizing Responsibility for Ecocide   
 
I. Overview Bridging Responsibility in Transitional Justice and Environmentalism   
 
 The last chapter recommended expanding the Transitional Justice framework to cover 
cases of ecocide that were committed intentionally (i.e., with the aim of benefiting the acting 
group) and resulted in the loss of vital interests (i.e., causing partial or complete social death) of 
non-consenting cultural group(s). As argued, a key reason supporting the inclusion of these sorts 
of grave environmental harms within the Transitional Justice paradigm is that they involve some 
degree of state oppression (e.g., direct, indirect, or negligent). Accordingly, it seems 
uncontroversial that the state must play a central role in providing reconciliatory redress for these 
injustices. 
 However, limiting our conception of responsibility for ecocide to states or state actors 
seems misguided, in that it would almost certainly exclude many relevant causal factors and 
culpable actors from analysis.99 Such a result is problematic because (as will be argued) 
                                                        
99 In an attempt to briefly illustrate inadequacies of focusing wholly on state responsibility for 
ecocide, we can draw from Thomas Pogge’s critique of explanatory nationalism, i.e., the view 
that the state is the relevant unit of moral responsibility. Since as he asserts, “explanatory 
nationalism does not fit the real world … [in that] global factors are all-important for explaining 
present human misery [for our purposes, environmental degradation]” (Pogge 2002: 144). The 
reason for this, he argues, is that supra-state institutions (e.g., the IMF, World Bank, WTO, etc.), 
international law, and globalized modes of interaction shape domestic policy and state outcomes 
more so than internal decision-making. As he goes on to explain, “such [interstate] factors 
crucially affect what sorts of persons shape national policy…what incentives these persons face, 
what options they have, and what impact the implementation of any of their options would have 
on domestic poverty and human-rights fulfillment [and for our purposes, environmental 
protection]” (Pogge 2002: 144). Consequently, the problem with holding states exclusively 
accountable for ecocide is that such a view fails to recognize the extent to which the globalized 
and interdependent international order determines domestic proceedings. As Simon Caney states, 
“existing international institutions (such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the 
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establishing the full class of actors responsible for overcoming these wrongs bolsters the 
prospects of achieving successful reparative and reconciliatory outcomes.100 In this light, the 
work aims to avoid the mistake of overly or exclusively focusing on state responsibility at the 
expense of ignoring other actors (e.g., individuals, corporations, intergovernmental 
organizations, etc.) potential role in generating ecocide.101  
                                                        
International Monetary Fund (IMF)), by promoting economic growth, encourage countries to 
engage in deforestation and the high use of fossil fuels, both activities which lead to climate 
change [and environmental harms more generally]” (Caney 2005: 755). Moreover, another 
problem with viewing states as the sole locus of responsibility for ecocide is that while it may 
seem justifiable to hold states accountable for their self-governing decisions; it is nevertheless 
true, that a substantial amount of environmental harm is committed by illegal and non-state 
sanctioned activity perpetrated by individuals or corporations, i.e., harm(s) caused by rogue 
actor(s) that the state did not endorse, support, approve, or authorize. Additionally, it is important 
to recognize the role of multinational corporations, wealthy individuals, foreign powers, and 
international institutions in shaping state policy through their ability to lobby, pressure, coerce, 
capture, or control domestic legislation and regulatory processes. As such, all of these factors 
express the diminishing role of state sovereignty; and thus, they offer insight into why focusing 
only on state responsibility for ecocide is inadequate. In summary, such a state-centric framing 
fails to account for at minimum two relevant levels of analysis. First, it ignores the impact of 
international institutions and global systems that determine state policy at a macro-level. 
Secondly, it fails to account for environmental harms resulting from the activities of non-state 
actors (e.g., individuals and corporations) operating independent of or undermining state 
authority at a micro-level. 
100 The justification for determining who is responsible for environmental transformative justice, 
prior to determining what is required, stems from an intuition that responsibility is the key 
motivating precondition for justice, i.e., we have to first feel that an issue matters and pertains to 
us, before we are motivated to act. As Furio Cerutti explains, “whatever our theories about 
justice are, we tend to do justice to people only when we feel that we are responsible for their 
survival, dignity, and well-being” (Cerutti 2009: 493). As such to prevent our proposed theory of 
environmental transformative justice from being purely scholastic, it is essential that the view 
adequately express a notion of responsibility capable of motivating and persuading the 
appropriate parties to take action.      
101 One of the challenges of undertaking an analysis of responsibility in Transitional Justice and 
environmentalist is that defining a conception of ‘responsibility’ that covers all of our everyday 
uses of the term has proven philosophically difficult. As David Miller states, “the concept of 
responsibility ―has proved to be one of the most slippery and confusing terms in the lexicon of 
moral and political philosophy” (Miller 2007: 82). For instance, H.L.A. Hart vividly explicates 
some of the various uses in the following passage: “As a captain of the ship, X was responsible 
for the safety of his passengers and crew. But on his last voyage he got drunk every night and 
was responsible for the loss of the ship and all aboard. It was rumored that he was insane, but the 
doctors considered that he was responsible for his actions. Throughout the voyage he behaved 
quite irresponsibly, and various incidents in his career showed that he was not a responsible 
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 Consequently, this chapter endeavors to develop an expansive account of responsibility 
that can be applied to our paradigm cases of ecocide. The goal is that an effective delineation 
will assist subsequent chapters in apportioning actors’ requisite obligations (i.e., necessary aims, 
measures, and mechanisms) for achieving environmental transformative justice. 
 Ideally, the conception of responsibility developed ought to be persuasive, politically 
useful, reasonably acceptable to the parties involved, and serve to counter harmful and obscuring 
ideologies that disguise accountability (both over-inclusively and under-inclusively) for ecocide. 
To achieve these aims, the chapter will proceed in two sections: (1) summarize the conception of 
responsibility traditionally employed in both Transitional Justice and environmentalism, so as to 
discern a common understanding of responsibility that satisfies both disciplines;102 (2) offer a 
hypothetical instance of ecocide that fulfills all our criteria (i.e., from the last chapter)103 as a 
means of testing a proposed theory of responsibility designed to delineate classes of actors 
answerable (e.g., morally, legally, politically, etc.) for repairing and reconciling the harm that 
broadly meets the goals of both disciplines.  
 In many ways this work strives to serve as a bridge between Transitional Justice and 
environmentalism; two disciplines that have hitherto not engaged and communicated with each 
other. In this light, it is helpful to discern similarities and differences in each discipline’s 
                                                        
person. He always maintained that the exceptional winter storms were responsible for the loss of 
the ship, but in the legal proceedings brought against him he was found criminally responsible 
for his negligent conduct, and in separate civil proceedings he was held legally responsible for 
the loss of life and property. He is still alive, and he is morally responsible for the deaths of 
many women and children” (Hart 1968: 211). Thus, our initial use of the term relies on a rough-
and-ready folk conception, which will hopefully be further refined as we delve into the 
respective disciplines’ employment of the concept.    
102 The term ‘discipline’ is used loosely in the chapter; since, as will be discussed subsequently, 
it is unclear if environmentalism represents a coherent discipline. 
103 The need for greater conceptual freedom in stipulating details while examining theories of 
responsibility, justifies why it is beneficial to analyze hypothetical scenario(s) instead 
exclusively limiting ourselves to the actual facts of the real-world examples that we explored last 
chapter.  
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respective positions and practices regarding the allocation of responsibility.104 Ultimately, the 
work contends that both disciplines (after having taken rather different routes) have each 
developed comparable notions of responsibility.  
 Thus, the goal of this section is to illustrate key features undergirding the notion of 
responsibility that both disciplines employ in achieving their desired objectives. The hope is that 
greater conceptual integration will serve to facilitate each discipline’s ability to draw upon and 
utilize potentially valuable conceptual insights and practical tools from the other when 
confronting ecocide. 
 To summarize, the chapter aims to demonstrate that both disciplines have settled on an 
understanding of responsibility that has three central components.105 First, the requisite notion of 
responsibility must be both backward (retrospective) and forward (prospective) looking. 
Backward looking in that it is able to hold actor(s) accountable (e.g., morally, politically, legally, 
etc.) for their deed(s) that are broadly construed to include both action and inaction.106 Forward 
looking in that it is able to discern actor/actors’ obligations towards particular object(s), 
                                                        
104 Unfortunately, neither discipline has set forth a clear and systematic articulation of its 
respective conception of responsibility. Thus, the work attempts to offer such an understanding 
by analyzing historical trends, developments, proclamations, discussions, and practices within 
Transitional Justice and environmentalism to highlight how each discipline approaches the 
subject of responsibility.     
105 There are undoubtedly more than three points of commonality between Transitional Justice 
and environmentalism’s conception(s) of responsibility (e.g., responsibility for harms can track 
across state borders, responsibility is not wholly determined by causal proximity, etc.). 
Nevertheless, the justification for analyzing specifically these three components is that they are 
important for devising a notion of responsibility that satisfies core aims of each discipline.  
106 Joel Feinberg, in his work Doing and Deserving, canonically describes past-oriented blame 
and the legal liability model of responsibility as both based in establishing contributive fault: 
“First it must be true that the responsible individual did the harmful thing in question or at least 
that his action or omission made a substantial causal contribution to it. Second, the causally 
contributory conduct must have been in some way faulty. Finally, if the harmful conduct was 
truly ‘his fault,’ the requisite causal connection must have been directly between the faulty 
aspect of his conduct and the outcome” (Feinberg 1970: 222).  
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relation(s), and end(s) (e.g., a referee’s responsibility is to call a fair game).107 Secondly, both 
disciplines benefit from utilizing a conception of responsibility that is able to hold actors both 
aggregately and collectively answerable and responsive;108 while concurrently, maintaining 
mechanisms for distinguishing and differentiating degrees, levels, and kinds of culpabilities, 
accountabilities, duties, and obligations between them.109 Finally, the notion of responsibility 
                                                        
107 In this sense, for an actor to be responsible requires that: (1) an actor must be able to 
knowingly cause a certain effect; (2) an actor must reasonably deem these effects beneficial, and 
(3) an actor must have been able to act otherwise, i.e., not achieve the desired effects. For 
instance, Kyle Whyte eloquently defines proscriptive responsibility as, “the reciprocal (though 
not necessarily equal) attitudes and patterns of behavior that are expected by and of various 
parties by virtue of the different roles that each may be understood to play in a relationship. 
Elders may have responsibilities to mentor youth through passing on wisdom; younger 
generations are, in turn, responsible for learning actively from their elders. A community may 
have a responsibility to care for sturgeon habitat; sturgeon, in turn, may provide food and may 
even be expected to protect wild rice and the fishery itself” (Whyte 2013: 519).   
108 For clarificatory purposes it is helpful to briefly explain the difference between aggregative 
(the concept is also sometimes referred to as shared, summative, or distributed responsibility in 
the social ontology literature) versus collective (the concept is also sometimes referred to as 
group or joint responsibility in the social ontology literature) responsibility. Essentially, 
‘aggregate responsibility’ is an individualist notion that distributes responsibility to each of the 
members that comprise the entity under discussion. So, saying “we are responsible” in this sense 
is like saying, “we have red hair”; in that saying, “we have red hair” means that I have red hair 
and you have red hair, just as “we are responsible” in this sense means I am responsible, and you 
are responsible. Whereas, ‘collective responsibility’ is non-distributional, it is collective in a 
stronger sense. For instance, saying, “we are responsible” in this sense is like saying, “we 
surrounded the castle”; “we surrounded the castle” does not mean that I surrounded the castle 
and you surrounded the castle; it is not distributive. And the same for “we are responsible” in the 
collective sense. As such, in cases of collective responsibility, responsibility may not confer to 
individual members, in fact sometimes collectives can be responsible for something, even though 
none of the members comprising the collective bear any responsibility. For instance, imagine a 
scenario in which a mine that a corporation excavated eighty years ago, presently collapses and 
causes an avalanche. Furthermore, the corporation destroyed all their records and information 
pertaining to the mine over sixty years ago. In such a scenario, none of the current employees or 
stakeholders of the corporation are personally responsible for the avalanche because none of 
them were involved with the initial excavation or destruction of the relevant information that 
would have informed them of an impending crisis that required their intervention; but yet, the 
corporation would still be held collectively liable for harm.  
109 For instance, as stipulated all of our cases of ecocide must contain state oppression (e.g., 
direct, indirect, or negligent). Thus, with regards to the type of environmental harm we are 
concerned with, the state is necessarily collectively responsible as a group-agent. But that does 
not imply it is the only group-agent collectively responsible; since, multiple (yet separate) group-
agents can be held aggregately responsible, if they each contribute to a harm (e.g., a corporation 
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must be socially capacious, in that the categories and kinds of social-entities included as 
potential bearers of responsibility is expansive (e.g., including individual(s), corporation(s), 
agency(ies), community(ies), institution(s), state(s), interstate organization(s), global network(s), 
etc.).110  
                                                        
that caused environmental destruction with state permission). Furthermore, holding a group-
agent collectively responsible does not foreclose the prospects of piercing the group-agent itself 
and concurrently allocating aggregative responsibility to individual members comprising the 
group.  
110As will be discussed, entities can be held responsible in various ways. But for the purposes of 
this work, only entities that constitute group-agents can be held collectively responsible. As such, 
it is necessary to specify what distinguishes a group-agent from other socio-ontological 
arrangements. Hence, below is a brief taxonomy of socio-ontological arrangements designed to 
illustrate the difference between sets, amalgamations, collectives and groups. First, ‘sets’ are 
non-morally relevant grouping of individuals, e.g., redheads, those born on May 26th, everyone 
who sneezed within the past minute. Such groupings are not appropriate sites of collective or 
aggregative responsibility. For a comparable conceptualization, see Peter French’s discussion of, 
“mere collections of people” (French 1984: 5). Next ‘amalgamations’ are individuals in direct 
contact with each other due to some immediate circumstance, e.g., the survivors of a plane crash, 
people (customers, chefs, waiters, the owner, etc.) in a restaurant an hour before closing, patrons 
in a movie theatre. Such groupings are not appropriate cites of collective responsibility. But, 
under some circumstances the actors may share aggregative responsibility to organize 
themselves into a ‘random collective’ to achieve some end. For instance, imagine an 
amalgamation of random passersby coming upon a man stuck in an abandoned well, they realize 
that he will drown if they do not help him up; but they disagree on how to achieve this. As they 
stand around arguing about what to do, he drowns. In such a case it is obvious that something 
ought to have been done. Nevertheless, we would not hold the amalgamation in-and-of-itself 
responsible, but would instead, hold each actor responsible for failing to come together to assist. 
For a comparable conceptualization, see Virginia Held’s discussion of, “random collectives” 
(Held 1970: 471-481). Whereas, ‘collectives’ are collections of individuals that mutually enter 
into an agreement to achieve some end, e.g., going on a walk together, playing tennis, helping a 
friend move into a new apartment, etc. Essentially, at minimum collective formation requires A 
and B to commit to E. Thus, there are two commitments: A committing to cooperate with B to 
achieve E and B committing to A to achieve E. But importantly, collectives lack permanency and 
dissolve once the commitment is satisfied. As such, the responsibility for harm caused during the 
course of the commitment is shared in aggregate by both A and B, but such arrangements do not 
generate collective responsibility – which unfortunately, is somewhat confusing because of the 
name. For a comparable conceptualization, see Stephanie Collins’ discussion of, “end-oriented 
groups” (Collins 2017: 588-590). Lastly, ‘groups’ are agents in their own right in that they are 
group-agents that come into being when individuals intend to establish an ongoing institution 
that can exist even if the composition of the members change, e.g., companies, corporations, 
clubs. Essentially, ‘groups’ form when A commits to B to form an identifiable subject E that can 
exist and operate independently of A or B’s involvement. In this case if a harm is caused during 
the course of group activity, the individual members may share responsibility; but there emerges 
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 Before we delve into a summary of each discipline’s respective path to the above 
conception of responsibility, it is helpful to emphasize that it is unsurprising that both have 
settled on similar views. Since, as will be shown, they are both responding to comparable, 
overlapping, and interrelated global trends and developments, e.g., greater interconnectivity 
between peoples and places, weakening sovereignty of the nation-state, growing asymmetry 
(diminishing parity) concerning particular peoples, institutions, and states’ worldwide influence. 
But it is also important to highlight that in practice and theory, both Transitional Justice and 
environmentalism have played roles in substantively and epistemically producing these shifts, in 
that each has effectively advocated for changing our perception, understanding, orientation, 
behavior, and relation to each other and the world.  
 
A. Responsibility in Transitional Justice  
 
 Historically, Transitional Justice focused predominately on individual responsibility. The 
discipline’s nascent orientation becomes clear after observing the Allies’ decision at Nuremberg 
and Tokyo War Trials to prosecute individuals for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 
crimes of aggression; instead of holding Germany, Japan, the NAZI regime, or the Japanese 
Empire collectively responsible for the atrocities committed during WWII. As Britain’s Chief 
Prosecutor at Nuremburg, Sir Hartely Shawcross advocated, “there can be no reconciliation 
unless individual guilt for the appalling crimes of the last few years replaces the pernicious 
theory of collective guilt on which so much racial hatred hangs” (Shawcross 1996: A17).     
                                                        
a sense of collective responsibility as well, which applies to the group itself as a single, unified, 
moral agent. For a comparable conceptualization, see Margaret Gilbert’s discussion of “plural 
subjects” (Gilbert 1989, 2000, and 2006). As Christian List and Philip Pettit explain, groups can 
constitute moral agents if they, “have representational states, motivational states, and a capacity 
to process them and act on their basis” (List and Pettit 2011: 162). 
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 It is significant to highlight that the Allies’ decision to pursue individual responsibility 
was groundbreaking, as traditionally international law was regarded as limited to relations 
between states as group-agents. For instance, James Brierly in his work, The Law of Nations, 
classically defined international law as, “the body of rules and principles of action, which are 
binding upon civilized states in their relations with one another” (Brierly 1963: 1). 
 Thus, pursuant to the classical model, states rather than individuals (i.e., natural persons) 
would be held accountable for violations of international law, e.g., if a battalion from state-A 
violated international law in state-B, state-B would seek redress collectively against state-A, 
instead of proceeding against the individual members of the battalion.111  Essentially, this 
example illustrates that while it is causally necessary that states act through individuals (e.g., 
their agents, representatives, and citizens); customarily, the legal notion of state responsibility 
conveyed the perception that states act themselves as social bodies (group-agents), not through 
the aggregated acts of individuals comprising them.   
 Nevertheless, in the aftermath of WWI this classical view of international law proved 
problematic. To summarize at the Treaty of Versailles, the Allies employed the then orthodox 
understanding of international law and held Germany collectively responsible for, “violation of 
established laws and customs of war and the elementary laws of humanity” (1919).112 But this 
decision proved costly, in that many historians believe that the “war guilt” clause, (i.e., decreeing 
that Germany was responsible for the damages and losses suffered during the war) and the 
                                                        
111  Additionally, under traditional international law, state-A may not do certain things to state-B 
or any other state. Conversely, state-B or any other state may not do the same thing to state-A. 
However, all these states may do whatever they want within their borders, i.e., the focus is 
between states, not between states and individuals or between individuals themselves (Brierly 
1963).  
112 However, it should be noted that while the Allies themselves did not directly prosecute any 
individual after WWI, the German Imperial Court of Justice at Leipzig tried twelve of the forty-
five individuals that the Allies had recommended but convicted only six (Bassiouni 1997: 20).  
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imposition of levies and sanctions on the German people as retributive compensation for harm 
suffered, contributed to the rise and success of the NAZI party precipitating WWII.113  
Consequently, after WWII, the Allies wanting to avoid making the same mistake opted to 
eschew collective guilt (i.e., declaring an entire state or people responsible) and instead 
embraced a legal response centered on condemning the evils of the period by prosecuting 
individuals for violating international law. For instance, at Nuremberg it was famously 
pronounced, “crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities” 
(1945).       
 The Allies’ decision to target individual actors in the wake of the atrocities of WWII 
instead of whole states or peoples proved successful, in that it is often credited as a key factor in 
the rapid, effective, and lasting restoration and reintegration of Germany and Japan into the 
international community. Thus, in light of this accomplishment, Transitional Justice 
wholeheartedly advocated and implemented policy-approaches that remained dedicated to 
pursuing individual responsibility as the preferred means of overcoming legacies of historical 
injustice: As Saira Mohamed narrates in her highly informative work on the history of collective 
responsibility in Transitional Justice: 
  In the trials confronting the legacies of repressive military rule in Latin America in the 
 1980s; the creation of the international tribunals addressing the crimes committed in the 
 former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1990s; the establishment of South Africa's 
 ambitious and groundbreaking Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 1995; and the 
 adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (‘ICC’) in 1998, jurists, 
 policymakers, and human rights advocates have emphasized the importance of focusing 
 attention on the actions of individuals, and have cautioned against assigning blame for 
 atrocities to groups or  states. (Mohamed 2009: 328) 
 
 
1. TJ and the Return of Collective Responsibility   
                                                        
113 Elazar Barkan’s work, The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices, 
provides an in-depth discussion illustrating that by, “forcing an admission of war guilt at 
Versailles, rather than healing, the victors instigated resentment that contributed to the rise of 
Fascism” (Barkan 2000: xxiii). 
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 However recently, the discipline’s hegemonic acceptance that grave injustices are best 
overcome through focusing strictly on individual over collective responsibility has come under 
scrutiny. Ruti Teitel succinctly problematizes the choice to ignore collective responsibility, 
explaining that, “criminal justice primarily seeks to establish individual responsibility for 
wrongdoing, but the tyranny of the modern bureaucratic state diffuses responsibility throughout 
the polity; thus, the ordinary workings of criminal justice are inapposite” (Teitel 2000: 149). 
Consequently, Teitel believes Transitional Justice ought to acknowledge that, “the massive and 
systemic wrongdoing that is particularly characteristic of modern repression implies a 
recognition of the mix of individual and collective responsibility” (Teitel 2000: 217).  
 Essentially, Teitel’s insight is that grave injustices are often systemic and pervasive; thus, 
relying on a conventional understanding of individual responsibility is inadequate or unsuitable 
for fully grasping, confronting, and remedying the scope and scale of the wrongs under 
consideration. He argues that Transitional Justice can better overcome injustice by accepting a 
more diffuse and comprehensive view of responsibility (i.e., one that is capable of capturing the 
socio-political background and structural forms generating much contemporary oppression), 
instead of limiting the analysis to individual agency.   
 Recently, Transitional Justice has heeded this insight and begun moving in precisely this 
direction, as vividly evidenced by the International Court of Justice’s 2007 ruling that countries 
as well as individuals could be prosecuted for genocide.114 Nevertheless, as Mohamed explains 
                                                        
114 The 2007 decision was made pursuant to a 1993 claim filed by Bosnia and Herzegovina to the 
International Court of Justice that Serbia and Montenegro was committing genocide (i.e., during 
the breakup of Yugoslavia, Serbs were responsible for killing between 100,000 and 200,000 
Bosnian Muslims, in what is widely regarded as the worst atrocity in Europe since WWII) (Ball, 
Tabeau, and Verwimp 2007: 3). Ultimately, the court ruled that genocide had occurred (i.e., in 
the small town of Srebrenica in which eight thousand Bosnian men and boys were massacred in 
 89 
there has been ample backlash against, “the ICJ’s conclusion that the Genocide Convention 
obligates states not to commit genocide and that the ICJ has jurisdiction to decide the 
responsibility of a state for committing genocide aroused significant criticism” (Mohamed 2009: 
349).  
 Reservations against the Court’s decision, affirming that states can be found collectively 
responsible, stem from the fact that not all citizens of even the most deplorable nation(s) engage 
in morally reprehensible activity (e.g., murder, rape, torture, etc.).115 Thus, critics argue it would 
be unjust to hold uninvolved actors that happen to reside in a state responsible for atrocities they 
did not commit and maintain that it is wiser to remain focused on individual malfeasances (i.e., 
continuing the practice of determining guilt through traditional criminal trials), as means of 
declaring the innocence of the remaining members of the society (i.e., those that did not partake 
in the commission of grave wrongs).  
 The benefit of such an approach (i.e., stressing the need to delineate between the guilty 
and innocent) represents a vital step in the transitional process in that removing, punishing, and 
sanctioning bad actors can break cycles of violence, hatred, and animosity between groups by 
diminishing the victimized group’s need for vengeance; while concurrently, increasing the 
likelihood that the remaining members of the community can work together to heal.116 As Jane 
Stromseth asserts, a core value and aim of individually focused criminal proceedings is that, 
                                                        
July 1995), but that there was not enough evidence attributing the genocide to Serbia despite the 
fact that the Court confirmed that it was authorized to find states liable ((SaCouto 2007: 2).    
115 For instance, during the Rwandan genocide it is estimated that there were around 200,000 
perpetrators (i.e., “any person who participated in an attack against a civilian in order to kill or to 
inflict serious injury on that civilian”) in a population of over seven million, in what is widely 
considered the highest per capita perpetrator rate in modern history (Straus 2004: 87).   
116 Additionally, prosecuting those responsible diminishes the need for vengeance from the 
victimized group and as such can assist in breaking the cycle of violence between historical 
antagonists. As Aryeh Neier states, “if those directly responsible are tried and punished, the 
burden of blame will not be carried indiscriminately by members of an entire ethnic group. 
Culpability will not be passed down from generation to generation” (Neier 1998: 211).  
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“[they] remove the stain of impunity from traumatized societies” (Stromseth 2007: 253). 
 Despite these important goals, Transitional Justice scholars have begun to recognize 
shortcomings (i.e., in regard to achieving justice) that arise from wedding the discipline to an 
exclusively individualistic conception of responsibility. For example, Transitional Justice has 
long emphasized the importance of truth and truth-telling as a vital aspect of the reparative and 
reconciliatory process. But individual criminal trials are often unable to paint a complete picture 
of events, produce shortages of truth, and limit truth-telling in part because their traditional 
focus, design, and procedure, readily overlooks delving into the structural background elements 
driving the actor’s motivation(s), decision-making process(es), and behavior(s).  
 For instance, individual trials fail to account for the actions (or inactions) of those who 
stood by and watched while atrocities occurred or those who legally supported, abetted, and 
elected leaders calling for the commission of such harms. As Laurel Fletcher and Harvey 
Weinstein state, “individualized guilt may contribute to a myth of collective innocence” 
(Fletcher and Weinstein 2002: 580).  
 Succinctly, Thomas Franck clearly expresses the central issue caused by maintaining 
Transitional Justice’s restrictive focus on individual liability. “Genocide is a hydra-headed 
monster. It warrants a multifaceted response. The heralded advent of individual liability should 
not cloud our understanding of the continued importance of state responsibility” (Franck 2007: 
573). Accordingly, Mark Drumbl bemoans moral-gaps resulting from ignoring the insight that 
mass atrocities require mass action. “The deliberate choice by international criminal justice 
institutions to selectively blame a handful of individuals . . . erases . . . the involvement of 
ordinary [persons]…[thus] leads to a retributive shortfall, insofar as only a few people receive 
their just deserts, while many powerful states and organizations avoid accountability” (Drumbl 
2005: 1314).   
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 The above quotes express Transitional Justice’s growing recognition that pervasive and 
systemic human rights violations generally involve state apparatuses, bureaucratic machinery, 
and social resources necessary for their commission. Consequently, to better reveal the complex 
bureaucracy, massive scale, and powerful organizational structures that facilitate widespread 
human rights violations; it is often crucial to focus on collective responsibility of the state or 
state-institutions, rather than limiting the analysis to individual guilt. Hence in this light, the 
entire polity is directly accountable when states authorize, permit, or fail to prevent grave 
atrocities from occurring – which was a key point of emphasis in the preceding chapter.  
Additionally, because the commonly held democratic view that states no longer own 
individual(s), but that individual(s) jointly own, manage, and operate states, there has been 
growing recognition of the need for expanding aggregative responsibility for graves harms in 
Transitional Justice settings. For instance, Michael Walzer endorses this insight, asserting that, 
“citizenship is common destiny, and no one, not even [the regime’s] opponents...can escape the 
effects of a bad regime, an ambitious or fanatic leadership, or an overreaching nationalism” 
(Walzer 1977: 297).117  
Or as Franck explains, while defending the need for greater shared responsibility in 
Transitional settings, “when a state deliberately leads, helps, trains, arms, clothes, pays and 
inspires those who do commit genocide, then, while the passive citizenry does not share the 
perpetrators’ guilt, it does share responsibility for the enormity of what was done in the 
                                                        
117 Cerutti vividly illustrates this point in regard to citizens from developed nations responsibility 
for environmental harms. “We, the generality of citizens, are not as responsible for 
environmental errors and crimes committed in the past by corporations and public 
administrations as their leaders and managers are. However, in democratic countries we are 
largely responsible because we elected politicians who were known for their inability and 
unwillingness to regulate polluting activities in the economy and social life; not to mention our 
consumerist attitude in everyday life and our unawareness of its environmental consequences” 
(Cerruti 2009: 493).  
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citizenry’s name and the citizens’ responsibility to help make amends” (Franck 2007: 572-573). 
Thus, the argument maintains that it is in virtue of the privilege of citizenship and being a 
member of a political community that all citizens share some aggregative responsibility for when 
states commit egregious wrongs in their name.118  
Accordingly, Transitional Justice has begun to appreciate that it will gain a more 
complete understanding of the truth, provide more effective redress and reconciliation, and better 
prevent similar harms from occurring in the future by embracing a model of responsibility that is 
readily amenable to including the full range of actors and collective processes that generate grave 
harms. Thus, there has been growing emphasis on the need to expand beyond a legalistic 
conception of individual guilt and embrace models of shared and collective responsibility.119 
 
2. TJ and Common But Differentiated Responsibility 
 
 Obviously, incorporating collective and shared responsibility into the Transitional Justice 
framework is not meant to replace or eliminate holding particular actors guilty for mass state-
sanctioned atrocities; instead, the inclusion of collective and shared responsibility ought to 
function in conjunction with traditional individual liability to better support and facilitate the 
discipline’s aims. As such, the notion of collective and shared responsibility employed by 
Transitional Justice should not hold all actors equally accountable for grave injustices, i.e., the 
                                                        
118 Jaspers in reference to the guilt of the German citizenry after WWII explicitly makes this 
point, stating: “One might think of cases of wholly non-political persons who live aloof of all 
politics, like monks, hermits, scholars, artists-if really quite non-political, those might possibly 
be excused from all guilt. Yet they, too, are included among the politically liable, because they, 
too, live by the order of the state. There is no such aloofness in modern states” (Jaspers 1947: 
56).  
119 How exactly states, peoples, or institutions ought to be held accountable is a matter of debate, 
but at present we will proceed without discussing the topic, but it will be the focus of the 
subsequent chapter.   
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discipline requires mechanisms for differentiating degrees of culpability, blame, duties, and 
obligations between perpetrators, abettors, supporters, spectators, dissenters, resistors, etc.120 
Consequently, Transitional Justice’s growing acceptance and willingness to employ norms of 
collective and shared accountability, while maintaining a strong tradition of prosecuting 
individual actors, demonstrates that the field is moving towards embracing an understanding of 
responsibility as both common, but differentiated (which will henceforth be abbreviated as 
CBDR).   
 Furthermore, a key benefit arising from Transitional Justice’s embrace of CBDR stems 
from the discipline’s dual aim of achieving reparation (i.e., past-oriented redress of past wrongs, 
thereby obtaining justice for victims) and reconciliation (i.e., future-oriented restoration of civic 
trust and social solidarity; seeking justice for social rehabilitation and progress) in response to 
grave injustices. Essentially, an effective and just transition requires both backward- and 
forward-looking considerations; and fortunately, a notion of CBDR assists in furthering these 
aims, while diminishing points of conflict and contention between them.   
 
3. TJ and Backward and Forward-Looking Responsibility 
 
 For instance, the backwards-looking objective is deontic, in that it expresses 
society/societies’ obligation to hold those responsible to account (i.e., do justice for victims). But 
obviously, the stakes in transitional settings are high and the worry is that casting the net of 
blame too widely may have troubling consequences, i.e., rekindle violence, instability, and 
                                                        
120 But at present, Transitional Justice scholarship has not developed a framework for 
differentiating levels and kinds of responsibility. Thus, a goal of subsequent sections will be to 
offer such an account of CBDR in cases of ecocide, but at present I hope it seems intuitive that a 
just model of responsibility for Transitional Justice settings requires distinguishing between the 
various classes of actors. 
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animosity between groups. Thus, focusing over zealously on past-oriented redress potentially 
undermines the discipline’s consequentialist goal of stabilizing a volatile situation by achieving 
peace, security, and reconciliation. However, if past wrong(s) are not given due consideration, 
then such oversight(s) may jeopardize reestablishing the rule of law, promoting accountability, 
signaling a “normative break” from past injustices, or uncovering the historical truth.  
 
 Discussing how to optimally balance these competing deontic and consequentialist 
objectives in the wake of ecocide will be taken up in subsequent chapters.121 But for now, the 
focus remains on demonstrating ways in which embracing an understanding of CBDR assists 
Transitional Justice in overcoming some of the difficulties that arise from embracing the dual 
(and sometimes competing) aims of backward-looking reparation and forward-looking 
reconciliation.  
 For one, employing a notion of differentiated responsibility potentially diminishes 
resentment from actors who never behaved outside of ordinary moral bounds (i.e., did nothing 
egregiously wrong). Such actors would likely feel that they are being unfairly and arbitrarily 
targeted - if they were held to account, while countless other actors around the world who acted 
similarly, receive no condemnation.122  
                                                        
121 Thus, when determining how to deal with perpetrators of ecocide, an adequate approach must 
be mindful of the competing and conflicting roles and values of criminal prosecutions. For 
instance, there is a debate within Transitional Justice with some scholars and practitioners 
arguing that criminal trials are necessary to send the message that there is no impunity for such 
crimes; whereas, others argue that prosecution sends the message that everyone else bears no 
responsibility for what occurred. Accordingly, how to justly balance these concerns will be the 
focus of the next chapter.    
122 This problem in many ways mirrors much of the debate surrounding moral luck. Why should 
certain individuals shoulder greater moral blame depending on social contexts that are outside of 
their control when each led similar lives and behaved comparably? As Thomas Nagel states, “it 
is intuitively plausible that people cannot be morally assessed for what is not their fault, or for 
what is due to factors beyond their control…without being able to explain exactly why, we feel 
that the appropriateness of moral assessment is easily undermined by the discovery that the act or 
attribute, no matter how good or bad, is not under the person's control. While other evaluations 
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 It seems psychologically intuitive that it is counterproductive to condemn actors who 
behaved “normally” (i.e., within generally accepted, average, and everyday ways of being), since 
such widespread blame would likely breed bitterness and dissatisfaction that might weaken 
previously amenable actors’ incentive to assist in reestablishing victims’ wellbeing, restoring 
social cooperation, and reconciling with past wrongs. Thus, for prudential and instrumental 
reasons it is imperative to avoid holding all members of a society equally to account. 
 Furthermore, taking steps towards differentiating responsibility allows Transitional 
Justice to reserve past-oriented blame (e.g., criminal punishment and social redress) to the worst 
perpetrators (i.e., those who flagrantly violated moral conventions); which in turn assists in 
isolating these actors’ guilt from tarnishing the rest of society (i.e., those who behaved in average 
everyday ways). Nonetheless, the decision to hold states collectively responsible, while 
expanding conceptions of aggregative responsibility, allows Transitional Justice to emphasize 
that all the citizens still must take responsibility (i.e., they have a role to play, not that they are all 
collectively guilty) for overcoming injustices and striving towards a better tomorrow (i.e., the 
future-oriented betterment of the society).  
Such an approach is justified because as Franck following Karl Jaspers and Michael 
Walzer, explains, “it is both fair and right that the citizenry of every state that visits serious 
injury on a people should have to bear at least significant parts of the cost” (Franck 2007: 571).  
Thus, we can see how a notion of CBDR assists Transitional Justice in achieving both past-
oriented reparation and future-oriented reconciliation and explains why in recent years the 
discipline has moved in the direction of fostering a diversity of approaches (i.e., individual, 
aggregative, and collective) that can work in conjunction to ensure nuanced responses demanded 
of particular cases.  
                                                        
remain, this one seems to lose its footing” (Nagel 1979: 25).  
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4. TJ and a Socially Capacious Conception of Responsibility  
 
 Lastly, implied in the above discussion is the fact that Transitional Justice must employ a 
conception of responsibility that is capable of including at least two distinct types of 
metaphysical entities natural persons and state collectives. However, recent trends in the 
discipline portend a shift towards further expanding the categories and kinds of social-entities 
included as potential bearers of responsibility. 
 Transitional Justice’s extension of responsibility to novel types of actors is most clearly 
pronounced in the discipline’s recent treatment of corporate accountability.123 As Greeta Koska 
states, “consensus is building around the need for transitional justice to secure redress for 
corporate human rights abuses” (Koska 2016: 41).124 For instance, the former UN High 
Commissioner of Human Rights, Louise Arbor, supports expanding the scope of Transitional 
Justice to include socio-economic rights and corporate responsibility:125 
                                                        
123 Lisa Laplante explains, “it is not clear that the role of business was purposely excluded [in 
Transitional Justice], as much as simply overlooked especially since the notion of non-state 
accountability for human rights is a relatively new area of rights enforcement…certainly, 
Transitional Justice offers a variety of tools that can be suited to deal with human rights 
violations committed by businesses in the context of transitions complementing traditional 
litigation” (Laplante 2016: 2).  
124 For example, in 2011, a Colombian Peace and Justice Court judge requested that Colombia’s 
Attorney General investigate Chiquita Banana and seize the company’s domestic assets because 
of its role in paying protection money to right-wing paramilitary groups responsible for human 
rights violations (Carranza 2015). Additionally, the ICC in 1998 agreed to expand its jurisdiction 
to include legal persons (i.e., corporations) as possible perpetrators (Chiomenti 2006). But as of 
yet, no corporation has been tried. Also, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
recommended a one time “wealth tax” on business that profited from apartheid (Nattrass 1999). 
However, this proposal was never pursued.     
125 The discussion of corporate accountability plays into a larger trend in Transitional Justice that 
focuses on including socio-economic injustices beyond legal and political rights violations. As 
Evelyne Schmid and Nolan Aoife explains, “scholars and practitioners increasingly question 
transitional justice’s neglect of socioeconomic considerations. Over the past few years, an ever-
growing number of authors have engaged in an important and increasingly complex debate about 
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 Transitional justice should take up the challenge that mainstream justice is also reluctant 
 to rise to: acknowledging that there is no hierarchy of rights and providing protection for 
 all human rights, including economic, social and cultural rights...A comprehensive 
 transitional justice strategy would therefore want to  address the gross violations of all 
 human rights during the conflict and, I suggest, the gross violations [including corporate 
 wrongs] that gave rise or contributed to the conflict in the first place. (Arbour 2006: 14)  
 
 While it is true that at present no international trial has judged corporations responsible 
for human violations;126 nonetheless, Transitional Justice scholars have begun to recognize 
corporate complicity and involvement in past atrocities, i.e., through companies’ role in: (1) 
directly taking part in violent activity to further corporate interests; (2) directly assisting human 
rights violators (e.g., funding groups responsible for mass atrocities); (3) passively tolerating 
human rights violations, and (4) facilitating socio-political corruption that may spark, justify, or 
                                                        
whether transitional justice should and/or can incorporate economic and social concerns” 
(Schmid and Aoife 2014: 2). Expanding Transitional Justice’s scope to include socio-economic 
harms is defended on the grounds that excluding these issues reduces the adequacy of any 
narration of a conflict. The problem is that ignoring socio-economic inequality implicates a 
particular story of the conflict, a narrowed discourse for discussing grievance, and a limited 
vocabulary for gaining redress. As such, the worry is that the power of a Transitional Justice 
mechanism to define injustice or violation should provoke careful examination of the story told 
during transition because if we fail to adequately tell what happened, then a just transition may 
be impossible. Thus, in this vein, one of the primary goals of this dissertation is to continue the 
push for greater inclusivity by arguing that environmental harms ought to be included as relevant 
narrative of concern for Transitional Justice.  
126 As prominent legal scholar Leora Bilsky notes, “criminal law’s focus on individual intent has 
persistently prevented it from addressing the collective nature of bureaucratic and corporate 
wrongdoing. Hence no corporation has ever been charged with or convicted for an international 
war crime or similar offense” (Bilsky 2012: 350-351). Roughly, the problem is that it is difficult 
to establish legal liability. Since as previously mentioned, traditionally international criminal 
courts (e.g., the ICC), prioritize prosecuting direct physically violent harm; whereas, businesses 
often contribute to bodily harm only indirectly, i.e., corporations may have transported soldiers, 
transferred monies, supplied goods to combatants, etc. But these acts are only indirectly linked to 
physical violence, e.g., designer Hugo Boss designed and manufactured Nazi SS uniforms, but 
drawing a reasonable legal connection between the clothing and acts of genocide is challenging. 
It is important to point out that the Allies prosecuted a few board members and executives of 
German companies after WWII (e.g., Krupp Steel was accused of preparing Nazis for aggressive 
war; Flick of plundering and the use of slave labor, and I.G. Farben of supplying Zyklon B used 
in gas chambers); but these trials only pertained to individual guilt, i.e., none of the companies 
themselves were found collectively liable. For a thorough discussion of corporate accountability 
and the Holocaust, see Anita Ramasastry 2002 and Matthew Lippman 1992.   
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facilitate mass violence.127 Additionally, the discipline has recently emphasized the important 
function corporations play in furthering reconciliation, social stability, and prosperity by 
facilitating socio-economic growth and development favorable for preventing societies from 
falling back into conflict.128  
 Essentially, the key insight is that if Transitional Justice strives to address the root causes 
of conflict (i.e., establish a holistic narrative of injustice, while obtaining justice for the victims) 
and prevent comparable harm from occurring again (i.e. achieve the discipline’s “never again” 
motto), then it is beneficial to avoid excluding any actors connected to the atrocities (e.g., 
including corporations) from prospective consideration.129 Otherwise, the decision to ignore 
relevant factor(s) and actor(s) may perpetuate impunity and generate accountability-gap(s) that 
risk undermining the transitional process. As Ruben Carranza succinctly explains:   
 Corporate accountability, corruption, other economic crimes, violations of  economic and 
 social rights and disputes involving access to land and natural resources are all part of a 
 broader set of grievances that many in the field of transitional justice simply regarded as 
 background but did not consider inherent to the work of truth commissions, reparations 
 programs or prosecutors. That has changed. There is now more pluralism and transitional 
 justice has evolved from being narrowly focused on physical integrity violations to 
 recognizing that armed conflict, political violence and repression cannot be de-linked 
 from their economic and social causes and consequences…Timor-Leste, Chad, Liberia, 
 Sierra Leone, Kenya and most recently Tunisia, were not dissuaded from turning  to 
                                                        
127 Lawrence Cockcroft explains the link between corruption and human rights violations. “A 
corrupt government, which rejects both transparency and accountability, is not likely to be a 
respecter of human rights. Therefore, the campaign to contain corruption and the movement for 
the promotion and protection of human rights are not disparate processes. They are inextricably 
linked and interdependent” (Cockcroft 1998).  
128 However, as is often the case in transitional settings, pursuing corporate accountability faces 
the pervasive difficulty of balancing competing forward and backwards looking interests, i.e., 
whether to prioritize reconciliatory or reparative concerns. As Damiano de Felice explains: 
“First, even though companies play a critical role in fostering the economic progress which is 
needed to bring societies out of the risk of falling back into conflict and repression, this is not a 
sufficient reason to barter contribution to economic recovery with immunity from accountability. 
If one wants to address the root causes of conflict and repression, it is fundamental to consider 
the role of all actors, including corporations” (de Felice 2015: 517). How to resolve this dilemma 
in cases of ecocide will receive detailed analysis and consideration in the next chapter.  
129 For a thorough analysis of the topic, see Sabine Michalowski’s Corporate Accountability in 
the Context of Transitional Justice (Michalowski 2014).  
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 transitional justice as a way of extracting corporate accountability for the role of 
 businesses during dictatorship or armed conflict. In different ways, their truth  
 commissions and prosecutors examined ‘economic crimes’ alongside physical integrity 
 violations, and the role of corporations in both types of abuse. (Carranza 2015) 
 
 Accordingly, the above summary expresses Transitional Justice scholars and 
practitioners’ mounting awareness and willingness to recognize corporate responsibility. But it is 
important to emphasize that the same reasoning used to justify Transitional Justice’s inclusion of 
corporations as potentially liable (i.e., emphasizing that to fully grasp and correct injustices, it is 
beneficial to consider the role of all types of actors involved in and contributing to harm) is 
readily applicable to any and all categories and kinds of actors capable of constituting group-
agents (e.g., corporation(s), community(ies), state(s), non-governmental agency(ies), etc.).130  
 Basically, once corporations, states, state-institutions, and non-state actors (e.g., the 
interahamwe and janjaweed mentioned last chapter) are considered collectively accountable in 
transitional settings, then there appears to be no sound basis for restricting other types of legal 
persons (defined as natural persons or group-agent) from being held collectively responsible 
within the Transitional Justice framework. Limiting the potential kinds of actors responsible for 
                                                        
130 Essentially, a socially capacious framing of responsibility entails that any entity capable of 
being construed as a legal person (natural persons or group-agents) can be held accountable. 
Thus, non-agential entities (i.e., non-persons, sets, amalgamations) would be excluded. One may 
argue that this seems like an unnecessary distinction, since of course responsibility presupposes 
agency. But it is important to bear in mind that many cultures have embraced norms of 
responsibility that apply to inanimate objects and non-persons. As Feinberg explains, the early 
Greeks, Romans, and Hebrews held “instruments of harm” in-and-of-themselves responsible, 
“whether it were a tool, a weapon, a tree, an ox…was regarded as the immediate and - natural 
object of vengeance. It was noxal, that is, accursed, and had to be forfeited to the victim, or his 
family, to be torn apart or annihilated” (Feinberg 1970: 230). Thus, a socially capacious 
conception of responsibility offers clear standards for excluding many types of entities. For 
instance, in our attempt to discern responsibility for ecocide a socially capacious interpretation 
stipulates that an oil tanker would not be responsible for ecocide after an oil spill, but the captain 
that intentionally crashed it would be; a volcano would not be held responsible for the 
environmental destruction its lava flows cause, but the state that failed to adequately warn, 
protect, or assist a vulnerable population would be; cattle that destroy a grassland would not be 
held responsible, but the agro-business that incentivized a policy of overgrazing would be, etc.  
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grave atrocities unduly hampers practitioners’ ability to respond to complex and novel 
circumstances. Thus, the discipline implicitly recognizes and benefits from embracing a socially 
capacious notion of responsibility, i.e., one capable of holding any and all legal persons 
potentially accountable.       
 In conclusion, this section has hopefully demonstrated that Transitional Justice currently 
employs a notion of responsibility that is: (1) common, but differentiated, (2) both backward and 
forward looking, and (3) socially capacious. Obviously there are many aspects of Transitional 
Justice that will need to be explored to justify integrating “environmental transformative justice” 
within the Transitional Justice framework, e.g., Transitional Justice focuses on the different ways 
that perpetrators are held accountable, the sorts of reparations and amends making that are 
required of them, the need for transformation of social and political structures, creating a 
historical record to memorialize and acknowledge past events, navigate the possibilities and 
perils of reconciliation, and stressing the importance of transitional regimes distinguishing 
themselves from prior regimes that perpetrated or countenanced wrongdoing. Hence, to truly 
make a compelling case for connecting Transitional Justice and environmentalism, the work will 
have to take up how these and other issues find parallels in the case of justly responding to 
ecocide – which, is the focus of the next chapter. But at this point, we can move forward and 
begin analyzing environmentalism’s conceptualization of responsibility. 
 
B. Responsibility in Environmentalism  
 
 In many ways the history of environmentalism is a discussion focused on expanding our 
responsibility towards previously ignored entities. For instance, at the turn of the 20th century 
(i.e., the period often considered the birth of modern environmentalism) John Muir (the founder 
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of the Sierra Club) famously advocated that we have a responsibility to preserve areas of pristine 
nature and non-human life for their intrinsic value (i.e., an ecological responsibility); whereas, 
Gifford Pinchot (the 28th Governor of Pennsylvania) promoted the view that we have a 
responsibility to limit resource extraction to the maximum sustainable yield, so as to conserve 
natural resources for future generations (i.e., an intergenerational responsibility).131 
 Nevertheless, attempting to provide a coherent narrative of the conceptual development 
of responsibility in environmentalism, is hampered by the fact that there is disagreement among 
environmentalists regarding essentially all the elements that would normally define a discipline, 
e.g., the objective(s), mechanism(s), practice(s), subject matter(s), etc.132 Thus, unlike 
Transitional Justice (an extremely broad discipline itself), it is unclear if one can even construe 
environmentalism as a discipline at all.  
 Consequently, what this section aims to achieve is to offer a brief historical overview of a 
few dominant strands in environmental thinking, which express shifts and tensions regarding 
environmentalists’ broad understanding of responsibility. The hope is that this imperfect 
summary, will at least illustrate that a comprehensive account of responsibility for environmental 
harms (i.e., one encompassing a wide swath of often conflicting and competing environmental 
considerations), ought to be: (1) common, but differentiated, (2) both backwards and forward 
looking, and (3) socially capacious.  
                                                        
131 This debate is often credited as the birth of modern environmentalism. For a thorough 
discussion of the topic, see Bryan Norton’s Sustainability (Norton 2005).       
132 The term ‘environmentalism’ is not capitalized in the dissertation, since it does not name a 
proper discipline like Transitional Justice or Environmental Justice. Nevertheless, Joe Desjardin 
provides an illuminating list of prototypical environmental concerns, “conservation of fossil fuels 
and other natural resources, soil erosion and desertification, preservation of wilderness areas, 
forests, and wetlands, preservation of endangered species, air and water pollution, agricultural 
use of pesticide, chemical fertilizers, and genetically modified crops and livestock, moral 
standing for animals and plants, global warming, the depletion of ozone layer, biodiversity, 
urban sprawl, nuclear waste, and population growth” (DesJardins 1998: 825).      
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1. Origins of Environmental Responsibility 
 
 Humans like all other life forms must alter their environment to survive. But, in virtue of 
our cognitive sophistication, behavioral plasticity, and dynamic sociability, we have proven 
exceptionally adept at transforming the world around us. Unfortunately, as John Gray laments, 
our species adaptive capacities have posed a problem for innumerable other organisms: 
“Throughout all of history, and prehistory, human advance has coincided with ecological 
devastation” (Gray 2002: 7).133  
 Hence the evidence of widespread ecological harm, coupled with the insight that early 
man could simply relocate to greener pastures after depleting their current habitat of readily 
accessible resources, allows us to plausibly suggest that many (if not most) prehistoric 
communities would have had limited concern regarding their role in causing ecological 
degradation.134 As Martha Macintyre contends, “the lack of a conservation ethic can itself be 
explained in functionalist terms – they [i.e., prehistoric communities] did not need one and 
therefore did not develop ideas about sustainability. The low populations and simple 
technologies ensured that human impact was restricted” (Macintyre 2002: 5). As Thomas 
                                                        
133 As Lynn White states: “Ever since man became a numerous species, he has affected his 
environment notably. The hypothesis that his fire-drive method of hunting created the world's 
great grasslands and helped to exterminate the monster mammals of the Pleistocene from much 
of the globe is plausible, if not proved” (White 1967: 1203).  
134 As such the property regime of early man was likely one of ‘open access,’ wherein it was 
often the case that no one had the right to exclude anyone else from using a resource in 
uninhabited land. Thus, if this anthropological hypothesis is correct, then prehistoric man’s 
treatment of the environment can be analyzed using Garrett Hardin’s poorly dubbed concept, 
“the tragedy of the commons,” which incongruously has nothing to do with common property; 
but instead, illustrates the hazards of unrestricted ecosystem use arising from lack of 
management system(s), absence of defined property right(s), and the inability to negotiate social 
agreement(s) or convention(s) (Hardin 1968).   
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Princen explains:  
In an ecologically ‘empty world,’ a world in which human impact was minuscule relative 
to the extent and regenerative capacity of resources and waste…being resourceful meant 
getting the most from nature’s bounty…but not for long-term sustenance…[Since] one 
just had to pack up and move on. There was always another frontier. (Princen 2005: 8) 
 
 Accordingly, the assumption is that conceptions of environmental responsibility would 
likely not have arisen until after groups acknowledged that they had no available uninhabited 
land to expand into (i.e., that they lived in a ‘full world’) and were compelled to settle their 
current habitat.135 As Per Olsson, Carl Folke, and Fikret Berkes explain: 
 Investigators found that people moving from one area to another easily gained 
 detailed knowledge of particular resources and species, but peoples’ knowledge of 
 processes and functions of the underlying ecosystem that sustains those resources  was 
 patchy and incomplete. It seems like knowledge and understanding relevant for 
 management of ecosystem dynamics takes a much longer time to develop. This suggests 
 that dwelling for long periods of time in specific places is helpful in generating an 
 understanding of ecosystem dynamics and sustainable management practice. (Olsson, 
 Folke, and Berkes 2004: 77) 
 
 Therefore, once pre-modern communities reach this saturation point (i.e., a “full earth” 
when moving into a new territory required confrontation with another group), their only chance 
of achieving a self-sufficient and peaceful existence (i.e., without invading another group’s 
territory) was to develop ecologically sustainable practices, i.e., “self-interested, conserving 
feedback that comes from attachment to place” (Berkes et al. 2006: 1558). As Berkes explains, 
“[after] the hunters know that it is possible to deplete animals [or resources more generally] by 
overhunting and that wastages do matter, their value systems change accordingly” (Berkes 1998: 
123).  
                                                        
135 This assumption rests on abundant research suggesting that humans in traditional societies 
generally behave as “optimal foragers,” in that they seldom leave resources alone, unless they 
have better options available (Borgerhoff-Mulder 1988). Furthermore, because of their small 
population sizes, pre-saturation hunter-gathering bands would likely not need to or be able to 
read the signs and signals from their lightly treaded upon habitat or separate their exploitative 
impact from non-human (i.e., “natural”) fluctuations that would affect the available abundance of 
resources.    
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 Hence in an attempt to achieve a sustainable lifestyle, there is much anthropological and 
archaeological evidence to suggest that these communities embraced a notion of common 
property, in which members of a community would share a resource but exclude nonmembers of 
the community from accessing it (Bromley 1991). As Margaret McKean explains, “common 
property regimes, used by communities to manage ecological resources for long-term benefits, 
were once widespread around the globe” (McKean 1996: 5).136 
 Accordingly, our discussion of autarkic communities last chapter, vividly illuminated that 
eco-social systems relying on notions of common property are an effective means of sustaining 
resources and connecting peoples to a place.137 Essentially, autarkic communities develop and 
embrace cultural norms supporting environmental stewardship, recognition of the group’s 
embeddedness within their habitat, and internalization of the value of maintaining harmonious 
ecosystem functioning.138 For instance, as Warwick Fox recounts, his conversation with a Nez 
Percé Native American about potentially plowing the land, “Smohalla does not reply with a 
closely reasoned explanation as to why the ground has intrinsic value but rather with a rhetorical 
question expressive of a deep identification with the earth: ‘Shall I take a knife and tear my 
                                                        
136 Elinor Ostrom throughout her illustrious career, worked tirelessly to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of common property regimes (i.e., absent the need for state control or privatization) 
in managing resources for which demand is too high to tolerate ‘open access,’ but for various 
reasons, parceling the resource itself proves challenging. For a thorough analysis of the topic, see 
her work Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Ostrom 
1990).      
137 One of the solutions explored in the next chapter will be the possibility (re)establishing 
common property regimes in response to ecocide.  
138 Stella Tamang, an indigenous leader from Nepal, expresses the relationship thusly, 
“indigenous peoples…have an intimate connection to the land; the rationale for talking about 
who they are is tied to the land. They have clear symbols in their language that connect them to 
places on their land…groups that only can achieve their spiritual place on the planet by going to 
a certain location” (Henningfeld 2009: 117). Another example expressing indigenous societies’ 
internalization and deep recognition of their imbeddedness, integration, and dependence upon 
natural system(s) is the Fijian concept of vanua, “which regards the land, water, and human 
environment as a unit, one and indivisible” (Berkes and Folke 1998: 9).   
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mother's breast?’” (Fox 1986: 76).139  
 As such, we have seen that autarkic communities foster rich notions of environmental 
responsibility that allowed them to sustainably inhabit an ecosystem for generations. But for the 
purposes of analyzing environmentalism’s notion of responsibility for environmental harm, 
focusing on groups that successfully live in harmony with their surrounding habitat, offers 
negligible insight. Consequently, it will be helpful to examine communities that rely on modes of 
subsistence that overextend their ecosystem’s carrying capacity and generate environmental 
degradation. In this light, we will now move on to discuss conceptions of environmental 
responsibility developed in modern Occidental culture.      
 
2. Nuisance Law as Responsibility for Environmental Harm  
 
 Historically, at least in the English-speaking world, individual environmental 
responsibility was limited to the avoidance of causing injury to other’s enjoyment of real estate 
(i.e., their land).140 In early English common law, private property (i.e., land use and ownership) 
                                                        
139 Carolyn Merchant emphasizes that one of the consequences of this shift of perspective, from 
ceasing to view nature as a living, nurturing mother to instead viewing it as inert, dead, and 
mailable matter (i.e., as expressed by Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes, Newton and other fathers of 
modernity), is that an important constraint on exploiting nature was lost. Since as Merchant 
states, “one does not readily slay a mother, dig into her entrails for gold, or mutilate her body” 
(Merchant 2005: 43).  
140 Of course there are older instances of what would today be considered environmental policy 
legislation, e.g. in 676 Cuthbert of Lindisfarne enacts legislation protecting birds on the Farne 
Islands (Okafor 2011: 277); in 1150 Sri Lankan King Nissanka Malla decreed that no animals 
should be killed within a radius of seven gau from his capital city of Anuradhapura (Clifton 
2007); in 11th century the Caliphate of Cordoba organized waste containers and waste disposal 
facilities to prevent contamination (Artz 1980: 149); in 1366 Paris made it illegal for butchers to 
dispose of animal within the city (Hoornweg 2015: 38); in the 14th century the Venetian Republic 
passed legislation to limit deforestation in the surrounding hills to prevent erosion and silting 
downstream (Grove 2003: 16); etc. But these and similar examples were all enacted to deal with 
specific problems and singular issues; and thus, unlike the common law property protection 
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was regarded as sacrosanct (Nolon 2006: 823). As William Blackstone, one of the first and most 
preeminent legal scholars stated, “that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims over 
the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the 
universe” (1782).141 Thus, a plaintiff could file suit for environmental harms that deprived them 
of their land (disseisina – deprivation), direct interference and entry on their land (transgressio – 
trespass), and for indirect interference with the use of their land from outside their land 
(nocumentum – nuisance) (Coquillette 1979: 765).  
 From an environmental perspective, the tort of nuisance appears to be the most relevant 
and compelling cause of action, in that it represents the one area of common law that limits 
landowner’s use of their property. Essentially, nuisance law prohibits private land usage(s) that 
undermine and diminish the rights of other property owners to use and enjoy their land, i.e., sic 
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (“so use your own property as not to injure your neighbors”) 
(Coquillette 1979: 776). Since, the available remedies of a successful nuisance claim include the 
removal and abatement of the aggravation, the tort offers a legal means of stopping 
environmental degradation, i.e., “in civilizing the cities and in protecting the countryside” 
(Brenner 1974: 403). Hence, nuisance law in many ways represents the embryonic origins of 
environmental protection of peace and quiet, clean air, sanitation, etc. (Brenner 1974: 403).  
 For instance, the King’s Bench ruling in Aldred’s Case (1610) is often considered the 
birth of environmental law (Schoenbrod 2000: 5). In the case, the court held that operating an 
odorous pigsty near a neighborhood was a nuisance. As such, Aldred’s Case specifically and 
nuisance law more generally, established legal responsibility to abate noxious noises, smells, 
sights, irritants, and pollutants provided their generation is not in line with the customary use of 
                                                        
framework, none of these policies articulate a comprehensive doctrine of environmental 
responsibility.        
141 See Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England (1782).  
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the land (i.e., think contemporary zoning laws)142 (Epstein 2015: 6).  
 But from an environmental standpoint, an issue with the common law’s reliance on 
customary usage, when determining if an activity is permissible or not, is that such a standard 
neuters nuisance law’s ability to restrict or reproach environmental harm(s) occurring in already 
degraded areas. Consequently, historically mistreated neighborhoods (i.e., those already 
suffering under environmental hardship) will be further disadvantaged in receiving 
consideration, compensation, and protection from new or ongoing harms. Hence, focusing on 
customary use greatly impacts and impairs the possibility of achieving an equitable social 
distribution of environmental bads and goods.  
 More generally, legally assenting to customary practice as appropriate hinders the 
prospect of reducing pollution in societies with histories of environmental mistreatment – such as 
our own. Since obviously, emphasizing the role of traditional use when determining if violations 
have occurred, will reinforce, maintain, and protect current levels and patterns of 
environmentally harmful activity.  
 Basically, accepting customary usage as legitimate renders the common law impotent 
regarding the prospects of legally prohibiting conventional practices or indicting established 
conditions within an area. Thus, an issue with limiting environmental responsibility to common 
law standard(s) in the modern world (i.e., a world defined by mass consumerism, unmitigated 
globalized production, unsustainable resource extraction, and widespread pollution) is that such 
an approach fails at passing judgment against and restricting many environmentally harmful 
practices, i.e., it is unable to compel actors to cease and desist from customary uses of the land 
                                                        
142 For instance, New York City’s implementation of single-use zoning ordinances in the early 
20th century that were initially implemented as urban planning measures to protect the interests 
of high-end merchants on Fifth Avenue from the encroachment of garment factories and other 
industrial operations in a retail area (Nolon 2006: 830).  
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that are damaging to ecosystems. And unfortunately, since, industrial practices have been 
pervasive for generations in many contemporary societies (e.g., during the last two hundred 
years, the Industrial Revolution altered the landscapes of much of Western Europe and North 
America), it is likely this standard would bar many opportunities for pro-environmental legal 
recourse.  
 Hence, an appropriate method to prevent continued environmental degradation requires 
taking responsibility to curb unsustainable production, consumption, extraction, and pollution, 
i.e., proscriptively establish, follow, and enforce acceptable environmental standards. As David 
Schoenbrod explains: “It is much easier to discern a custom against the existence of pigsties in a 
certain neighborhood than a custom about how many pigsties there should be [in society more 
generally]. A few refineries in a large metropolitan area may be fine, but not a dozen” 
(Schoenbrod 2000: 6).  
 Essentially, the issue is that the common law framework is designed to focus on actual 
harm(s) (i.e., a party must show damages). Thus, nuisance claims are inherently reactive and 
backwards looking and as such are ill suited to motivate preventative measures to stop 
environmental harms from occurring in the first place (i.e., beyond the threat of future litigation 
causing actors to forgo or abate potentially tortious activity). Case in point, environmental 
enforcement mechanism(s) based on custom(s) are limited to offering ex post facto judgments 
and as such, are unable to determine if new technologies or social practices are acceptable prior 
to implementation. 
 Also, traditionally, under the common law, only aggrieved private property owners could 
bring nuisance claims. Therefore, private torts are unable to protect unowned or publicly owned 
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natural objects.143 Furthermore, under common law property owners had no responsibility to 
preserve their land (i.e., so long as no one else’s property was impacted, land owners had the 
right to degrade or destroy their property as they saw fit). Thus, worrisomely for many 
environmentalists, these standards entail that natural objects are only protected for their extrinsic 
value to their owner, i.e., common law does not recognize the intrinsic value of nature in-and-of-
itself or extrinsic value to the commons.   
 Moreover, many environmental nuisances have long gestation periods, e.g. the threat of 
radioactive poisoning from Plutonium is minimum 24,100 years; arsenic, lead, and mercury can 
contaminate water supplies for generations; one fifth of carbon molecules stay in atmosphere for 
over a thousand years, etc. (Bell 2017: 280). As such, the long temporal scope of environmental 
harms may foreclose opportunities to hold responsible parties to account, i.e., if those liable for 
causing harm cease to exist (e.g., natural persons dying or corporations going out of business) in 
the intervening period, between their noxious activity and the onset of resulting damages, then 
those harmed may be left with no legal recourse.   
 Furthermore, litigation is costly (i.e., in terms of both financial, temporal, and social 
capital); thus, the poor or socially disenfranchised may in practice lack the ability to investigate, 
file, and pursue valid causes of action. Consequently, it is likely that limiting environmental 
protection to the tort of nuisance disproportionally benefits wealthy and socially privileged 
actors.  
                                                        
143 Historically public nuisance was a crime, only enforceable by the Crown. “Indeed, until 1536, 
private actions for public nuisance were disallowed on the grounds that only the king, and 
certainly no common person could have a remedy because of a crime” (Hodas 1989: 884). Thus, 
in the early common law period there were no mechanisms available for private citizens to file 
suit against public environmental harms. Also, we can see that the state (i.e., the Crown) always 
maintained the power to dictate and enforce environmental protection. Nevertheless, for much of 
the modern period the state abstained from taking an active role in preserving and defending 
non-human environmental objects and interests.  
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 Finally, the common law approach developed to handle situations in which a clearly 
defined defendant harmed a clearly defined plaintiff. In such cases, the roles and responsibilities 
are well defined, in that the plaintiff is the aggrieved party responsible for bringing the cause of 
action and the defendant is responsible for compensating the plaintiff for their loss and/or 
stopping the harm from occurring once guilt is established. 
But much environmental harm in the modern world does not fit this narrative, in that 
many suffer (hundreds, thousands, millions, even billions in the case of climate change) from 
effects resulting from the cumulative and combined contributions of innumerably dispersed and 
uncoordinated actors (potentially even the victims themselves). As such, common law is 
ineffective in providing recourse for these sorts of cases.  
  As Schoenbrod wryly explains, the problem with pursuing complex systemic harm(s) 
from within the common law framework is that, “enforcement maybe worthwhile [i.e., from a 
social perspective], but worth no one’s while [from an individual perspective] (Schoenbrod 
2000: 6).144 Thus, if the only available social response to environmental destruction is the 
common law tort of nuisance, then many instances of pervasive, widespread, and systemic 
industrial overproduction and waste  (which much environmental harm is since the Great 
Acceleration)145 may go unabated and unenforced. As Simon Caney explains, the problem with 
such a position is that, “we should not [emphasis added] take pollution as a given and then act in 
                                                        
144 Christopher Stone in his famous essay, “Should Trees Have Legal Standing,” explains the 
problem with relying on common law approaches to protecting a stream from pollution, thusly: 
“So far as the common law is concerned, there is in general no way to challenge the polluter’s 
actions save at the behest of a lower riparian…[But] the lower riparian may simply not care 
about the pollution. They themselves may be polluting and not wish to stir up legal waters. They 
may be economically dependent on their polluting neighbors. And, of course, when they discount 
the value of winning by the cost of bringing the suit and the chances of success, the action may 
be simply not worth the undertaking” (Stone 1972: 462-463).  
145 The Great Acceleration is demarcated as the post-WWII period, in which the human 
“population doubled in just 50 years, to over 6 billion by the end of the 20th century and the 
global economy increased by more than 15-fold” (Steffen et al. 2007: 617).  
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a reactive fashion: rather, we should be pro-active and take steps to minimize the likelihood of 
excessive pollution” (Caney 2005: 769).  
 
3. Statutory Expansion of Environmental Responsibility  
 
 Consequently, for all of these reasons modern states have pushed for statutory measures 
aimed at proactively strengthening environmental protection by expanding our individual and 
social environmental responsibility to avoid causing certain types of harms.146 According to 
Holmes Rolston, the explanation, justification, and motivation behind the litany of environmental 
legislation enacted during the second half of the 20th century stems from growing recognition 
that, “a community nearing the carrying capacity of its resource base will have to curb short-term 
self-interest for the long-term good of all (Rolston 2001: 351). 
 As Daneil Butt explains, “the [statutory] model…is…one where environmental 
protection is thought to come about using the power of the state to align self-interest with 
environmental good” (Butt 2017: 56). In other words, the legislation attempts to solve scenarios 
in which, the activity of numerous people that would normally be fine (or even beneficial) 
individually, collectively accumulates into social harm.  
 Thus, unlike the common law, which focuses on negative rights of non-interference, the 
                                                        
146 Rolston offers an extensive list of federally enacted environmental law in the United States: 
“Clean Air Act (1955), Amendments (1963, 1965, 1969, 1977, renewed 1970, 1990); Wild and 
Scenic Rivers Act (1968); Wilderness Act (1964) National Environmental Policy Act (1969); 
Marine Mammal Protection Act (1972); Endangered Species Act (1973, 1982), Amendments 
(1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980); National Forest Management Act (1976); Federal Land Policy 
and Management Act (1976); International Environmental Protection Act (1983); 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (Superfund) (1980), 
Amendments (1986); Clean Water Act (1987); Emergency Wetlands Resources Act (1986)” 
(Rolston 2001: 349-350). And, he explains that internationally, “there are over 150 international 
environmental agreements registered with the United Nations” (Rolston 2001: 350).  
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legislative act(s) aim at proactively promoting the public good. Accordingly, the laws often 
afford citizens broad standing (whether directly harmed or not) to bring claims against actors in 
violation of the statutory standards and requirements in the name of the public interest (public 
weal).147  
 As such, 20th century environmental legislation represents a radical departure in social 
engineering, away from laissez faire and retrospective consideration of environmental harm(s), 
tacitly endorsed by the common law, to a statutory approach designed to proactively bring about 
particular state(s) of affairs. For example, The Endangered Species Act aims at halting further 
extinction and protecting maximum biodiversity; The Clean Air and Clean Water Acts aim at 
ensuring safe drinking water and breathable air; Ozone Layer Protection Act aims at restoring 
ozone layer to its preindustrial functioning, etc. Hence, the statutes emphasize a prescriptive and 
forward-looking responsibility to achieve certain environmental targets and end states.  
 Consequently, the statutory measures facilitate an expansion of individual and social 
responsibility regarding environmental harms. Previously, actors were legally limited to pursuing 
claims regarding environmental harms occurring only on their own property and conversely 
actors were only liable for causing such harm to others’ property. Under the contemporary 
statutory framework all citizens can actively monitor and enforce environmental law(s) for the 
common good and all actors are liable in virtue of violating the statutes, even if no party is 
directly harmed. Thus, we can see that the statutory framework expands the subject matter of 
environmental responsibility beyond the traditional common law concern of protecting private 
land use.  
                                                        
147 For a vivid example of the broad standing afforded by contemporary environmental law to the 
general public, see the Supreme Court case Tennessee Calley Authority v. Hill (1978); in which, 
Hiram Hill, a law student at University of Tennessee, successfully filed suit under the 
Endangered Species Act (1973) to enjoin the construction of the Tellico Dam.  
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 However as previously stated, one of the key insights driving the proliferation of 
environmental regulations was mounting awareness and recognition that human activity was 
growing increasingly destructive to the environment.148 The concern was that the scope and scale 
of industrial productive and consumptive practices had reached such intensity that the combined 
effect of countless small acts, which in-and-of-themselves would normally be harmless (e.g., 
driving a car, taking a plane, using plastic, turning on air conditioning, fertilizing crops, using 
aerosol spray deodorants, etc.), were when aggregated, producing grave environmental harms 
(e.g., climate change, the sixth mass extinction, ocean acidification, etc.).149  
 Unfortunately, the statutory model faces many challenges in providing a conception of 
environmental responsibility adequate for preventing, repairing, and responding to the above 
crises. First and foremost, it is ill-designed for confronting the fact that many environmental 
problems are international in nature, in that they do not respect or confine themselves to state 
borders, i.e., harms (e.g., acid rain, chemical spills, ozone depletion, etc.) that are generated by 
processes and practices in one (or many) state(s) that can readily cross interstate-lines (e.g., by 
cycling through the atmosphere, waterways, groundwater, etc.) and negatively impact other 
state(s).     
 The problem is that the statutory model offers a framework for stipulating impermissible 
acts within state boundaries; but its intrastate focus, restricts state’s ability to command and 
control actors outside of their territorial borders to cease and desist from noxious activity. Hence, 
                                                        
148 Eileen Crist succinctly and evocatively describes, “the real [environmental] problem [as] the 
industrial consumer-complex that is overhauling the world in an orgy of exploitation, 
overproduction, and waste” (Crist 2007: 55).    
149 Rachel Carson’s seminal work, Silent Spring, offers one of the first and most successful of 
these types of accounts; in that she demonstrated, how the aggregated impact of non-coordinated 
individual behavior(s) (i.e., farmers using DDT to protect their crops) caused widespread and 
unforeseen environmental harm (i.e., the endangerment of bird species) (Carson 1962).   
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if states lack authority to extradite and prosecute international actors for “spillover” harms, then 
the statutory model’s limited domestic jurisdiction leaves citizens vulnerable to transnational 
pollution and ecological resource depletion. 
 Thus, a fundamental limitation of the statutory model is that even if citizens take 
maximum precaution for preserving and protecting their environmental wellbeing, i.e., enacting 
the strongest environmental legislation and enforcement mechanisms possible within their 
borders. They are nonetheless left vulnerable regarding environmental injury(ies) from abroad, 
i.e., the only available recourse under the statutory model is campaigning, negotiating, and 
persuading state(s) from which harm is emanating to enact policies aimed at outlawing or 
regulating injurious activity within their sovereign territory or appealing (without further legal 
backing or threat) to the responsible parties to cease and desist from the injurious activity. 
However, if these negotiations and lobbying strategies fail, the statutory model is unable to 
directly prosecute culpable parties or stop injuries from occurring.  
 Accordingly, the statutory model’s domestic framing, poses problems for tackling many 
pressing environmental issues, in that it is quite restricted in its ability to hold actors responsible 
for internationally generated harms to account.150 Essentially, the statutory model proves 
inadequate because its intrastate framing is unable to confront the reality that, “bits of 
populations [citizens] Ecological Footprint can be found all over the world” (Wackernagel and 
Rees 1996: 53).151 As such, environmentalism requires a conception of responsibility capable of 
confronting what Richard Falks calls, “endangered-planet problems” (Falks 1971).  
                                                        
150 As Andrew Linklater explains: “If societies were largely self‐contained and incapable of 
doing harm to one another then the boundaries of moral communities could converge with the 
boundaries of actual political communities, but the reality is quite different, and societies are 
inevitably drawn into complex dialogues about the principles of international coexistence” 
(Linklater 1998: 85). 
151 Mathis Wackernagel and William Rees define “Ecological Footprint” as, “the land (and 
water) area that would be required to support a defined human population and material standard 
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C. Common, But Differentiated Environmental Responsibility 
 
 Recently in a response to the above challenges, the international environmental 
community has moved towards developing and promoting a notion of ‘common, but 
differentiated responsibility’ for environmental harm (CBDR) (Eckersley 2015).152 Essentially, 
the international environmental community has opted to embrace CBDR because of the desire to 
cast a wide net, in the hopes of maintaining the benefits of shared and collective responsibility, 
while concurrently avoiding an overly condemnatory framework that draws socially insensitive 
conclusions by blaming victims for environmental degradation. 
 Basically, the work contends that CBDR is a compromised position between two 
competing strands of environmental thought – what I will broadly dub the ‘Anthropic 
perspective’ (which aims at developing a notion of common responsibility by holding all of 
humanity to account)153 and the ‘Environmental Justice perspective’ (which aims at developing a 
                                                        
indefinitely’” (Wackernagel and Rees 1996: 158). As Andrew Dobson explains the usefulness of 
such a definition is that, “the ecological footprint then becomes a time‐slice indicator of a human 
community’s metabolistic relationship with the goods and services provided by its natural 
environment” (Dobson 2003: 100).  
152 The concept of CBDR was famously expressed in the 1992 Rio Declaration: “States shall co-
operate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and restore the health and integrity of 
the Earth’s ecosystem. In view of the different contributions to global environmental 
degradation, States have common but differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries 
acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable 
development in view of the pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the 
technologies and financial resources they command” (Principle 7, 1992).  
153 For our purposes the Anthropic perspective is not strictly limited to the debate focused on 
determining if human activity has pushed the Earth into new geological age (i.e., the 
Anthropocene), but instead involves any environmental framework that blames humanity in toto 
for environmental degradation – e.g., James Lovelock’s Gaia Hypothesis that views humanity as 
disease that the Earth is combatting (Lovelock 2009); Simon Dalby’s Pyrocentric model that 
views humanity’s reliance on fire as the source of environmental destruction (Dalby 2018); 
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notion of differentiated responsibility attuned to historical realities that certain actors have played 
a greater role in generating environmental harm than others).154 Thus in an attempt to justify why 
environmentalism benefits from embracing CBDR, the remainder of the section will analyze 
these conflicting strands of environmental thought; while concurrently, illustrating how each 
perspective fails at conceptualizing an adequate notion of environmental responsibility.   
 
1. The Anthropic Perspective  
 
 The Anthropic perspective arose as an attempt to effectively frame and confront the 
problems presented by recognizing the growing (i.e., international and global) scope and scale 
that human activity is having on biotic and abiotic ecosystem functioning. The view likely stems 
from pessimistic strands of environmental thinking, which emphasize that humans necessarily 
require the death and destruction of many living things in order to survive, i.e., walking, bathing, 
clothing ourselves, eating, all necessitate harming other living things.   
 But more recently, the assessment that humanity in toto is responsible for environmental 
degradation, began receiving increased attention, when many academics (mostly scientists) 
started proposing that the Earth had entered a new geological era: the Anthropocene. 
                                                        
Edward Wilson’s Eremozoic drive, which contends that humanity is currently in the midst of a 
civilizing frenzy to empty reality of everything that is non-human (Wilson 2006); Erich Fromm’s 
Necrophilic orientation, which he believes pushes man to, “transform that which is alive into 
something unalive” (Fromm 1973: 332), etc.   
154 For our purposes the Environmental Justice perspective is a broad tent of various historically 
and sociologically attuned environmental standpoints - e.g., environmentalism of the poor (see 
Guha and Martinez-Alier 1997), climate justice (see Dawson 2010), sustainable self-
determination (see Corntassel 2008), ecofeminism (see Mies and Bennholdt-Thomsen 1999), 
environmental racism (see Bullard 1990); global environmental justice (see Grineski, Collins, 
Ford, Fitzgerald, Aldouri, Velazquez-Angulo, and Lu), and the environmental justice movement 
(see Shrader-Frechette 2002) – all of which concur in stressing the importance of recognizing 
differentiated levels of responsibility for environmental harms.   
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“Characterized by the fact that the ‘human imprint on the global environment has now become 
so large and active that it rivals some of the great forces of Nature in its impact on the 
functioning of the Earth system’” (Bonneuil and Fressoz, 2016: 4).155 
 Essentially, the Anthropic perspective places blame for transforming the environment to 
such an extent as to alter Earth-system functioning(s) on the Anthropos (i.e., the whole of 
humanity operating as a monolithic force). Thus, such an analysis can be interpreted as a 
“doubling-down” and expansion of the totalizing, universalizing, and collectivist rhetoric that 
had gained traction and credibility in the emerging corpus of environmental legislation.156 But 
                                                        
155 The Anthropic perspective gained traction within the scientific community in the second half 
of the 20th century as empirical evidence from multiple disciples (climatology, oceanography, 
geology, biology, etc.) began mounting, demonstrating the dramatic effect of human activity on 
the planet, i.e., we have entered the age of, “human dominance of biological, chemical, and 
geological process on Earth” (Crutzen and Schwagerl 2011). Use of words such as ‘dominance’ 
in the above quote express much of the hyperbolic rhetoric that many criticize the Anthropic 
perspective for. But for our purposes, refuting or supporting the veracity of these claims is 
beyond the scope of the work; as we are simply concerned with the Anthropic perspective, as a 
means of demonstrating the historical shift in environmental thinking away from intrastate 
concerns found in the statutory model, towards a view of common and collective responsibility 
focused on global environmental degradation.  
156 We can see the Anthropic view expressed in the following quotes: “humanity…due to our 
tinkering has given the world a low grade fever, which we need to quickly calm before it climbs” 
(Ackerman, 2014: 42); “we have utterly changed our world; now we’ll have to see if we can 
change our ways” (Ehrlich and Ehrlich 2008: 362); “as we destroy this planet…we have lost 
sight of our role as stewards” (Higgins 2010: XII); “in the contemporary world the extinction of 
the species Homo sapiens would be beneficial to the Earth’s Community of Life as a whole” 
(Taylor 1986: 114), and “there is increasing evidence that humanity is affecting Earth system 
functioning to a degree that threatens the resilience of the Earth system [more accurately the 
quote could have stated ‘threatens the resilience of human society’]” (Steffen et al. 2015). All the 
preceding quotes convey the message that humanity in-and-of-itself constitutes a culpable 
singular agent engaged in uniformly destructive activities. Nevertheless, the reasoning found in 
these and similar remarks are found regularly in environmental literature. The issue is that such 
assertions illustrate a rhetorical jump from the premise – ‘that the aggregate and cumulative 
impact of human activity is effecting the planet’ to the conclusion – ‘that all humans are at least 
partially responsible for the current state of the global environment’. As such, a central problem 
with the Anthropic perspective or other environmental theories that assert similar claim(s) is 
their reliance on such a dubious argumentative move. It is unclear if the environmentalists 
themselves actually endorse the view that all humans are culpable or if they are victims of being 
captured by unreflective rhetorical hyperbole; but nonetheless, if the words are interpreted 
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unlike the statutory model, which embeds responsibility for environmental harm within the 
territoriality of sovereign states, the Anthropic perspective transcends these intrastate boundaries 
by focusing responsibility for environmental degradation at the global scale.  
 An important feature of the view for our purposes is that it stresses the Anthropos’ 
common culpability, concern, and responsibility for preventing, mitigating, and repairing 
environmental harms, i.e., the Anthropic framework emphasizes a form of non-differentiated 
responsibility for all humanity. As Erle Ellis explains, while endorsing the view: “The Earth we 
have inherited from our ancestors is now our responsibility…there is no alternative except to 
shoulder the mantle of planetary stewardship. A good, or at least better Anthropocene is within 
our grasp” (Ellis 2011). Diane Ackerman expresses the same sentiment, thusly:  
 But, for a change, we know the exact causes of the extinction, having created them 
 ourselves – climate change, habitat loss, pollution, invasive species, big agriculture, 
 acidifying the oceans, urbanization, a growing population demanding more natural  
 resources – and we’re in a position to stop them, if we set our collective mind to it. 
 (Ackerman, 2014: 154) 
 
 Much of the appeal of the Anthropic view stems from the fact that it may be true that 
humanity has influenced the entire global environment. Since, as Rolston provocatively states, 
“100% natural systems no longer exist on Earth, since there is DDT in penguins in Antarctica” 
(Rolston 2016: 64).157 Nevertheless, there are numerous problems and challenges for framing an 
adequate conception of environmental responsibility from within the Anthropic perspective.  
                                                        
literally, then the Anthropic perspective is clearly grounded in and built upon this faulty 
assumption. 
157 A worry regarding Rolston’s statement is it relies on the problematic dichotomy separating 
Man from Nature. Many environmentalists have argued that it is precisely this view that Man is 
separate from Nature that has led to our present environmental crisis. Thus, an important step for 
improving our disastrous relationship with the environment is to push for greater understanding 
and recognition that we are in fact part of nature and entirely natural ourselves. As such, one of 
the hopes motivating this dissertation is that pursuing environmental transformative justice 
measures will assist in reaching this realization.     
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 For one, the conclusion that all of humanity is responsible and complicit in causing 
planetary environmental harm seems suspect and hastily drawn.158 It ignores the relevant fact 
that certain segments of the human population (e.g., roving imperialists vs. autarkic 
communities) are far more culpable than others (both historically and at present) for the general 
deterioration of the global environment, “a new human being born on Earth will have a carbon 
footprint a thousand times greater if she is born into a rich family in a rich country, than into a 
poor family in a poor country” (Bonneuil and Fressoz 2016: 70). As Vaclav Smil calculated, “the 
difference in modern energy consumption between a subsistence pastoralist in the Sahel and an 
average Canadian may easily be larger than 1,000-fold” (Smil 2008: 259). As such, the 
perspective is factually mistaken in emphasizing humanities’ undifferentiated and supposedly 
aligned role in causing environmental harm.  
 Another problem with the view is that it offers a totalizing “grand narrative” that reduces 
disparate environmental harms into an all-encompassing framework emphasizing radical changes 
occurring to the entirety of the Earth-system. Accordingly, such an approach exceeds our 
subjective awareness and obscures our ability to grasp the harms under consideration.159  
                                                        
158 One might argue that from a purely technical and captious perspective it is possible to make 
the argument that all humans are responsible - since at minimum we all release CO2 when we 
exhale. As such, from our very first breath, we are actively contributing to climate change and 
the litany of environmental crises generated by rising levels of atmospheric greenhouse gasses. 
But the problem with this argument is that it has been empirically demonstrated that many 
indigenous people lead net-carbon negative lifestyles (Tauli-Corpuz and Lynge 2008: 11-12). 
Thus, these people actually assist in mitigating environmental harm instead of contributing to it.      
159 Essentially, it is not that gathering, studying, learning, and acquiring intellectual 
understanding of Earth-level changes is beyond our cognitive abilities. Obviously, we have these 
capacities, or we would lack the litany of scientific evidence supporting the claim that we have 
entered the Anthropocene. The disconnect stems from how we in an everyday sense, emotionally 
experience and socially interact with the world. It is interesting to reflect on why these 
breakdowns in processing may occur. One speculative reason explaining why we are unable to 
emotionally process global rates of environmental degradation is that the knowledge may be too 
overwhelming, frightening, depressing, or might trigger a sense of existential dread or 
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The concern is that the Anthropic framework’s emphasis on planetary changes and global 
solutions is potentially demotivating for individual human actors that are phenomenologically 
embedded and exist within particular communities and habitats. Essentially, the problem is that 
our subjective and localized experience limits our ability to grasp (i.e., in our everyday lives) the 
Earth-level harm(s) under consideration (e.g., global temperature rise, ocean acidification, 
biodiversity loss, etc.).160 For instance, knowing that at the planetary-scale, the Earth will 
experience a three degrees-Celsius rise in temperature, offers little explanatory insight into what 
the impact of this global change will mean at a local level (i.e., how it will change and alter the 
immediate ecosystem(s) we engage with and rely upon in our everyday lives);161 which in turn, 
makes it extraordinarily challenging to conceptualize from this information the local harm(s) that 
will occur, what damages we are responsible for, or what action we can take to prevent, mitigate, 
                                                        
hopelessness. Furthermore, at a psycho-sociological level the problem with internalizing and 
acting upon the knowledge is its propensity to alienate, i.e., such knowledge may foster a sense 
of disconnect, discontentment, discomfort, and disdain for our own society’s unreflective naiveté 
and blissful ignorance in proceeding according to the logic of “business as usual” in the midst of 
an ever-growing environmental crisis.   
160 Thus, while it is true that modern locomotion (e.g., planes, high-speed trains, cars, etc.) 
allows us to rapidly traverse from one area of the globe to another and that modern modes of 
communication (e.g., the internet, telephone, television, etc.) allow us to stay informed and even 
instantaneously see far off corners of the globe; nonetheless, our daily lives are situated within 
the specific location we currently inhabit. As such, we are restricted in our ability to gain a 
vantage point, which allows us to grasp planetary change. 
161 It is important to stress that this argument does not imply that because these planetary changes 
occur at a scope and scale that humans are unable to grasp in our everyday lives that no harm is 
occurring. The harms (e.g., flooding caused by rising sea levels, starvation caused by 
biodiversity loss, heat strokes caused by increasing temperature) are no doubt real and injurious. 
However, the point is simply emphasizing that the threshold limits of human perception (i.e., the 
spatial and temporal scope and scale of phenomenological awareness) hinder our ability to 
experientially track perceptible differences linking specific act(s), to global alteration(s), 
resulting in localized harm. As such, these experiential limitations make it exceedingly 
challenging to assign responsibility for the actual injuries caused by planetary changes that the 
Anthropic perspective focuses on.    
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or adapt to palpable environmental degradation.162   
 Consequently, if we tend to struggle with experientially discerning or affectively 
internalizing the global trends that the Anthropic perspective is concerned with, then such an 
orientation (i.e., focusing on planetary changes to frame our analysis of environmental 
degradation) is likely to hinder responsiveness in our reactive emotional attitudes.163 Obviously, 
such a result is worrisome in that the work endorses the idea that we rely heavily on our reactive 
attitudes to compel action and allocate blame. Thus, if this analysis is correct, the Anthropic view 
(contrary to its own aspirations) may foster an insensitivity to environmental harm and transform 
us into the proverbial frog in a pot of gradually heating water numb and unable to respond to the 
changing world around us.164    
 Also, in this vein of analysis, the Anthropic view can lead to a skewed understanding of 
how environmental harms actually are brought about. For instance, after internalizing the 
Anthropic perspective that the combined action of all humanity is causing environmental 
                                                        
162 It seems intuitive that actor’s likelihood of involving themselves in preventing, repairing, or 
reconciling an injury correlate with their proximity to the wrong, i.e., either in their role in 
causing it or in the impact it has upon them. Basically, the worry is that the Anthropic 
perspective’s extraordinarily coarse-grained analysis of responsibility (i.e., holding the entire 
Anthropos responsible), forecloses the prospect of more intimately linking actors to harms; 
which may in turn, demotivate actors from taking steps to redress specific environmental issues.    
163 For a thorough discussion relating our reactive attitudes and emotional conditioning to our 
values and behaviors, see Jesse Prinz’s The Emotional Construction of Morals (Prinz 2007).  
164 If environmentalists fixate on the Anthropic perspective and exclusively emphasize our 
responsibility to combat Earth-level harms, then it might undercut our motivation, drive, and 
impetus to tackle more local and traditional environmental problems because it becomes 
increasingly difficult to prove that local action will bear fruit in light of wider global trends. 
Since as Michael Maniates explains, “when everything is connected to everything else, knowing 
how or when or why to intervene becomes difficult; such ‘system complexity’ seems to 
overwhelm any possibility of planned, coordinated, effective intervention” (Maniates 2001: 60). 
Thus, in many ways the work’s focus on ecocide is an attempt to reemphasize the importance of 
dealing with local ecosystems and the need to combat more traditional environmental harms (i.e., 
harms to specific habitats independent of their connection to and impact upon Earth-level 
systems). 
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degradation, one may begin to believe that the world is running out of water because in 
conjunction each individual human is drinking too much of it, taking too long of showers, or 
watering their lawns in access, etc.165  
Whereas, the reality is that it is industrial mass production, commercialization, and 
reliance on global supply-chains that generates the bulk of the harm.166 As Kirkpatrick Sales 
states, “the story has been the same every year: individual consumption – residential, by private 
car, so on – is never more than about a quarter of all consumption; the vast majority is 
commercial, industrial, corporate, by agribusiness, and government. So even if we all took up 
cycling and wood stoves it would have a negligible impact on energy use, global warming and 
atmospheric pollution” (Sale 2003)    
 Hence as we saw last chapter, human communities that subsist without relying on 
rapacious institutions, structures, and processes (i.e., autarkic communities) are often able to 
strengthen their habitat. As such, the Anthropic perspective functions to obscure the truth of 
                                                        
165 For a thorough discussion of the problem with increased individualization of responsibility in 
mainstream contemporary environmentalism, see Maniates’ “Individualization: Plant a Tree, 
Buy a Bike, Save the World?” (2002). Furthermore, by focusing on humans in general (i.e., the 
entirety of humanity) the Anthropic perspective has a tendency to be interpreted as implying a 
certain view of human nature, in that it makes it seems as though it is something innately within 
us all (e.g., greed, selfishness, shortsightedness, etc.) as members of the Anthropos that is 
causing the problem. However, it must be pointed out that the Anthropic perspective does not 
necessitate such a reading; nonetheless, it has a tendency to unwittingly engender such 
sentiments. Hopefully, the dissertation’s portrayal of autarkic communities in the last chapter, 
conclusively debunks this view and demonstrates that humans are not irreparably “hardwired” to 
live unsustainably. In fact, it is not outlandish to speculate that the vast majority of cultures and 
communities that have ever existed were likely sustainable and only collapsed after outside 
interference and meddling (e.g., invasion, exploitation, corruption, domination, etc.).     
166 The Climate Accountability Institute’s report detailing how, “over half of all emissions since 
human induced climate change was officially recognized can be traced to just 25 corporate and 
state producing entities,” has made it abundantly clear that often environmental degradation is 
not a product of individual behavior (Griffin 2017: 8).  
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environmental depredation, i.e., that not all humans and lifestyles inevitably harm the 
environment, nor will all communities be harmed to the same extent.167  
 Nonetheless, despite these difficulties, the perspective seems motivated by the laudable 
objective of stressing the fact that solving the present environmental crises requires a unified 
global effort (i.e., the same realization that limited the success of a more traditional statutory 
approach). Thus, a beneficial insight gleaned from the Anthropic framework is that it highlights 
the reality that to effectively combat environmental degradation at a global scale, requires across-
the-board cooperation, i.e., recognizing that we are all in this together. As Steven Vanderheiden 
succinctly states, “it also reminds us that we are all citizens of the same finite planet, bound 
together in relationships of interdependence and mutual responsibility” (Vanderheiden 2011: 83).  
 Consequently for our purposes, the Anthropic perspective effectively illustrates that 
environmentalism benefits by incorporating a ‘commonality’ criterion (meaning everyone has a 
role to play in combatting environmental harm) within its conception of responsibility.168  
                                                        
167 The Anthropic view’s focus on Earth-level changes problematically fails to consider the 
dramatic difference in vulnerabilities certain local communities face in comparison with others. 
For instance, lost in its global perspective is the disparate impact of living on an island 
ecosystem that is entirely washed away, versus living in a habitat that experiences a slight 
increase in rainfall; which in turn, masks the fact that certain groups are in need of greater 
assistance from environmental degradation than others.    
168 It must be highlighted that the global reach of the ‘commonality’ criterion in many strands of 
environmental thinking is at odds with the accepted range of responsibility in Transitional 
Justice, in that Transitional Justice has only recently and reluctantly expressed a willingness to 
expand collective responsibility to the intrastate-level; as such, nowhere in the field’s 
mainstream literature (unlike in environmentalism) is it argued that blame for mass atrocities 
ought to be allocated at a global-level. However, this work views the tension between the 
disciplines’ respective scope(s) of common responsibility as unproblematic; in fact, the 
conclusion is that the disagreement is helpful for illuminating a productive and insightful 
“division of labor” for each discipline to focus on when confronting ecocide. Essentially, the 
outlook is that Transitional Justice’s intrastate framing of ‘common responsibility’ is effective in 
tackling the specific token instance of ecocide by providing meaningful insight and mechanisms 
for tailoring reparative and reconciliatory response(s) suited to the need(s) of those impacted. 
Whereas, environmentalism is able to offer guidance on preventing and understanding the 
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Accordingly, while it might behoove environmentalists to move away from embracing the more 
dubious elements of the Anthropic perspective, there are advantages to not abandoning the 
critique entirely, as it has proven helpful in demonstrating the need for widespread cooperation 
in combating pervasive environmental degradation. 
 Essentially, an important corrective to the political environmentalist consciousness of the 
Anthropic perspective is recognizing that environmental destruction is not the fault of some 
generalized mass of humans (the Anthropos), i.e., much of the harm is generated by a small 
percentage of actors benefiting from environmentally unsustainable practices. Accordingly, we 
need a notion of responsibility that will allow us to better differentiate and hold actor’s 
environmentally bad decisions and mismanagement to account.169  
 
2. Environmental Justice Perspective   
 
 Fortunately, in the decades immediately preceding the initial formulation of the 
Anthropic perspective, new strands of environmental thinking arose that strove to confront 
precisely the problem of developing an effective framework for conceptualizing disparate levels 
of responsibility for environmental harms. As previously explained, we will capture these diverse 
trends and movements by broadly classifying them all under the umbrella term of Environmental 
Justice.  
                                                        
general type of harm ecocide embodies by explaining the global trends, policies, practices, 
norms, and institutions that are causing environmental degradation in the first place.  
169 One of the major goals of this project is to assist in more clearly illustrating how 
environmental harms actually occur. The work endeavors to achieve this aim through providing 
a model, which correctly represents the causes of ecocide by assigning the actors, actions, and 
institutions their appropriate causal significance.  
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 As stated, Environmental Justice focused first and foremost on differentiating degrees of 
responsibility for and victimization from environmental degradation. Notably, unlike the 
Anthropic perspective that derives much of its support and credibility from the scientific 
community; the Environmental Justice perspective gained traction and respectability from within 
the social sciences, humanities, and various social justice movements. Thus, the disciplinary 
origins, orientation, and training of practitioners and proponents of the perspective make it well-
positioned and conceptually equipped for considering historically differentiated responsibility for 
environmental harms.    
 The overarching objective of the various Environmental Justice movements is to show 
how certain segments of humanity have been treated unjustly in one or all of the following ways: 
(1) distributive injustice – the inequitable sharing of environmental ‘goods’ (resources) and 
‘bads’ (harm and risk); (2) procedural/participatory injustice – unfair ways in which social 
decisions are made that exclude individuals or groups from controlling their own relationship 
with their environment; and (3) lack of recognition – individuals, groups, and environments 
being historically undervalued (Vandherheiden 2016). “Witness Katrina in black and white 
neighborhoods of New Orleans, or Sandy in Haiti and Manhattan, or sea level rise in Bangladesh 
and the Netherlands, or practically any other [environmental] impact…there will be lifeboats for 
the rich and privileged” (Malm and Hornbord 2014: 66). 
 Hence, we can see that one of the key insights of the Environmental Justice perspective is 
emphasizing that instances of environmental harm track, reinforce, and exacerbate social 
inequities. Consequently, the goal of the Environmental Justice movement is to employ these 
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histories of injustice as means of recognizing, justifying, and achieving broad socio-economic 
and environmental objectives.170  
 
 However, there is a problem with the view in that it seems to presuppose that the 
environmental and social harms are distinct.171 Whereas, a central goal of this work is showing 
that socio-cultural and ecological systems are linked, i.e., the project strives to further understand 
                                                        
170 For instance, the EPA defines the movement’s core aims and aspirations as follows: 
“Environmental justice is the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless 
of race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the development, implementation, and 
enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies. EPA has this goal for all 
communities and persons across this Nation. It will be achieved when everyone enjoys the same 
degree of protection from environmental and health hazards and equal access to the decision-
making process to have a healthy environment in which to live, learn, and work” (EPA 2012). As 
Ashley Dawson explains: “These core tenets underlined that the movement was not just about 
environmental issues, but rather that social justice goals such as economic equity, cultural 
liberation, and the political participation of people of color at all levels of decision-making were 
an integral part of the struggle” (Dawson 2010: 326). 
171 An additional concern regarding the Environmental Justice perspective is that it appears to 
rely on a (re)distributive model focused on the equitable (re)allocation of environmental ‘goods’ 
and ‘bads.’ The distributive paradigm famously received its canonical articulation in Rawls’ A 
Theory of Justice, in which he states, “the principles of social justice... provide a way of 
assigning rights and duties in the basic institutions of society and they define the appropriate 
distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation” (Rawls 1971: 4). Young argues 
that a weakness of the distributive paradigm is that it leaves uncontested causally significant 
social structures that give rise to distributive patterns in the first place (Young 1990: 14-16). 
Thus, the Nozickian worry is that if Environmental Justice exclusively focuses on correcting 
unequal ‘end-state patterning’ of environmental benefit(s) and harm(s), then the same injustices 
may arise in the future, since the underlying processes that brought about the inequities are 
ignored, overlooked, and unchanged. Consequently, Environmental Justice seems unwilling to 
move beyond the traditional political discourse of distribution and as such fails to challenge 
deeper socio-ecological issues responsible for generating harm, i.e., it seems wedded to a “shared 
commitment to economic expansionism, a ‘subtheoretical’ belief that environmental conflicts are 
issue-specific and thus can be rationally managed and accommodated to continued growth, a 
concern to maintain a power base, and an antipathy to structural innovation that challenges these 
intellectual foundations and perceptions of self-interest” (M’Gonigle 1999: 19). But for present 
purposes, delving further into such criticisms is beyond the scope of the work, as we are simply 
concerned with the Environmental Justice perspective, as a means of demonstrating the historical 
shift in environmental thinking towards a model of differentiated responsibility for 
environmental depredation. However, the topic will be broached again, as one of the goals of the 
next chapter is attempting to offer innovative approaches for repairing and reconciling ecocide 
that look beyond the narrow scope of the distributive paradigm.  
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and communicate the complex interrelation, feedback, and embeddedness of people and their 
habitat.172   
 However, despite the above criticism, the Environmental Justice perspective is useful for 
our current purposes, in that the discipline by offering narratives of environmental injustice 
assists in providing insight into methods of analyzing disparate levels of responsibility for 
environmental degradation. Essentially, Environmental Justice effectively illustrates cases in 
which some groups received or expected to receive none of the benefit from an environmental 
harm, had little to no input in controlling the course of action that led to the harm, or went 
unrecognized as a relevant actor in the events that caused the harm. Therefore, in these cases, 
Environmental Justice rightly emphasizes that it seems strange to consider such groups 
responsible for the harms; and as such, the discipline successfully articulates a need for a 
conception of differentiated responsibility in environmentalism. 
 Accordingly, it is evident that the Environmental Justice approach (unlike the Anthropic 
view) is attuned to historical and social realities, i.e., that certain classes of actors materially and 
historically bear greater or complete responsibility for causing environmental harms. But the 
downside of such a view is that it may foster a sentiment that groups or individuals who are not 
                                                        
172 An early proponent of the link between ecological and social systems was the 19th century 
Russian anarcho-communist Peter Kropotkin, who extolled the virtues of self-sufficient 
agricultural communes that built up social traditions, environmental knowledge, and sustainable 
practices by engaging on a daily basis with their local habitat for sustenance. The eco-social 
connection was further explored in Murray Bookchin’s pioneering work, The Ecology of 
Freedom, which maintained that social hierarchies and human domination produced 
unsustainable and destructive relations with nature (Bookchin 1982). And recently, the 
disciplines of political ecology and ecological economics have advanced and refined the study of 
eco-social systems by developing mechanisms for, “merging the social (economic) sciences with 
the natural (biological and physical) sciences…[that] explicitly situates human institutions within 
their natural contexts and, in the process, challenges the tradition of domination over nature 
inherent in both the natural and economic sciences [as currently practiced]” (M’Gonigle 1999: 
21). 
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responsible for the harms are absolved from assisting and joining in environmental movements, 
e.g., Lawson explains how often, “African Americans feel no responsibility to join with 
environmentalists to address environmental issues beyond their local issues” (Lawson 2008: 3).  
 Consequently as we have illustrated, a difficult challenge for framing an adequate 
conception of environmental responsibility is navigating the divide between the aim of casting a 
wide net, in the hopes of maintaining the benefits of shared and collective responsibility (i.e., the 
goal of the Anthropic perspective), with the conflicting desire to avoid being overly inclusive 
and drawing socially insensitive conclusions that blame the victim for the environmental 
degradation (i.e., the goal of the Environmental Justice perspective). As previously stated, in 
attempting to resolve this tension, the international environmental community has settled on 
conjoining the two distinct and disparate goals by adopting the CDBR principle.  
 
D. Conclusion 
 
 Obviously, emphasizing CBDR for environmental degradation necessitates a view of 
responsibility that is both backwards and forwards looking. Backwards looking, in that it is able 
to hold those historically responsible to greater account (the Environmental Justice perspective 
furthers this objective); but forwards looking, in that it is able to emphasize that we all must 
work together to face the present environmental crises (the Anthropic perspective furthers this 
objective).  
 Lastly, from the protracted analysis throughout this section, it should seem 
straightforward that environmentalists are comfortable employing a socially capacious 
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understanding regarding the kinds of entities that are potentially answerable for causing 
environmental harm. This is evident from the fact that during the discussion, individuals, 
corporations, states, interstate institutions, global systems, and collectively all of humanity have 
at various points been blamed for generating environmental harm. Thus, many of the same 
prudential and epistemic concerns that compelled Transitional Justice scholars and practitioners 
to expand their notion of responsibility (i.e., to address the root causes of conflict by establishing 
a holistic narrative of injustice; obtain justice for the victims, and prevent comparable harm from 
occurring again), assist in explaining environmentalists’ willingness to hold all categories and 
kinds of actors that contribute to environmental degradation responsible.173  
 In conclusion, this section demonstrated that environmentalism is amenable to and 
benefits from adopting a notion of responsibility that is: (1) common, but differentiated, (2) both 
backwards and forward looking, and (3) socially capacious. Thus, the expectation is that the 
reader recognizes and accepts that Transitional Justice and environmentalism employ 
conceptions of responsibility that have substantial overlap and considerable commonality.  
 As such the work will now move on to propose a theory of responsibility that satisfies the 
                                                        
173 Furthermore, a pertinent feature for understanding responsibility for ecocide is the complex 
and dynamic interplay between different kinds of agents at various levels of analysis. Since as 
we have seen, narratives of responsibility often show the dynamic interplay between numerous 
classes, kinds, and categories of actors at many levels of analysis, e.g., powerful states 
influencing weaker states, wealthy individuals dictating state-policy, states regulating corporate 
activity, corporations shaping individual consumer preference, etc. Thus, it seems clear that 
ignoring this complex web of feedback(s) and interrelation(s) would leave pertinent causal 
elements missing. Moreover, the above list expresses the reality that actors’ (as the term broadly 
applies to individuals, corporations, states, interstate institutions, etc.) options and preferences 
are at least partially constructed and constrained by forces beyond their control. As such, to 
adequately evaluate actors’ decision-making and behavior requires considering these external 
influences that construct the actor(s) and the setting(s) in which they interact. Hence as we have 
consistently argued, it seems mistaken to believe that any one type of actor ought to be 
environmentalists’ sole focus of consideration when determining responsibility for ecocide.   
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above conditions and broadly meets the goals of both disciplines. Ultimately, the work contends 
that Iris Young’s analysis of responsibility provides valuable insights for achieving this 
objective. The next section will apply her understanding of responsibility to hypothetical and real 
cases of ecocide that meets our four criteria from the preceding chapter.174  
 But before we begin our analysis of Young’s conceptualization of responsibility it is 
important to highlight that our employment of her theory is unorthodox and may even contradict 
her intended objective. The reason for this as we will see, is that Young vehemently contends 
that simply existing in a society, institution, or global order that permits wrongs is not enough to 
justify individual responsibility for the harm (i.e., for Young one must have a more tangible and 
direct connection to the harm); whereas our project aims at developing a conception of 
responsibility that is both common, but differentiated (i.e., a theory of responsibility capable of 
including everyone, but in divergent roles and to various degrees). 
 Nevertheless, the gap between Young’s aims and our own is unproblematic, so long it 
can be demonstrated (i.e., the intended purpose of the remained of the chapter) that her theory 
can be reframed to express a notion of responsibility that is both common and differentiated, 
even if such an interpretation was not her intention. Thus, with this caveat in mind we can begin 
our analysis and application of Young’s model of responsibility to instances ecocide.  
 
II. Analyzing and Applying Iris Young’s Two-Tiered Model of Responsibility to Ecocide 
                                                        
174 The four criteria of ecocide are that the harm was: (1) committed intentionally for supposed 
benefit of acting group; (2) without consent of impacted group; (3) noninstrumental in the 
commission of a traditional crime against humanity, and (4) undermined the vital interests of a 
distinct cultural group, i.e., caused partial or complete social death to an impacted group.  
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 Young in Responsibility for Justice argues that the concept of ‘responsibility’ ought to be 
separated into two distinct kinds of models: (1) liability and (2) social connection (Young 2011). 
I will briefly summarize both of these models before applying them to the topic of ecocide.     
 Young maintains that the liability model is the traditional framework by which we 
conceive of legal and moral responsibility. Such an understanding of ‘responsibility’ as guilt, 
blame, and/or liability is, “indispensable for a legal system and for a sense of moral right that 
respects agents as individuals and expects them to behave in respectful ways toward others” 
(Young 2011: 99). Essentially, the goal of the liability model is to hold particular agents 
accountable for specific acts or omissions by which they have harmed identifiable others, i.e., 
providing retribution for localized harm(s) that upset normal background conditions.  
 Nevertheless, Young recognizes that there are limits to the liability model because not all 
injustices can be directly linked to specific wrongful acts of particular agents, i.e., there are some 
harms (as we have seen throughout the work, many environmental harms fall into this category) 
that are, “produced and reproduced by thousands or millions of persons usually acting within 
institutional rules and according to practices that most people regard as morally acceptable” 
(Young 2011: 95). Young defines these kinds of social harms, which transcend the customary 
bounds of responsibility found within the liability model as structural injustices. “When we 
judge that structural injustice exists, we are saying precisely that at least some of the normal and 
accepted background conditions of action are not morally acceptable” (Young 2004: 378).  
 Thus, the social connection model expresses the requisite notion of shared political 
responsibility necessary for engaging with these sorts of unjust background structures (Young 
2011). Unlike the liability model, the social connection model is focused on bettering (future-
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oriented) the situation, rather than allocating blame (past-oriented) (Young 2011: 108-109). 
Accordingly, in cases of structural injustice the social connection model maintains that 
individuals are not guilty of wrong(s); but are instead responsible for improving the background 
social conditions in which they interact (Young 2011: 105).  
 Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that Young does not think that the social 
connection model ought to replace the liability model, but instead it is designed to supplement it 
(Young 2011: 174). According to Young, the liability model and social connection model should 
be pursued in tandem as a means of complimenting each other and reinforcing the goals of 
repairing, reconciling, and preventing injustice. As such, the adoption of a two-tier model is the 
initial step in Young’s exploration of delineating kinds, classes, and degrees of responsibility 
depending upon actors’ relations to social injustice, i.e., establishing differentiated responsibility.  
 One of the benefits of such a framework is that it offers a clear method of distinguishing 
responsibilities between the past-oriented responsibility considered within the liability model and 
future-oriented responsibility considered within the social connection model. Thus, achieving 
one of the goals of the preceding section.  
 It is helpful to highlight that Young undertook this differentiating project as an attempt to 
challenge Hannah Arendt’s claim that all Germans are “collectively responsible” for the 
Holocaust, “simply by virtue of membership in a community and not according to more concrete 
social relationships and actions” (Young 2011: 81). Young instead contends throughout her work 
that simply existing in a society that permits wrongs is not enough to derive responsibility for the 
harm; one must have a more tangible and direct connection.175 Hence, with the goal of 
                                                        
175 It is important to reemphasize that our project will challenge precisely this feature (i.e., her 
antipathy towards collective and shared responsibility) of Young’s framework by demonstrating 
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differentiation of responsibility in mind, the section will examine how Young’s two-tiered model 
applies to the cases of ecocide delineated in the last chapter.  
 
A. Outline for Applying Young’s Hierarchy of Responsibility to Ecocide  
 
 This section will explore Young’s attempt at differentiating responsibility for social 
injustice to idealized cases of ecocide. In summary, relying on our previous analysis, it appears 
there are four relationships that individual members of roving imperialist communities (i.e., 
unsustainable industrialized and post-industrialized societies that are productively and 
consumptively integrated into global supply-chains) can have towards instances of ecocide: (1) 
those who are guilty of ecocide; (2) those who are not guilty of ecocide, but who bear 
responsibility because they participate in the society and provide guilty agents or harmful 
background conditions with at least passive support that undergirds their capacity to cause 
ecocide; (3) those who take action to distance themselves from the wrongs of ecocide, either 
through efforts at privately preventing some of them or through forms of withdrawal from acts, 
behaviors, habits, and institutions that generate environmental harm, and (4) those who publicly 
oppose, resist, and alter the background institutions and practices that generate ecocide.176 Thus, 
                                                        
how her model can satisfy the standard of common (i.e., everyone – in a global sense - has a role 
to play), but differentiated (i.e., to various degrees and in diverse ways) responsibility.     
176 One might consider excluding the last group from our taxonomy of responsibility for ecocide, 
since they are adequately meeting their obligation. However, the work has opted to include them 
as a category of responsibility because while they are currently satisfying their obligations as 
moral actors; the social connection model’s future oriented conception of responsibility, entails 
that actors must continue to engage in public opposition to structures generating injustice, i.e., 
responsibility is never fully discharged unless the unjust structures and outcomes cease. As such, 
they still have an ongoing responsibility; and therefore, ought to be included in our taxonomy.   
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this section will investigate each of these relationships and examine how they impact agents’ 
responsibility for ecocide.   
 Afterwards, the work will explore some difficulties for achieving the ‘commonality 
criterion’ by examining autarkic communities’ reparative and reconciliatory role in response to 
ecocide. Essentially, there are two possible relations of autarkic communities to ecocide: (1) 
victims of ecocide and (2) communities that have not experienced ecocide, i.e., they have not lost 
their habitat due to environmental harm(s).177     
 The analysis of autarkic communities that have avoided being impacted by ecocide is of 
significant interest, in that according to Young’s model, if classes of actors have no direct 
connection to injustices, then they have no responsibility to discharge. As such, there is the 
potential that the existence of communities that have no connection (either as victims or 
perpetrators) to ecocide may undermine the ‘common, but differentiated’ notion of responsibility 
(i.e., because they will have no role to play in the reparative and reconciliatory process). This 
determination is problematic, in that the preceding section asserted that CBDR was a crucial 
component for achieving the aims of Transitional Justice and environmentalism. Furthermore, as 
Kristin Shrader-Frechette argues, it is imperative that, “everyone ought to assume responsibility 
for the actions of those who pollute, develop and threaten either the land or the most vulnerable 
people on it” (Shrader-Frechette 2002: 4)   
 As such, special attention will be paid to these above-stated examples. Once again, it is 
helpful to highlight that the reason these cases warrant heightened consideration is because: if 
                                                        
177 Former-autarkic communities that were complicit in the ecocide that destroyed their habitat 
would be a third possible relation. However, since in these situations the communities have 
adopted unsustainable relationships with their ecosystem, they would be treated as roving 
imperialists for purposes of our analysis.  
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Young’s model is incapable of integrating such groups into our conception of responsibility, 
some may argue it bars the framework from satisfying the ‘commonality’ component of the 
CBDR principle, i.e., such a failure could be construed as demonstrating that Young’s account is 
inadequate for fully articulating all the elements of Transitional Justice and environmentalism’s 
preferred conception of responsibility.  
 
B. Roving Imperialists’ Responsibility for Ecocide  
 
1. Actors Guilty of Ecocide Under the Liability Model 
 
 Imagine a terrorist who hijacked and crashed a truck full of hazardous waste into a nature 
reserve or a ranching tycoon who decided to illegally cut down a publicly protected rainforest to 
expand his grazing acreage.178 Intuitively, it seems such actors ought to bear the highest level of 
                                                        
178 The work has opted to use the gendered pronoun ‘his’ to describe the rancher to pay homage 
to political philosophy’s long attempt to grasp the state of the world by identifying the party(ies) 
most responsible for why things are the way they are, i.e., narrate how and why certain group(s) 
achieved geo-political and socio-economic dominance. For instance, Karl Marx emphasizes the 
present role of the bourgeois capitalists in controlling the means of production (1867); Carole 
Pateman holds males and the sexual contract accountable (1988); and Charles Mills argues that 
to understand the current state of affairs, it is necessary to recognize whites’ imposition of the 
racial contract on the rest of the inhabitants of the world (1997). Each of these narratives lifts the 
veil of the status quo and illustrates the contingency of the current global arrangement. Since, 
environmental degradation is a major characteristic of the present state of affairs, one can 
reasonably argue that whoever is actively answerable for establishing and maintaining this social 
order, bears relatively greater levels of responsibility for the environmental degradation than 
actors less actively involved, i.e., those that played a more passive role. As such, the above 
narratives offer valuable insights regarding the likely demographic identity of those liable for 
environmental harm, e.g., the wealthy are more responsible than the poor; men are more 
responsible than women, and whites are more responsible than non-whites, etc. These degrees of 
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responsibility for these acts of environmental harm.  
 Fortunately, Young’s account supports precisely these determinations. Since, per her 
framework actors are afforded maximal responsibility and fall within the purview of the liability 
model if they are: (1) “causally connected” to the harm, (2) they acted “voluntarily” and (3) with 
“adequate knowledge of the situation” (Young 2011: 97).  
 As such, it seems uncontroversial in the two hypothetical examples above that all of these 
conditions have been met. Hence, baring discovery of additional excusing fact(s), the above 
cases seem like straightforward examples of agents maximally responsible for the resulting 
environmental harm.179 Consequently, we are justified in blaming and/or finding such agent(s) 
guilty of harm under the liability model, i.e., their responsibility for the wrong has been isolated 
and they deserve to be subject to moral judgment, civil sanctions, criminal punishment, and/or 
general social redress.180  
 Nevertheless, cases of rogue ranchers or environmentally destructive terrorists acting 
outside the law and against the general will are not the central focus of environmental 
                                                        
culpability hold true at a general intergroup-level of cross-comparative assessment, even if a 
finer grained analysis could expose instances of the reverse, e.g., that some poor/black/women 
pollute more than some rich/white/men. Essentially, these counterexamples demonstrate that 
intragroup (within the group) vertical-analysis may show levels of culpability equal to or greater 
than the culpability found in intergroup (between the groups) horizontal-analysis. But such a 
statistical realization does not disprove that there are meaningful differences in intergroup 
responsibility, thus justifying that our hypothetical ‘rogue rancher’ ought to be described as 
male. 
179 Per our examples from last chapter, the liability model of responsibility could be applied to 
Saddam Hussien and other high-ranking Iraqi officials that ordered the destruction of the 
Ma’dan’s wetland habitat.  
180 For example, Brazilian authorities arresting Ezequiel Antonio Castanha, (dubbed the “king of 
deforestation”) for organizing gangs to clear large swaths of protected rainforest (i.e., it is 
estimated that his activities account for upwards of 20% of all illegal deforestation in Brazil in 
recent years) is a clear case of a state holding an actor accountable from within the liability 
model for privately perpetrated environmental harm (Watts 2015).    
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transformative justice (even if their acts destroyed the habitat of an autarkic community). Since, 
so long as the state met its duty of care to prevent such harms from occurring and effectively 
provided punitive justice (i.e., criminal proceedings and punishment) and distributive justice 
(i.e., welfare relief and aid) for impacted communities, then there is no justification for 
demanding broader socio-political changes (i.e., advocate for Transitional Justice) in response to 
these atrocities.181 Essentially, in such cases the state and public institutions do not appear 
responsible for or incapable of repairing or reconciling with these types of privately perpetrated 
wrongs and thus, there is no pressing need for radical social transformation, i.e., these represent 
instances in which current social system(s), practice(s), and institution(s) are capable of 
achieving justice.182   
 Since as argued in the last chapter, the need for environmental transformative justice is 
triggered when the state acted directly or indirectly in support of ecocide or was negligent in its 
duty of care to prevent the environmental harm from occurring.183 Thus in the above examples, 
the need for environmental transformative justice is not met because the state did not act or failed 
to act.  
 As such, our analysis will benefit from moving to more pertinent cases. For instances 
                                                        
181 Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that corrupt state actors can be directly 
responsible for these types of harm. For instance, in 2008 the Brazilian Environmental Minister 
found that the government’s Land and Agrarian Reform Agency (INCRA) was the worst 
perpetrator of illegal deforestation (responsible for clearing 544,000 acres from 2005-2008) and 
that criminal charges would be filed against the heads of the agency (Balakrishnan 2008).   
182 That is unless there have been recurring instances of such harms and the state has taken no 
action to prevent them from occurring. In which case an argument can be made that the state has 
failed in its obligations to promote social welfare or that it is complicit and thus, socio-political 
change is necessary to prevent these injustices from occurring in the future.    
183 The next chapter will rely on insights gleaned from Transitional Justice and discuss the 
importance of states’ proactively codifying laws against ecocide instead of pursuing a policy of 
ex post facto criminalization (i.e., retroactively charging actors for crimes for acts that were legal 
during their commission) that may challenge and undermine the rule of law.  
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when: the state contracted the rancher to clear the land; the state passed laws that permitted the 
rancher to clear the land; the state failed to adequately enforce laws restricting these sorts of 
harms; the state underfunded agencies setup to monitor, supervise, and restrict access to 
protected lands; the state failed to respond to such harms in the past, etc. 
 Importantly according to Young’s model, guilt in each of these cases would not be 
limited to the rancher because state actors involved in perpetuating the injustice would be liable 
as well. For instance, if the rancher were a direct government contractor or employee, the rancher 
and government official(s), who voluntarily approved the project with adequate knowledge of 
the resulting harms, would be guilty of ecocide per the liability model.184 As such in this 
example, responsibility would be spread diffusely throughout the state’s decision-making 
apparatus.  
 Young emphasizes precisely this point when discussing Adolf Eichmann, arguing that it 
is possible that even if an actor is not the direct physical cause of harm, they can still be held 
responsible under the liability model. “Because many of those farther away in the causal chain 
made the decisions and gave the orders that drove the crimes, and their not having done so would 
have meant that hundreds of thousands of people might have lived” (Young 2011: 82).  
 Accordingly, in this light, the rancher or official, who never lifted an ax or chainsaw, are 
still liable as authors of injustice even if it was their employees and underlings who performed 
all the physically destructive labor. What matters for the liability model is that the agent is a 
                                                        
184 For instance, if anti-ecocide legislation had been enacted prior to the occurrence of 
environmental destruction in our case studies, it would be possible to hold the high-ranking 
government officials and corporate executives to account (e.g., the parties that authorized 
damming the La Grande, approved nuclear testing at Maralinga, and decided to mine Cerrejon 
Mountain) under the liability model.      
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primary party (i.e., causally and intentionally paramount) that could have acted otherwise to 
prevent the harm(s), i.e., the rancher or official could have decided against ordering to cut down 
the forest (Young 2011: 84). As such, the liability model offers an effective framework for 
holding the decision-makers (i.e., those who craft, determine, and execute policies) of roving 
imperialist communities accountable for ecocide.  
 Consequently, the notions of volition and control are extremely important for determining 
responsibility using the liability model.185 For instance, if an official who authorized the project 
to clear the land acted under duress because the mafia was threatening to murder her kidnapped 
children unless the project was approved, then the official can be excused from responsibility 
under the liability model because her act does not seem voluntary.186 Nonetheless, such a 
conclusion seems unproblematic and is supported by the fact that moral and legal codes are filled 
with a litany of excusing principles, which can be used to absolve actors (even if they are the 
proximal physical cause of the harm) of liability for wrongs, e.g., if the act was an accident, 
mistake, or inadvertent; if the act occurred as a result of reflex or unintended body movement; if 
the actor was restrained or pushed to act through external physical interference; or if the act was 
forced under threat, coercion, duress or necessity; etc., then the actor can be excused from blame 
(Strawson 1962). 
                                                        
185 We will define ‘volition’ broadly as the ability to have reasonably chosen to act otherwise.  
186 The example of the mafia intimidating a government official for the sake of logging rights 
may seem farfetched to some readers; but it is important to point out that in many areas of the 
world, the “timber mafia” is a powerful criminal element. In fact, a 2012 U.N. report, Green 
Carbon, Black Trade, estimates that 90% of all deforestation in the tropics is perpetrated by 
crime syndicates and that the value of this illegal activity is worth between $30-100 billions 
dollars (editor Nellemann 2012: 6). As such, it is unsurprising that these criminal groups have 
been known to intimidate, threaten, injure, and even kill opposition to gain and maintain control 
of these lucrative resources, e.g., Qureshi a Pakistani environmental activists recounts that his, 
“father and brother were killed for raising voices against the timber mafia” (Malik 2018).  
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 Accordingly, it is possible that the rancher’s employees whose actions are the proximal 
cause of the destruction of the forest, may nevertheless, be excused of responsibility under the 
liability model, i.e., if it can be shown that the workers had a restricted range of options to 
choose from. For instance, imagine a situation in which the rancher is the only available 
employer in the area, the workers’ meager wages are the sole means of providing for their 
families, and they are so destitute that they are unable to afford to relocate.187 Under such 
conditions, in which their options are limited to either: (1) follow the rancher’s orders or (2) be 
fired and unable to earn enough to survive; a strong argument can be made that the workers’ lack 
of viable options excuses them from guilt under the liability model.188  
                                                        
187 Sadly, such circumstances are common in poor rural communities, e.g., as CNN reported 
during a 2017 expose investigating how thousands are forced to work as slaves on cattle ranches 
in northern Brazil, “if you want a job, you have to head to one of the nearby cattle ranches, [but 
once there] you can’t leave because you owe money for the food [the rancher] has given you, 
you have a debt…and don’t receive any form of salary because…food and tools are deducted 
from wages” (Darlington, Charner, and Castro 2017). Furthermore, it is estimated that over 
60,000 laborers are trapped in similar systems of bondage slavery in the Brazilian cattle ranching 
industry alone (Maisonnave and Gross 2017).            
188 Obviously, moving to the topic of ‘whether or not the agent could act differently’ (i.e., if they 
had alternative possibilities) opens the door to an immense metaphysical debate between free 
will and determinism. I hope to avoid wading in on this topic as much as possible, by simply 
agreeing with Peter Strawson’s famous insight (as I believe Young did) that the importance of 
responsibility is not contingent upon the metaphysical dispute of whether or not we could have 
acted otherwise; instead what matters is that our social practices are dependent on employing the 
notion of responsibility, i.e., we structure social institutions and cultural norms of responsibility 
around the fact that humans necessarily have reactive attitudes towards others’ acts (Strawson 
1962). As Strawson maintains, these practices do not depend on the truth or falsity of 
determinism; they are just a fact of human life and as such, “it is useless to ask whether it would 
not be rational for us to do what it is not in our nature to (be able to) do” (Strawson 1962). With 
this in mind, I think Daniel Dennett’s account of “elbow room” provides a helpful 
conceptualization of what it means for an agent to “have been able to do otherwise” – i.e., being 
able to make decision from a range of options, which inevitably occurs within constraints 
(Dennett 1984). Thus, per the above metaphysical sketch, responsibility is dependent upon the 
commonsense folk-understanding that in most normal situations, actors have the ability to decide 
between a range of options; and thus, if they choose to do something wrong (per our reactive 
attitudes), then the agent is blameworthy. 
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 Thus, per the Youngian framework, this and similar cases move the analysis in the 
direction of the next level of responsibility for ecocide, i.e., actors who are not guilty or 
blameworthy of ecocide, but who bear responsibility because they participate in the roving 
imperialist society and provide the guilty agents or harmful background conditions with at least 
passive support that undergirds their capacity to cause ecocide. But before we move on to the 
next level of analysis it is helpful to highlight, regarding the discernment of responsibility for 
ecocide, that the liability model effectively captures that decision-makers (i.e., actors 
intentionally pursuing, advocating, and commanding environmentally destructive operations and 
policies) are most causally accountable (i.e., they are the but for cause); and thus, deserve the 
greatest degree of blame for resulting harms.      
 
2. Actors Not Guilty of Ecocide But Responsible Under the Social 
Connection Model 
 
 Once again consider the ‘rogue rancher’ example, in this case there are many potential 
actors whose participation played a role in providing the rancher with the ability and capacity to 
destroy the forest; nevertheless, it may seem strange to consider them blameworthy or guilty of 
ecocide. For instance, we have already mentioned the destitute laborer that was compelled to 
follow the rancher’s orders to clear the forest as a matter of economic survival. But there are 
many other potential upstream actors, e.g., chainsaw and ax manufacturers; the overworked 
police force that was unable to monitor the property; the ranchers’ family who provided him with 
unconditional support and confidence to act outside the law; the banker who loaned him the 
capital to buy a new bulldozer that was necessary to clear the dense forest, etc. Also, there exist 
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potentially countless downstream beneficiaries who maybe entirely unaware of the rancher’s 
nefarious deed, e.g., the consumers who can buy cheaper beef; the owner of the industrial 
refrigeration company that was able to make a profit by storing the meat; the slaughterhouse 
employees that were able to keep their jobs because of increased inventory; the finance minister 
who was applauded for increased exports; the shipping and packaging companies’ shareholders 
who saw a slight uptick in their respective investment portfolios, etc.    
 Obviously, there are borderline cases, wherein it will be difficult to determine whether or 
not an actor is complicit in the harm. But roughly for our purposes, an actor is considered 
complicit and falls within the liability model if they intended the consequence of the action, e.g., 
a neighbor who volunteers to help the rancher by providing room and board to the workers in 
exchange for a share of the illicit profits. Whereas, an actor is not complicit if they simply 
intended to participate in the group activity unconcerned with the outcome, e.g., a neighbor who 
offers room and board to the workers strictly out of loneliness.  
 Nevertheless, it is evident from the ‘rogue rancher’ example that there exists a multitude 
of potential actors that ought to be excused from guilt under the liability model even though it is 
unambiguous that they contributed and benefited from processes that produced ecocide (Young 
2011: 100).189 Furthermore, in this situation it is plausible to imagine that many of the actors 
never intended to cause ecocide or might even regret and wish to undo their contribution if they 
knew the role they played caused harm.  
                                                        
189 For example in our case studies of ecocide, it seems reasonable that many of the actors that 
contributed and/or benefited from the harm should not be held to account under the liability 
model, e.g., the scientists who were employed to study the impacts of nuclear fallout at 
Maralinga; the consumers that received lower energy bills because of mining Cerrejon Mountain 
or damming the La Grande; the pilots that were ordered to drop the atomic bombs, etc.         
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 The preceding section analyzed a scenario where the rancher acted at the behest of the 
state, in which liability for the environmental harm circulated beyond the rancher to include state 
official(s) who authorized and requested the rancher’s services. This section will focus on 
analyzing instances in which the rancher acted within socially and legally acceptable parameters 
(i.e., only clearing his private property), but the state was not directly involved.190  
 We can imagine a scenario in which the rancher legally cleared his own land, with no 
intention of destroying an autarkic community’s habitat; but unfortunately and unbeknownst to 
him, the ecological toll of his and numerous other legal and commonly taken actions (other 
ranchers legally clearing their private property) led to the total ecological collapse of the 
surrounding forest (i.e., the ecosystem inhabited by an autarkic community). In many ways, this 
revised example represents the quintessential case of structural injustice; in that no one (not even 
the rancher) intended the negative outcome to the autarkic community; but yet the confluence of 
background conditions and the actors’ socially acceptable behavior caused ecocide.191  
                                                        
190 Nevertheless, the state can be considered indirectly involved, in that it established the laws 
that permit such harm. 
191 It is somewhat difficult to fit this example into our paradigm framework of ecocide because 
while the environmental harm was intentional with regards to the rancher’s own property, the 
resulting downstream environmental collapse that destroyed the autarkic community’s habitat 
was unintended. But if the rancher’s activity was common practice throughout the society and 
the ripple effect (i.e., injuries to one area of an ecosystem may spread to impact others) of 
environmental harms were widely recognized, then we can infer that the environmental 
degradation of the autarkic community’s habitat was a foreseeable and accepted loss at a 
societal-level. As such, we are justified in stretching our delineation of ecocide to include such 
cases. It is important to point out that this example is conceptually distinct from ecological loss 
generated by broader Anthropic (Earth-level) environmental harm(s) (e.g., rising sea levels 
sinking an island community) because in this case the intended activity (i.e., clearing a forest) is 
the same as the resulting harm (i.e., forest loss); whereas, with regards to Anthropic harms, the 
intended activity (e.g., burning fossil fuels) causes completely different and more attenuated 
unintended harm(s) (e.g., sea-level rise). Essentially, the argument for including the ‘structural 
rancher’ case within our analysis of ecocide is that there is a close causal and conceptual link 
between the intended activity (i.e., clearing a forest) and the resulting harm (i.e., forest loss), 
which differentiates this example from other instances of structural environmental harm (i.e., 
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 Young explains that the failure of the liability model in these and similar cases of 
structural injustice, “is that structures are produced and reproduced by large numbers of people 
acting according to normally accepted rules and practices, and it is in the nature of such 
structural processes that their potentially harmful effects cannot be traced directly to any 
particular contributors to the process” (Young 2011: 100).  
 The fact that structural injustices are such a pervasive feature of the modern world 
(particularly with regards to environmental harm) makes it exceedingly problematic that the 
liability model is unable to delineate responsibility for correcting them. Unfortunately, it seems 
entirely likely that structural injustices will continue to occur indefinitely unless we adopt a more 
inclusive conception of responsibility that makes actors feel obligated to alter behaviors that 
generate background conditions that perpetuate these harms.192   
 As such, it is vital that we devise a framework capable of delineating responsibility for 
actors who are not guilty of ecocide; but who nevertheless, bear responsibility because they 
participate in the society and provide the guilty agents or harmful background conditions with at 
least passive support that undergirds their capacity to cause ecocide. Fortunately, Young’s social 
connection model provides a perfect account for delineating responsibility in these cases.  
 As previously demonstrated, many of the actors in the various ‘rancher examples’ are not 
liable for the ecocide, but they do bear some responsibility in that they benefited and contributed 
                                                        
climate change) in which the activity (i.e., burning fossil fuel) has no obvious similarity to the 
harm (e.g., sea-level rise, desertification, etc.).  
192 As Roman writer, Publilius Syrus, famously stated, “we tolerate without rebuke the vices with 
which we have grown familiar” - if this is true, then turning a blind-eye to endemic harms is 
tantamount to passive acceptance of injustice. Thus, as a means of overcoming this worry, the 
work is striving to develop a conception of environmental transformative justice to awaken us to 
the injustice of ecocide.  
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to the harm, i.e., they are relevantly connected to the problem. Young contends that moral-actors 
upon recognizing their proximity and relation towards a wrong will feel compelled to answer for 
the harm (Young 2011: 121). As such, this sense of ‘responsibility’ functions as a virtue, i.e., as 
a personal desire to, “carry out activities in a morally appropriate way” motivated by the 
sentiment that “all who dwell within the structures must take responsibility for remedying 
injustices they cause” (Young 2011: 104-105).  
 Succinctly, the social connection model attempts to establish a virtue-theoretic 
conception of responsibility (whereas, the liability model relies on a deontic conception of 
responsibility), in which actors feel an internal motivation, desire, and disposition to better the 
institutions and practices in which they partake. But before proceeding, it is important to 
highlight that the social connection model’s reliance on a virtue theoretical approach to 
responsibility is pertinent to the work’s later attempt to demonstrate that Young’s account 
satisfies the ‘commonality’ criterion of the CBDR principle.      
 In summary, the social connection model emphasizes that individuals who benefit or 
contribute to institutions or social practices that cause ecocide have a responsibility to work 
towards alleviating the problem. This sense of ‘responsibility’ is not isolating, in that finding out 
that countless other actors are involved in causing the harm does not discharge an agent whose 
actions contributed to the outcome from taking responsibility (Young 2011: 106). As such, the 
social connection model calls for common responsibility, “it follows that all those who contribute 
by their actions to the structural processes that produce injustice share responsibility for those 
harms” (Young 2011: 109).  
 Furthermore, the social connection model is not focused on blame (past-oriented); it is 
instead oriented towards improving the future (Young 2011: 109). Finally, ‘responsibility’ under 
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the social connection model can only be discharged through shared public action (meaning 
working together, not in the sense of necessarily having to form a group-agent, even though that 
would be a viable option). As Young explains, “thousands or even millions of agents contribute 
by our actions in particular institutional contexts to the processes that produce unjust outcomes. 
Our forward-looking responsibility consists in changing the institutions and processes so that 
their outcomes will be less unjust. No one of us can do this on our own” (Young 2011: 111).   
 Ultimately, the social connection model’s notion of ‘responsibility’ as future-oriented, 
non-isolated, and only dischargeable through political action is incredibly important for 
combatting environmental harm. The reason for this is that many of the contributing factors (e.g., 
climate change, ocean acidification, biodiversity loss, etc.) causing environmental injury 
worldwide are unintended consequences from generations of diverse actors maintaining and 
expanding social dependence on unsustainable industrial mass production and consumption. 
Thus, no current set of actors is wholly to blame (per the liability model) and continuing to point 
fingers will only result in greater resentment, defensiveness, and animosity; when instead, what 
we need is a united and sustained cooperative effort to combat the problem(s).  
 As we have seen, the social connection model’s inclusion of actors who are not guilty of 
harm, but who still bear responsibility because of their participation in or benefit from actions 
that caused the harm, creates a spectrum of responsibility exceeding the liability model’s binary 
account of guilt or innocence. As such, in the ‘structural injustice rancher’ example (i.e., where 
no actor intended the destruction of the autarkic community’s habitat) no one is guilty under the 
liability model, but many parties have a responsibility to discharge per the social connection 
model.  
 Thus, to show how the two models work together, it is illustrative to once again return to 
the ‘rogue rancher’ example. In this case, the rancher would be guilty of ecocide under the 
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liability model and ought to face punitive and retributive justice measures (i.e., criminal 
punishment and social sanction). Nevertheless, as discussed, there are countless upstream and 
downstream actors that are connected as beneficiaries and/or enablers of the rancher’s ecocidal 
activity; but yet, are not guilty under the liability model because they lacked ‘elbow room’ to 
have acted differently or they had no intention or knowledge of causing harm. But fortunately, 
the social connection model offers a framework capable of justifying why these upstream and 
downstream beneficiaries and enablers ought to take responsibility for repairing and reconciling 
the wrongs.  
 Thus, the social connection model allows us a fuller recognition of the ubiquitous 
responsibility for ecocide in roving imperialist societies; since the culture, modes of subsistence, 
and way of life rely heavily on activities that degrade and destroy autarkic communities’ 
habitats.193 And as Young states, “beneficiaries of the process, have responsibilities. Their being 
privileged usually means, moreover, that they are able to change their habits or make extra 
efforts without suffering serious deprivation” (Young 2011: 145). Consequently, one can 
reasonably argue that whoever is actively answerable for establishing, maintaining, benefiting, 
and/or participating in the roving imperialist social order (i.e., the vast majority of actors in 
industrial or post-industrial societies) bear some responsibility under the social connection model 
for correcting and preventing ongoing environmental injustices.  
                                                        
193 If we look at specific cases (i.e., the ‘rogue rancher’ example), it is easy to imagine a plethora 
of roving imperialists with no connection to the specific harm or even any recognition or 
awareness that an injustice is occurring. However, if we shift perspective(s) away from the 
specific (token) instance of ecocide and instead focus on analyzing ecocide as a general (type) of 
phenomenon, one may contemplate if it is possible for any roving imperialist to be entirely 
unconnected from each and every instance of ecocide worldwide. Case in point, since roving 
imperialists’ culture (i.e., the current dominant social order defined by unsustainable globalized 
industrial mass production and consumption) is structurally destructive to the environment 
(which seems uncontroversial), then members of groups that disproportionately benefit from or 
contribute to the system (both historically and at present) have a responsibility to consider their 
connection(s) to ongoing environmental injustice(s).  
 148 
 More specifically, if it is true that globalized industrial mass production and consumption 
is damaging to the environment (which seems certain),194 then actors relying on the large-scale 
supply-chains and non-sustainable practices to satisfy their needs, are at least partially 
responsible for environmental degradation. With that being said, we can move on to analyzing 
the next level of responsibility for ecocide, i.e., individuals living in roving imperialist societies 
who take action to distance themselves from the wrongs of ecocide, either through efforts at 
privately preventing some of them or through forms of withdrawal from acts, behaviors, habits, 
and institutions that generate environmental harm.  
 
3. Actors Distanced From Wrong But Responsible Under the Social  
 Connection Model  
 
 Returning to the ‘structural injustice ranching’ example, in which the rancher had no 
intention of causing ecocide, but unfortunately and unbeknownst to him, the ecological toll of his 
and numerous other legal and commonly taken actions led to the complete ecological collapse of 
                                                        
194 As Fred Magdoff and John Bellamy Foster state: “Most of the critical environmental 
problems we have are either caused, or made much worse, by the workings of our economic 
system. Even such issues as population growth and technology are best viewed in terms of their 
relation to the socioeconomic organization of society. Environmental problems are not a result of 
human ignorance or innate greed. They do not arise because managers of individual large 
corporations or developers are morally deficient. Instead, we must look to the fundamental 
workings of the economic (and political/social) system for explanations. It is precisely the fact 
that ecological destruction is built into the inner nature and logic of our present system of 
production that makes it so difficult to solve” (Magdoff and Bellamy 2010: 7). They defend this 
claim by examining the systemic causes of environmental destruction stemming from the fact 
that the current dominant mode of production and consumption is based on continuous growth, 
which they rightly argue is impossible to maintain as the Earth has finite resources (Magdoff and 
Bellamy 2010). Additionally, they assert the system’s profit motive captures and controls the 
political, judicial, and social systems, which undermines the means of potentially curbing the 
drive for perpetual growth and capital accumulation, i.e., interests in short-term profit (for the 
global corporate elite) determine social policy decision-making, at the expense of long-term 
wellbeing for the people and the planet (Magdoff and Bellamy 2010).   
 149 
the surrounding forest. In such a case, we can imagine actors taking steps to distance themselves 
from the harm, e.g., an owner of a slaughterhouse deciding not to purchase cattle from ranchers 
that graze on newly cleared land; an environmental activist writing letters to ranchers explaining 
and condemning the environmental impact of their activities; employees recognizing the 
potential environmental harm and conscientiously objecting by quitting their job rather than 
following the rancher’s order, etc. 
 In all of these examples, we see actors taking morally laudable steps to privately distance 
themselves from the harm, but the problem is that in-and-of-themselves none of these actions 
will likely prevent the present (or similar future-cases of) ecocide from occurring. The failure 
stems from the fact that none of these acts alter the underlying background structure(s) that 
enabled the harm to occur in the first place, e.g., the rancher will be able to make a profit selling 
his cattle to another slaughterhouse, in spite of the one abstaining owner; the rancher can ignore 
the letter and the destruction will continue unabated; even if employees quit, the remaining 
excess labor force can be hired to carry out the task, and lastly, at least in the ‘structural injustice 
rancher’ example, even if the rancher does stop clearing the land, the combined impact of other 
ranchers’ activity will still cause ecological collapse (but this would not necessarily be the case 
in the ‘rogue rancher’ example).   
 Thus, as illustrated, private acts while commendable from a moral standpoint, achieve 
little in terms of stopping, preventing, or diminishing structural harms. As Arendt states, such 
acts, “practically speaking, did nothing” as they leave the offending structures in place (Arendt 
1963: 104). Interestingly, if an actor was powerful enough to independently prevent the 
structural injustice (i.e., alter the background condition) via their own private action, then a case 
could be made that their failure to do so implies guilt under the liability model. Thus, for our 
purposes we can assume that in the above example none of the actors (or potentially any actor) 
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are powerful enough to stop the structural injustice on their own (as the definition of ‘structural’ 
implies).   
 As such, the evident failure of private action justifies the social connection model’s claim 
that what is necessary to prevent structural injustices from occurring is shared public action, e.g., 
the slaughterhouse owner could try and convince the slaughterhouse industry to unite in 
boycotting the processing of cattle grazed on newly cleared land, in the hopes of undercutting the 
profit motive driving the ranchers’ decision to clear the land in the first place; the activist could 
work towards convincing bulldozer manufacturers to stop selling to ranching operations; the 
employees could campaign to increase public funding for scientific research, education, and 
awareness regarding the environmental impact of ranching activities, etc. Thus, these and similar 
combined public  
activities that change the socio-political practices, institutions, and norms in roving imperialist 
societies would have a greater chance of successfully preventing ecocide.  
  Intuitively, it seems correct that if an actor recognizes something as wrong; then 
distancing oneself from the harm does not seem to discharge responsibility, i.e. if we view 
something as unjust, our responsibility ought to be to prevent it from occurring instead of simply 
removing ourselves from contributing to the problem. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong highlights this 
point in his discussion of environmentalists’ personal responsibility regarding climate change: 
 Some environmentalists keep their hands clean by withdrawing into a simple life where 
 they use very little fossil fuels. That is great. I encourage it. But some of these escapees 
 then think that they have done their duty, so they rarely come down out of the hills to 
 work for political candidates who could and would change government policies. This 
 attitude helps nobody. We should not think that we can do enough simply by buying fuel-
 efficient cars, insulating our houses, and setting up a windmill to make our own 
 electricity. That is all wonderful, but it neither does little or nothing to stop global 
 warming, nor does this focus fulfill our real moral obligations, which are to get 
 governments to do their job to prevent the disaster of excessive global warming. 
 (Sinnott-Armstrong 2005: 312)  
 Sinnott-Armstrong insightfully illustrates and supports the social connection model’s 
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assertion that discharging responsibility necessitates shared public action designed to alter 
background social structure(s) in an attempt to prevent or ameliorate injustice(s) from occurring 
in the future. Since as Derrick Jensen and Lierre Keith insightfully assert, “the role of an activist 
is not to navigate systems of oppressive power with as much integrity as possible, but rather to 
confront and take down these systems” (Jensen and Keith 2012: 424).195  
Accordingly, agents who engage in this kind of shared public activity represent the final 
and least culpable relational-level of responsibility towards structural injustices. Thus, in the case 
of roving imperialist societies the only individuals adequately discharging their responsibility for 
ecocide are those that publicly oppose, resist, and alter the background institutions and practices 
that generate environmental harm.196  
 
4. Discharging Responsibility Under the Social Connection Model  
 
But what level of political engagement is required of an actor to adequately discharge 
their responsibility? For instance, does an actor discharge their responsibility if they take part 
                                                        
195 However, it is worth mentioning that acts traditionally considered wholly in the private sphere 
(i.e., family management, production and consumption of goods and services within the 
household, etc.) can occasionally embody forms of public expression when they are enacted in 
the spirit of changing social norms, conventions, and practices. For instance, the decision to stop 
using plastic straws can be considered a public act, if abstention is undertaken (at least partially) 
as a form of political expression, i.e., as a means of impacting the social conversation, 
normalizing nonuse, undermining the industry’s profitability, demonstrating that prohibition 
would not be overly burdensome, etc.     
196 With regard to environmental harm more generally (i.e., not specific instances of ecocide) the 
responsibility of individuals living in roving imperialist communities per the social connection 
model is to advocate for socio-political change that will alter the hegemonic acceptance of 
unsustainable globalized mass production and consumption as the principal mode of subsistence.  
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only once in a public protest resisting the social structures, institutions, practices, and policies 
that are generating ecocide? Young would likely hold that this meager level of engagement is 
inadequate and instead argue that what is required is for actors to take part in ongoing and 
consistent shared public efforts to alter and end practices that they participate in that generate 
injustice. As she states, “one has the responsibility to do whatever it takes to bring about specific 
ends or purposes” (Young 2011: 143).  
However, one might object that in the case of an injustice as widespread and pervasive as 
ecocide it seems outlandish, farfetched, unrealistic, and absurd to claim that actors are 
responsible for altering the systems causing the harm, especially considering the current global 
dominance of industrial mass productive and consumptive societies.  Nevertheless, Young 
accepts that many of our moral obligations may appear daunting, “some people might take this 
line of discussion as a reductio ad absurdum. If your theory of responsibility faces me with tasks 
bigger than I can fathom, then your theory must be wrong” (Young 2011: 143). However, she 
does not acquiesce and rebukes such criticisms by asserting, “that in a very unjust world [such as 
ours, with regard to ecocide], such an attitude is overly conservative and allows most of us to tell 
ourselves complacently that we are doing what we can and all that can be expected of us to 
improve things” (Young 2011: 123-124).197  
Additionally, she defends her position by claiming that the social connection model’s 
virtue theoretic, commonly shared, and forward-looking features make it more manageable than 
one might have first presumed (Young 2011: 142-144). She argues that while actors do bear 
responsibility for altering unjust systems that they participate in; they nevertheless, do not bear 
this responsibility alone, in that all actors involved share similarly in responsibility.  
                                                        
197 It is precisely this sort of complacency and deference to the status quo regarding 
environmental degradation that environmental transformative justice aims to alter by bringing to 
light the injustice of ecocide.  
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Also, since the social connection model does not hold actors guilty or blameworthy of 
past wrongs, they have no putative duties or required acts of penitence. As such, they have 
greater discretion to decide how to conduct themselves with the aim of publicly combating the 
injustice given their abilities, circumstances, and competing moral concerns.198 
Finally, because the model recognizes that it is always uncertain if actors will be able to 
achieve their objectives. The framework accepts that good intentions, aspirations, and efforts to 
work together to alter unjust social practices are morally laudatory and efficacious in-and-of-
themselves, regardless as to whether the projects lead to imperfect results. Consequently, failure 
to end an injustice is not necessarily tantamount to shirking one’s moral responsibility, so long as 
good faith attempts to rectify and redress the problem continue to be made.    
As discussed, the social connection model arouses actors’ sense of responsibility to 
combat injustice by appealing to their desire to be morally virtuous and their concern for the 
plight of others.199 But as such, it leaves much of the normative decision-making up to the actors 
themselves to determine what level of participation appeases their conscience. Nevertheless, the 
framework is not entirely self-motivated in that it allows for and endorses criticizing actors for 
not adequately involving themselves or being ineffective and counterproductive in their efforts to 
improve or end unjust systems they are connected with. As Young says, “we have a right and 
obligation to criticize others with whom we share responsibility” (Young 2011: 144).200 
                                                        
198 For instance, it would be appropriate for actors to prioritize redressing injustices resulting 
from a specific token case of ecocide that they acknowledge and recognize an intimate 
connection with; rather then, focusing their efforts on the more daunting task of changing social 
structures that are causing ecocide as a type of harm more generally.     
199 Essentially, the social contract model functions as a tool of moral persuasion to motivate 
actors to accept future obligations to improve unjust social systems with which they are engaged 
(i.e., it concerns internally embracing responsibility); whereas, the liability model functions as a 
means of justifying the impositions of moral censure on actors in virtue of their past wrongs (i.e., 
it concerns externally mandating responsibility).    
200 The next chapter will explore at length what the target objectives and reasonable levels or 
involvement ought to be when we examine the sort of social principles, structures, and 
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At present, it is unnecessary to delve further into determining what levels of involvement 
are adequate for discharging responsibility for ecocide. Since, the next chapter will explore the 
topic at length, as the work examines the sort of social principles, structures, and institutions that 
actors should strive to publicly promote in order to prevent, mitigate, and repair the injustices of 
ecocide, i.e., discuss the content of environmental transformative justice. 
 Thus, in conclusion, we have seen that Young emphasizes actors’ “social position” in 
relation to injustice(s) as the central criterion by which her model accounts for differentiated 
responsibility. Nevertheless, is it possible for an actor to have no relation to the harm of ecocide 
and as such, no responsibility to discharge? As we have argued it seems unlikely that any 
individual member of roving imperialist society would satisfy this condition (as their basic way 
of life intrinsically generates environmental destruction), but what about autarkic communities 
that have never participated, benefited, or have any interest in maintaining processes of non-
sustainable industrial mass production and consumption – do these groups still have 
responsibility to discharge regarding ecocide?  
 This question is of significant concern for the CBDR principle because if an actor has no 
responsibility to discharge, then one can argue that Young’s model does not satisfy the criterion 
of ‘commonality’ (once again meaning everyone has a role to play) embraced in contemporary 
environmentalism.201 Thus, to foreclose this argument the work will endeavor to prove that the 
model of responsibility endorsed is maximally broad, in that it has the capacity to include all 
actors.  
                                                        
institutions actors should strive to publicly promote in order to prevent, mitigate, and repair the 
injustices of ecocide, i.e., discuss how to achieve environmental transformative justice.  
201 To reiterate, Young would likely conclude that autarkic communities that bear no relation to 
ecocide would have no responsibility to discharge. But our work seeks to show how her theory 
can be employed (i.e., contrary to her own objective) to draw the opposite conclusion as a means 
of satisfying the ‘commonality’ criterion of the CBDR principle.  
 155 
Nevertheless, some may worry that it is overly ambitious, unnecessary, and controversial 
to argue that the ‘commonality’ criterion of the CBDR principle entails potentially including all 
actors and that it would make more sense to limit the criterion’s applicability to groups of 
individuals that are causally linked to ecocide. However, while such an undertaking maybe 
burdensome, if it proves successful, we are rewarded with a model of responsibility that 
forecloses the objection that the ‘commonality’ criterion has not been met. Additionally, such an 
inclusive framing of responsibility for ecocide is capable of appealing to and satisfying the 
popular and pervasive environmental sentiment that each of us has a role to play in confronting 
environmental degradation. Thus, to explore this topic we will investigate the responsibility of 
autarkic communities to combat ecocide.  
 
C. Autarkic Communities’ Responsibility for Ecocide   
 
Referring back to last chapter, we can imagine autarkic communities’ whose habitat were 
destroyed through no fault of their own by ecocide (e.g., the Anangu, Wayúu, and Cree and 
Afro-Colombian villages). Obviously in these scenarios, the autarkic communities are victims of 
ecocide having lost their traditional way of life and ancestral home. Yet nonetheless, per the 
social connection model, victims have a responsibility to discharge.  
 
1. Autarkic Victims and Responsibility  
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After instances of victimization one might find it strange to claim that the members of 
autarkic communities have a responsibility to discharge.202 But Young’s theorization of the 
social connection model draws exactly this conclusion. She argues that even if victims did not 
contribute to the injustice, they still have an interest in the issue (i.e., their own well-being) and 
that interest in-and-of-itself constitutes a relation to the harm that ought to be discharged through 
shared public action. “Even if they don't [contribute to the harm], victims of injustice should 
take some responsibility for challenging the structures that produce it. It is they who know the 
most about the harms they suffer, and thus it is up to them, though not them alone, to broadcast 
their situation and call it injustice” (Young 2011: 146).  
Therefore, in the case of victimized autarkic communities (i.e., situations in which they 
are entirely innocent and contributed nothing in causing the environmental injustice), they still 
have an interest in ameliorating the harm; and thus, Young argues they should take shared public 
action to discharge this responsibility. Understandably, in these situations there exist potentially 
immense practical challenges inhibiting the autarkic communities’ ability to undertake political 
action to redress ecocide; in that they have lost their habitat, way of life, and lack connection to 
and knowledge of domestic, international, and global power structures.  
Nevertheless, victims do have first-hand experience of the environmental damages(s) 
they suffered and thus, can best understand their specific grievance(s) and appreciate their 
particular reparative and reconciliatory need(s). It is for this reason that the social connection 
                                                        
202 It is important to keep in mind that Young’s social connection model employs an unorthodox 
proscriptive notion of responsibility that is focused on motivating actors to strive for a better 
tomorrow, instead of on allocating blame for past injustices (which is instead the concern of 
Young’s liability model). Thus, one may argue that to avoid conceptual confusion, a new 
concept such as responsivity ought to be adopted to capture the apportionment of future oriented 
moral demands. However, in keeping with Young’s work we will eschew adopting a new term 
and continue to employ a notion of responsibility that covers both discussion of what one has 
done in the past and what one can do moving forward.  
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model maintains that even victims who contributed (created, maintained, participated, and/or 
benefited) nothing to an injustice still have a responsibility to take action, i.e., to bring the harm 
to public consciousness.203 But what about autarkic communities that were able to avoid 
suffering ecocide, do they still have responsibility to discharge per the social connection model?  
 
2. Non-Harmed Autarkic Communities and Responsibility  
 
Unlike in the prior ‘victimization’ case, unaffected autarkic communities are not even 
connected to ecocide as victims. Furthermore, we can envision scenarios in which, their 
traditional way of life has successfully enabled them to protect, maintain, and preserve their 
habitat in spite of the ongoing and growing global environmental crises. Hence, in these 
‘ecological stewardship’ cases it is possible that the autarkic communities are unaware of the 
threat of ecocide or of their role in protecting their habitat from harm. Thus, for these reasons, 
‘ecological stewardship’ cases involve situations in which actors are living as far removed as 
possible from non-sustainable modes of subsistence (i.e., systems of unsustainable globalized 
industrial mass production and consumption) and thereby are maximally disconnected from 
environmental wrongs.    
Hence, cases of ‘ecological stewardship’ present the social connection model with actors 
least responsible for discharging responsibility for ecocide, in that these successful autarkic 
communities did not contribute, benefit, nor were they even harmed by environmental 
degradation. As such, is it possible for the social connection model to justify that these 
                                                        
203 Also, such a determination is beneficial in that it returns a sense of agency to victimized 
groups that previously had been ignored.   
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communities have forward looking responsibility to discharge in the absence of any relation to 
environmental injustice?  
To answer this question, we must analyze the four forward looking parameters that 
Young provides to justify actor’s responsibility to redress injustices occurring within the “global 
society” – power, interest, privilege, and collective ability (Young 2011: 144). We can quickly 
disregard the last parameter - ‘collective ability’ - as it is dependent on pairing with at least one 
of the other parameters to motivate the group’s involvement in redressing injustice. As such, the 
rest of the section will briefly apply the three remaining parameters (‘power’, ‘privilege’, and 
‘interest’) to the ‘ecological stewardship’ case (i.e., the most challenging example for 
demonstrating actors responsibility for redressing environmental harm) in an attempt to 
determine if the social connection model has the potential to justify a common responsibility for 
combatting environmental ills that can be applied to all, i.e., conclusively confirm that the model 
satisfies the ‘commonality’ criterion of the CBDR principle.  
 The first parameter to evaluate is power, which Young defines as, “influence over 
processes that produce outcomes” (Young 2011: 144). Since, by definition autarkic communities 
are uninvolved in global mass industrial production or consumption, they are epistemically and 
practically distanced, lacking knowledge and involvement with the processes and procedures 
producing environmental harm and as such are ill-suited to influence and shape them. Thus, the 
parameter of ‘power’ is unable to provide a necessary connection between the autarkic 
communities and environmental injustice(s) requiring redress.  
 One might be tempted to argue that the autarkic communities have the power to protect 
their own habitat, thus they have a responsibility to continue their traditional lifestyle. But this is 
not an expression of ‘power’ per the model, since the group’s maintenance of their customary 
traditions and practices does not directly alter or influence the background processes and social 
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structures generating environmental harm.  
 The second parameter to consider is privilege, which Young describes as an actor’s 
ability, “to change their habits or make extra efforts without suffering serious deprivation” 
(Young 2011: 145). Since, autarkic communities lead highly habituated lifestyles committed to 
preserving their customary relationship with their local environment they clearly lack ‘privilege’ 
per Young’s account, in that any alteration to their way of life (i.e., changes to their traditional 
patterns of behavior) could result in serious loss of wellbeing. Accordingly, autarkic 
communities do not occupy a ‘privileged social position’ and therefore, in this case the 
parameter does not foster responsibility for redressing environmental harms.  
 Finally, regarding the parameter of interest, we have already stipulated that in the 
‘ecological stewardship’ case it is conceivable that autarkic communities may be unconcerned 
(or more likely unaware) regarding environmental harms that do not impact their local habitat. 
Nevertheless, one might be tempted to assert that autarkic communities have an interest in 
altering social structures, relations, and institutions causing environmental harm tout court. 
 Essentially, the argument relies on an assumption that if environmental degradation is 
permitted to continue unabated, then it will eventually impact the autarkic communities’ habitat. 
But this claim is dubious, (leaving aside the fact that autarkic communities might be unaware of 
the crises) in that their traditional engagement with their habitat has already proven to be 
resilient. As such, the premise – ‘that autarkic communities’ habitat will inevitably be affected 
by external environmental degradation’ - seems uncertain.204 Accordingly, if it is the case that 
such groups can independently sustain their habitat and way of life, then it is possible that they 
                                                        
204 Essentially, the point is that an autarkic community’s sustainable and resilient lifestyle may 
prove so effective in preserving their habitat that it successfully outlasts roving imperialists’ 
unsustainable mode of subsistence, i.e., the industrial and post-industrial globalized system may 
collapse before the autarkic communities experience social death due to ecocide.  
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would have little interest in altering their behavior or concern for broader environmental harms 
to which they are wholly unconnected or affected.  Furthermore, if they were unable to continue 
to preserve their ecosystem, then by definition they would no longer be ‘ecological stewards’ and 
as such, could easily be situated within Young’s model as either victims, beneficiaries, 
contributors, or perpetrators depending upon their involvement in the environmental degradation 
impacting their habitat - as our previous discussion has illustrated.    
Consequently, the above analysis of ‘ecological stewardship’ cases offers a hypothetical 
class of actors with no relationship to ecocide per Young’s interpretation of the social connection 
model. Hence in the potentiality that such communities exist, Young would likely assert that the 
social connection model would be unable to link these peoples to environmental harms and as 
such, they would be exempt of responsibility (even from within her rather expansive conception 
of responsibility) for redressing these injustices.  
Immediately, one might argue that this result is unproblematic and does not violate the 
‘commonality’ criterion of CBDR principle because at least at present, these communities (if 
they exist) represent such a small minority of the people inhabiting the planet that it makes no 
substantive difference (in that they do not cause or are impacted by ecocide) if they are excluded 
from responsibility. However, this retreat is conceptually unsatisfying, since the stated objective 
is to show that the theory of responsibility under consideration is flexible enough to demonstrate 
that all people potentially have a role to play in response to environmental injustice.205   
                                                        
205 This argument may seem somewhat pedantic, especially if it is shown that no unconnected 
ecological stewards exist. Nevertheless, it is conceptually important because it illustrates that 
Young’s framework can satisfy a maximally expansive reading of the ‘commonality’ criterion of 
the CBDR principle, i.e., it offers a framework of responsibility able to fully articulate the folk 
environmentalist understanding that we must all work together to confront environmental 
degradation.  
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Consequently, and contrary to Young’s stated application of her theory, the work 
contends that unconnected ecological stewards can be integrated into her model of 
responsibility. Once again, the reason such a conclusion is of interest is because it demonstrates 
that the framework is able to unconditionally satisfy the ‘commonality’ component of the CBDR 
principle in cases of ecocide. Essentially, the work argues that unconnected ecological stewards 
have an important responsibility (i.e., have a role to play) in redressing environmental injustices 
per the social connection model in their role as environmental heroes.  
The key insight necessary to reach this conclusion is recognizing that Young failed to 
fully consider or articulate the virtue theoretic aspect(s) of her account. As previously explained, 
the social connection model is virtue-theoretic, in that it relies on actors’ motivation and 
disposition to strive for moral excellence by embracing their responsibility to improve 
institutions and practices in which they partake. But as Linda Zagzebski explains, the process of 
identifying and developing virtuous motivations and dispositions requires moral exemplars. “We 
do not have criteria for goodness in advance of identifying the exemplars of goodness” 
(Zagzebski 2004: 41). Hence, the social connection model tacitly relies on the existence of heroic 
actors displaying qualities, behaviors, and habits that others can admire and emulate, i.e., the 
model requires commendable acts and actors that push social boundaries and transcend the 
established status quo.   
As such, unconnected ecological stewards by continuing their traditional lifestyle 
represent exemplars of environmental heroism, in that they demonstrate (potentially 
unbeknownst to them) sustainable ways of life, which are far less environmentally destructive 
than extractive and exploitative materialism practiced by roving imperialists (i.e., the currently 
dominant mode of subsistence). Autarkic communities’ customary engagement with their habitat 
offers a tangible reimagining of social structures and modes of sustainable subsistence, i.e., they 
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provide a concrete vision for devising innovative practices and institutions to prevent, mitigate, 
and repair environmental harms that are severely lacking in contemporary society.  
Heightening the need for unconnected ecological stewards to play the role of 
environmental heroes (even if it is unbeknownst to them) is the fact that there is a dearth of 
environmentally sustainable ways of life within the dominant global order. Therefore, without 
unconnected ecological stewards, the social connection model would be lacking in virtuous 
exemplars (i.e., communities living sustainably within their habitat) to inspire, demonstrate, and 
guide change to the social practices, behaviors, institutions, norms, and values generating 
environmental harm. Thus, in this sense, even unconnected ecological stewards in their role as 
potential environmental heroes play an important part in the application of the social connection 
model’s virtue-theoretic approach to redressing ecocide.206 Furthermore, there is no undue 
burden placed upon these communities, since their responsibility is discharged simply through 
maintaining their sustainable way of life.207    
Consequently, emphasizing the virtue-theoretic aspect of Young’s account illuminates a 
path by which the model satisfies CBDR’s criterion of ‘commonality’ even in the ‘ecological 
stewardship’ case, in that it establishes a way in which all peoples and communities have a role 
to play in combatting ecocide. The hope is that this discussion has demonstrated that Young’s 
model represents a coherent articulation of the principle of CBDR, in that it satisfies both the 
‘common’ and ‘differentiated’ criteria.  
                                                        
206 It is unclear that this feature would apply to other sorts of injustices, but at least for our 
purposes of analyzing responsibility for ecocide per the social connection model, unconnected 
ecological stewards play an essential role as exemplars of environmental heroism that likely no 
other community could satisfy as effectively.     
207 However, if the group’s lifestyle becomes unsustainable, then they would by definition be 
connected to environmental degradation and thus, straightforwardly fit within Young’s model of 
responsibility.    
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Therefore, at this point, we have demonstrated that Young’s theorization of responsibility 
meets both the ‘common but differentiated’ and ‘backwards and forwards looking’ criterion that 
broadly meets the goal of both environmentalism and Transitional Justice. As such, the last 
element necessary for confirming that Young’s account is capable of satisfying the aims of both 
disciplines is to prove that her conception of responsibility is capable of including a broad set of 
social entities.  
 
D. Young’s Model as a Socially Capacious Conception of Responsibility 
 
Throughout the section, we have focused on individual responsibility, but conceptually it 
seems rather straightforward that the liability and social connection model are both readily 
amenable to including any sort of legal person (i.e., natural persons and group-agents) within 
their respective frameworks; which, as discussed in the preceding section, is required for an 
adequate and effective conception of responsibility capable of satisfying the aims of both 
Transitional Justice and environmentalism. 
For instance, instead of focusing on the guilt of the rogue rancher, we can concurrently 
stipulate that his company, Rogue Ranching Inc., was collectively liable for the illegal clearing 
of the forest, and thus, ought to face punitive and retributive social sanctions (e.g., fines, 
mandatory reforms, forced closure, etc.). Moreover, the liability model of responsibility applies 
to states, in that when states violate international law they can be blamed, held accountable, and 
sanctioned for illicit activity by the international community (which we saw in our analysis of 
Transitional Justice). Accordingly, once corporations, states, and individuals are considered 
accountable per the liability model, then there appears to be no sound basis for restricting other 
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types of group-agents (e.g., NGOs, municipalities, social clubs, etc.) from being blamed for past 
wrongs.  
Additionally, the social connection model is capable of integrating corporations, states, 
NGO’s, etc., in that the same virtue-theoretic motivations that applies to individuals (i.e., to 
strive for moral excellence by embracing their responsibility to take steps to better institutions 
and practices in which they partake), can be applied to group-agents. However, one might argue 
that the virtue-theoretic ‘motivations’ of group-actors are products of collaborative efforts and 
sentiments of the individuals comprising the group, i.e., that agency in collectives reduces down 
to the individual agency of the individual actors making up the collective.  
Therefore, such an analysis stipulates that fundamentally, the social connection model is 
limited to individual responsibility, since the governance and decision-making of collective 
organizations always reduces down to the choices of individuals within them. But as has been 
discussed, such a view is discredited, in that social ontology and rational choice theory have each 
demonstrated that group-agents often take on a causal life of their own, i.e., their prior decisions 
may dictate courses of action that are contrary to the subjective preferences of the individuals 
that make them up.208 Thus, there are situations in which the group-agent’s aims and aspirations 
diverge from the subjective wishes of the group members, i.e., sometimes groups demonstrate 
emergent behavior that is irreducible to the individual preferences of the members compromising 
them. Accordingly, it is possible that the group-agent - itself - may decide to strive for moral 
excellence by taking action to better the institutions and practices in which they engage; thus, 
satisfying the virtue-theoretic aims of the social connection model. 
                                                        
208 See the Condorcet paradox (Condorcet 1785) and Arrow’s impossibility theorem (Arrow 
1950), both of which formally explain (i.e., using rational choice theory) ways in which 
collective preferences can be contrary to the wishes of the subjective individuals comprising the 
group.    
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 Obviously, the actions, policies, and changes group-agents ought to take in response to 
ecocide per the social connection model are distinct from those required of individuals (i.e., 
natural persons). For instance, holding Exxon responsible for an oil spill, does not mean that 
individual employees (in-and-of-themselves), should begin cleaning up the spill regardless of 
their role in the company, e.g., the accounting department should don HAZMAT suits, wade into 
the impacted area, and start scrubbing oil off plants and animals.209  
Essentially, group-agents must act as morally unified plural-subjects and we will delve 
into precisely what this obligation entails in the next chapter. But for now, it is important to 
stress that we have demonstrated that Young’s account is amenable to a socially capacious 
conception of responsibility that meets the goals of both Transitional Justice and 
environmentalism. Hence, the section has illustrated that Young’s account can be interpreted as 
(1) common, but differentiated, (2) both backward and forward looking, and (3) socially 
capacious; and as such, it offers a framework for satisfying the requisite elements stipulated in 
the preceding section as necessary for both disciplines’ conception of responsibility.    
Thus, in conclusion, the work has offered an adequately developed conception of 
responsibility for ecocide, i.e., one that is persuasive, politically useful, reasonably acceptable to 
the parties involved, and counters harmful and obscuring ideologies that disguise accountability 
(both over-inclusively and under-inclusively) for environmental harm. Furthermore, the notion of 
responsibility has been designed to satisfy the needs of both Transitional Justice and 
environmentalism, as a means of seamlessly facilitating each discipline’s ability to draw upon 
and utilize potentially valuable conceptual insights and practical tools from the other when 
confronting ecocide.  
                                                        
209 To act collectively, the agents that take part in the cleanup must be authorized in a certain 
sense by Exxon. Individual employees acting out of their own sense of moral obligation would 
not constitute a collective act but would instead be an instance of individual beneficence.  
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With these objectives met, a subsequent topic of consideration is analyzing what is 
required of those responsible for repairing and reconciling the injustice of ecocide? In other 
words, the next chapter will work towards developing a conception of environmental 
transformative justice for post-ecocide states.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 167 
CHAPTER THREE 
Why is Ecocide Unjust? A Constructivist Approach to Diagnosing the Injustice of Ecocide   
 
I. Introduction to Constructivist Approaches to Justice  
 
  At this point in the text, it would be helpful to the reader to delineate a précis-overview, 
recounting exposition within the preceding chapters, elucidating their strategic aims and 
objectives. The first chapter considers paradigm cases and an idealized description of ecocide, 
illustrating normatively relevant ways that these wrongs fall within the purview of Transitional 
Justice due to the harm suffered (i.e., social death and loss of vital interests) and the manner in 
which the harm occurred (i.e., direct, indirect, or negligent state action). Essentially, the first 
chapter established the circumstance of environmental transformative justice, in that it delineated 
the particular social settings that trigger the normative concerns to which environmental 
transformative justice is responsive.210 
The second chapter amplified insights gained in the first chapter and attempted to 
establish the full class of actors that have a role to play in overcoming the injustice of these 
circumstances. Essentially, the second chapter sought to develop a conception of responsibility 
that was persuasive, politically useful, and reasonably acceptable to the parties involved, while 
assisting in countering detrimental and obscuring ideologies that disguise accountability (both 
                                                        
210 The work accepts what Colleen Murphy categorizes as a Humean approach to justice, in 
which, “instead of theorizing about justice in the abstract as Plato did, we should approach the 
question of what is just in a given case by identifying the problem of justice that is at issue in a 
set of circumstances…these conditions explain why justice is an issue in the first place, that is, 
why a problem of justice exists and what the contours of that problem are” (Murphy 2017: 41). 
Basically, the view involves recognizing that there are different types of justice (e.g., 
distributive, corrective, retributive, etc.) that are each responsive to particular sets of 
circumstances.   
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over-inclusively and under-inclusively) for ecocide. A core insight of the second chapter was that 
in order to adequately discharge responsibility actors would be required to take part in shared 
public activity (i.e., political action) to oppose, resist, and alter the background institutions and 
practices generating each case of ecocide under discussion.  
 Accordingly, at present the dissertation has established the circumstances in which 
environmental transformative justice is operative and who is responsible for engaging in 
environmental transformative justice. Thus, what remains is to determine what ought to be done 
in these situations. What objectives should actors be striving to achieve? And what must occur to 
in order to fully obtain justice for the victims of ecocide? Most simply, what are the principle 
aims of environmental transformative justice?     
As such, the focus of the third and fourth chapters will be investigating how 
environmental transformative justice can work towards repairing and reconciling the injustice of 
ecocide. An important aspect of this analysis is demonstrating that the goals, procedures, and 
mechanisms for achieving environmental transformative justice are compatible with, 
complement, and simultaneously further those of both Transitional Justice and environmentalism 
respectively. Ultimately, establishing links between Transitional Justice and environmentalism 
strengthens and reaffirms a goal of this project, i.e., to rationally enlist and join both disciplines 
as allies against ecocide.      
After decades of analyzing and reviewing the real-world successes and failures of 
societies attempting to overcome grave historical wrongs, the objectives of Transitional Justice 
are fairly well established. Murphy succinctly summarizes how the discipline aims at 
transitioning societies away from pervasive structural inequality, ending normalized political and 
collective wrongdoing, establishing legitimate authority, and promoting social stability (Murphy 
2017). As she emphasizes, achieving this kind of social transformation requires furthering the 
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rule of law, developing relational capabilities, and establishing political trust (Murphy 2017: 
120-135). Accordingly, justice for victims of severe political injustice involves 
acknowledgement of past wrongs, recognition of victims’ status as members of the political 
community, reparations paid to victims, and holding perpetrators accountable for their role in 
enacting grave wrongs (Murphy 2017: 172-186).  
Conversely, as discussed last chapter, it is exceedingly difficult to neatly summarize the 
broad and differentiated aims of environmentalism. Nevertheless, the work maintains that from 
an environmentalist perspective there are two main objectives that arise when confronting the 
cases of ecocide under consideration. First, steps must be taken to move towards an 
environmentally sustainable state (what exactly ‘sustainability’ entails will be explored later in 
the chapter) in which social practices, structures, and norms generating ecocide are no longer 
tolerated and accepted. Secondly, the state, in conversation with affected communities, must 
consider the possibility of restoring or constructing (i.e., in the same or different geographic 
location) the lost habitat by attempting to renew biological, structural, and ecosystem 
functioning.   
 
A. Employing Constructivist and Comparative Approaches to Justice   
 
But before we can begin analyzing how environmental transformative justice can work 
towards meeting the goals of Transitional Justice and environmentalism, it is helpful to see if it is 
possible to construct a general theory of environmental transformative justice by relying on 
established conceptions of justice.211 Such an undertaking will hopefully lend support and 
                                                        
211 It is important to point out that the dissertation is not trying to offer fundamental principles of 
justice which, “transcends the facts of the world” that would quiet the philosophical demands of 
Plato or G.A. Cohen (Cohen 2008). Instead the project is striving to provide reasonable (all 
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normative justification for the above mentioned goals of Transitional Justice and 
environmentalism when confronting ecocide and assist in forging a disciplinary alliance capable 
of challenging such injustice.   
 Thus the third and fourth chapters of the dissertation will explore what I contend to be the 
two major approaches for articulating, legitimating, and applying conceptions of justice in 
political philosophy: (1) a constructivist approach that attempts to delineate ideal distributive 
principles, rules of regulation, and institutional structures that if enacted with strict compliance in 
favorable conditions would generate a just state – e.g., Rawls, Dworkin, Scanlon, and Gauthier; 
and (2) a comparative approach interested in examining the actual world and asking how it can 
be made more just by observing what lives are like and what people are capable of achieving by 
making comparisons between persons and groups – e.g., Sen and Nussbaum.  
            As such, we will begin by working through both of these approaches’ respective 
methodology for determining what justice requires concerning the paradigm cases and idealized 
description of ecocide. The assumption is that these methodologies can play a complementary 
role (i.e., each approach’s particular weaknesses, deficiencies, and limitations can be assuaged 
by relying on the strengths and insight of the other) in our attempt to develop an adequate 
conception of environmental transformative justice.212  
                                                        
things considered) rules of regulation for responding to the fact-sensitive circumstances of post-
ecocide societies. Thus, the dissertation can avoid having to engage with Cohen’s criticism of 
constructivist methodology (i.e., that constructivism derives and justifies principles of justice 
from non-moral facts in a way that distorts our understanding of justice) because it already 
admits it is undertaking a pragmatic approach aimed at reaching overlapping consensus for 
responding to a specific set of harms (coping with reality), instead of striving to reach an 
absolute final judgement (copying some immutable Truth). In other words, there is no need for 
us, when conceptualizing environmental transformative justice, to embrace Cohen’s strategy of 
theorizing strictly fact-independent principles of justice that eschew engaging with how things 
work in practice.  
212 It is important to keep in mind that the practices, methods, and policies for adequately 
responding to ecocide will likely improve as the process of environmental transformative justice 
is repeatably undertaken. The reason for this stems from the fact that if practitioners have access 
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Accordingly, the purpose is not to defend one approach over the other, but to 
pragmatically utilize and adopt insights from each in the hopes of developing a conception of 
environmental transformative justice able to offer societies meaningful guidance and assistance 
for combating legacies of ecocide.213 In due course, if such approaches are able to justify and 
reaffirm the aims of Transitional Justice and environmentalism, then it strengthens the work’s 
goal: to demonstrate the interdisciplinary nature of environmental transformative justice.  
By building a theory of environmental transformative justice from within a pluralist 
account of mainstream conceptions of justice, the work seeks to bolster the possibility of 
achieving general agreement via ‘overlapping consensus’ (i.e., differing normative doctrines 
agreeing on particular policy objectives despite advancing generally inconsistent conceptions of 
justice) as to what needs to occur in order to justly respond to cases of ecocide. As Steven 
Vanderheiden states, “even if the differences among approaches [to justice] are of theoretical 
interest, such differences should not obstruct consensus around practical measures to lessen (if 
not fully rectify) the injustice in question (Vanderheiden 2016: 398). For instance, approaching 
the issue of how to respond to ecocide by appealing to multiple theoretical frameworks, assists in 
demonstrating potential diagnostic convergence regarding the harms suffered and prescriptive 
                                                        
to a growing body of empirical evidence (i.e., from past attempts), then they will be more readily 
able to learn valuable lessons from prior successes or failures. Hence, it is reasonable to assume 
that the conception of environmental transformative justice currently on offer, may change as it 
is applied. It is helpful to recognize that anytime a new conception of justice is proposed, 
practitioners should embrace a ‘learn-by-doing’ approach, in which the goals, means, evidence, 
and values of policy-making are all open for constant (re)examination.   
213 In many ways the answer to the question regarding how best to proceed in such circumstances 
will greatly depend on the values and goals of the affected community. As Bryan Norton stresses 
when making environmental decisions the procedure is often more important than the absolute 
substantive conclusion. He asserts that the process must be, “democratic…it must be iterative, it 
must be open to all voices in the community, and it must be receptive to multiple values and 
varied formulations of these values” (Norton 2005: 273). Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume 
that it would be beneficial for post-ecocide communities’ decision-making process, if theorists 
can offer guidance regarding the objectives of environmental transformative justice. 
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convergence regarding potential remedies.214 Furthermore, such an endeavor will serve as an 
effective diagnostic tool to further capture and clarify the injustice of ecocide and in so doing 
strengthen the case for action by demonstrating robust consensus around core normative 
judgements.     
 
B. Overcoming a Preliminary Issue with Applying Rawls’s Ideal Constructivist Theory 
to Ecocide   
 
Constructivists assert that the fundamental objective and principal method of advancing 
justice is to delineate ideal principles and basic social structures that are necessary and sufficient 
for achieving a just state under reasonable conditions. As Cohen succinctly explains, 
constructivists determine the principles of justice by relying on a “privileged selection process” 
in which, “the fundamental principles of justice are the outcome of an idealized legislative 
procedure whose task is to select principles that will regulate our common life” (e.g., Rawls’s 
original position or Scanlon’s requirement of rules that no one could reasonably reject) (Cohen 
2008: 282).  
 Thus, in an attempt to determine the ideal principles of environmental transformative 
justice, we will begin by applying John Rawls’s theory of “justice as fairness” to ecocidal 
states.215 The justification for focusing on Rawls is that his seminal theory is the preferred (or at 
                                                        
214 As Cass Sunstein emphasizes, “sometimes people can agree on individual 
judgements even if they disagree on general theory” (Sunstein 2007: 4).  
215 Once again, “ecocidal states/societies” are defined as states that directly, indirectly, or 
negligently allowed intentional environmental harm to occur, which undermined the vital 
interests of a distinct cultural group without the group’s consent; whereas, the term “post-ecocide 
states/societies” refers to states/societies that are in the process of enacting environmental 
transformative justice after ecocide (see 1).  
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least most widely discussed) constructivist account in contemporary political philosophy.216 
Furthermore, situating our discussion regarding how to justly respond to ecocide within the heart 
of the mainstream liberal tradition is beneficial, since as Charles Mills expounds: “The 
importance of liberalism is that it is the most successful political philosophy of modernity and is 
now globally hegemonic. Liberalism provides the most developed body of normative theory for 
understanding the rights of persons and the conceptualization of social justice” (Mills 2017: 
203).  
Lastly, a benefit of looking at Rawls, is that his theory’s emphasis on respecting 
pluralism of values and fraternity between citizens makes it well suited for incorporating and 
recognizing the interests of autarkic communities in liberal societies.217 Such a theoretical 
contribution is important because at present scholars often rely on importing principles of 
sovereignty and noninterference from international relations theory to make sense of these 
‘outsiders within.’218 Such a perspective is discouraging for our present moment, in that we are 
in desperate need of encouraging ecologically sustainable self-sufficiency (like those practiced 
                                                        
216 There are prudential reasons for conducting our inquiry of environmental transformative 
justice through a Rawlsian perspective, in that such a framing offers the greatest likelihood of 
uptake, traction, and understanding with regards to the mainstream liberal political philosophy 
community, i.e., the currently dominant paradigm of political thought. But additionally, I have 
no qualms working within the Rawlsian framework because I still feel it offers the best 
constructivist account of justice in contemporary philosophy.  
217 Moreover, the investigation is informative from a purely academic perspective, in that 
employing “justice as fairness” to diagnose the injustice of ecocide can help clarify and illustrate 
some interesting features, tensions, and limitations of the theory. For instance, some questions to 
consider during the analysis are: (1) Is it possible to find the fair terms of social cooperation for 
citizens who are not integrated into society in the ways Rawls would have imagined, in that they 
live in separate cultural and economic spheres?; (2) Providing opportunities is very important for 
Rawls, but how can this objective be satisfied for communities whose interests do not align with 
the broader society?, and (3) Is there a point at which a disregard for economic efficiency in the 
name of fairness encroaches on justice itself?    
218 See Jeff Corntassel’s work “Towards Sustainable Self-Determination: Rethinking the 
Contemporary Indigenous-Rights Discourse” that advocates for noninterference and increased 
sovereignty for self-sufficient communities” (Corntassel 2008).  
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autarkic communities) as a realizable goal.219 Accordingly, the chapter hopes to demonstrate how 
Rawls’s theory of “justice as fairness” can further the goal of incorporating autarkic interests into 
“well ordered” societies.220     
  Famously, Rawls in a Theory of Justice constructed an idealized social arrangement 
designed to maintain equal liberties, maximize fair opportunity, and minimize inequality (Rawls 
1971).  But can these principles apply in cases of ecocide? Can Rawls’s ideal constructivist 
theory provide guidance regarding how to justly grapple with the injustice of ecocide?  
The initial answer is that Rawls’s ‘ideal theory’ will obviously prove inadequate because 
repairing past injustices, such as ecocide, falls under the purview of what Rawls himself calls 
‘non-ideal theory’ (Rawls 1971 revised edition 1999: 8).221 To briefly explain the distinction, 
                                                        
219 In other words, autarkic communities’ way of life should not be viewed as something 
necessarily foreign, alien or carved-off from our mainstream political community but should 
instead be championed as realizable, as evidenced by the fact that it already exists within our 
society. Essentially, what is needed is not a hands-off approach, which emphasizes non-
interference and treats autarkic communities as foreign actors best left to their own devices; but 
instead, efforts ought to be made to embrace and advocate for these communities, so as to 
support their ability to maintain and reproduce their traditions, practices, cosmologies, and 
relationships with their ancestral land, not only for their benefit, but for the benefit of society as a 
whole. As David Schlosberg and David Carruthers explain: “In movements against coal mining, 
oil and natural gas drilling, industrial use of scarce water, and numerous other threats to local 
resources, much of the indigenous response is related to the capacity for communities and 
cultures to thrive” (Schlosberg and Carruthers 2010: 30).  
220 The goal of increasing social fraternity and cooperation between groups is in part why the 
preceding chapter of the dissertation defended the ‘commonality’ criterion of the CBDR 
principle.  
221 The reason that Rawls’s approach is ahistorical, and thus not fully adequate in non-ideal 
situations, stems from his initial philosophical prescriptive, since the veil of ignorance and the 
original position are designed to render irrelevant socio-personal considerations that are morally 
extraneous to the establishment of just principles: “No one knows his place in society, his class 
position or social status; nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and 
abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like” (Rawls 1971 revised edition 1999: 11). Thus, 
the very objective of Rawls’s thought experiment neutralizes individuals’ ability to consider their 
past and present conditions during deliberation. But the past is an inextricably relevant concern 
for societies in the wake of ecocide, in that the community necessarily contains at a minimum 
two dissimilar historical social groups victims (former-autarkic peoples – current-ecological 
refugees) and perpetrators (roving imperialists). As will be argued, there is a strong intuition that 
these victims of ecocide ought to be afforded distinct moral attention. Thus, for environmental 
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‘non-ideal theory’ focuses on identifying injustices of the present and investigating how societies 
can move away from these injustices, towards achieving a just future (as defined by ‘ideal-
theory’).   
 However, it must be emphasized that presently we are not attempting to consider how 
post-ecocide societies ought to achieve the ideal; but are instead, undertaking the constructivist 
project of determining what the ideal is when determining the objectives of environmental 
transformative justice prior to the actualization of these goals. Thus, while we are in the midst of 
developing a constructivist framework for responding to the injustice of ecocide, we must 
initially proceed as ‘ideal theorists’ before moving to problems of implementation, which are 
considered the purview of ‘non-ideal theory’.222   
Broadly, the constructivist method prioritizes the need for clear and distinct principles of 
justice and stipulates that social progress can only reliably occur after ideal objectives have been 
identified (Simmons 2010). As Rawls states, “the reason for beginning with ideal theory is that it 
provides the only basis for the systematic grasp of more pressing problems [non-ideal theory]” 
(Rawls 1971 revised edition 1999: 8). 
 Obviously, many non-ideal theorists contend that Rawls’s view is mistaken, and that ideal 
theory is too detached from reality to help guide social progress or even worse that it facilitates 
greater injustice (Mills 2005, 2007, 2012, 2015 and 2017). They instead presume that social 
                                                        
transformative justice settings the specific identity and historical experience(s) of a group or 
individual are relevant factors for consideration when meting out social justice. No purely future-
oriented, ahistorical, normative framework will adequately assuage the moral requirement of 
remedying past wrongs.    
222 Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that a general problem with engaging with Rawls in 
matters of non-ideal theory is that it is not clear what the status of his own principles should be. 
Are they applied in conjunction with (hypothetical) principles of non-ideal theory? Or is there a 
temporal sequence by which you do corrective justice first and only then seek to apply Rawls’s 
principles? Thus, in proceeding we will assume that we can appeal to Rawls’s principles even 
under the radically non-ideal conditions of ecocidal societies, but only as a means of illustrating 
how these societies are non-ideal.  
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progress requires detailed attentiveness to the present state of the actual (‘non-ideal’) world; 
starting with an understanding of current political and economic systems, as well as social 
institutions, which necessitates applying a dynamic psychological picture of how people actually 
behave in addition to sociological attunement to the societal conditions that we wish to improve.  
As such, non-ideal theorists believe that only by earnest diachronic consideration of the 
current state of affairs will we be able to make just decisions that improve society (Fatima 2014 
and Tobin 2009). Accordingly, the non-idealist approach to justice (i.e., one that takes seriously 
past and present circumstances, relations, conditions, processes and social interactions), seems 
rather appropriate for analyzing the (in)justice of ecocidal and post-ecocide societies, in that past 
histories and present circumstances of victims (former-autarkic peoples – current-ecological 
refugees) and perpetrators (roving imperialists) are of relevant moral concern.223  
However, because we are working from within a constructivist framework, we can table 
these criticisms for the present and assume that the constructivists are correct in the view that 
non-ideal theorists would themselves require ideal normative standards to be able to offer 
guidance and insights in non-ideal settings (see Rawls 1993, Buchanan 2004, Valentini 2009, 
and Simmons 2010). As Lisa Herzog explains:  
“Ideal theory, as understood here, is not about what is right and wrong per se, without any 
consideration of the context in which its principles are to be applied but aims at being action-
guiding. It can therefore be reasonably limited by limitations of what it is possible to do. If 
one does not accept this principle, ideal theory loses the ability to provide the guidance it is 
supposed to deliver.” (Herzog 2012: 276) 
 
Hence, if Rawls and other ideal constructivists are correct (as we are assuming needs to be 
the case in order to devise coherent principles of environmental transformative justice), then his 
                                                        
223 For instance, our normative evaluation of a situation will likely vary if we believe the harm 
was self-inflicted or instigated by another. In other words, non-ideal theory tracts onto the moral 
sentiment that proper analysis of (in)justice requires knowledge of the processes that brought 
about the state of affairs.  
 
 177 
and their theories ought to be able to provide some insights and guidance even in non-ideal 
settings, (e.g., ecocidal societies) as defenders of ideal theory argue it must. As Mills eloquently 
reminds us: “Ideal theory is not supposed to be an end in itself but is instrumental to the goal of 
more adequately dealing with injustice” (Mills 2017: 155). Thus, to satisfy this requirement, this 
work intends to demonstrate that a Rawlsian constructivist approach can offer insights regarding 
what justice requires of post-ecocide communities and as a means of diagnosing the injustice of 
ecocide.  
To advance this line of inquiry the chapter will proceed in two phases. First, it will engage 
with a canonical reading of Rawls’s theory and attempt to analyze how his famous two principles 
of justice can be applied to cases of ecocide, i.e., employ an orthodox account of the theory to 
begin fleshing out the tenets of environmental transformative justice. Secondly, the work will 
rely on recent scholarship by Moises Vaca and Juan Espindola (2014) and Charles Mills (2017) 
that convincingly argues that Rawls’s theory of “justice as fairness” requires an additional 
principle of reparative justice; and then analyze how this augmented Rawlsian account can be 
applied to cases of ecocide. Thereby we can further develop a theory of environmental 
transformative justice by relying on an unorthodox, yet supposedly consistent reading of Rawls’s 
theory. The hope is that this constructivist analysis will provide plausible (i.e., mainstream 
liberal) principles of environmental transformative justice to reasonably guide the process of 
rectifying and reconciling with the wrongs of ecocide.   
  
II. Conceptualizing Justice Post-Ecocide: An Orthodox Rawlsian Approach  
 
Rawls’s constructivist approach from “behind the veil of ignorance” in the “original 
position” endorses two principles of justice: 
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(First Principle) Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system 
of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.  
(Second Principle) Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are 
both:  
(a) To the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings 
principle, and 
(b) Attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity (Rawls 1999: 266).224 
These principles are supposed to regulate the “basic structure” of society, i.e., the full set of 
constitutional, political, legal, economic, and social institutions operating within a state. Rawls 
defines the “basic structure” as, “the main political and social institutions and the way they fit 
together as one scheme of cooperation” (Rawls 2001: 4). Therefore, in order for a society to be 
just, its basic structure must satisfy the two principles of justice.  
 In this sense, Rawls’s constructivist theory is ideal in a non-technical sense in that it 
proposes an ideal society that we should aim for as a model (Valentini 2009 and 2012). As 
Rawls states in Political Liberalism, his theory strives to show, “how the social world may 
realize the features of a realistic utopia…[that] provides a long-term goal of political endeavor, 
and in working toward it gives meaning to what we can do today” (Rawls 1993: 128).  
When we examine ecocidal societies on these terms, it is abundantly clear that they fall 
far short of the “realistic utopias” that Rawls championed, in that they egregiously fail at 
satisfying his two principles of justice. To explain their shortcomings, the work will briefly 
describe the central discrepancies between these societies and one that would be considered 
“well-ordered” in that it is in line with Rawls’s principles of justice.  
                                                        
224 I have opted to quote Rawls’s final formulation of the two principles from A Theory of Justice 
the revised edition from 1999; which as the final formulation in the work, represents the clearest 
articulation of his thought emerging after decades of careful, pondering, analysis, scrutiny, astute 
judgment, and refinement.   
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For simplicity’s sake regarding Rawls’s understanding of well-ordered societies, the 
work will proceed by specifying the miscarriages of justice occurring in ecocidal states by 
examining each principle pursuant to Rawls’s stated lexical priority, in that basic liberties can 
never be sacrificed to promote fair equality of opportunity or the difference principle; fair 
equality of opportunity can never be undermined to promote the difference principle, and the just 
savings principle is an intergenerational constraint on the difference principle.225 Thus, we will 
begin by examining the first principle, which henceforth shall be referred to as the basic liberty 
principle, which defends personal freedom and develops a system of legal and political rights; 
next we will move on to the second clause of the second principle, which henceforth will be 
referred to as the fair equality of opportunity principle (FEO), which ensures fair and equal 
prospects of achieving attractive social positions; next we will move on to the first clause of the 
second principle, which henceforth will be referred to as the difference principle, which 
establishes solidarity with the least advantaged group, and finally, we will consider the restrictive 
condition of the first clause of the second principle, which henceforth will be referred to as the 
just savings principle, which establishes intergenerational fairness.   
 
A. Ecocidal Societies’ Failure to Respect Basic Liberties  
                                                        
225 It is important to point out that there is controversy over whether or not Rawls’s lexical 
prioritization of the principles of justice is defensible. For instance, Thomas Pogge argues that 
certain basic economic goods (second principle) are more important than civil and political 
freedoms (first principle) (Pogge 1989: 132-134). And Taylor provides an extensive list of 
theorists opposed to Rawls’s lexical prioritization, which includes, “Brian Barry, Kenneth 
Arrow, H.L.A. Hart, Russell Keat and David Miller, Henry Shue, Joseph DeMarco and Samuel 
Richmond, Ricardo Blaug, and Norman Daniels” (Taylor 2003: 247). But wading into these 
debates, will take us too far afield from our analysis. Also, since we are presenting a canonical 
interpretation, it makes sense to proceed according to Rawls’s favored ordering to avoid 
misrepresenting how the principles are supposed to cohere in support of the overall theory of 
justice. Furthermore, the lexical priority of the principles is somewhat irrelevant for our present 
purposes because each will be analyzed on its own terms.  
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Rawls’s first principle of justice communicates the basic rights and liberties that are to be 
distributed equally to all citizens. As he explains, the “intuitive” idea behind the basic liberty 
principle is, “to generalize the principle of religious toleration to a social form, thereby arriving 
at equal liberty in public institutions” (Rawls 1999: 180 Note 6). Helpfully, Rawls offers a list of 
the basic liberties, stating:  
Important among these are political liberty (the right to vote and to hold public office) 
and freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; 
freedom of the person, which includes freedom from psychological oppression and 
physical assault and dismemberment (integrity of the person); the right to hold personal 
property and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by the concept of the 
rule of law. (Rawls 1999: 53) 
  As we saw in our paradigm cases of ecocide in the first chapter, the environmental 
destruction of autarkic communities’ habitat directly violates many of the basic liberties.226 It 
seems incontrovertible that members of the victimized group suffered psychological oppression 
caused by the loss of their means of subsistence, their ancestral traditions, and meaning in their 
lives.227 Furthermore, as documented, it is often the case that the environmental destruction is 
precipitated by the expulsion of communities from their ancestral land (e.g., the Australian 
                                                        
226 It is necessary to reemphasize that in the paradigm cases of ecocide under discussion, the 
members of autarkic communities had either full, dual, or plural citizenship in the state at issue. 
This is important because Rawls’s conception of “justice as fairness” is limited to intrastate 
relations, in that he makes a simplifying assumption that the societies under consideration are 
self-contained, i.e., “closed system[s] isolated from other societies” that citizens only enter and 
leave by birth and death (Rawls 1999: 7). Thus, ensuring that the victims effected by ecocide are 
citizens precludes possible complications arising when attempting to analyze the mistreatment of 
communities that do not fall under the state’s jurisdiction. But these complications may hinder 
the application of our framework to cases in which sovereign autarkic communities were 
subjected to ecocide by foreign powers, which is/was a common occurrence, especially during 
colonialism.    
227 For instance, a recent psychological study found that after an Ecuadorean indigenous village 
lost their ancestral land due to a mining operation, 42% of the villagers suffered from mental 
health problems, especially children traumatized by being exposed to the noise of industrial 
processes (Brown 2017).   
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government forcibly relocating the Anangu off their reservation), which likely constitutes 
physical assault and violates the right to hold personal property, against either intentional or 
arbitrary seizure.   
 But one might question if ecocide could potentially occur without basic liberties being 
infringed? It is certainly true, that many instances of environmental destruction occur without 
transgressing basic liberties, e.g., natural disasters or when all actors involved voluntarily agree 
to destroy the habitat. However, the cases that fall within our conception of ecocide are narrower 
in scope, in that the environmental harm must have (1) been intentionally enacted, (2) absent 
consent from an impacted community, which (3) undermined their vital interest(s).  
Since the ecosystem had previously constituted such a vital interest, that its destruction 
caused partial or complete “social death” of the impacted community, it seems clear that the 
victimized community must have had or deserved some title to the land.228 At minimum, Rawls 
would consider the destruction of these ecosystems without the impacted communities’ consent, a 
violation of their personal property rights. Since for Rawls, personal property is a basic liberty that 
includes, “at least certain forms of real property, such as dwellings and private grounds,” i.e., 
housing, shelter, and personal items (Rawls 200: 114 note 36).  
Essentially, Rawls couches his defense of personal property in Hegelian terms, as a means 
of securing, “a sufficient material basis for personal independence and a sense of self respect, both 
of which are essential for the adequate development and exercise of the moral powers” (Rawls 
                                                        
228 In fact, this conclusion has been adopted into international law, pursuant to Article 5 of the 
United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas, 
which states that “Peasants and other people working in rural areas have the right to have access 
to and to use in a sustainable manner the natural resources present in their communities that are 
required to enjoy adequate living conditions” (UN 2018) and Article 26 of the UN Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which states that “Indigenous peoples have the right to the 
lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used 
or acquired” (UN 2007).  
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2011: 114).229 Therefore, because of the reality of how intimately linked these communities were 
(materially, culturally, and psychologically) to their habitats all cases of ecocide (i.e., 
environmental destruction that satisfy the above criteria) appear to engender violations of their 
basic right to personal property.  
 Furthermore, beyond these glaring human rights abuses, the spirit of the basic liberty 
principle is violated in ecocidal states. The goal of basic liberties is to ensure all citizens have the 
maximum freedom to develop their respective capabilities and engage with others in cooperative 
social ventures. As Rawls states, “the basic rights and liberties and their priority are there said to 
guarantee equally for all citizens the social conditions essential for the adequate development 
and the full and informed exercise of their two moral powers - their capacity for a sense of 
justice and their capacity for a conception of the good” (Rawls 1999: xii).230  
 Thus, ecocidal societies undermine the core aspiration of the basic liberty principle by 
inhibiting members of impacted autarkic community’s purposeful self-development, i.e., “[the] 
necessary conditions for realizing the powers of moral personality” (Rawls 1982: 162).231 Since 
                                                        
229 For a thorough discussion of Rawls’s defense of the right to personal property, see Katy 
Wells’ article, “The Right to Personal Property” (Wells 2016).  
230 It is important to underscore that purposeful self-development is not a basic liberty in its own 
right, such a loose construal would push the concept beyond its standard usage. But the goal of 
the basic liberty principle is to establish the basis of a society that allows citizens to advance 
their purposeful self-development. Accordingly, if citizens are not attaining or furthering their 
purposeful self-development there is reason to believe that basic liberties are being violated.  
231 There are other liberal frameworks, proceeding from radically different premises, which are 
also able to justify how ecocide violates basic rights. For instance, pursuant to Robert Nozick’s 
libertarian entitlement theory (based on Locke’s labor theory of value) the state’s involvement in 
ecocidal activities unjustly infringes upon members of autarkic communities’ legitimate right to 
their private property. In the sense that, since these communities first labored on the land and 
developed these natural resources, they are entitled to these goods as justly acquired property to 
the exclusion of others and any infringement of these rights (e.g., third party destruction of the 
goods) demands compensation pursuant to Nozick’s principle of rectification (Nozick 1974). 
However, such a reading is complicated by the issue, going back to Locke himself, of whether 
autarkic communities’ mode of appropriation establishes property rights in the sense libertarians 
would acknowledge.      
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ecocide destroys these peoples’ traditional way of life, hampers their ability to meet their basic 
needs, and uproots their social connections, it severely curtails their ability to achieve their 
higher interests, e.g., forging stable social unions, developing their self-governing powers, or 
articulating conceptions of justice using public reason.    
 However, one might argue that these former autarkic community members (i.e., ecocide 
refugees) could still have their basic liberties satisfied in another location. While it is true that 
after the harm, the impacted citizens may be placed in a situation, in which they can pursue their 
purposeful self-development. However, such a result is unlikely because of the significance that 
connecting to a particular place plays in these citizens’ self-conception (e.g., they are unable to 
conduct religious ceremonies that were tied to a specific geographic location or natural entity 
that has been destroyed or made inaccessible). As such, uprooting autarkic citizens from places 
to which they have deep ties, likely forecloses important aspects of their self-development.   
Moreover, the act of causing, instigating, or allowing ecocide to occur (per our technical 
definition) always constitutes a violation of the impacted citizens’ rights because of the reality 
that they never consented. The reason for this is that, since ecocide occurs without consent, it 
necessarily undermines victimized autarkic citizens’ “social basis of self-respect” because it 
demonstrates the contempt and indifference the state has towards the “conception of the good” 
and “social arrangements” on which these peoples rely to govern their lives. It makes it seem as 
though their way of life, concerns, and well-being are valueless or at least unworthy of 
consideration, protection, or preservation, which is anathema to the basic liberty principle’s goal 
of fostering a sense of self-worth throughout the citizenry. Thus, the violation has already 
occurred, even if the victimized citizens are subsequently placed in a situation in which their 
basic liberties are respected.         
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 Furthermore, it is true that ecocide may occur because other segments of the populations 
are acting in accordance with their basic liberties (e.g., industrial farmers or cattle ranchers using 
their property rights). The issue is that ecocidal states err by pervasively privileging roving 
imperialists’ ‘comprehensive doctrines’ over that of autarkic communities (e.g., prioritizing 
growth rather than sustainability; integrating into global-supply chains rather than maintaining 
local subsistence; viewing man as dominant and separate from nature rather than viewing man as 
having a reciprocal, mutual, and integrated relationship with nature; faith in disciplinary 
experimental science and technology rather than faith in traditional cultural knowledge, learning, 
and practices, etc.), which is in direct opposition to the basic liberty principle’s objective of 
compelling states to remain neutral and to not favor or prioritize the merits of reasonable 
“conceptions of the good” over other legitimate views. As Rawls states: “The principles not only 
specify the terms of cooperation between persons, but they define a pact of reconciliation 
between diverse religions and moral beliefs, and the forms of culture to which they belong. If 
this conception of justice now seems largely negative, we shall see that it has a happier side” 
(Rawls 1999: 194).   
  Additionally, one may object that basic liberties do not apply to autarkic communities 
because these communities exist outside of and independent from the modern liberal states that 
Rawls is considering. Rawls, however, recognizes that modern states contain numerous diverse 
communities and advocates cultural pluralism (which is a central justification for basic liberties 
in the first place). “It is a serious error not to distinguish between the idea of a democratic 
political society and the idea of a community. Of course, a democratic society is hospitable to 
many communities within it, and indeed tries to be a social world within which diversity can 
flourish in amity and concord” (Rawls 2001: 21).  
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Since modern liberal societies are designed to tolerate and respect a wide array of 
cultures and communities, there seems to be no conceptual justification for assuming that 
autarkic communities would be entirely absent from within their borders. In fact, our case studies 
prove that such an assumption is false, since some of our paradigm instances of ecocide occurred 
within prototypically modern liberal states (e.g., the Cree in Canada and the Anangu in 
Australia). 
Nevertheless, despite the above endorsement of pluralism, one may pursue the argument 
that the basic liberties do not apply to autarkic communities by claiming that their members’ way 
of life and subsistence practices do not meet Rawls’s idealized conception for citizenship – i.e., 
“fully cooperating members of the political society” (Rawls 1999: xiii). The argument relies on 
endorsing the assertion that to be afforded basic liberties, individuals must be contributing 
members of society; since, for Rawls, “society” entails “a system of cooperation designed to 
advance the good of those taking part in it…a cooperative venture for mutual advantage” (Rawls 
1999: 4). As Jeppe von Platz explains:  
At the heart of the Rawlsian idea of democratic society as a system of social cooperation 
between free and equal citizens is the idea that all citizens participate in and contribute to 
the production of the social goods; citizens are and ought to be part of the cooperative 
system and play a productive role in the economy. In short—and the broad sense I 
specified in the introduction—citizens work (Platz 2016: 291).   
 
Hence, Rawls maintains that to be granted the rights and advantages of citizenship 
requires contributing to the statewide system of cooperation for mutual benefit. But the issue, per 
this line of reasoning, is that autarkic communities’ subsistence practices, cultural achievements, 
and way of life fail to adequately contribute to the wellbeing of the broader society.232 As non-
                                                        
232 In fact, what the work proves is in many ways the opposite, in that autarkic citizens are 
cooperative members of ill-ordered societies. Mills defines “ill-ordered societies” as, “coercive 
rather than cooperative ventures, characterized by exploitation and systemic disrespect for 
subordinated groups” (Mills 2017: 208).  
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reciprocators, they are not fully engaged members of the society; and thus, the state has no 
obligation to consider them citizens nor grant them the advantages (i.e., basic liberties) of social 
cooperation.        
Unsurprisingly, such an argument is immediately dismissed by Rawls because according 
to his theory, achieving citizenship only requires the “capacity” to contribute (which we can 
construe broadly as engaging in “socially beneficial activity”): “the only relevant feature of 
persons is…having the normal capacities to be a cooperating member of society over a complete 
life” (Rawls 1993: 79).  As Platz clarifies, “the status, rights, and obligations of citizenship are 
predicated on the capacities, not on their proper actualization, so (a bit paradoxically), anyone 
who can be a citizen is a citizen.” (Platz 2016: 292).  
Accordingly, since there is no doubt that members of autarkic communities have the 
capacity to contribute social benefits, then they must be considered citizens deserving of basic 
liberties. However, a pressing point for our analysis is demonstrating that autarkic communities’ 
traditional way of life does in fact bestow benefits to the wider society.  
Such a confirmation is unnecessary to show that autarkic citizens are deserving of basic 
liberties. But it is nevertheless worthwhile to demonstrate ways in which autarkic communities 
do in fact generate social benefits because without this assurance, there is the risk that too narrow 
a conception of social cooperation will hinder some communities from recognizing their value 
and receiving the full esteem and respect they deserve for their effort.233  
                                                        
233 Historically (and worrisomely at present), a common form of propaganda that fascist regimes 
engaged in is to ‘scapegoat’ some segments of the society as unproductive, as a means of 
justifying their marginalization, mistreatment, or extermination as enemies of the state. For 
instance, Hitler stated that the Nazi Party supported bodenständigen Kapitalismus (“productive 
capitalism”) that was based on profiting from one's own effort but condemned “unproductive 
capitalism” such as loans and financial speculation, which he villainized the Jewish community 
for engaging in (Freidman 2011: 24). Accordingly, because of these ties to horrific legacies of 
oppression we ought to be extremely wary of arguments that seek to label a given population as 
unproductive.  
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Essentially, the worry is that if the conception of “socially beneficial activity” is not 
construed broadly enough to include autarkic communities’ subsistence practices and cultural 
achievements, then it may increase the difficulty of theorizing the injustice of ecocidal societies 
from within a Rawlsian or other framework(s) of justice. Since, if localized subsistence and 
cultural practices are viewed as bereft of value, it could support and justify the state’s decisions 
to honor, esteem, and privilege roving imperialist productive lifestyles over those of autarkic 
communities, perceived as otiose and incongruous.  
Undoubtedly, such a conclusion is anathema to the basic liberty principle’s aim of 
maintaining a pluralistic conception of society, i.e., one that is amenable and hospitable to 
various communities and cultures pursuing their own “conceptions of the good” and ways of life. 
Thus, to prevent these issues from arising, it is important to construe “socially beneficial 
activity” (i.e., work or productive labor) broadly or else risk illiberally prioritizing certain “social 
arrangements” and “conceptions of the good” over others.  
Fortunately, it should seem fairly obvious that such a circumscribed interpretation of 
productive labor is flawed. For instance, if the meaning of work is limited to commodity 
production or marketable labor (as often happens in the discipline of Economics), key aspects of 
value creation that are undoubtedly necessary to maintaining and reproducing a functioning 
society are obscured, e.g., child rearing, benevolent aid and assistance, maintaining ecosystem 
functioning, production for direct consumption. Case in point, feminists have long decried the 
view that laboring in competitive markets (i.e., working subjects driven by their acquisitive 
desire for more, imposing form and order on objects) constitutes the paradigmatic model of 
social contribution because it makes invisible and dismisses women’s traditionally non-market 
involvement in society (e.g., household labor, child rearing, birthing, etc.) (Schwarzenbach 
1987).     
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Analogous to the feminist criticism above, it is important that autarkic communities’ 
contribution to society be recognized. Fortunately, as discussed in the preceding chapters, 
autarkic communities’ subsistence practices are undoubtedly beneficial to the broader society, as 
they promote ecosystem functioning, protect biodiversity, preserve in-depth knowledge of local 
habitats, and provide outsiders the opportunity to learn sustainable and environmentally friendly 
practices.234 Accordingly, while autarkic communities may not produce marketable commodities 
or bolster the ranks of wage labor, it is clear that their way of life certainly benefits the broader 
society. Thus, we have shown that not only do autarkic citizens have the capacity to contribute: 
they actually do contribute.   
 At present, it is unnecessary to push the debate further and defend the view that autarkic 
communities’ subsistence practices are in fact more socially beneficial than those of roving 
imperialists because, as stated earlier, liberal societies ought to remain agnostic on these matters 
(if possible) or risk privileging some “conceptions of the good” over others.235 Hence, as has 
been shown, autarkic subsistence practices do meet the standard of “social cooperation” within a 
                                                        
234 For instance, a great example of environmentally beneficial practices that autarkic 
communities can disseminate to the wider society is their in-depth knowledge of agroecology 
(i.e., applying ecological processes to agricultural production). For a thorough discussion of 
indigenous communities’ role in preserving, developing, and promoting agroecology, see Josep 
Gari 2000, Sara Scherr and Jeffery McNeely 2008, and Shiva 2016. All these authors emphasize 
that preserving traditional agroecological practices, not only allows particular cultures to survive, 
but also increases the output, sustainability, and resiliency of our food production worldwide. As 
Vandana Shiva explains, “when one recognizes that small farms across the world produce greater 
[70% of food comes from small scale farms] and more diverse outputs of nutritious crops, it 
becomes clear that industrial breeding has actually reduced food security” (Shiva 2016: 163). 
Accordingly, it is a goal of this dissertation to highlight that in many ways autarkic communities 
are not obsolete historical relics, but actually represent the vanguard of ecological rationality, in 
that they employ highly sensible and epistemologically sophisticated techniques and methods for 
sustainably adapting to complex environments. As Thomas Princen explains, “such resource 
users, far from being at the margins of modern life, are actually at the forefront, especially when 
‘modern’ includes the contemporary ecological predicament” (Princen 2005: 47).  
235 One of the goals of the work is to at least make the reader confront the possibility that 
autarkic communities may in fact create more societal benefit, then the currently dominant 
roving imperialist lifestyle.  
 189 
Rawlsian state, which must construe socially productive contribution (work) broadly or risk 
illiberally prioritizing one way of life over another.236 Therefore, this analysis has dismissed the 
argument that inhabitants of autarkic communities should not be afforded the advantages of 
citizenship (i.e., basic liberties) because they are non-reciprocating members of society.  
Lastly, there is one final argument that one might proffer to deny members of autarkic 
communities’ basic liberties. It is important to state upfront that this argument seems rather 
farfetched, however it is occasionally worth rebuking potentially misguided objections before 
they arise to help clarify the overall analysis.  
Basically, the argument proceeds by assuming that because these communities violate the 
basic liberties of their own members, they have forfeited the right to these protections 
themselves. Before we continue, it is necessary to point out that nothing in our analysis so far has 
shown that autarkic communities do not respect the basic liberties of their members. As such, the 
burden would fall on those wishing to make this claim to provide compelling evidence 
supporting their assertion, because there is nothing inherent to the structure of autarkic 
communities necessitating that they violate some of their members’ basic liberties.   
Nonetheless, we will simply stipulate that for argument’s sake there is in fact a particular 
community that restricts some of its members’ basic liberties, e.g., they prevent certain members 
                                                        
236 Also, as Platz explains, a broad understanding of “social cooperation” is consistent with 
Rawls’s own view that brought together diverse Humean, Marxian, and Kantian insights: “The 
Humean insight is that societies exist (descriptively and normatively) because societies produce 
the goods and services that make for good human living: security (of person and property), 
stability (of rules and relations), and the supply of desirable goods and services (learning and 
education, culture and science, healthcare and housing, technology and the means of 
commodious living - agriculture, heating and cooling, plumbers and plumbing, and so on). 
Society is the cooperative venture by which we together produce all these goods. The Marxian 
insight is that these goods are produced by the work that the members of society do together. The 
Kantian insight is that social cooperation should be seen as taking place between free and equal 
moral persons, which implies that the terms of cooperation by which goods are produced, 
distributed, and consumed must be agreeable (fair) to all members as free and equal moral 
persons” (Platz 2016: 291).  
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from voting or forbid them from interacting with outsiders. The somewhat curious argument 
relies on the intuition that since these communities violate their members’ basic liberties, they 
ought to lose their own. Or as Rawls rhetorically quips when considering the limits of toleration 
for intolerant groups in liberal society, “it seems that an intolerant sect has no title to complain 
when it is denied an equal liberty…[since] a person’s right to complain is limited to violations of 
principles he acknowledges himself” (Rawls 190: 1999).  
This sentiment may have some intuitive plausibility in cases where the right at issue is of 
the same kind as the right that the group is internally restricting, e.g., when a group censoring its 
own members complains of outside censorship from the state. It is farfetched, however, to 
imagine a scenario in which the autarkic community’s internal violation of their members’ basic 
liberties resembles with the type of wrongs under consideration in ecocidal societies. One 
potential instance might be an autarkic community that destroys some of its members personal 
property but complains when the state destroys their collective habitat.   
While this argument seems highly tenuous, we will continue the analysis because, even in 
this absurd example, it still does not entail that the state can violate the community’s basic 
liberties. Since, as Rawls explains, basic liberties can only be violated in the situations where it is 
necessary to preserve liberty itself, “freedom should be restricted only when the tolerant 
sincerely and with reason believe that their own security and that of the institutions of liberty are 
in danger. The tolerant should curb the intolerant only in this case” (Rawls 1999: 193). 
Therefore, since the autarkic community’s destruction of some of its members’ personal 
property seems unlikely to rise to the level of posing an existential threat to the institutions of 
liberty themselves, the state lacks justification for intervening and violating the community’s 
basic liberties beyond standard criminal proceedings. In summary, the state could never justify 
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violating the autarkic citizens’ basic liberties because of the community’s internal injustices, 
unless the response was necessitated to preserve the institution of liberty itself.    
The work has now shown that ecocidal societies have acted unjustly by not protecting the 
basic liberties of members of autarkic communities within their borders. Consequently, to satisfy 
the standards of “justice as fairness,” it is necessary that these states cease acting in ways that 
directly, indirectly, or negligently generate ecocide that violates the basic liberties of their 
citizenry. Next, the work will explore how ecocidal societies also commit injustices by violating 
the fair equality of opportunity clause of Rawls’s second principle of justice.  
 
B. Ecocidal Societies’ Failure to Respect Fair Equality of Opportunity 
 
The goal of the fair equality of opportunity principle (FEO) is to regulate citizens’ ability 
to attain differing social positions and achieve personal development, while still insuring that 
“these offices and positions are open to all under fair equality of opportunity” (Rawls 1971). 
Essentially, all citizen with comparable talents should have an equal chance of realizing their 
socio-economic objectives.237  
Thus, in order to further FEO, it is necessary that, regardless of background or social 
origins (e.g., rich or poor, majority or minority race, ethnicity, male or female, etc.), that all 
citizens have equal opportunity to develop their talents and achieve their aspirations. As Rawls 
states, “those with similar abilities and skills should have similar life chances…who are at the 
same level of talent and ability, and have the same willingness to use them, should have the same 
prospects of success regardless of their initial place in the social system” (Rawls 1999: 63). But 
FEO maintains that social positions throughout all sectors of society must be attainable in a 
                                                        
237 The goal is to limit the impact of contingencies (i.e., facts about persons over which they 
exert no control and appear arbitrary from a moral point of view) on citizen’s life prospects.  
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“substantive” sense beyond mere “formal” openness, “there should be roughly equal prospects of 
culture and achievement for everyone similarly motivated and endowed” (Rawls 1999: 63).238  
In order to ensure comparable access to “substantive” opportunity, it is vital that, for 
instance, the education or health care systems should be designed to level social barriers and 
foster the prospects of equal life chances (Rawls 1999: 63). To illustrate what “substantive 
opportunity” (i.e., that each citizen has equal prospects of developing their natural talents as any 
other) entails, it is helpful to provide an example.  
Consider two people Alex and Sam, both of whom are equally motivated to go to law 
school and become lawyers. Alex has wealthy parents who are able to afford hiring tutors, 
whereas Sam’s family is poor and cannot afford tutors. Consequently, Alex excels in school and 
is admitted to a prestigious law school and after graduation is hired to a competitive position as a 
lawyer; whereas Sam did comparatively worse in school and was not able to gain admittance to 
law school. Thus, Sam’s prospects of becoming a lawyer were unsuccessful.    
This example violates fair equality of opportunity because Alex and Sam lacked 
comparable substantive prospects of developing their abilities to attain competitive social 
positions, while they nevertheless still had the same formal chances, in that there were no legal 
restriction or discriminatory practices that overtly barred either from attempting to pursue a 
career in law. Nonetheless, it is obvious that Alex was in a better position to become a lawyer 
                                                        
238 Robert Taylor provides a helpful summary of Rawls’s conception of fair equality of 
opportunity: “FEO has two discrete components. First, FEO demands formal equality of 
opportunity or ‘careers open to talents,’ that is, it forbids arbitrary discrimination (on grounds of 
race, gender, etc.) by either the state or private agents and condemns all monopolistic privileges 
(including barriers to entry in labor markets, like closed-shop unionism and exclusionary 
occupational licensing). Second, FEO requires substantive equality of opportunity: all citizens 
must be guaranteed a fair chance to compete for offices and positions in the basic structure of 
society, regardless of social circumstances (e.g., class status or family background)…More 
specifically, the state might impose inheritance and gift taxes, restrict the right of bequest, and 
subsidize education (whether directly through public schools—including so-called charter 
schools—or indirectly through vouchers, tuition tax credits, loans, etc.)” (Taylor 2009: 480). 
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because of luckily being born to a wealthy family that provided extra resources and advantages 
for winning competitive social positions.239  
Accordingly, the injustice stems from the fact that initially Sam had equal motivation and 
could have been as proficient a lawyer as Alex, if given the same resources. As such, it is clear 
that FEO goes beyond simply prohibiting discriminatory laws and policies that formally restrict 
access to social positions and personal development and instead mandates substantive equality of 
opportunity aimed at affording all citizens the chance to actualize and develop their abilities.240 
Hence, it is supposed to combat and level undeserving advantages that certain segments of the 
citizenry may receive by virtue of birth, accident, or structural inequity.  
                                                        
239 As Thomas Nagel explains in his discussion of Rawls’s view on affirmative action: “Those 
born poor cannot compete as effectively as the well-off for desirable positions, because their 
families can't give them the same level of education, the same network of support, the same 
cultural advantages, health care, and so forth. They are also likely to have less motivation to 
succeed. This means that they don't have fair equal opportunity even if they are not formally 
discriminated against” (Nagel 2003: 84). 
240 However, it is important to highlight that Rawls is not asserting the implausible position that 
justice requires that everyone be afforded the same chance at achieving a prestigious social 
position. For one, Rawls maintains that FEO is not intended to erase the effects of natural 
endowment because the difference principle is designed to play such a role in his theory. As Lars 
Lindblom explains: “Even if the more talented would have a better chance of attaining some 
coveted position, the gains that they would have from this would be constrained by the difference 
principle. If there are people who have better prospects of becoming, say, judges, due to their 
innate talent, then FEO says that they should have better chances to occupy such a position than 
those who have less native talent for it. The difference principle then regulates the structure of 
salaries and wages in society (as well as the tax system)” (Lindblom 2018: 241-242). 
Accordingly, Rawls accepts that natural aptitudes are relevant when determining if a person 
should have the opportunity to advance in a given field (e.g., it is not unjust if a society 
consistently rejects applicants that are naturally ill-equipped to perform fine motor skills from 
becoming emergency room surgeons). Or as Darrel Moellendorf succinctly states, “with respect 
to those who are unequal in the specified way, equality of opportunity does not equalize at all” 
(Moellendorf 2006: 301). Hence, Rawls is endorsing the view that every citizen should have the 
right to pursue any career, but not the right to expect that opportunities will be equalized 
irrespective of their actual degree of talent. Essentially, everyone deserves access to a reasonable 
education, regardless of socio-economic status, race, ethnicity, comprehensive view, or 
geographical location; however, the state may have different obligations to persons based on 
their desires, motivation, and abilities. Consequently, the state does not need to subsidize 
everyone who thinks it would be exciting to go to law school, but entrance exams must be fair to 
all in determining whether one has the aptitude for a certain field of study.  
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Do ecocidal states therefore violate members of autarkic communities’ FEO by failing to 
provide these communities with equal life chances for individuals with equal talent? 
Immediately, one might think not necessarily in all cases. For instance, in some instances these 
citizens may be equitably compensated for the loss of value caused by the destruction of their 
ancestral home, even if they did not consent to the tradeoff; and moreover, one may argue that by 
forcibly being integrated into the broader society, they may be better situated to satisfy FEO after 
the harm.241  
But such an argument seems implausible for many reasons. For one, ideal theory requires 
that every citizen is entitled to FEO, i.e., when ‘the veil’ is lifted we can discern whether FEO is 
in fact realized by looking at each individual members of the society. Thus, it is rather unlikely 
that each and every former autarkic citizen will have the material, psychological, and epistemic 
resiliency to adequately compete pursuant to FEO after the destruction of their habitat. 
 For example, it is likely the case, that these citizens experienced psychological trauma 
(e.g., depression, post-traumatic stress, anxiety, etc.) stemming from their experience and 
impotence in being unable to prevent the destruction of their home and loss of their way of life. 
Secondly, ecocide leaves them vulnerable to cultural marginalization, in that they are likely 
disadvantaged by the fact that they have been hurled into a situation in which they have to 
                                                        
241 For instance, Jeffery Sachs argues that the best way to end poverty (i.e., increase FEO) is for 
states to undertake widespread infrastructural development (e.g., build roads and expand the 
electrical grid), comparable to the type of state activity discussed in our paradigm cases of 
ecocide (e.g., the Canadian government damming the La Grande in the hopes of opening up the 
“wilderness” of James Bay to “civilization”). For example, he asserts that a key element of the 
economic success of China was dependent on, “how the [Chinese] government has taken pains to 
ensure that the power grid and transportation network reaches every village in China” (Sachs 
2007). Obviously, throughout our analysis we have seen how such development projects will 
likely result in ecocide. However, Sachs as a proponent of developmentalism is unperturbed by 
these worries, since he views the resulting environmental harm as necessary consequences of 
ending poverty and increasing FEO through the process of integrating the rural poor into the 
global economy (Sachs 2005).    
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compete in a society with vastly different norms, values, and expectations than their own. Lastly, 
the destruction of their local ecosystem deprives them of material resources and one of their 
greatest epistemic advantage, i.e., their habitat learning.   
As such, destroying the autarkic community’s habitat, practically ensures that some of 
these citizens lack the requisite tools to develop their capacities in comparison with other 
members of the society. Essentially, these psychological, cultural, epistemic, and material 
barriers represent additional hindrances, undermining autarkic citizens’ ability to strive for social 
advantage, develop capacities, and achieve well-being in a way that non-impacted citizens do not 
face. Thus, for these reasons, it is unlikely that ecocidal states satisfy FEO with regard to all their 
autarkic citizens harmed by environmental destruction (i.e., ecocide refugees).  
 Nevertheless, we can stipulate that despite all these impediments, enough compensation 
of ‘primary goods’ has been allocated to empower all of these citizens and ensure that they can 
compete for privileged social positions (e.g., become doctors, lawyers, engineers, judges, etc.). 
Thus, if these conditions are met, one may argue that it is not necessarily true that ecocide 
violates FEO.  
However, drawing such a conclusion is presumptuous, because it fails to consider the fact 
that FEO has a “motivation” component, in that the social roles or prospects for personal 
development must be substantively open to, “similarly endowed and motivated [emphasis 
added]” citizens (Rawls 1999: 243). This ‘motivation component’ mandates that to ensure FEO 
is being satisfied, it is necessary to consider the social roles or achievements that agents are 
actually interested in pursuing.242  
                                                        
242 However, it is important to emphasize that the ‘motivation component’ is bounded by the 
social roles that actually exist in the society. In other words, FEO necessitates that all citizens 
have the right to pursue whatever is available to some. But that caveat does not give states the 
freedom to end preexisting forms of social contribution, since such restrictions and denials would 
violate citizens’ basic liberties.  
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Thus, we must undertake our analysis of FEO by contemplating the social roles and 
achievements that former autarkic citizens desire for themselves. As such, the inquiry into 
whether or not these citizens have been placed in a position, which allows them to compete for 
the privileged positions coveted by the broader society is irrelevant with regards to FEO, in that 
pursuant to FEO it does not matter if these citizens are now in a position to become doctors, 
lawyers, engineers, and judges, if they are unmotivated towards pursuing these social positions.    
Accordingly, Rawls’s stipulation that FEO requires that, “there should be roughly equal 
prospects of culture and achievement” means that the autarkic community’s own cultural 
achievements and aspirations are the relevant locus of consideration (Rawls 1999: 63). In other 
words, the issue is that if ecocidal states assume that former autarkic citizens desire to be 
integrated into the dominant culture, then they are illiberally prioritizing certain “conception of 
the good” and “comprehensive doctrine” over others -- which as discussed is a violation of the 
basic liberty principle.  
As such, the relevant question is if ecocide refugees have equal prospects and abilities to 
gain social positions or personally develop in ways that they are actually interested and 
motivated after ecocide (within the range of social positions actually open to others)? Hence, we 
must consider what social roles or personal achievements ecocide refugees would want and 
aspire to for themselves. 
As specified in the first chapter, “successful living” for autarkic communities is 
maintaining homeostasis in their habitat (see 44-47). Accordingly, it is likely the case that these 
citizens would wish to return to their traditional, self-sufficient, and sustainable way of life, 
rather than integrate into the dominant culture.  
 Hence, one such social role that we can reasonably assume they might desire, is to return 
to subsistence farming. Thus, if this assumption is correct, then a way to see if ecocide 
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undermines FEO, is to analyze if the environmental destruction hinders former autarkic citizens’ 
prospects of becoming subsistence farmers, so long as it is a social role available to others in the 
society.243   
It is apparent from our prior analysis that the effects of ecocide may impede former 
autarkic citizens’ prospects of succeeding as subsistence farmers. For instance, the habitat 
learning they had accrued was exceedingly specialized and possibly nontransferable to 
ecosystems that differ from their local habitat’s ordinary functioning. Hence, in these scenarios, 
ecocide refugees are likely at an undeserved epistemic disadvantage when competing with other 
farmers after their local habitat has been compromised.  
Accordingly, in such scenarios (i.e., where ecocide refugees are at a disadvantage in 
becoming subsistence farmers when compared with other citizens trying to achieve this social 
role) it is incumbent upon states to assist ecocide refugees in overcoming the difficulties 
presented by the changed environment; and thus, if such aid is not forthcoming, then FEO has 
been violated. For instance, three solutions states may pursue to satisfy FEO, would be to: (1) 
provide training to educate ecocide refugees regarding how to cope with the changed 
environment; (2) grant ecocide refugees access to a functionally identical ecosystem (i.e., 
relocate them to a comparable ecosystem), or (3) restore the degraded ecosystem and allow the 
ecocide refugees to return. A problem with all of these policy proposals, is that the state may 
lack the requisite knowledge, resources, or ability to provide such assistance. For one, how can 
one determine if another ecosystem is functionally identical or know how to fully restore a 
                                                        
243 However, it would not be a violation of FEO in societies where subsistence farming is no 
longer an available social position. In other words, FEO is only operative in regard to actually 
available social positions that others can attain. Hence, it is not the case that each and every 
society has to have subsistence farmers to satisfy FEO, but if a society does have such a social 
position, then per FEO the prospects of attaining such a position have to be equally available to 
all comparably talented and motived citizen.    
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severely degraded habitat? Moreover, even if such determinations and undertakings are 
practically possible, they may nonetheless prove exceedingly expensive and divest funds from 
other FEO-promoting ventures.   
Furthermore, even if the assistance projects prove successful, ecocide refugees are 
nevertheless at a competitive disadvantaged in the interim. As such, the temporal-gap between 
the ecocidal act and the completion of the assistance project, entails a period in which ecocide 
refugees’ FEO is violated.   
Accordingly, regardless of whether ecocide refugees decide to attempt to return to their 
traditional subsistence lifestyle or integrate into the broader society, the additional material, 
psychological, epistemic, and cultural obstacles mentioned before remain FEO-reducing factors. 
As such, these impediments must be overcome, since they place undue burden on the effected 
citizens, which leave them at a substantive disadvantage regarding their ability to compete for 
social positions and further their personal development -- whatever those aims entail.  
Obviously, such reparative measures may prove exceedingly costly; and as such, they 
will undoubtedly divert social resources away from other FEO-promoting undertakings. Thus, 
with respect to the prospects of efficiently achieving a well-ordered society that satisfies FEO, it 
is almost certain, that it would have been better, if ecocide had never occurred in the first 
place.244 The reason for this is that ecocide, displaces citizens from communities, in which FEO 
is being satisfied (i.e., living in self-sufficient autarkic communities); and instead, creates 
conditions in which these citizens will likely require aid and assistance to achieve FEO.    
                                                        
244 Undoubtedly, we would always prefer that injustices are prevented, that harms never occur, 
and that citizens are treated fairly. However, one of the focuses of this dissertation is to 
emphasize that given the non-ideal nature of the actual world, we must work to develop 
strategies aimed at preventing the harms caused by ecocide and devising principles and 
mechanisms for responding to cases where such harms have already occurred.  
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Hence, we can see that unless widespread FEO-promoting measures are enacted to 
support the victims of ecocide, it is exceedingly difficult to maintain that ecocidal states are 
“cooperative ventures for mutual advantage” with regard to their autarkic citizenry. Accordingly, 
destroying autarkic community’s habitat, practically ensures that these citizens lack the requisite 
tools to develop their capacities in comparison with other members of society. Thus, with the 
analysis of FEO complete, the chapter will move on to investigate if ecocidal societies also 
commit injustices by violating the difference principle clause of Rawls’s second principle of 
justice. 
 
C. Ecocidal Societies’ Failure to Respect the Difference Principle  
 
The difference principle holds that “social and economic inequalities are to be arranged 
so that they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged” (Rawls 1999: 72). It is designed to 
secure a just distribution of social resources by aiming to benefit all segments of society, but 
most importantly to assist the least fortunate. As Derek Bell helpfully explains: 
For Rawls, we cannot maintain social and economic equality because labor specialization 
is unavoidable, and citizens should not be expected to be pure altruists willing to accept 
equal rewards for unequal contributions to the overall level of society’s resources. 
However, unequal division can only reflect the equality of citizens if it is to everyone’s 
advantage. (Bell 2004: 297)   
 
Hence, the difference principle’s distributive requirement is designed to align the interest 
of all groups in a society through a “’close-knit’ mutual chain-connectedness” that facilitates 
improvement in the socioeconomic conditions of the least advantaged and fosters fraternity 
across society (Rawls 1999: 70-73). Basically, the goal of the difference principle is to ensure 
that the worst-off in society should not distrust or feel alienated from other groups because they 
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understand that all socioeconomic institutions and policies are designed to promote their best 
interest.  
Consequently, the immediate question to ask is, are members of former autarkic 
communities that have had their habitat destroyed the least advantaged? Since, if they are, then 
the difference principle mandates that ecocidal societies must be maximally concerned (without 
violating FEO, the just savings, and basic liberty principles) with raising the socioeconomic 
status of these citizens to enable them to become, “normal and fully cooperating members of 
society” (Rawls 1999: xiii).  
It is necessary, however, to highlight that this discussion is not exploring if autarkic 
communities constitute the least advantaged prior to ecocide – which, as will be shown, is 
unlikely. As such, the work is not trying to prove that the initial act of ecocide violates the 
difference principle because it harms the least advantaged group; but instead, is trying to 
establish that members of former autarkic communities (i.e., ecocide refugees) ought to be 
considered the least advantaged. If this is confirmed, then it necessitates that post-ecocide states 
have an obligation to optimally raise the socioeconomic standing of ecocide refugees (without 
violating FEO, just savings, and basic liberty principle or lowering another group’s wellbeing 
below ecocide refugee’s current standard of living) and that failure to do so constitutes a breach 
of the difference principle.  
In other words, autarkic citizens are not the least advantaged before the ecocide, but after 
the ecocidal event transforms them into ecocide refugees, then they are the least advantaged.  
Thus, the argument is that ecocidal states can violate the difference principle in two ways: the 
very act of ecocide creates least advantaged persons and the states might fail to raise the socio-
economic status of these least advantaged persons. 
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However, as Rawls acknowledges, “the serious difficulty [with the difference principle] 
is how to define the least fortunate” (Rawls 1999: 83). Thus, to establish whether ecocide 
refugees are the least fortunate, it is necessary to begin by exploring Rawls’s methodology for 
determining and defining relative social position.   
 Initially, he proposes two potential approaches. First, he argues that the least advantaged 
refers to social position: “Choose a particular social position, say that of the unskilled workers 
and then to count as the least advantaged all those with the average income and wealth of this 
position, or less” (Rawls 1999: 84). Secondly, he defines the least advantaged in terms of relative 
income and wealth with no reference to any social position. “All persons with less than half of 
the median income and wealth may be taken as the least advantaged segment” (Rawls 1999: 84).   
Rawls acknowledges that these definitions of the “least advantaged” are somewhat 
arbitrary. “Any procedure is bound to be somewhat ad hoc. Yet we are entitled at some point to 
plead practical considerations, for sooner or later the capacity of philosophical or other 
arguments to make finer discriminations must run out” (Rawls 1999: 84).  
Nevertheless, it is helpful to recognize that both of these formulations indicate that Rawls 
was at least partially attracted by the prospects of determining the least advantaged by virtue of 
strictly economic considerations, in that he proposed correlating lack of primary goods with 
reduced economic income, wealth, and employment. Ultimately, however, Rawls found both 
approaches inadequate because primary goods constitute a comprehensive index of rights, 
liberties, opportunities that transcend mere economic calculations of income, wealth, and 
employment. As Rawls clarifies, “primary goods are now characterized as what persons need in 
their status as free and equal citizens, and as normal and fully cooperating members of society 
over a complete life” (Rawls 1999: xiii).245 
                                                        
245 Rawls viewed this reconfigured definition as an improvement on his prior conception of 
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 For Rawls, equating the determination of the “least advantage” with possession of 
economic resources is inadequate because all primary goods should be included in the 
evaluation. “The serious difficulty is how to define the least fortunate group. To fix ideas, let us 
single out the least advantaged as those who are least favored…with the relevant measures based 
on primary goods” (Rawls 1999: 83).  
Consequently, Rawls’s decision to determine relative social position based upon 
measures of primary goods in toto allows for an expanded interpretation of the “least 
advantaged” because, per his theory, “the social bases of self-respect” is the primary good of 
utmost significance (Rawls 1999: 478). As Rawls states, “the most important primary good is 
that of self-respect…it includes a person's sense of his own value, his secure conviction that his 
plan of life, his conception of his good, is worth carrying out…implies a confidence in one’s 
ability, so far as it lies within one's power, to fulfill one's intentions." (Rawls 1999: 386) 
Hence, now that the discussion regarding how to determine the least advantaged is 
complete, the work will briefly explore all three formulation to see if citizens displaced from 
autarkic lifestyles by ecocide ought to be considered amongst the worst-off members of society. 
It is necessary to remind the reader that in practice the determination of the least advantaged 
would have to occur on a case-by-case basis, since each situation is different, and the relative 
social position of certain groups may change in a given context. Nevertheless, the forthcoming 
analysis should provide enough evidence to make it eminently clear that ecocide refugees will be 
                                                        
“primary goods” as, “things that every rational man is presumed to want…goods [that] normally 
have a use whatever a person’s rational plan of life” (Rawls 1999: 54). He was unsatisfied with 
the older conceptualization because it seems as though what constituted a primary good was 
dependent upon “natural human psychology” instead of on, “a moral conception of a person that 
embodies a certain ideal” (Rawls 1999: xiii). Clearly, it is the latter conception that is required 
for developing “higher order interests” and becoming “free and equal” cooperating members of 
society as Rawls’s theory intends (Rawls 1999: xiii).   
 203 
among the worst-off members of a society. Lastly, it is important to appreciate that the least 
advantaged group is not a small or fine-grained category, but a significant social group, e.g., the 
“less than half of the median income and wealth” criterion entails that any citizen or social group 
falling within the bottom third of society in regard to wealth and income is a member of the least 
advantaged.  
First, it seems likely that after ecocide (barring state intervention), former members of 
autarkic communities have few other prospects than to become unskilled laborers. The reason for 
this, as has been explained, is that the traditional habitat knowledge they possess is exceedingly 
specialized and likely nontransferable. The destruction of their local ecosystem thus rendered 
their greatest source of expertise and specialized skillset obsolete. Furthermore, it is unlikely that 
they would have trained or attempted to acquire abilities to compete for employment positions in 
the broader society because learning, practicing, and mastering multiple modes of survival is a 
difficult undertaking, and it would have seemed unwarranted to develop excess skills while their 
traditional way of life successfully met their needs. Consequently, it seems rather likely that 
upon being forced into engaging with the broader society to meet their needs that ecocide 
refugees would only be considered qualified for unskilled laborer positions, in which case they 
constitute the least advantaged under the “unskilled labor” formulation.  
Additionally, regarding the “less than half of the median income and wealth” formulation 
of determining the least advantaged, it seems apparent that, due to the same factors mentioned 
above, members of former autarkic communities will live in impoverished conditions well below 
this threshold. For one, they just lost their greatest source of wealth and income, in that their 
collective lands used for agriculture, livestock rearing, water, hunting, fishing, gathering herbs, 
building material, and fuel have been destroyed.  
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Secondly, because their closest relations (friends and family) likely suffered the same 
fate, they lack well situated social connections that can offer material assistance and stability in 
times of hardship. Also, the lack of social connection and cultural marginalization is problematic 
because even when they are able to acquire education and job training, their impoverished social 
network makes it difficult to convert these skills to greater earning potential, as seen in the 
discussion of FEO.   
Finally, there is the real possibility of conflict, animosity, hostility, and violence between 
the ecocide refugees and the communities to which they are forced to relocate. These tensions 
are a predictable outcome, if the local communities view the ecocide refugees as “outsiders” 
competing for their resources and straining the carrying-capacity of their social institutions. As 
such, these conflicts can result in diminishing opportunities because local communities will be 
less inclined to offer support, encouragement, and opportunities; and, furthermore, if violence 
does erupt, then the wealth the ecological refugees may have accumulated could be stolen or 
destroyed.246  
Thus, for all the above reasons, it is eminently reasonable to assume that, in most 
scenarios, ecocide refugees will constitute the least advantaged, per the “having less than half of 
the median income and wealth criterion” criterion. Nevertheless, a developmentalist (for a 
canonic example of developmentalism, see Sachs 2005) may argue that development projects 
aimed at integrating the autarkic communities into the global economy would work to their 
                                                        
246 One might object that such crimes could not occur in a well-ordered society, thus they are not 
relevant concerns when engaged with analyzing ideal principles of justice. However, Rawls 
himself admits that ideal theory mandates “strict compliance” only at the level of social 
institutions, not with regard to the behavior of individual actors. This is evident from the fact that 
he includes punitive measures as a feature of his ideal society. “It is clear from the preceding 
remarks that we need an account of penal sanctions however limited even for ideal theory. Given 
the normal conditions of human life, some such arrangements are necessary” (Rawls 1999: 212). 
Thus, individual actors could fail to comply with the principles of justice, meaning that such 
forms of theft or violence could occur even in a well-ordered society.  
 205 
benefit by increasing their wealth and income; and as such, lift them out of the least advantaged 
position.247  
We will subsequently take up the developmentalists’ challenge. However, to avoid 
arguing against a “strawman” it is beneficial to first consider Rawls’s preferred conception of 
“the least advantaged” that focuses on the distribution of a broader set of primary goods beyond 
the purely economic concerns of income, wealth, and employment.   
Thus, are ecocide refugees still the least advantaged, if the criterion is weighing 
individuals’ ability to develop into purposeful selves (i.e., ones driven to actualize a reasonable 
way of life, develop one’s moral capacities, and engage with others in the public sphere)? In 
answering this question, it is important to remember that, per the broadened conception of the 
difference principle, the most important primary good for society to distribute is the “social bases 
of self-respect” – accordingly, citizens lacking in this resource are the least advantaged.  
                                                        
247 Developmentalism has been the hegemonic ideology driving international affairs at least since 
Harry Truman’s 1949 inaugural address, in which he announced the U.S.’s aspiration of 
delivering a “fair deal” for the entire world, aimed at “uplifting” the “underdeveloped areas” of 
the globe (Escobar 1995: 3). As Arturo Escobar explains, “the dream [i.e., economically 
developing the underdeveloped areas of the world] was universally accepted by those in power” 
(Escobar 1995: 4). But they recognized that such development came at a price, as the United 
Nations, Department of Social and Economic Affairs stated: “There is a sense in which rapid 
economic progress is impossible without painful adjustments. Ancient philosophies have to be 
scrapped; old social institutions have to disintegrate; bonds of cast, creed and race have to burst; 
and large numbers of persons who cannot keep up with progress have to have their expectations 
of a comfortable life frustrated. Very few communities are willing to pay the full price of 
economic progress” (U.N. 1951: 15). But despite recognizing these concerns, the goal of 
“development” has proceeded unrelentingly ever since. In many ways, a central aspiration of this 
dissertation is to challenge the developmentalist credo by highlighting some of the eco-social 
benefits that arise from not forcing autarkic communities to integrate into the prevailing 
neoliberal global order. Furthermore, by challenging the developmentalist narrative, we can see 
how environmental transformative justice aligns with and supports core aspirations of 
“environmentalism of the poor,” in that both movements advocate for, “the defense of the right 
to place and territory and the right to stay without being displaced” (Anguelovski and Marinez-
Alier 2014: 173).   
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As such, it seems rather straightforward from the preceding analysis to accept that 
ecocide refugees are severely deprived of “the social bases of self-respect,” in that the society 
treats these citizens as though they are undeserving of fundamental rights and liberties by 
destroying their traditional way of life in blatant displays of contempt, indifference, and 
disrespect for their values and aspirations. Clearly, such acts demonstrate that the society views 
these citizens’ goals and life projects as unworthy of pursuit.  
Essentially, through the act of ecocide, the state publicly expresses that it views these 
peoples’ concerns and well-being as valueless or at least unworthy of consideration, protection, 
or preservation, when weighed against the interests of other segments of society. The resulting 
material, psychological, and cultural harms clearly undermine ecocide refugees’ ability to foster 
stable social unions, develop their self-governing powers, or engage with others as equals in the 
public realm, which are all vital components for achieving self-respect. 
Because of all of these compounding injuries, there are compelling reasons justifying 
why ecocide refugees would likely constitute the least advantaged. Thus, the very act of ecocide 
placed these citizens in this vulnerable position in violation of the difference principle. 
Moreover, if ecocide refugees are the least advantaged and ecocidal states’ basic structures are 
not setup in such a way as to improve these citizens’ absolute social standing and strengthen their 
prospects for developing self-respect, then these states are further in violation of the difference 
principle.  
However, as previously stated, developmentalists may argue, that the best way to 
improve autarkic citizens’ social standing and develop their self-respect, is to integrate them into 
the broader society. As we will show such an argument rests on the faulty premise that members 
of functioning autarkic communities are the least advantaged and in need of assistance. For 
instance, a pro-integration theorist may highlight the fact that, The World Bank estimates that in 
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China between 1978 and 2010, over 20 million peasants a year have abandoned their rural 
subsistence lifestyles in search of higher paying industrial jobs in urban centers; and that, this 
migration has resulted in over 500 million people being lifted out of poverty (World Bank 2012).  
Hence, developmentalists can argue in defense of ecocidal activity that the economic 
gains generated by ecocidal development could outweigh the losses to autarkic citizens. In other 
words, ecocidal development places these citizens in a better socio-economic position, than they 
would have been otherwise. Accordingly, the developmentalist is arguing that ecocidal states do 
not violate the difference principle because their basic structures are setup in such a way as to 
improve these citizens’ absolute social standing and strengthen their prospects for developing 
self-respect.  
Essentially, developmentalists rely on empirical evidence to support the claim that 
ecocidal development and forced integration does not violate the difference principle because it 
places autarkic citizens in better socio-economic position. However, even if it is demonstrably 
true that such activity does increase these citizens social capital (which is dubious), these 
arguments still fail to satisfy “justice as fairness” because ecocidal development and forced 
integration, nevertheless violate autarkic citizen’s basic liberties. Thus, pursuant to Rawls’s 
framework, the resulting socio-economic gains are not acceptable, if the tradeoff entails 
sacrificing certain citizens’ basic rights. Since, according to Rawls, preserving basic liberties, 
takes precedence over all other ideals, including FEO and the difference principle.248  
                                                        
248 As Taylor states: “The Priority of Liberty treats these liberties as paramount and prohibits 
their sacrifice for the sake of efficiency, utilitarian and perfectionist ideals, or even other 
principles within Justice as Fairness (e.g., FEO and the Difference Principle) (Taylor 2003: 246). 
Nevertheless, as we have previously stated, many theorists have criticized Rawls’s lexical 
prioritization, but because we are undertaking a canonical reading, it is important to avoid 
misrepresenting how the principles are supposed to cohere to avoid distorting the overall theory.  
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The reason for prioritizing basic liberties over other ideals, stems from Rawls’s disdain 
for the view that, “all human interests are commensurable, and that between any two there 
always exists some rate of exchange in terms of which it is rational to balance the protection of 
one against the protection of the other” (Rawls 1993: 312). Accordingly, persevering the priority 
of basic rights over other ideals is of paramount importance, because without this constraint 
political liberalism risks lumping the value of all primary goods together and losing what makes 
it distinct from utilitarianism or intuitionism.    
However, to further challenge developmentalists’ contention (i.e., that economic and 
structural development that aims at integrating autarkic communities into the global economy is 
beneficial to the impacted communities), it will be helpful to briefly explore, why it is unlikely 
that members of functioning autarkic communities should be considered the least advantaged, in 
the first place. First and foremost, functioning autarkic communities allow inhabitants to develop 
their higher-level capacities. As we have seen, these communities take great pride in leading 
environmentally sustainable lifestyles that foster materially rich and spiritually fulfilling 
connections to their habitat and ancestors (see 48-52). While they may not have a lot of wealth in 
a purely monetary sense (i.e., the benchmark developmentalists are focused on), they still have 
more than enough resources to meet their basic material needs, while forging a stable social 
union that allows them to develop their self-governing powers and organize their lives around a 
conception of the good.   
As discussed, monetary wealth is an inadequate proxy for primary goods. Rawls 
highlights this fact by stipulating that voluntarily idle surfers, who may have little monetary 
wealth, are still not entitled to social welfare as the least advantaged: “Those who are unwilling 
to work would have a standard working day of extra leisure and this extra leisure itself would be 
stipulated as equivalent to the index of primary goods of the least advantaged. Those who surf all 
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day off Malibu must find a way to support themselves and would not be entitled to public funds” 
(Rawls 1988: 257). For this reason, it seems exceedingly unlikely that individuals from 
functioning autarkic communities ought to be considered the least advantaged.  
Consequently, while ecocide may not harm (or might even help) the least advantaged 
(e.g., imagine a scenario in which the least advantaged are the urban poor that actually benefit 
from the ecocidal act of damming a river because it provides them electricity), it nevertheless 
violates autarkic communities’ basic liberties and likely their fair equality of opportunity. Thus, 
developmentalists’ claim that economic growth and structural development benefit autarkic 
communities is dubious, especially from a Rawlsian perspective that prioritizes the protection of 
basic rights above all else.  
Also, as we will now discuss, Rawls’s constructivist approach establishes a “just savings 
principle” that further constrains arguments relying on the difference principle, which seek to 
justify sacrificing natural resources for greater economic growth. But before moving on to 
analyze the “just savings principle,” it is important to emphasize that it seems clear that, after 
ecocide, the resulting refugees (i.e., former inhabitants of autarkic communities) are likely 
members of the least advantaged (at least in the short term) and that it was the ecocidal activity 
itself, which placed them in this vulnerable position. Moreover, to avoid further violating the 
difference principle, ecocidal states and post-ecocide state must be maximally concerned 
(without violating FEO, the basic liberty principle, and the just savings principle) with raising the 
socio-economic status of these citizens to enable them to develop their higher capacities and 
become cooperating members of society.  
 
D. Ecocidal States’ Failure to Respect the Just Savings Principle  
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Rawls maintains that his constructivist approach (relying on the hypothetical thought 
experiment of the original position) can establish a sufficient level of intergenerational savings 
(i.e., living people’s obligation to future peoples) to preserve a just society across time (Rawls 
1999: 251-262). The reason for this is that the representatives in the “original position” know 
that they will belong to a specific generation, but from “behind the veil of ignorance” they are 
ignorant about which particular generation that will be.249 Thus because of their unbiased 
positionality, Rawls argues that the representatives would agree to a just savings principle, 
stipulating that, “the members of any generation (and so all generations) would adopt as the one 
their generation is to follow and as the principle they would want preceding generations to have 
followed (and later generations to follow), no matter how far back (or forward) in time” (Rawls 
1993: 274 and 2001: 160).250  
 Essentially, Rawls stipulates that the difference principle distributes social resources 
“within generations” whereas, the just saving principle allocates social resources “between 
generations” (Rawls 2001: 159).  Accordingly, he views the just savings principle as a constraint 
on the difference principle that determines, “how far the present generation is bound to respect 
the claims of its successors” (Rawls 2001: 159).251 
                                                        
249 Representative persons are not actual persons, but representative a type of person. As such, 
they are unable to provide social resources to particular individuals, since such a fine-tuned 
distribution would be impossible to accomplish from the original position. 
250 To explain why presently living people would agree to concern themselves with the wellbeing 
of future generations, Rawls initially argued for a “motivational assumption” that representatives 
care for their descendants and as such, they will voluntarily save to benefit them (Rawls 1971: 
144). But he later withdrew this motivational assumption seemingly in part because it 
presupposed a comprehensive doctrine of the good.  
251 Here is Rawls’s longer explanation regarding how the balancing between the just savings and 
difference principle functions: “This is done by supposing that this principle is defined from the 
standpoint of the least advantaged in each generation. It is the representative men from this group 
as it extends over time who by virtual adjustments are to specify the rate of accumulation. They 
undertake in effect to constrain the application of the difference principle. In any generation their 
expectations are to be maximized subject to the condition of putting aside the savings that would 
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Importantly, Rawls’s conception of the difference principle (including the just savings 
clause) is sufficientarian, in that there are fixed limits to its application.252 For one, it is 
impermissible to disrupt basic liberties or FEO when furthering the aims of the difference 
principle (Rawls 1999: 258). Since, as Rawls states, “each person possesses an inviolability 
founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override” (Rawls 3: 1999). 
                                                        
be acknowledged. Thus, the complete statement of the difference principle includes the savings 
principle as a constraint” (Rawls 1999: 258).  
252 To understand sufficientarianism it is helpful to compare it with the two other popular 
proposals for establishing requirements of intergenerational sustainability: (1) aggregative and 
(2) equalitarian. Essentially, aggregative theorists argue from a utilitarian perspective and 
maintain that society ought to aim towards maximizing intergenerational resources. As Axel 
Grosseries explains, it requires “earlier generations to adopt a positive savings rate” (Grosseries 
2001: 313). Whereas, equalitarian theorists (e.g. Solow, Hartwick, and Arneson) argue “we 
should equalize the capacity to achieve welfare across generations” (Wolf 2018: 58). As Robert 
Solow maintains, “[sustainability entails] an obligation to conduct ourselves, so that we leave to 
the future the option or capacity to be as well-off as we are” (Solow 1993: 181). The immediate 
problem with an aggregative saving rate is that, in the case of infinite generations, there is never 
ending sacrifice that results in no generation’s benefit and, in the case of finite generations 
(which we can assume), the worst off-generation (i.e., the earliest generation) is made worse-off 
than they would have been without the aggregative saving requirement (Grosseries 2001: 313-
314). Such a result seems unjust in that it inverts the maximin principle (i.e., to maximally 
benefit those in the worst position) and instead makes the worst-off even more worse off; while 
ironically, maximally benefiting the most well-off later generation. Whereas, the problem with 
an equalitarian saving rate is that its aim of preserving a non-diminishing stock of social 
resources is either too demanding or too lenient. For instance, in the case of a growing 
population, maintaining the same resource base across generations seems inadequate, in that it 
will lead to increased suffering. As Clark Wolf explains, “a sustainability criterion that requires a 
nondecreasing supply of consumable resources or nondecreasing aggregate welfare will imply 
increasing want and deprivation or decreasing per-capita well-being from one generation to the 
next, if population size is increasing rapidly from one generation to the next” (Wolf 2018: 60). 
Whereas, in the case of a shrinking population, an equalitarian saving rate, asks the current 
generation to sacrifice more than is necessary to ensure that the next generation’s needs are 
adequately met. A sufficientarian approach to sustainability avoids these worries by specifying 
some sufficient threshold to be met, which defines currently living peoples’ obligation to future 
generations. For Rawls that threshold is to maintain “the conditions needed to establish and to 
preserve a just basic structure over time” (Rawls 2001: 159). As such, once this threshold is met, 
it avoids the aggregative worry of requiring too much of the worst-off earlier generations and 
avoids the equalitarian worry of either over or under sacrificing for equality’s sake and instead 
focuses on reaching and maintaining long term human interests (e.g., establishing just 
institutions, protecting basic liberties, maintaining FEO, allowing citizens to develop their moral 
powers).   
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Accordingly, per “justice as fairness” the state would never be justified in sacrificing its 
citizen’s basic rights to benefit the worst off or assist future generations. Such a conclusion is 
important for our purposes because it preempts an ecocidal state from arguing that destroying an 
autarkic community’s habitat (which as we have argued violates their basic liberties) was just 
because the resulting economic gains and development advantaged the less fortunate and/or 
future generations substantially enough to normatively outweigh the autarkic community’s loss.    
The just savings clause is sufficientarian in other respects.253 As Rawls explains in The 
Law of Peoples the just saving requirements change as societies progress:  
(a) The purpose of a just (real) savings principle is to establish (reasonably) just basic 
institutions for a free constitutional democratic society (or any well-ordered society) 
and to secure a social world that makes possible a worthwhile life for all its citizens. 
 
(b) Accordingly, savings may stop once just (or decent) basic institutions have been 
established. At this point real saving (that is, net additions to real capital of all kinds) 
may fall to zero; and existing stock only needs to be maintained, or replaced, and 
nonrenewable resources carefully husbanded for future use as appropriate. (Rawls 
2001: 107)254 
 
Therefore, the aim of the just savings principle shifts once society reaches a certain level 
of social development. As Wolf explains, “in the first stage, before just institutions have been 
established, the purpose of saving is to ensure that later generations have it better than earlier 
ones” (Wolf 2018: 65). Whereas, in the second stage, after just institutions have been achieved, 
all intergenerational justice requires is for current generations to continue saving enough so that, 
“the required institutions must meet needs and protect fundamental rights and liberties” (Wolf 
2018: 65). Grosseries classifies these two stages as an accumulation stage, “where net saving is 
                                                        
253 The sufficientarian features of Rawls’s theory are often overlooked, but they are deserving of 
greater consideration as a radical corrective to the growth-oriented neoliberal perspective 
promoting roving imperialism around the world.   
254 Also, this insight is helpful for our purposes because it shows that Rawls acknowledges that 
just societies are unlikely to arise within a generation. Accordingly, it is reasonable and 
reassuring for us to recognize and expect that transforming ecocidal states to environmentally 
sustainable and just societies will likely take generations of effort, activism, and perseverance.   
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required from each generation” and steady-state stage, “where the saving rate can fall to zero 
(but not below)” (Grosseries 2001: 317).  
It is important to reemphasize that, at neither stage, can basic liberties or FEO be 
sacrificed to increase the savings rate (Rawls 1999: 258). Thus, because of ecocidal states’ 
failure to meet these higher-level priorities of protecting their autarkic citizenry’s basic liberties 
and FEO, the just savings principle has unequivocally been violated. But, as we will now 
demonstrate, ecocidal states additionally fail the just savings principle by improperly pursuing 
the tradeoff between economic development and environmental protection.  
As we have seen, Rawls’s two-staged sufficientarian just savings principle offers helpful 
insights for establishing a sustainable society, in that it undercuts the aim of economic expansion 
and development as an end-in-and-of-itself and instead maintains that growth is strictly a means 
to the end of establishing and maintaining just institutions needed to foster citizens’ equal basic 
liberties and ability to exercise their moral powers (Henderson 2011: 11-17). To grasp this point, 
it is imperative to recognize that Rawls eschews a view of the difference principle which 
maintains that justice requires an ever-expanding stock of social resources to continue to increase 
the absolute position of the least advantaged in perpetuity.  
For instance, Rawls is actually suspicious of great material wealth and argues that, 
“beyond some point [wealth] is more likely to be a positive hindrance, a meaningless distraction 
at best if not a temptation to indulgence and emptiness” (Rawls 1999: 258). He also asserts the 
sufficientarian position directly by stating that once “the correct minimum has been reached, the 
difference principle is satisfied, and no further increase is called for” (Rawls 1999: 252).  
Thus, with the above sufficientarian perspective in mind, we can better understand 
Rawls’s motivation behind advocating a steady-state (that is, once just institutions necessary to 
foster citizens equal basic liberties and ability to exercise their moral powers has been 
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established) requiring no increased savings (i.e., capital growth). Since, as Gail Henderson 
explains, Rawls’s theory “involves a shift away from the current paradigm of continuous eco-
nomic growth as an end or good in itself—a paradigm which is both environmentally and 
economically unsustainable” (Henderson 2011: 4). 
Therefore, the problem for our purposes (as we have seen throughout the work) is that 
ecocidal societies promote a roving imperialistic worldview (i.e., the currently dominant 
neoliberal perspective), which holds that continuous economic growth and development ought to 
be a chief goal of the state. As Henderson eloquently expounds:  
Consumerism and progress therefore are inextricably linked, and the level of 
consumption enjoyed by a population is the criterion on which government ought to be 
judged. This rhetoric reinforces individual behavior that treats the accumulation of wealth 
as an end in itself. All of this makes it difficult to address the problem of future 
environmental harm. (Henderson 2011: 10) 
 
Hence, ecocidal states under the sway of roving imperialist ideology fail to adopt the 
sufficientarian insights of Rawls’s just saving principle and instead pursue environmentally 
destructive and non-sustainable aggregationist practices and policies in the mistaken hope of 
open-endedly maximizing capital accumulation. A model that Nick Hanley, Jason Shogren, and 
Ben White insightfully recognize “pushes increasingly against environmental constraints, 
threatening the operation of the joint economic-environmental system” (Hanley, Shogren, and 
White 2007: 15). 
Consequently, Rawls defends a theory of justice that challenges the currently dominant 
roving imperialist social order by fostering appreciation that economic growth ought to be 
viewed as a means to an end, rather than as an end-in-and-of-itself.255 As such, Henderson hopes 
                                                        
255 John Stuart Mill was also dissatisfied with the unconstrained growth-oriented capitalism he 
experienced in his lifetime, as he vividly articulates he saw individuals spending their lives 
“struggling to get on” and “trampling, crushing, elbowing, and treading on each other’s heels” in 
the pursuit of wealth (Mill 1848: note 65). Thus, to escape this state of affairs, he argued for a 
“steady-state” that by removing the pursuit of wealth and the “art of getting on” would instead 
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that Rawls’s insight will garner greater awareness and appreciation for the environmentalist 
insight, “[that] slower economic growth is not a ‘sacrifice’ by the present for the sake of the 
future, but rather reveals what current generations are sacrificing for the sake of increased 
wealth, such as a greater amount of leisure time and the health benefits of improved 
environmental quality” (Henderson 2011: 14).256 Princen echoes this sentiment, stating:  
 
“Members of so-called advanced societies…where unending economic growth is an 
unquestioned ‘good thing’ essential for progress, cherished for its ability to solve all 
problems, even those of growth itself, that even here [some] people have learned to say 
                                                        
develop the “art of living” (Mill 1848: note 65).  John Maynard Keynes in his optimistic essay, 
“Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren” also believed that humanity would reach a 
steady-state of “economic saturation” in which people would be free from the toil of capital 
accumulation after solving “the economic problem” that is “the struggle for subsistence” 
(Keynes 1930). But the tradition of predicting that humanity would eventually achieve a steady-
state has an even older intellectual pedigree. Even Plato in Laws argued that the ideal state would 
be a “static agrarian community” in which, “the number of households, or ‘hearths’ must be kept 
constant [he later offers a figure of 5040], to ensure that no grave social revolution shall arise 
from either over-population or under-population. Over-population would lead to unrightful 
expansion at the cost of neighbors, and under-population to inadequacy of national defense” 
(Taylor 1934: XXX VII). Furthermore, in the Republic, the Kallipolis (i.e., ideal state) is 
sufficientarian in that it ceases further capital accumulation upon reaching a level of prosperity in 
which it can defend itself and support and reproduce the Guardian class (i.e., the Philosopher 
Kings and auxiliaries). Thus, we can see there is a long history of sufficientarianism in the 
Western intellectual tradition.  
256 Henderson offers an additional compelling prudential reason for adopting Rawls’s 
sufficientarian just savings framework, stemming from the time-delay between cause and effect 
of environmental harms, “[in that] by the time the effects on the environment of present-day 
economic activities are realized, it will be too late to do anything about them” (Henderson 2011: 
15). As such, “preventing serious reductions to the environmental quality that will be 
experienced by future generations may mean slowing down economic development in the 
present in order to avoid the unforeseeable harms of economic activity…[it] is also necessary in 
order for regulatory institutions to be able to keep up with and effectively prevent or mitigate the 
predicted environmental impacts of which we are presently aware” (Henderson 2011: 15). And 
while advances in science may facilitate better predictions regarding how our practices and 
policies will impact the environmental, the complexity and dynamic nature of ecosystems 
practically forecloses the prospects of ever making completely accurate assessments of the 
consequences and repercussions of our actions on the environment. Thus, justifying the need to 
build slack, redundancy, and resilience into our ecological-economic social system, which the 
currently dominant roving imperialist/neoliberal global system fails to do.     
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enough. And they need to know that saying enough need not be a matter of sacrifice…is 
not just a means of surviving. It is a means of thriving” (Princen 2005: 5).257   
 
But could ecocidal states justify their destruction of autarkic communities’ habitats on the 
grounds that they are in the accumulation phase; and thus, such activity is necessary to achieve 
just institutions? This question raises a core difficulty regarding our goal of constructing 
principles of environmental transformative justice from within a Rawlsian framework, in that 
defining precisely what is supposed to occur when economic development and environmental 
protection come into conflict is a tension never explicitly resolved in Rawls’s body of work. 
Nevertheless, by drawing conclusions based on the basic liberty principle and FEO, we can show 
that in a traditional Rawlsian account, ecocidal states fail to make the right determination in this 
important trade-off.  
To demonstrate this, it is important to remember Rawls maintains that a central objective 
of the just saving principle is to “preserve the gains of culture and civilization” (Rawls 1999: 
252). Hence, as mentioned, according to his theory, each generation ought to pass on to the next 
“a fair equivalent in real capital as defined by the just savings principle” (Rawls 1999: 256).  
Notably, Rawls defines “real capital” broadly as “not only factories and machines, and so 
on, but also the knowledge and culture, as well as the techniques and skills, that make possible 
just institutions and the fair value of liberty” (Rawls 1999: 256). Since autarkic communities rely 
                                                        
257 Princen argues for the importance of promoting sufficientarian ideals by explaining that: “In 
an ecologically constrained world, people need the rhetorical and political means for turning a 
silencing hand to the barkers and boosters, to the marketeers, to the spinmeisters and political 
handlers, all of whom tell us that the good life comes from purchasing goods, and that because 
goods are good more goods must be better” (Princen 2005: 6). Therefore, while efficiency and 
continuous growth might have served us well in the past, Princen maintains this was under 
favorable conditions (i.e., when the earth had abundant resources and waste-sinks), whereas now: 
“Under other conditions - namely, environmental criticality - a different set of [sufficientarian] 
principles are needed, a set that embodies social restraint as the logical analog to ecological 
constraint, a set that guides human activities when those activities pose grave risks to human 
survival” (Princen 2005: 19).      
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on certain ‘cultural knowledge, techniques, and skills’ in relation to a specific habitat for 
maintaining their traditional way of life, it is imperative that states do not harm these ecosystems 
because, as previously discussed, the basic liberty principle bars basic social institutions from 
prioritizing one reasonable way of life over another. As has been demonstrated, ecocidal states 
would be violating autarkic citizens’ basic liberties, if they permitted the destruction of vital 
resources necessary for pursuing their conception of a good life, developing their moral powers, 
and becoming cooperating members of society.  
In summary, the just savings principle mandates that these habitats must be saved in 
order to preserve the choices available to future generations of autarkic citizens, or else the state 
risks illiberally violating these citizens’ basic rights.258 As Henderson explains: 
Maintaining a particular degree of environmental quality is necessary to preserve the 
range of choices available to future generations. For instance, depleting resources can 
‘narrow diversity’, which in turn could limit future generations’ options in addressing 
future problems…The ability to benefit from the environment would include 
opportunities to fish, farm and hunt, to breathe clean air and drink clean water, to have 
access to a variety of species and breeds of plants and animals and to contemplate nature. 
(Henderson 2011: 18) 
 
 To situate this discussion in terms that readers may be more familiar with, the just 
savings principle does not adhere to a strategy of weak sustainability, meaning that not all social 
resources are substitutable, even under conditions stipulating that all conversions must maintain 
or increase society’s total resource pool.259 Basically, per the just saving principle, it is not the 
                                                        
258 We can use Ronald Dworkin’s work to show the injustice of destroying habitats on which 
autarkic communities rely on for their survival from within another famous liberal constructivist 
paradigm. According to his theory, such action would be wrong in that it violates the “grounds of 
neutrality” to allow “a way of life that has been desired and found satisfying in the past, to 
become unavailable to future generations, and indeed to the future of those who now seem 
unaware of its appeal” (Dworkin 1985: 202).   
259 Weak sustainability stems from the work of two neoclassical economists: Robert Solow 
(1974; 1986; 1992; 1993) and John Hartwick (1977; 1978; 1990). Weak sustainability maintains 
that it is possible to substitute man-made capital for natural capital (Neumayer, 2003). 
Interestingly, one of the goals of this work is to provide justification for proceeding in the 
opposite direction and occasionally substituting natural-capital for man-made capital.    
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case that manufactured, human, social, financial, and natural capital are all interchangeable. As 
such, a problem with interpreting the just savings principle through a weak sustainability lens is 
that it would illiberally prioritize certain conceptions of the good (roving imperialists’ 
worldview) over others (autarkic communities’ worldview).   
Accordingly, the best way to respect citizens of autarkic communities’ basic liberties and 
FEO is to ensure that certain natural entities are exempt from being exploited by processes of 
capital accumulation that would cause their destruction, under the auspices of generating greater 
manufactured, human, social, or financial capital. “Justice as fairness” therefore requires that at 
least a limited set of natural resources (i.e., those that are essential for enabling certain citizens to 
pursue their own conceptions of a good life, develop their moral powers, and become 
cooperating members of society) ought to be protected by norms of strong sustainability.260 Such 
a conclusion ensures that certain natural resources are non-fungible and must be preserved – that 
is so long as the protection of these resources does not cause comparable or worse injustice, i.e.,  
violating other citizens’ basic liberties or FEO.261  
Essentially, autarkic communities’ lifestyle and “comprehensive doctrine of the good” 
require strong sustainability measures aimed at preserving their specific habitat. As such, a just 
Rawlsian state has an obligation to preserve these resources or it will fail to respect these 
citizens’ way of life.  
                                                        
260 See Konrad Ott’s “Institutionalizing Strong Sustainability: A Rawlsian Perspective” for a 
more detailed defense regarding why a Rawlsian constructivist approach requires adopting a 
rule-based variant of strong sustainability (Ott 2014).  
261 Strong sustainability arose as an environmentalist response to the notion of weak 
sustainability utilized in neoclassical economics. It maintains that certain forms of natural capital 
cannot be substituted for man-made capital (Dobson 1998). Thus, the natural entities under 
consideration must be preserved because there are no man-made entities capable of performing 
the same function.  
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It is important to highlight that the state disallowing roving imperialists from accessing 
these resources does not trigger comparable justice concerns, because these citizens’ can satisfy 
their subsistence needs and promote their way of life by drawing upon resources from 
elsewhere.262 Therefore, since they are not dependent upon these specific resources in any 
substantive way, their basic liberties are not at risk of violation by being barred from exploiting 
these resources -- especially when compared with the difficulties facing autarkic communities if 
these resources are destroyed. Thus, the state by preserving these resources pursuant to the just 
savings principles is not prioritizing one “conceptions of the good” or “comprehensive doctrines” 
over another. 
Remember, Rawls’s ideal constructivist theory recognizes the importance of allowing 
opportunities “for individuals and associations to be attached to their particular culture and to 
take part in its common public and civic life” (Rawls 2001: 111). As such, a virtue of Rawls’s 
approach is that it requires us to pay attention to peoples’ particular present and future interests, 
preferences, and needs, instead of strictly prioritizing the unconditional aggregation of social 
resources.263  
To achieve this necessitates that the just savings principle be interpreted as a constraint 
on resource-use, which ensures that resources are not destroyed unless such use is unavoidable 
                                                        
262 As Henderson explains it is often important to, “ask whether it is possible to achieve the 
growth necessary to establish and maintain just institutions in a less environmentally harmful 
manner and whether further exploitation of currently untouched natural resources is really 
necessary to achieve this goal” (Henderson 2011: 15). For Henderson, the reason behind asking 
this question is that our, “obligation is to avoid, to the greatest possible extent, actions that would 
preclude future generations from endorsing our traditions and values” (Henderson 2011: 23). 
263 Ott clearly captures this feature of Rawls’s theory: “Reasonable people behind the veil of 
ignorance may know that nature provides several types of services, such as provisioning, 
regulating, and cultural services, but do not know what role such services of nature may play in 
their individual concept of the good. If so, they cautiously might opt for more conservation and 
restoration since they, as real individuals, may be benefitted highly by the cultural values of 
nature (such as beauty or recreation) (Ott 2014: 904).  
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for achieving or maintaining the principles of justice (Wissenburg 1999: 193-196).264 In other 
words, the just savings principle should be viewed as a safeguard that each generation leaves 
society no worse than when they inherited it, without losing anything essential. As Marcel 
Wissenburg, explains such an interpretation of the just savings principle, “puts the onus of proof 
for the legitimacy of environmentally harmful acts on the bad guys” (Wissenburg 1999: 198).   
Accordingly, the constraints placed on society by the just saving principle guarantee that 
present-and-future citizens will have access to the natural entities (i.e., habitats, animals, plants, 
landmarks, etc.) they need in accordance with their “comprehensive doctrine of the good,” that is 
so long as such access does not undermine present-and-future citizens’ basic liberties, FEO, or 
the difference principle. Such an interpretation of the just savings principle affirms Henderson’s 
assertion, “that while communities and their cultures change over time, this does not justify 
[from within a Rawlsian framework] precluding future generations from participating in 
traditional practices because of environmental mismanagement by previous generations” 
(Henderson 2011: 22).  
We have demonstrated in our paradigm cases and idealized model of ecocide that 
ecocidal societies fail in their obligation to preserve the fair and equal opportunity of future 
generations of autarkic citizens to participate in their traditional cultural practices and way of 
life.265 As Brian Barry explains, “the requirement is to provide future generations with the 
                                                        
264 Wissenburg argues that the “restraint principle” undergirding the just savings principle 
requires that, “no good shall be destroyed unless unavoidable and unless they are replaced by 
perfectly identical goods; if that is physically impossible, they should be replaced by equivalent 
goods resembling the original as closely as possible; and if that is also impossible, a proper 
compensation should be provided” (Wissenburg 1999: 193). Furthermore, he defends the view 
that the “restraint principle” is a “necessary condition of liberal democracy” because of its role in 
fostering social stability and intergenerational cooperation (Wissenburg 1999: 197).   
265 As we have discussed, the destruction of these communities’ territories and livelihoods force 
these citizens into the role of ecocide refugees struggling to survive and meet their needs in an 
alien and often hostile culture and society. Furthermore, the loss of these citizens’ ability to pass 
down to their descendants their traditional subsistence skills and cultural practices can 
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opportunity to live good lives according to their conception of what constitutes a good life” 
(Barry 1999: 104). Hence, ecocide violates this requirement in that it forecloses autarkic 
communities’ choices in the future, in that it prevents impacted citizens from being able to 
continue their traditional subsistence practices on their ancestral on their ancestral land.  
Moreover, it seems unlikely that the economic growth and development necessary to 
achieve just institutions can only occur by destroying autarkic communities’ habitat. Since as 
Rawls states, “it is a mistake to believe that a just and good society must wait upon a high 
material standard of life” (Rawls 1999: 257).  
Consequently, it appears that ecocidal states violate the just savings principle even if the 
harm occurs during the accumulation phase because their consistent prioritization of economic 
growth and development over environmental preservation unjustly favors certain “conceptions of 
the good” and “comprehensive doctrines” over others, e.g., roving imperialism over autarkic 
ways of life, weak sustainability over strong sustainability, etc. Unless the state can definitively 
demonstrate that the only way to achieve (during the accumulation phase) or maintain (during 
the steady-state phase) just institutions is to pursue ecocidal activity, which seems extremely 
unlikely.266 In other words, eliminating ecocide in a society, almost certainly places the society 
in a better position to realize “justice as fairness” in both the present and the future.     
Nevertheless, at present we are unable to provide a complete theorization of how 
sustainability (i.e., developing a standard to satisfactorily limit how our actions and decisions can 
                                                        
profoundly affect current and subsequent generations self-esteem, pride, autonomy, and self-
respect. 
266 Essentially, relying on Rawls’s categorization of states in Laws of Peoples, we can place 
ecocidal states into categories. First, if a state is unable to pursue or maintain just institutions 
without enacting ecocide, then such a state ought to be considered a “burdened society,” in that it 
is too immiserated to achieve or preserve just institutions (Rawls 1999b). Whereas, a state that 
engages in ecocidal activity superfluous to the pursuit or maintenance of just institutions ought to 
be considered an “outlaw state” (Rawls 1999b).    
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constrain the opportunities of future generations) ought to be conceptualized when vital interests 
come into conflict, other than gesturing towards Norton’s theory of adaptive environmental 
management as a promising schema (Norton 2005, 2009, and 2015).267 The reason for endorsing 
Norton’s framework is that he embraces a pluralistic account of ‘multiple’ and ‘varied’ 
environmental values that is sensitive to local human communities’ wants and needs in a manner 
conducive to maintaining a liberal ecological-economic social system, i.e., one that is able to 
respect a diverse set of environmental perspectives; while concurrently, fostering mechanisms 
for achieving overlapping consensus regarding how to proceed in environmental decision-
making when competing interests arise (Norton 2005, 2009, and 2015).268   
                                                        
267 Essentially, Norton stresses the procedure of environmental decision-making over fixed and 
absolute substantive conclusions. He asserts that the process must be “democratic” in that “it 
must be iterative, it must be open to all voices in the community, and it must be receptive to 
multiple values and varied formulations of these values” (Norton 2005: 273). The ultimate aim 
of his schema is to optimize the ratio of environmental opportunities to constraints for present 
and future generations (Norton 2009: 41). This is comparable to Barry’s classic articulation of 
sustainability, that the present generation ought to preserve at minimum the current “range of 
opportunities” for future generations: “What justice requires, I suggest, is that the range of 
opportunities open to successor generations should not be narrowed. If some openings are closed 
off by depletion or other irreversible damage to the environment, others should be created (if 
necessary, at the cost of some sacrifice) to make up” (Barry 1978: 243).  
268 Whereas monistic accounts of environmental values (e.g., Economism or Intrinsic Value 
Theory) illiberally prioritize some “comprehensive doctrines” and “conceptions of the good” 
over others. Thus, while Norton’s adaptive ecological management is anthropocentric (i.e., 
strictly concerned with the opportunities and constraints placed on present and future human 
beings), it does not do so in an illiberal way, because it can incorporate actor’s non-instrumental 
reasons for preserving a specific environmental entity through recognizing that these interests are 
opportunities that hold value both at present and for posterity’s sake. Furthermore, Wolf 
assuages concerns over the fact that Norton’s schema frames sustainability through the lens of 
furthering anthropocentric opportunities, by explaining that: “We live in an era of swift 
environmental change and, in many instances, destruction that threatens the most serious 
imposition of constraints, and deprivation of opportunities for later generations…[thus] 
advocates of different value theories are likely to converge in their judgments about most of the 
pressing environmental policy and environmental management decisions we presently face” 
(Wolf 2018: 57).  Hence, while there are different possible motivations for promoting the idea of 
environmental sustainability, e.g., autarkic communities will want to protect ancestral lands from 
industrial development, while industrialists will want to ensure the continuous revenue stream or 
impose eco-modernizing costs on their competitors. Nevertheless, these disparate motivations all 
advocate to a greater or lesser extent the same commitment to environmental sustainability. 
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III. Augmenting Rawlsian Constructivism with a Rectificatory Principle of Justice  
 
This work has demonstrated several reasons why ecocidal societies are unjust, ill-
ordered, and uncooperative ventures that act in direct violation of Rawlsian principles. But the 
problem is that such a traditional Rawlsian framework appears to only offer guidance regarding 
how societies ideally ought to structure themselves moving forward, in that it requires them to 
respect all citizens basic rights, foster a system that engenders fair and equal life prospects, 
maximally assist the downtrodden, and ensures that future generations can meet their needs.  
Thus, it is reasonable to assume that traditional Rawlsian principles can effectively 
achieve many of the Transitional Justice objectives (i.e., ending pervasive structural inequality 
and normalized political and collective wrongdoing, while establishing legitimate authority and 
promoting social stability) and environmentalist objectives (i.e., achieving sustainability and 
ecosystem preservation). Nevertheless, the principles are clearly future-oriented and as such 
prove inadequate for achieving the past-oriented aims of Transitional Justice (i.e., requiring the 
acknowledgment of past wrongs, restoring victim’s moral status and equal social standing in 
relation to others across time) and of environmentalism (i.e., justifying the restoration or 
(re)construction of lost habitats). As Mills rightly acknowledges in his criticism of Rawls: 
“Preemptive precautions to prevent injustices entering the ‘basic structure’ of a society are not 
                                                        
Thus, it seems fair to argue that the idea of environmental sustainability can be reached through 
an “overlapping consensus” of varied interests, positions, and perspectives. As David Miller 
states, “to put this back into Rawlsian terms, untouched natural products are to be seen as 
primary goods for persons regardless of their particular, subjectively held, conceptions of the 
good” (Miller 1999: 164).  
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the same as rectificatory measures aimed at correcting them once they have already occurred. 
Prevention generally differs from cure” (Mills 2017: 140).269    
Accordingly, such a future-oriented framework is problematic because there is a strong 
intuition in both Transitional Justice and environmentalism that past wrongs require specifically 
tailored forms of redress.270 Recent scholarship by Vaca and Espindola convincingly argues that 
Rawls’s ideal constructivist theory requires an additional principle of reparative justice (Vaca 
and Espindolda 2014).271 Furthermore, Mills offers a method for augmenting Rawls’s 
                                                        
269 It must be pointed out that the failure to consider issues of rectificatory justice is not 
particular to Rawls. As Mills highlights: “The under theorization in the tradition of corrective 
justice for subordinated groups, despite the subordination of most of the population nominally in 
the theory’s ambit, is itself a manifestation of this complicity. Contemporary political 
philosophy’s post-Rawlsian focus on ‘ideal theory’ is thus not aberrant but completely 
continuous with this long history of moral evasion” (Mills 2017: 209).  
270 As discussed, one of the core intuitions driving Transitional Justice is that forgetting the 
wrongs of the past and moving forward as though nothing transpired constitutes a grave 
injustice. In brief, a reason supporting the need for reparative justice and forgiveness in 
transitional settings is the abundance of empirical evidence confirming that the decision to forgo 
correcting grave injustice(s) increases the rate of recurrence of harms in the future (Laplante 
2008). David Bloomfield highlights the concern that forgetting the past and moving forward, as 
though nothing occurred, would be a grave injustice, which may lead to further conflict in the 
future: “One of the biggest obstacles to transition is that, because of the violence of the past, their 
relations are based on antagonism, distrust, disrespect and, quite possibly, hurt and hatred. It is 
hardly a recipe for optimism, no matter how effective or perfect those new structures may 
be…there is a pressing need to address the past” (Bloomfield 2003: 11). But beyond these sorts 
of instrumental arguments, there is a long tradition of normative thought arguing that 
overcoming injustice requires rebalancing the moral scale for its own sake, simply because it is 
the right thing to do, i.e., it is morally important to try and give people what they deserve. As 
Kant famously argued: “Even if a civil society were to be dissolved by the consent of all its 
members (e.g., if a people inhabiting an island decided to separate and disperse throughout the 
world), the last murderer remaining in the prison would first have to be executed, so that each 
has done to him what his deeds deserve and blood guilt does not cling to the people for not 
having insisted upon this punishment; for otherwise the people can be regarded as collaborators 
in this public violation of justice” (Kant 1996: 333).  
271 As a reminder we defined “reparations” broadly as past-oriented redress of past wrongs, 
thereby obtaining justice for victims. It is important to emphasize that reparative justice in this 
sense includes punishment of perpetrators, which as will be discussed is a vital feature of 
Transitional Justice.   
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constructivist approach, so as to be able to establish past-oriented reparatory principles of justice 
(Mills 2017).   
The chapter will now analyze these insights in an attempt to see if an augmented, yet 
inherently Rawlsian constructivist account can justify and develop the need for rectifying past 
wrongs to fully satisfy the previously stated aims of Transitional Justice and environmentalism 
for responding to ecocide. Once again, the ultimate goal of this constructivist undertaking is to 
devise a theory of environmental transformative justice that satisfies both disciplines.272 
 
A. Compatibility of Traditional Rawlsian Approach with Unrectified Injustice 
 
Vaca and Espindola begin by showing that a conventional Rawlsian framework is 
compatible with not rectifying past injustices, if these harms are no longer contributing to current 
injustices (Vaca and Espindola 2014: 236-240). They demonstrate this by imagining a well-
ordered society that, despite past injustices, is currently able to satisfy the two principles of 
justice without taking active corrective measures. Effectively, such a state achieves an 
institutionally fair and equitable society by ‘drawing a line in the sand’ requiring that, 
                                                        
272 Immediately, one might object that even if it can be shown that there is a current injustice that 
needs to be repaired (i.e., restoring lost habitat that was destroyed), that does not necessitate 
invoking the notion of Transitional Justice. However, as previously shown because of the type of 
harm suffered (i.e., social death and loss of vital interests) and the manner in which the harm 
arose (i.e., direct, indirect, or negligent state action), the state is reasonably obligated to take 
action to ensure that such wrongs never occur again. Accordingly, it would be inadequate to only 
repair the harm done (i.e., restore the status quo) because the underlying system(s), practice(s), 
norm(s), and social relation(s) that generated the harm would likely remain intact. Thus, an 
appropriate response in our paradigm cases of ecocide entails altering and replacing the 
structures generating the harm. In other words, such wrongs demand the sort of social 
transformation that Transitional Justice is designed to achieved, i.e., transitioning societies away 
from pervasive structural inequality, ending normalized political and collective wrongdoing, 
establishing legitimate authority and promoting social stability.  
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henceforth, the society would operate exclusively in accordance with Rawls’s future-oriented 
principles of justice.  
For our purposes, imagine a society that engaged in ecocide in the recent past, but has 
since ceased these harmful practices. Additionally, in this hypothetical society, every citizen is 
aware and accepts the fact that the basic liberties of all are now being respected, the well-being 
of the least advantaged is being maximized, social resources are being justly conserved for future 
generations, and because of tremendous psychological resilience and unrestrained ability, the 
citizens of former autarkic communities are able to fairly compete as equals for all social 
positions.273  
In such a scenario, Vaca and Espindola correctly surmise that, per a traditional Rawlsian 
account, “justice as fairness” has been satisfied, in that the society is not violating any principles 
of justice. As they explain, such examples illustrate how Rawls’s theory is amenable to the 
possibility that: “Ideal liberal justice requires [only] ensuring the prerogatives of justice from the 
present on. It does not require providing means of historical rectification” (Vaca and Espindola 
2014: 240).  
To summarize, they are arguing that such examples prove that, according to a traditional 
Rawlsian account, there is no need for adopting a further principle of reparatory justice from 
“behind the veil” in the “original position” because the current principles are sufficient for 
correcting historical injustices; and, as such, any additional principle of justice is unnecessary. 
                                                        
273 Obviously, per the discussion in the last section regarding FEO, it is highly likely that the 
psychological disadvantages and other obstacles to a healthy self-respect and the ability for 
victims to compete as equals against the rest of society would be insurmountable, without 
rectifying historical injustices. Accordingly, a Rawlsian could maintain that such a scenario is 
quite unrealistic: past injustices linger on in current injustices, e.g., the unjust treatment of blacks 
in the United States today has its origins in the injustice of slavery. 
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However, they believe such a conclusion is misguided and inadequate for capturing the 
normative significance of rectifying historical injustice.  
 
B. Proving a Just Rawlsian Approach Requires a Rectificatory Principle 
 
Initially, one may argue that Vaca and Espindola cannot rely on the abundant 
psychological and sociological evidence that has already been mentioned (i.e., showing that 
victims of past wrongs need reparative assistance to effectively compete for social positions in 
accordance with FEO) because, as stipulated, in these scenarios the former victims, due to their 
tremendous psychological resilience and unrestrained ability, are not impeded by the past. Such a 
conclusion, however, would be a misapplication of Rawls’s ideal theory, in that, as previously 
explained, he was striving to articulate “how the social world may realize the features of a 
realistic utopia” (Rawls 1993: 128).  
Thus, it would be misguided to imagine or presuppose that victims can be reasonably 
expected to overcome the type of grave historical harms under consideration (e.g., genocide, 
ethnic cleansing, ecocide, etc.), when there are countless studies to the contrary. As Briton Lykes 
and Marcie Mersky explain, “there is a general sense among mental health and psychosocial 
researchers and practitioners that all of these forms…of reparations programs… can have 
important effects on psychosocial conditions at the individual and national or collective level” 
(Lykes and Marsky 2006: 591).274  
                                                        
274 These reparations programs include measures that focus on material well-being, restoration of 
legal rights or property, promoting equal standing before the law, all of which seem directly 
achievable through the two principles of justice. But they also include the truth-seeking 
processes, apologies, commemorations, memorialization that are not necessarily justified through 
the two principles.   
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Hence, there is ample empirical evidence supporting Vaca and Espindola’s position that, 
“the aspiration to come to terms with an unjust past is a permanent feature of normal human 
psychology” (Vaca and Espindola 2014: 231) Accordingly, it is reasonable to assume that 
victims of grave political harms (such as the instance of ecocide in our case studies) would have 
great interest and need for the state and society to recognize and strive to come to terms with the 
harms they have suffered, which as Transitional Justice has repeatedly proven, requires separate 
reparative measures.  
Importantly, Vaca and Espindola emphasize that victims’ psychological need for 
recognition and mending of past wrongs committed against them is in line with other 
psychosocial regularities that Rawls considers applicable to determining principles of justice 
(Vaca and Espindola 2014). For instance, even a well-ordered society requires coercive and 
punitive measures because, despite “strict compliance” at an institutional level, not all 
individuals will act in accordance with the principles of justice. As Rawls states, “it is reasonable 
to assume that even in a well-ordered society the coercive powers of government are to some 
degree necessary, [since] even under reasonable ideal conditions, it is hard to imagine, for 
example, a successful income tax scheme on a voluntary basis” (Rawls 1999: 211) Furthermore, 
he continues this line of reasoning by admitting, “that we need penal sanctions however limited 
even for ideal theory, given the normal conditions of human life, some such arrangements are 
necessary” (Rawls 1999: 212) .    
 Hence, Vaca and Espindola rightly acknowledge that for Rawls, “the ‘normal conditions 
of human life’ include the psychological fact that moral considerations alone cannot motivate 
ordinary persons to endorse and comply with a conception of justice … [and therefore] Rawls’s 
theory takes into account a psychological fact about human motivation” (Vaca and Espindola 
2014: 232). Therefore, based on this insight, they conclude that victims’ interests “in coming to 
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terms with the past is similar to other human psychological regularities that Rawls’s ideal theory 
is sensitive to” (Vaca and Espindola 2014: 232).  
In summary, the argument presents a challenge, questioning the view that Rawls was fine 
with excluding the possibility of voluntary tax schemes or that people will never break the law as 
“normal” feature of human psychology, yet believing he was willing to disregard the 
psychological actuality that some victims of grave political wrongs would require society to 
recognize and strive to come to terms with the harms they have suffered. Essentially, they argue 
that if Rawls admits some of these psychological regularities, then there appears no clear reason 
why he would exclude others.  
One may argue that the psychosocial regularity that Vaca and Espindola are considering 
ought to be excluded because the type of “well-ordered” society Rawls has in mind would not 
have legacies of grave injustices. For instance, Janna Thompson claims we must drop “Rawls’s 
assumption that there is strict compliance with justice in order to consider how representatives of 
family lines would regard claims for reparation for historical injustice” (Thompson 2001: 129).  
Vaca and Espindola, however, argue that Thompson is mistaken in her claim that 
Rawlsian “strict-compliance” makes it impossible to tackle past wrongs from within ideal theory 
because her view leads to the strange conclusion that the “well-ordered” societies Rawls is trying 
to illustrate must always have been just (Vaca and Espindola 2014: 233-234). Essentially, the 
oddness stems from the realization that if ‘historical strict compliance’ is mandatory, then 
Rawls’s theory could only be applied to societies that are and always have been just.  
The problem is that such an interpretation is idealistic in the ‘bad sense’, in that it 
forecloses the prospects of any state ever achieving “justice as fairness” because all societies 
have historical injustices – especially if ecocide, as construed throughout the work, is included as 
a grave political injustice. In which case, Rawls’s ideal theory would fail in its goal of providing 
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a “realistic utopia” that can offer guidance to “non-ideal” theory, as defenders of the ideal/non-
ideal divide argue it must.275 As Rawls states, “the idea of a well-ordered society should also 
provide some guidance in thinking about non-ideal theory, and so about difficult cases of how to 
deal with existing injustices” (Rawls 2001: 13).  
Furthermore, maintaining that societies have always been just is not a necessary 
“favorable condition” to ensure “strict-compliance,” since all that is required is that once a “well-
ordered” society is established, reasonably normal social functioning would foster and promote 
the stability of the socio-political regime across generations (Rawls 2001:13). As Rawls explains, 
“[strict compliance] probes the limits of the realistically practicable, that is, how far in our world 
(given its laws and tendencies) a democratic regime can attain complete realization of its 
appropriate political values” (Rawls 2001: 13).  
Moreover, Vaca and Espindola correctly express that, from “behind the veil of 
ignorance,” the society’s “historical record” is closed to the representatives (Vaca and Espindola 
2014: 235). Hence, actors in the “original position” cannot know or assume the society’s past, 
i.e., whether or not grave historical injustices have occurred. Vaca and Espindola thus 
insightfully argue that this requirement provides “a very good reason for the parties to ensure 
provisions for coming to terms with the past: for all they know, it may be the case that their well-
ordered society includes historical injustices as part of its past” (Vaca and Espindola 2014: 235). 
Furthermore, even if it is discovered upon “lifting the veil” that the society has no legacy of 
injustice, there is no obvious drawback to having had included vestigial provisions for coming to 
terms with past in the society’s basic structure.      
                                                        
275 As Rawls himself states: “We view political philosophy as realistically Utopian: that is, as 
probing the limits of practicable political possibility. Our hope for the future of our society rests 
on the belief that the social world allows at least a decent political order, so that a reasonably 
just, though not perfect, democratic regime is possible (Rawls 2001: 4). 
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Accordingly, since Rawls’s goal is to offer a “realistic utopia” (i.e., one that is practicably 
possible and stable over time), it is essential that citizen’s “normal” motivation and interests (i.e., 
as supported by an abundance of psychosocial evidence) would necessitate the prospect of taking 
steps to correct past injustices. Essentially, the problem is that, if Rawls’s theory does not include 
a principle for rectifying historical wrongs, then the theory fails at offering a “practical 
possibility” of maintaining a well-ordered society because at least at present all societies have 
committed grave injustices in their past (especially if ecocide is included), and empirical data 
shows that victims of grave political injustice ‘reasonably’ require social recognition and 
reparations for attaining psychological wellbeing and social functioning.  
Hence there is ample support for Vaca and Espindola’s conclusion that “the interests in 
coming to terms with an unjust past must be conceptualized as part of ideal theory…[since], as 
we have seen, this interest is analogous to other psychological regularities that are already central 
to Rawls’s ideal theory” (Vaca and Espindola 2014: 236). What they have demonstrated is that it 
is too much to ask of victims of grave historical injustice (like ecocide) to move forward without 
receiving social recognition and reparations.  
Importantly, this conclusion holds even in cases in which psychologically resilient 
victims’ FEO is not in jeopardy, since the state’s obligation to maintain the moral status of 
citizens as fully equal applies to their life as a whole. Because “political violence is an 
institutional way of undermining the equal moral worth of persons,” then recognition of past 
wrongs is needed to restore victim’s moral status and equal social standing in relation to others 
across time (Vaca 2013: 300).276 As Vaca and Espindola explain:  
                                                        
276 Furthermore, states’ obligation to guarantee the dignity of all citizens across time is no more 
farfetched a requirement than the need to accept that citizens will have diverse and competing 
conceptions of the good or recognizing that citizens will occasionally fail to act in full 
compliance with the principles of justice. Furthermore, it is precisely the political nature of the 
injustice that engenders the need for public response and acknowledgment.   
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Without the public expression of such condemnation, it is simply not clear whether such 
society in fact respects the status of victims as equal citizens; if it did, why would it 
remain silent about acts that undermine that status? Failing to acknowledge recent past 
wrongdoing amounts to suggesting that there are major and sensitive parts of the shared 
life of victims and the rest of society that are irrelevant to the moral. (Vaca and Espindola 
2014: 238) 
 
It is important to keep in mind that rectifying wrongs does not pertain strictly to instances 
in which victims of grave political injustices are still alive. Since, as Vaca emphasizes, “Rawls 
assumes that a liberal society is a continuum in time, his theory is still to show concern for the 
problems of interacting generations” (Vaca 2013: 316). This insight is most pronounced in 
Rawls’s rejection of time preference as a legitimate concern for “justice as fairness” because as 
he states: 
In the case of the individual [as a representative in the original position], pure time 
preference is irrational; it means that he is not viewing all moments as equally parts of 
one life. In the case of society, pure time preference is unjust: it means (in the more 
common instance when future is discounted) that the living take advantage of their 
position in time to favor their own interests (Rawls 1999: 260).  
 
While Rawls admits that the most common case is for actors in the present to prioritize 
their needs and interests over those of future generations (thus, necessitating his stipulation of a 
‘just savings’ requirement), the intergenerational nature of liberal society would also apply 
retroactively and consider the interaction of present and future generations with their ancestors. 
Rawls’s theory thus obliges concern regarding the present generation’s treatment of both its past 
ancestors and future heirs (Vaca 2013: 312-316).277 
                                                        
277 Duncan Ivison succinctly clarifies societies’ obligation to their past: “A political community 
is constituted not only by the actions of those in the present, but also by those in the past, through 
the construction and maintenance of its identity over time…[thus] when we identify with a 
nation or state we often associate ourselves with its past as much as its present, not only in terms 
of things about which we take collective pride, but also those for which we may feel a sense of 
shame or regret” (Ivison 2008: 519). Basically, the argument is that members of states have 
obligations to rectify past injustices because, if citizens presently accept the privileges of residing 
within their political community, then they must also take responsibility for the historical harms 
that have been committed by the norms, interactions, institutions, and social structures 
generating these benefits.  
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Accordingly, the problematic compatibility of traditional Rawlsian theory with 
embracing the possibility of ‘drawing a line in the sand’ and proceeding as though nothing had 
occurred to overcome grave historical wrongs clarifies the need to augment the theory with a 
principle of rectificatory justice. Consequently, Vaca and Espindola have shown that an ideal 
constructivist approach supports the conclusion that environmental transformative justice 
requires a principle of rectificatory justice -- one that can repair and reconcile the illicit 
advantages ecocidal states have received at the expense of their autarkic citizens.  
 
C. Devising a Rectificatory Principle from a Rawlsian Constructivist Approach    
 
As has been argued, a properly augmented Rawlsian constructivist account requires the 
acknowledgment of past wrongs, restoring victim’s moral status and equal social standing in 
relation to others across time. But Vaca and Espindola offer little guidance regarding how such 
ground can be gained. Fortunately, Mills offers a schema for establishing rectificatory principles 
via an augmented Rawlsian constructivist framework.  
Mills proposes that to begin the process of determining how to proceed in correcting 
legacies of injustice, we should rely on an augmented “Rawlsian apparatus that is explicitly 
modified to adjudicate matters of non-ideal theory” (Mills 2017: 215). Essentially, his approach 
dictates that we ought to include a “device of representation” to craft a “different thought-
experiment” that makes us sensitive to historical injustices and the need to “dismantle an already 
existing unjust basic structure” (Mills 2017: 212-213).  
Thus, for our purposes, we would acknowledge that we will emerge into a society whose 
basic structure tolerates environmental destruction that unjustly prioritizes some citizens’ way of 
life over others (to the extent that it actually causes social death and ends their way of life). As 
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such, the question from the “original position” becomes “What measures would you select to 
correct for these histories of environmental injustice?” while not knowing if one might be an 
autarkic citizen or ecocide refugee when the veil lifts.278    
After engaging with the thought-experiment, I propose (and hope that it seems intuitively 
plausible) that we would agree to four principles: (1) adopt sustainable environmental practices – 
so long as such practices do not violate Rawls’s traditional principles of justice; (2) respect 
multiple ecological-economic systems and cultures – so long as they do not violate (1); (3) 
acknowledge, repair, and rectify past wrongs, and (4) work to restore or construct impacted 
ecosystems and communities (restoration ought to be preferred to construction, if possible – if 
neither is possible greater emphasis must be placed on victims’ reparative compensation in [3]). 
As such, these four principles constitute the aims of environmental transformative justice.  
At present, hopefully, the intuitive logic of accepting these principles from a modified 
Rawlsian constructivist position is clear. Additionally, the next chapter aims to bolster the 
plausibility of accepting these principles by illustrating the ways in comparative approaches to 
justice reach comparable conclusions regarding how to justly respond to ecocide.279      
But before moving on to analyzing comparative approaches to justice, it is necessary to 
highlight that a virtue of the preceding investigation is that it demonstrates the ways in which a 
modified Rawlsian constructivist approach is capable of providing normative justification for all 
                                                        
278 Mills in applying his methodology to the subject of correcting legacies of white supremacy 
proposes three principles: (1) end racially unequal citizenship; (2) end racial exploitation, and (3) 
end racial disrespect (Mills 2017: 214). Interestingly, enacting environmental transformative 
justice measures will likely assist in promoting Mills’ objectives of diminishing racial 
exploitation and furthering racial equality and respect because, as we have seen in our case 
studies, autarkic communities are often inhabited by non-whites, whereas roving imperialists 
have historically been white.  
279 The differences between constructivist and comparative approaches to justice appear 
significant from a theoretical perspective, but from a substantive policy perspective they reach 
many of the same prescriptive conclusions and have much in common in critiquing the current 
status quo global order.  
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the aims of Transitional Justice. Additionally, since the harm at issue in cases of ecocide pertains 
to ecological destruction, it seems reasonable to assume that the appropriate attempts at 
reparation, rectification, and acknowledgment of past wrong ought to include environmental 
features – which will be discussed in the final section of the next chapter.  
Moreover, from a folk perspective, it is common-knowledge that environmentalists are 
often concerned with restorative projects aimed at repairing or reconstructing lost or damaged 
ecosystems. Also, from a technical theoretical standpoint, Norton in his famous theory of 
environmentally sustainable decision-making appears to recognize and endorse the importance of 
past-oriented environmental reparative measures. For instance, as he states in his canonical work 
Sustainability, “we can harm the future by failing to create and maintain a culture and a 
community respectful of its past, including both the human and the natural history of the 
common heritage” (Norton 2005: 339). Furthermore, he champions Edmund Burke’s definition 
of society as “a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are 
living, those who are dead and those to be born” (Norton 2005: 337).280 Hence, we can 
reasonably assert that since environmentalism often focuses on correcting environmental harm, 
that the discipline (broadly construed) would endorse restoring the local habitat to its pre-injury 
functioning in cases of ecocide.281  
As such, a traditional Rawlsian framework, which strictly focuses on future-oriented 
sustainability, preservation, and conservation of natural entities is inadequate from an 
environmental perspective. However, our augmented Rawlsian constructivist account is able to 
                                                        
280 Nevertheless, Norton fails to discuss past-oriented environmental values, despite these robust 
pronouncements. Thus, the work endeavors to close this apparent conceptual-gap by including an 
account of past-oriented environmental reparative measures within his adaptive ecological 
management framework.  
281 Furthermore, it must be highlighted that restoration entails autarkic communities should be 
allowed to return to their ancestral land, because their traditional subsistence practices play a 
vital role in maintaining the ecosystems’ proper functioning.   
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satisfy environmentalism’s restorative and corrective aims. As well as capture the transformative 
justice insight, that it is not enough to simply restore the status quo, instead justice requires 
repairing past harms while changing relations, structures, practices, and institutions generating 
the harm, so that it will not occur in the future, i.e., the aim of Transitional Justice.       
Unfortunately, due to the nature of the harm, functional restoration may prove 
impossible, e.g., the Anangu’s land is radioactive, the Cree’s land is inundated, and Wayúu land 
is mined out.282 Nevertheless, the present point is simply to highlight that environmentalism 
(broadly construed) likely supports the need for restorative or reconstructive practices in cases of 
ecocide; and that, fortunately, an augmented Rawlsian constructivist approach (comparable to 
the one offered by Mills) can justify these sorts of past-oriented environmental measures.     
Thus, we have demonstrated that an augmented Rawlsian constructivist approach can 
justify the aims of both Transitional Justice and environmentalism and have ascertained 
reasonable parameters regarding the aims of environmental transformative justice. But a litany of 
problems still lingers.  
First and foremost, our analysis offers little guidance in determining how to proceed to 
combat the injustice of ecocide in the actual world. Even after establishing the above ideals, we 
still face application issues. For instance, how should the competing reparative (past-oriented 3 
and 4) and reconciliatory (future-oriented 1 and 2) principles of environmental transformative 
justice be prioritized? Or why should a society with limited resources (all societies thus far) 
                                                        
282 As Wissenburg explains, “[environmentalism] demand[s] that an object should not be 
destroyed unless unavoidable, that if it must be destroyed it should be replaced by an identical 
object, that if this is impossible an equivalent object should be made available, and that if the last 
is also impossible, a proper compensation should be provided” (Wissenburg 1999: 193). Thus, 
from an environmental justice perspective, there remain two non-ideal potential options: (1) 
reconstructing the ecosystem in a comparable location and granting it to the impacted 
community or (2) attempting to provide comparable compensation. However, as will be 
discussed, both of these options are flawed.  
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divert funds towards restoring a destroyed ecosystem, when there are other pressing societal 
concerns?283 Or why should a society respect traditional land uses that are less efficient, when 
modern technological practices could increase resource aggregation to assist those in need?   
Most simply, the issue is whether theorists and practitioners can provide guidance to 
communities regarding how to balance the diverse requirements of environmental transformative 
justice when the plurality of aims and ends come in conflict with each other or other social 
values. Fortunately, the comparative approach of articulating, legitimating, and applying 
conceptions of justice offers a robust method of social evaluation based on examining 
the actual world and asking how it can be made more just, by observing what lives are like and 
what people are capable of achieving, by making comparisons between persons and groups. The 
next chapter will thus seek to develop guidelines for how to implement environmental 
transformative justice after ecocide, by relying heavily on insights from Amartya Sen and Martha 
Nussbaum’s innovative capabilities-based theorization of comparative justice.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
283 For one, such a decision may require massive resource allocation to even begin approaching 
the ecosystem’s prior functioning and any attempt to substantively repair victims’ habitat might 
require such drastic resource apportionment that it would begin undermining the availability of 
primary goods to other deprived demographics. Jeremy Waldron eloquently highlighted this 
concern: “The present circumstances are the ones that are real: it is in the actual world that 
people starve or are hurt or degraded if the demands of justice in relation to their circumstance 
are not met. Justice, as we say, is a matter of the greatest importance. But, the importance to be 
accorded it is relative to what may actually happen if justice is not done, not what might have 
happened if the injustice of the past had been avoided” (Waldron 1992: 27).  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
How Should We Respond to Ecocide? Using a Comparative Approach to Overcome the Injustice 
of Ecocide  
 
I. Introduction to Comparative Approaches to Justice   
 
The comparative approach eschews constructivists’ transcendental attempt at determining 
an ideally just society. As Amartya Sen explains, “justice-enhancing changes or reforms demand 
comparative assessments, not simply an immaculate identification of ‘the just society’” (Sen 
2009: 401). The reason for this, as Sen argues, is that even a fully-articulated description of an 
ideally just society would still be unable to offer guidance regarding how to make comparative 
assessments necessary for real-world policy making.  
To illustrate this point, Sen uses an example from art and explains that, in arguing for the 
aesthetic superiority of Van Gogh over Picasso, it is superfluous to identify the most perfect 
painting in the world in that, “there would be something deeply odd in a general belief that a 
comparison of any two alternatives cannot be sensibly made without a prior identification of a 
supreme alternative” (Sen 2009: 101-102). Hence Sen, generalizing from the aesthetic example, 
maintains that it is neither necessary nor sufficient to have a transcendental ideal for making 
comparative judgments.284 In fact he maintains that “there is no analytical connection there at 
all” (Sen 102: 2009).  
                                                        
284 Sen’s longer explanation regarding the insufficiency of pursuing an ideal account of justice is 
that there are various incongruent elements involved in evaluating distance between diversions 
from an ideal: “(1) disparate domains of imperfection, (2) distinct dimensionalities of 
transgressions and (3) diverse ways of weighing different infractions. The identification of 
transcendence, which is what a transcendental theory does, would not yield any means of 
addressing these problems to arrive at a relational ranking of departures from transcendence” 
(Sen 2009b: 50). 
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We have seen in our own analysis that idealized constructivist principles fall short in their 
ability to offer guidance regarding how to balance and select between a plurality of competing 
concerns that arise when confronting real world transgressions of the ideal. For instance, the last 
section of the preceding chapter was unable to answer if post-ecocide states in the process of 
transitioning from their unjust past should prioritize restoring impacted ecosystems or adopt 
sustainable practices in order to prevent comparable harm from occurring in the future?285  
 The comparative approach is helpful in that instead of attempting to illustrate an ideally 
just society, it focuses on the evaluative space and practical reasoning underlying the decision 
process of combatting injustice. In this way, the view embraces “imperfect,” “partial,” and 
“limited agreements” for addressing injustice and improving the lives of those in need (Sen 
2009). As will be demonstrated, the benefit of such an approach is that it can readily provide 
immediate guidance on how to proceed when confronting pressing and difficult situations (i.e., 
when actual claimants are competing over limited resources in less than ideal settings), in ways 
that appealing to a distant, theoretical, and potentially unrealizable ideal cannot.          
Thus, to examine how the comparative approach can be applied to overcoming injustice 
in our cases of ecocide, we will first explore Sen’s work Idea of Justice because it is the most 
complete and developed articulation of the approach. Afterwards, we will explore Martha 
Nussbaum’s formulation of the capabilities approach because it offers helpful clarification and 
highlights definitive aspects of wellbeing that seem pertinent for effectively responding to 
ecocide. The hope is that both perspectives can play a complimentary role (i.e., each approach’s 
particular weaknesses, deficiencies, and limitations can be assuaged by relying on the strengths 
                                                        
285 For a vivid example illustrating the inescapable plurality of competing justice concerns, see 
Sen’s “Three Children and a Flute” (Sen 2009: 12-15).  
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and insight of the other) in our attempt at determining how to implement environmental 
transformative justice after ecocide.  
 
A. Sen’s Comparative Approach  
 
Sen’s career as an economist, decision theorist, and political philosopher has consistently 
focused on the plight of the poor, impoverished, and downtrodden, especially those residing in 
developing nations that have limited access to resources necessary for sustaining minimally 
decent lives. Accordingly, he is interested in conceptualizing deprivation as a form of injustice 
and is motivated to develop frameworks for guiding humanitarian aid and intervention assisting 
those in need.   
In order to further these aims, Sen argues that normative sociopolitical theorizing should 
begin from an Aristotelian perspective, which asks, “What is required for human flourishing?” 
(Sen 2009: 253-254). He contends that answering this question will help in developing effective 
guidelines for evaluating ‘quality of life’ and determining individual and group needs. In this 
light, he maintains that the greatest shortcoming of the Rawlsian approach is that exclusively 
focusing on institutional fairness impairs the theory’s ability to consider individual or group 
‘well-being’ directly.286 Essentially, Sen argues Rawls was concerned with designing a society 
                                                        
286 Sen argues that Rawls’ approach is unable to adequately respect inter-individual differences 
because it fails to take into account the wide variation in actors’ ability to convert primary goods 
into well-being. For instance, he offers the example of disabled persons or pregnant women to 
justify the need to move away from focusing on the distribution of primary goods, to instead 
assessing freedom and capability directly: “[A] disabled person can do far less with the same 
level of income and other primary goods than can an able-bodied human being. A pregnant 
woman needs, among other things, more nutritional support than another person who is not 
bearing a child” (Sen 2009: 66). Ingrid Robeyns insightfully explains that there are three factors 
influencing conversion rates (i.e., the relation between ‘a good’ and achieving a certain ‘being or 
doing’) of at any given moment: “First, personal conversion factors (e.g. metabolism, physical 
condition, sex, reading skills, intelligence) influence how a person can convert the characteristics 
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that would promote the means of satisfactory living, but neglected to consider the pressing issue 
of achieving the end goal of ‘good living’ itself (Sen 2009: 254).287    
Hence, Sen believes that those concerned with reducing injustice should focus on very 
specific aspects of the lives of persons and communities as the relevant metrics for analyzing the 
success or failure of policy decisions. Thus because of the problems of transcendental theorizing 
mentioned above, Sen argues that combatting injustice is better served by utilizing realization-
focused comparative reasoning found in economics and social choice theory over the 
arrangement-focused contractarian reasoning that has dominated political philosophy since 
Hobbes (Sen 2009: 8).288   
Basically, the comparative approach maintains that the best method for figuring out what 
justice requires in a given situation is to focus on actors’ ranked-preferences as a means of 
reaching consensus regarding which outcomes are preferable. But, obviously, strictly focusing on 
preferences (i.e., actors’ subjective utility/satisfaction)  could lead to greater injustice, as actors 
                                                        
of the commodity into a functioning. If a person is disabled, or in a bad physical condition, or 
has never learned to cycle, then the bicycle will be of limited help to enable the functioning of 
mobility. Second, social conversion factors (e.g. public policies, social norms, discriminating 
practices, gender roles, societal hierarchies, power relations) and, third, environmental 
conversion factors (e.g. climate, geographical location) play a role in the conversion from 
characteristics of the good to the individual functioning” (Robeyns 2005: 99).   
287 Sen relates this distinction to two conceptualizations of justice found in classical Indian 
jurisprudence -- niti and nyaya. “The former idea, that of niti, relates to organizational propriety 
as well as behavioral correctness, whereas the latter, nyaya, is concerned with what emerges and 
how, and in particular the lives that people are actually able to lead” (Sen 2009: xv).  
288 Sen explains that both lines of reasoning were developed in the Enlightenment: “One 
approach concentrated on identifying perfectly just social arrangements and took the 
characterization of ‘just institutions’ to be the principal – and often the only identified – task of 
the theory of justice. Woven in different ways around the idea of a hypothetical ‘social contract’, 
major contributions were made in this line of thinking by Thomas Hobbes in the seventeenth 
century, and later by John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant, among 
others…[While] a number of other Enlightenment philosophers (Smith, Condorcet, 
Wollstonecraft, Bentham, Marx, John Stuart Mill, for example) took a variety of approaches that 
shared a common interest in making comparisons between different ways in which people’s lives 
may be led, influenced by institutions but also by people’s actual behavior, social interactions 
and other significant determinants” (Sen 2009: xvi).  
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are likely to promote their biased interests or make imprudent assessments because they have 
internalized and been influenced by corrupting ideologies.289 As Nussbaum states, in applauding 
Sen’s contribution to exposing inequalities based on sex: “But utility, Sen argues, is inadequate 
to capture the heterogeneity and noncommensurability of the diverse aspects of development. 
Because it fails to take account of the fact of adaptive preferences, it also biases the development 
process in favor of the status quo, when used as a normative benchmark” (Nussbaum 2003: 
34).290   
Hence, to overcome these difficulties, the decision-making process must be imbued with 
impartiality. For instance, Rawls relied on the original position, to eliminate information that 
might bias implicated stakeholders in their deliberation. But the comparative approach offers a 
different method for achieving impartiality by focusing on maximally informing (with the 
relevant available information) impartial spectators (i.e., actors having no stake in the outcome, 
unlike social contract theorists’ implicated stakeholders), instead of decreasing the informational 
access of invested parties. As James Konow explains:  
The impartial spectator…is not denied any information…Indeed, the spectator is 
encouraged to acquire all information that might be relevant to reaching moral decisions, 
including possibly from his own experiences and circumstances. Impartiality in this 
model is achieved by considering only evaluations of individuals who have no stake in 
the situation they are judging. (Konow 2009: 105)291  
                                                        
289 As Milton Friedman opined: “There is no objective standard of ‘fairness.’ ‘Fairness’ is strictly 
in the eye of the beholder… To a producer or seller, a ‘fair’ price is a high price. To the buyer or 
consumer, a ‘fair’ price is a low price. How is the conflict to be adjudicated?” (Friedman 1977 
290 Robeyns similarly endorses Sen’s methodological contribution to unveiling inequalities based 
on sex. She explains his insight thusly: “Sen argues against a utility-based evaluation of 
individual well-being because such an evaluation might hide important dimensions and lead to 
misleading interpersonal or intertemporal comparisons. A person may be in a desperate situation 
and still be contented with life if she has never known differently. A utilitarian evaluation will 
only assess her satisfaction and will not differentiate between a happy, healthy, well-sheltered 
person, and an equally happy, but unhealthy and badly sheltered person who has mentally 
adapted to her situation” (Robeyns 2003: 63).  
291 See Konow’s research empirically testing and confirming the viability of the informed 
impartial spectator as a means of eliciting moral consensus and agreement during distributive 
decision-making (Konow 2009).   
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The existence of truly impartial spectator(s) is a conceptual fiction that is realistically 
impossible to actualize because even the most materially indifferent and causally far removed 
spectator may nevertheless take an interest in a matter or feel invested in an outcome. As Konow 
elucidates: “For example, spectators with no material claim might still interject their interests 
into a situation by vicarious identification with the one stakeholder or the others. Even if self-
interest plays no real or imagined role, spectator judgments can be biased by biased information 
or biased experiences that impact processing of even complete information” (Konow 2009: 106).  
Sen acknowledges that a truly impartial spectator is a conceptual fiction. He nonetheless 
argues that the heuristic device offers insights that the idealized contractarian line of reasoning is 
unable to accommodate. First, he claims it is “better at dealing with comparative assessment and 
not merely identifying a transcendental solution” (Sen 2009: 70). In this way the comparative 
approach is able to offer guidance on the actual choices on offer, instead of remaining, 
“engrossed in an imagined and implausible world of unbeatable magnificence” or paralyzed by 
the “inescapable plurality” of competing justice concerns (Sen 2009: 106).  
Furthermore, such an approach is able to take “note of social realizations and not only the 
demands of institutions and rules” (Sen 2009: 70). In part, this methodological advantage stems 
from the fact that by invoking the ‘impartial spectator’ the comparative approach is able to 
consider a diverse set of “distant voices” guided by various types of reasoning and normative 
understandings capable of transcending a particular society’s institutional norms (Sen 2009: 108-
109).  
As Sen explains, the use of the ‘impartial spectator’ helps the comparative approach 
“avoid parochialism and local perspectives” dominated by the status quo acceptance of resident 
rules and regulations (Sen 2009 108-109). Thus, the thought-experiment of the ‘impartial 
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spectator’ assists policy makers in opening unforeseen avenues of social improvement by 
escaping the indoctrinating effect of en vogue modes of reasoning: 
[O]nce the principles [institutions and rules] are formulated in unconstrained terms, 
covering inter alia a great many cases other than those that motivated our interest in those 
principles, we can run into difficulties that were not foreseen earlier, when we signed up, 
as it were, on the dotted line. We then have to decide what has to give and why. Some 
may find social choice theory to be too permissive and indecisive…but the alternative, 
well illustrated by mainstream theories of justice…of inflexible insistence on exacting 
and highly demanding rules does not give the idea of justice its due. (Sen 2009: 207)  
 
 Additionally, the use of the ‘impartial spectator’ enables the comparative approach to 
permit “incompleteness in social assessment,” while still providing “guidance in important 
problems of social justice, including the urgency of removing manifest cases of injustice” (Sen 
2009: 70). Essentially, by focusing on preferences on a case-by-case basis, the comparative 
approach is able to buildup priority rankings outlining how best to combat injustice, while 
remaining tentative and acknowledging that new information and further examination could 
result in favoring different decisions (Sen 2009: 107).    
Thus, because the comparative approach eschews determining what constitutes ideal 
justice and instead focuses on changing the world based on assessing how lives are really like, 
the method allows practitioners and theorists to advance justice directly by fighting existing 
oppression “like slavery, or the subjugation of women…or protest against systematic medical 
neglect…or repudiate the permissibility of torture…or reject the quiet tolerance of chronic 
hunger” (Sen 2009: xii). Accordingly, Sen’s analysis (i.e., comparing how individual and groups 
are actually fairing) commences in full view of the kinds of challenging circumstances (e.g., our 
paradigm cases of ecocide) that Rawls would have excluded from his ideal theorizing.  
Nonetheless, at this point, one might ask, what exactly does it mean to compare well-
being? How is an impartial spectator (or we for that matter) supposed to evaluate the quality of a 
human life? Fortunately, in order to answer these questions, Sen has developed a framework for 
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making interpersonal and intergroup comparisons, by relying on tracking potential and actual life 
achievements. This has been dubbed the capabilities approach. 
Sen relies on a fourfold classification schema based on two distinctions for assessing 
human advantage. First, he considers the promotion of individual well-being (i.e., objective 
flourishing) as distinct from the pursuit of individual agency goals (i.e., any subjective end the 
agent is interested in achieving even if it is detrimental or has nothing to do with improving their 
objective well-being).292 Second, he considers achievement as distinct from the freedom to 
achieve. Thus, as Sen explains, “the two distinctions together yield four different categories of 
advantage, related to a person: (1) ‘well-being achievement’, (2) ‘agency achievement’, (3) 
‘well-being freedom’, and (4) ‘agency freedom’” (Sen 2003: 35 and 2009: 287).  
Essentially, Sen is endorsing the view that policy-makers should rely on evidence 
gathered by comparing various segments of the population along these four categories of 
advantage to inform social decision-making. He believes the benefit of such a realization-
focused approach is that it provides actual information regarding the feasibility of achieving 
alternative social arrangements, in that if certain groups have greater functionings or capabilities, 
then it seems within the realm of possibility that comparable social benefits could be achieved by 
                                                        
292 A vivid example Sen uses to illustrate the difference between the ‘agency goal versus well-
being distinction’ is an individual on a hunger strike, who promotes their agency goals (e.g., 
Gandhi fighting for Indian independence) at a great personal sacrifice to their well-being (e.g., 
their health and nourishment) (Sen 2009: 287-290). In this instance, the actor weighs their 
agency goals more highly than their personal welfare. Hence, because of these sorts of cases, Sen 
recognizes the need to avoid viewing well-being as always more important than personal agency. 
Nevertheless, he also recognizes that sometimes agency goals should not take priority over 
welfare concerns, in that in some cases the state has a valid interest in promoting well-being over 
allowing individuals to engage in objectively harmful, reckless, or negligent activities (e.g., 
cannibalism, drunk driving, vaccinating children, etc.). Essentially, Sen’s distinction between 
agency goals and well-being is an attempt to bridge a core tension in liberalism that of balancing 
the public interest in collective welfare versus the private interest in self-development. In other 
words, the distinction seeks to offer societies insight regarding how to adjudicate the contentious 
border of the public-private divide, i.e., between promoting collective well-being versus 
individual self-creation (Rodeiro 2018).        
 246 
less fortunate segments of society. Sen argues such informational benefits are unavailable to 
constructivist approaches (i.e., those focused on identifying the structure of a fully just society) 
because even if such a transcendental determination was successful, it would not entail that the 
demands of an idealized society could necessarily be realized (Sen 2009: 105).  
Moreover, a related reason that Sen defends the realization-based informational focus of 
the comparative approach over the transcendental focus of constructivism, is that it readily 
allows social theorists to track the advancement or retreat of (in)justice by referring to alterations 
in groups’ functionings and capabilities over time (Sen 2009: 8). In other words, Sen argues that 
constructivism is unable to offer reliable guidance regarding whether a policy is advancing 
justice if it falls short of the ideal.  
Accordingly, Sen maintains that the comparative approach’s attention to actual 
functionings and capabilities between various segments of the society is vital for discerning how 
to feasibly advance justice in non-ideal situations, i.e., the actual world. But before we can begin 
applying his schema in order to evaluate the comparative disadvantages caused by ecocide, it 
will be helpful to clarify two key concepts in the capabilities approach: functionings and 
capabilities.    
 
1. Functionings  
 
“Well-being achievement” and “agency achievement” are both functionings. According 
to Sen, “functionings” are the most basic notion in the capabilities approach, “represent[ing] 
parts of the state of a person–in particular the various things that he or she manages to do or be in 
leading a life” (Sen 1993: 31). The ‘doings or beings’ he includes as functional achievements are 
rather broad in that they include basic necessities, like having adequate access to food, water, and 
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shelter; to extremely multifaceted types of success, such as receiving social recognition and 
developing a sense of self-worth (Sen 1993: 31).  
Essentially, functionings include valued achievements. Therefore, it is obvious that the 
relative weight of the value of a functioning is both subjectively and culturally relative. 
Nonetheless, Sen holds that some functionings are “more basic” than others, insofar as they are 
shared widely, both individually and cross-culturally because they play such a central role in 
human life; and as such, a just society requires bringing these “crucially important functionings 
up to a certain minimally adequate level” (Sen 1993: 41).  
Hence, he seems to assume that depriving actors of attaining these “crucially important” 
functionings constitutes a grave injustice, which requires amelioration. Nevertheless, Sen has 
remained vague and avoided specifying what these “most basic” functionings are and instead 
defended the view that such evaluations ought to occur via democratic processes of general 
social discussion and public reasoning (Sen 2005: 158). As Robeyns explains: “One important 
aspect of Sen’s capability approach is its underspecified character. The capability approach is a 
framework of thought, a normative tool, but it is not a fully specified theory that gives us 
complete answers to all our normative questions. It is not a mathematical algorithm that 
prescribes how to measure inequality or poverty” (Robeyns 2003: 64).  
The reason why Sen’s interpretation of the capabilities approach is underdetermined is 
that he embraces social choice theory’s perspective that each decision is context specific and 
requires actors involved to engage in their own comparative assessment. He embraces this 
method over philosophy’s tendency towards universal absolutism, which seeks to establish a 
‘one-size-fits-all’ standard applicable in all cases. Sen holds this view essentially due to his 
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desire to promote agency, which entails taking actors seriously and affording them the 
opportunity to participate and be involved in the evaluative process.293  
The pros and cons of Sen’s underdetermined approach will be explored when we 
compare it to Nussbaum’s more definitive interpretation, which endorses a specific list of 
capabilities that must each be satisfied to a threshold-level or else the society under consideration 
will “[fall] short of being a fully just society, whatever its levels of opulence” (Nussbaum 2006: 
75). But before moving on to this analysis, it is necessary to specify what constitutes a 
capability.  
 
2. Capabilities  
 
According to Sen “capabilities” are the “alternative combinations of beings and doings 
[i.e., functionings] the person can achieve” (Sen 1993: 29 and 37). Thus, “well-being freedom” 
and “agency freedom” express an actor’s capabilities because, in conjunction, they list all of the 
functionings (sometimes called “functioning vectors”) a person can potentially achieve (e.g., 
good health, an exciting career, a loving family, a fulfilling social life, etc.).  
As such, a “capabilities set” captures the full permutation of opportunity and potential 
(but not actual, achievement) that an actor has in their life. Each capability set includes an 
extensive number of functionings (i.e., what the actor actually achieves), but it is through 
                                                        
293 Also, he is wary that the act of proffering a list, will itself distort public reasoning and bias 
social decision-making. As he states, “It also points to the absurdity of the argument that is 
sometimes presented, which claims that the capability approach would be usable – and 
‘operational’ – only if it comes with a set of ‘given’ weights on the distinct functionings in some 
fixed list of relevant capabilities. The search for given, pre-determined weights is not only 
conceptually ungrounded, but it also overlooks the fact that the valuations and weights to be used 
may reasonably be influenced by our own continued scrutiny and by the reach of public 
discussion” (Sen 2009: 242).  
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evaluating an actor’s available capability set that we make determinations about their freedom. 
Since even if the actor chooses not to pursue a capability, having the potential to pursue it 
indicates freedom, which should be valued. As Sen rhetorically remarks, “if freedom had only 
instrumental importance for a person’s well-being, and choice had no intrinsic relevance, then 
this [i.e., functionings themselves] could indeed be the appropriate informational focus for the 
analysis of capability” (Sen 2009: 236).  
Hence, according to Sen, even though functionings are important, capability sets are the 
site of policy concern in the capabilities approach. The justification for this stems from the fact 
that public policy is effectively unable and normatively should not dictate exactly what people 
will actually choose to do in their lives (i.e., because freedom is valuable in-and-of-itself). Public 
policy should nonetheless try to ensure that the options available are plentiful, abundant, and 
allow actors to lead lives worthy of making choices according to their subjective values. As Sen 
explains:  
 
There is also a policy-related question that makes the distinction between capabilities and 
achievements important for a different reason…In considering the respective advantages 
of responsible adults, it may be appropriate to think that the claims of individuals on the 
society may be best seen in terms of freedom to achieve (given by the set of real 
opportunities) rather than actual achievements. For example, the importance of having 
some kind of a guarantee of basic healthcare is primarily concerned with giving people 
the capability to enhance their state of health. If a person has the opportunity for socially 
supported healthcare but still decides, with full knowledge, not to make use of that 
opportunity, then it could be argued that the deprivation is not as much of a burning 
social concern as would be the failure to provide the person with the opportunity for 
healthcare. (Sen 2009: 238) 
   
Essentially, the above quote explicates that policy-makers should be less focused on 
individuals actualizing certain opportunities and more concerned with ensuring that individuals 
have a litany of worthwhile opportunities to choose from. Accordingly, Sen is emphasizing that 
the range of choices must include multiple appealing options for a decision to be considered free, 
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i.e., freedom requires that the options under consideration are actually choice-worthy.294 If 
someone is presented with only a single viable option and a number of objectionable ones, the 
opportunity aspect of freedom is violated insofar as the actor’s deliberation in choosing a course 
of action is restricted. For instance, if we look at the choice facing the Anangu of either risking 
their health and lives to return to their still radioactive ancestral land or abandon their traditional 
home to avoid radiation poisoning, we can clearly see that an actor facing this predicament is 
unable to make a truly free choice, because neither option is appealing.  
However, the problem with focusing on capabilities is that as unrealized potentialities, 
capabilities cannot be observed directly. Hence, since only human behavior can be observed 
directly, individuals or groups’ capability sets must be supposed and indirectly assessed through 
their functionings and a multitude of inferences from the social sciences and common-sense 
reasoning.     
As such, Sen relies on the relationship between achievement (functionings) and freedom 
(capabilities) to assess and improve overall quality of life for persons and groups. With this 
conceptual clarification complete, we will now proceed in applying Sen’s evaluative schema to 
the harm of ecocide. 
 
B. Applying Sen’s Comparative Approach to Evaluating the Harm of Ecocide  
 
 As previously discussed, Sen relies on four broad criteria for exploring how actors and 
groups are faring. Hence, to evaluate the harm of ecocide, we must explore how it hinders 
individuals and groups’ (1) well-being achievement, (2) agency achievement, (3) well-being 
                                                        
294 Sen’s assertion, that a truly free decision requires the decider having a range of worthy 
options, mirrors Daniel Dennett’s discussion of “elbow room,” which we applied in the last 
chapter to the topic of delineating responsibility. 
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freedom, and (4) agency freedom. Once again, the goal of this analysis is to illustrate how the 
comparative approach can offer guidance regarding how to reconcile and repair the harm of 
ecocide.   
 
1. Ecocide’s Hindrance to Well-Being Achievement  
 
Surveying our case studies should make it abundantly clear that ecocide undermines 
autarkic communities’ well-being achievement (i.e., the ability to act and to be in an objective 
state of flourishing). For instance, as we have recounted at length, autarkic actors in ecocidal 
situations suffer mental trauma (e.g., post-traumatic stress, depression, addiction, etc.), physical 
deprivation (e.g., lack of adequate food, water, and shelter), cultural loss, and even death 
resulting from the environmental destruction. And while it is true that the specific goals valued 
by an actor or community are relative, the above injuries uncontrovertibly challenge human well-
being.295  
As such, focusing on the reduced well-being achievements of post-ecocide communities 
illustrates the degraded and undesirable conditions in which these actors have been placed and 
underscores what must improve in order to afford these actors the prospects of a good human 
life. Hence, comparing autarkic communities’ well-being achievement before and after ecocide 
assists in ascertaining the extent of harm suffered and establishing reasonable baselines for 
pursuing corrective justice, i.e., returning impacted actors to their pre-injury level of objective 
functioning. Furthermore, comparing impacted citizens well-being achievement to other 
                                                        
295 In order to determine whether a particular achievement rises to the level of an “important 
functioning” (i.e., one that if absent challenges actors’ prospects of well-being), depends on 
empirical research and ‘common sense’ reasoning confirming that the achievement is one with 
widespread cross-cultural and intersubjective appeal.  
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segments of the population offers a method for adjudicating how best to prioritize competing 
distributive justice claims.296  
 
2. Ecocide’s Hindrance to Well-Being Freedom  
 
Ecocide does not only undermine well-being achievement, it also limits the range of 
options available to actors and communities to achieve well-being. For instance, imagine two 
actors from autarkic communities that both leave their ancestral home. Actor A made the 
decision to depart to pursue the prospects of greater economic opportunity in a more profitable 
area of the country (i.e., Actor A is a migrant). Whereas, Actor B was forced abandon their home 
because environmental destruction made continued subsistence in the region impossible (i.e., 
Actor B is an ecocide refugee).   
In terms of achievement both actors are equally situated having left their ancestral home 
– and we can stipulate that each is adapting approximately as well as the other in their new life. 
In such a scenario, the actor’s respective well-being achievement is the same.  
In terms of freedom, however, there does seem to be a palpable difference between the 
two. Case in point, Actor A (the migrant) still has the opportunity to return home and continue 
their traditional way of life. Accordingly, such a decision remains an option in the migratory 
                                                        
296 It is important, however, to highlight that these sorts of comparisons are not attempting to 
compile a complete ranking, but instead are designed to establish minimal thresholds of well-
being, which, if not met, constitute patent injustices deserving of correction. For instance, if we 
look at two impacted communities regarding important functionings (e.g., access to clean air and 
water) and discern that one community is significantly worse off than the other, this does not 
entail that the community with better conditions is unworthy of assistance. Minimal standards 
help in creating helpful boundaries for justifying intervention and determining need, while 
allowing practitioners and policy makers to recognize that there may frequently be individuals 
and groups worse off than the one under consideration; and yet, such findings do not diminish 
the normative importance of assisting both communities, if each fall below agreed upon 
threshold(s).  
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actor’s capability set. Whereas, for Actor B (the ecocide refugee) the choice to pursue their 
traditional way of life is foreclosed, which likely affects their well-being (e.g., increase stress, 
sadness, anxiety, and depression) and freedom (i.e., less range of options to choose from). 
Hence, the actor’s respective well-being freedom is unequal, in that Actor A has the option of 
satisfying their basic needs (i.e., meeting their well-being achievement) in ways unavailable to 
Actor B – which remains true, even if Actor A never considers or acts upon the capability.  
We can thus see how ecocide undermines actors and communities’ well-being freedom, 
in that it limits the range of meaningful capabilities available for them to exercise. Such being 
the case, post-ecocide states must aim to preserve and reestablish a wide array of reasonable 
options for achieving welfare, i.e., enact policies that allow a maximally diverse set of citizens 
and communities to decide how to subsist, flourish, and prosper.  
Accordingly, for the sake of expanding well-being freedom, it is important that states 
pursing environmental transformative justice carefully consider and avoid enacting reparative or 
reconciliatory measures that foreclose viable pathways for aggrieved citizens, and society more 
generally, in choosing how to meet their welfare needs. For instance, policies that indefinitely 
allocate resources to impacted communities for meeting their basic needs may be problematic 
from a well-being freedom perspective, in that such one-dimensional measures could diminish 
opportunities for the recipients to (re)achieve self-sufficiency, by creating a situation in which 
their well-being achievement becomes exclusively dependent on the state’s allowance, instead of 
fostering exploration and development of their own autonomous subsistence practices. It is vital 
for post-ecocide states to recognize that environmental transformative justice not only concern 
itself with improving citizens and communities’ actual welfare after ecocide (e.g., if they have 
adequate food, shelter, water, work, health, education, relationships, etc.), but also consider the 
range of opportunities available for satisfying basic needs.       
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3. Ecocide’s Hinderance to Agency Achievement 
 
Agency achievement involves actors actually satisfying their subjective ends – the 
“beings and doings” actors judge as valuable for their self-development and actualization, 
independent of their role in contributing to more objective aspects of human welfare. Obviously, 
ecocide directly undermines autarkic citizens’ ability to achieve their aims and express their 
values. For instance, our paradigm cases of ecocide involve destruction of sacred sites or entities 
(e.g., spirit animals and totem species) which autarkic citizens hold in reverence. These sacred 
sites or entities may hold little value to outside observers, and it might be the case that they 
provide no resources capable of satiating basic material or cross-culturally accepted needs; 
nevertheless, they may still hold great subjective value to certain citizens, in that their destruction 
may diminish these individuals’ ability to develop into the type of people they desire to be. 
Clearly, a life where agency achievement is impeded is significantly impoverished. But 
since agency achievements are subjective, it is difficult for states to know how to promote them. 
For this reason, it is paramount that states avoid interfering in people’s lives without their 
consent, so as to avoid taking action that may undermine the conditions for their agency 
achievement – which sadly was a recommendation ignored in our paradigm cases of ecocide.297  
Hence, to avoid limitations of agency achievement, states must allow potentially affected 
parties to participate in decision-making processes and endow them with the power to influence 
policy.298 For instance, it seems reasonable to speculate that ecocide would have been less likely 
                                                        
297 For our purposes, a useful guiding principle would be mandating, that if the potentially 
impacted community does not voluntarily consent, then the state must reconsider engaging in or 
allowing environmentally destructive activity.  
298 Essentially, Sen is incorporating a view defended by deliberative democratic theorists (e.g., 
Joshua Cohen and Jurgen Habermas), that stakeholders need the opportunity to be involved in 
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in our paradigm cases, if states had pursued a public decision-making process that offered 
members of potentially impacted autarkic communities a substantive chance to voice their views 
and contribute to shaping policy. Protecting agency achievement thus requires that the pursuit of 
environmental transformative justice rely on inclusive reparative and reconciliatory measures, as 
both an end (in-and-of-itself) and as a means of fostering extensive participation and equitable 
distribution of power to all the parties involved.      
 
4. Ecocide’s Hinderance to Agency Freedom  
 
Agency freedom entails actors having a wide range of options available to them 
regarding what to value in their lives. As demonstrated, ecocide undermines this because it 
destroys distinct ways of life. Each time a community or culture dies an entire way of being (i.e., 
the hopes, dreams, values of a people) is lost with it. Hence, all instances of ecocide that satisfy 
our criteria entail diminishment of a society’s collective agency freedom; since, in each case, 
members of the impacted autarkic community have undoubtedly been deprived of pursuing many 
of their subjective desires (e.g., communing with the same habitat as their ancestors, building 
reciprocal relationships with the local flora and fauna, and teaching their practices to future 
generations).  
                                                        
open discussions aimed at voicing/hearing concerns and engendering widespread consent. As 
Cohen succinctly explains: “The deliberative conception of democracy is organized around an 
ideal of political justification. According to this ideal, to justify the exercise of collective 
political power is to proceed on the basis of a free public reasoning among equals. A deliberative 
democracy institutionalizes this ideal. Not simply a form of politics, democracy, on the 
deliberative view, is a framework of social and institutional conditions that facilitates free 
discussion among equal citizens—by providing favorable conditions for participation, 
association, and expression—and ties the authorization to exercise public power (and the 
exercise itself) to such discussion—by establishing a framework ensuring the responsiveness and 
accountability of political power to it” (Cohen 1997: 412-413).   
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  It is thus imperative that post-ecocide states in their quest for environmental 
transformative justice strive to prevent further social death. But they must also work towards 
increasing awareness and memorialize what has already been lost, since, without preservative 
measures, alternative modes of being will disappear forever. Accordingly, steps taken to promote 
cultural preservation, awareness raising, and memorialization must aim to inspire present and 
future generations to believe that there are a multitude of environmentally friendly modes of 
being which they may pursue as a means of finding meaning in their lives. 
If an actor’s dreams, hopes, goals, desires, and aspirations are unactionable, then they 
cannot be said to be part of their capability set; and thus, are not included as part of their agency 
freedom. Expanding agency freedom therefore requires that the actors be afforded practicable 
education opportunities and adequate resources: at least enough so that enacting and developing 
environmentally friendly practices, institutions, and modes of being is actually feasible.  
Due to the lack of environmentally friendly practices in mainstream contemporary 
society, one can reasonably argue that effectively pursuing environmental transformative justice 
requires post-ecocide states to consider far ranging policy proposals designed to push social 
boundaries and transcend the established status quo in their attempts to maintain and expand 
agency freedom. The extent of social transformation required will be discussed in the remainder 
of the chapter. For now, it will be helpful to analyze Nussbaum’s interpretation of the 
capabilities approach, because much of the proceeding discussion of Sen’s work has been rather 
vague in offering concrete policy objectives that specify ways the comparative approach can 
guide the pursuit of environmental transformative justice. 
 
II. Nussbaum’s Interpretation of the Capabilities Approach   
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As previously discussed, Sen delineates the relevant categories of importance for 
comparing individuals’ and groups’ quality of a life as: their well-being, agency, freedom, and 
achievement. Nussbaum agrees with Sen regarding the significance of these four factors but 
asserts the need to adopt a more definitive list.  
 
A. Nussbaum’s Disagreement with Sen  
 
She identifies a weakness of Sen’s approach, claiming that without a definitive list of 
capabilities, the framework will be unable to assist practitioners and theorists in answering a key 
question: “Is a society minimally just?” (Nussbaum 2011: 193).299 She maintains that to answer 
the question of determining threshold levels of justice requires a definitive list of basic human 
capabilities. Thus, without such a list, it is impossible for Sen’s theory to specify what conditions 
or states of affairs are patently (un)just. In other words, Nussbaum argues that if Sen’s approach 
is going to be able to substantively guide social policy, then it requires endorsing a particular list 
of capabilities:  
Either a society has a conception of basic justice or it does not. If it has one, we have to 
know what its content is, and what opportunities and liberties it takes to be fundamental 
entitlements of all citizens. One cannot have a conception of social justice that says, 
simply, ‘All citizens are entitled to freedom understood as capability.’ Besides being 
wrong and misleading in the ways I have already argued, such a blanket endorsement of 
freedom/ capability as goal would be hopelessly vague. It would be impossible to say 
whether the society in question was just or unjust. (Nussbaum 2003: 46-47)  
 
 Nussbaum claims that Sen’s insistence on refraining from adopting a definitive list of 
capabilities rests on two fundamental errors. First, that he is wrong in his view that “freedom” is 
                                                        
299 As Nussbaum states: “I shall argue, however, that the capabilities approach will supply 
definite and useful guidance…only if we formulate a definite list of the most central capabilities, 
even one that is tentative and revisable, using capabilities so defined to elaborate a partial 
account of social justice, a set of basic entitlements without which no society can lay claim to 
justice.” (Nussbaum 2003: 36)  
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an all-purpose political good. Secondly, he erroneously believes that pluralism is incompatible 
with adopting a definite list of capabilities.  
She argues against Sen’s position that “freedom” is always intrinsically good, claiming it 
is mistaken and incoherent because, obviously, “some freedoms limit others” (Nussbaum 2003: 
44). For instance: “The freedom of rich people to make large donations to political campaigns 
limits the equal worth of the right to vote. The freedom of businesses to pollute the environment 
limits the freedom of citizens to enjoy an unpolluted environment” (Nussbaum 2003: 44).300  
 Furthermore, she claims that Sen is wrong in asserting that respecting cultural pluralism 
requires underspecification of capabilities; because, as she explains, such a conclusion rests on 
the faulty premise that adopting a definite list of capabilities undermines actors’ ability to be 
heard and respected throughout the social decision-making process. In fact, she arrives at the 
opposite conclusion, arguing that respecting other cultures and listening to a multitude of 
perspectives requires a definitive list of capabilities: 
Real respect for pluralism means strong and unwavering protection for religious freedom, 
for the freedom of association, for the freedom of speech. If we say that we are for 
pluralism, and yet refuse to commit ourselves to the nonnegotiability of these items as 
                                                        
300 Nussbaum formalizes this critique, stating, “the very idea of freedom involves the idea of 
constraint: for person P is not free to do action A unless other people are prevented from 
interfering” (Nussbaum 2011: 148). Furthermore, she argues that not all “freedoms” are good: 
“For example, the ‘right’ to have intercourse with one’s wife whether she consents or not has 
been understood as a time-honored male prerogative in most societies, and men have greatly 
resented the curtailment of liberty that followed from laws against marital rape – one reason why 
about half of the states in the US still do not treat nonconsensual intercourse within marriage as 
genuine rape, and why many societies the world over still lack laws against it. The freedom to 
harass women in the workplace is a tenaciously guarded prerogative of males the world over: the 
minute sexual harassment regulations are introduced, one always hears protests invoking the idea 
of liberty. Terms like ‘femi-nazis’ are used to suggests that feminists are against freedom for 
supporting these policies. And of course, in one sense feminists are indeed insisting on a 
restriction of liberty, on the grounds that certain liberties are inimical both to equalities and to 
women’s liberties and opportunities” (Nussbaum 2003: 45). She also argues that not all freedoms 
are normatively important nor matters of justice, “for example the freedom of motorcyclists to 
drive without helmets, a society can say, these freedoms are not very important; they are neither 
very bad nor very good” (Nussbaum 2003: 45).  
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fundamental building blocks of a just political order, we show that we are really half-
hearted about pluralism. (Nussbaum 2003: 48)  
 
 It is important to emphasize that Sen and Nussbaum’s theoretical disagreement on these 
issues likely stems from their different disciplinary backgrounds. As Robeyns states, “Sen’s roots 
lie in the field of social choice, and he therefore believes that we should search for fair and 
consistent democratic procedures to draw up the list” (Robeyns 2003: 68-69). Whereas 
“Nussbaum has done a lot of work on the philosophy of the good life and, more recently, on 
constitutional design, and in this context, it is much more important that a scholar proposes and 
defends a fully-fleshed out list of capabilities” (Robeyns 2003: 69).  
Due to these disciplinary differences, Sen emphasizes the importance of democratic 
deliberation to reach consensus about the relevant capabilities, whereas Nussbaum relies on a 
method of Socratic reasoning to establish the basic preconditions required for living a flourishing 
human life.301 As she explains, “like Rawls, I view my arguments as essentially Socratic in 
character: I appeal to the interlocutor to ponder what is implicit in the notion of human dignity 
and a life in accordance with it” (Nussbaum 2011: 160).   
Unlike Sen, she maintains that philosophical reasoning, on its own, is capable of 
discerning the complete list of capabilities required for leading a life worthy of dignity that 
resonates with members of our species the world over. As she states, her method involves 
                                                        
301 Nussbaum worries that a wholly democratic approach to social decision-making (what Sen 
seems to occasionally endorse) could result in outcomes that sacrifice central capabilities. As she 
states: “Suppose a majority of people in India, meeting and deliberating in ways that meet the 
moral constraints of the best informed-desire conceptions, desire to replace their pluralistic 
constitution by one declaring India a Hindu state…This should not lead us to conclude that equal 
freedom of conscience is a negotiable item for a decent pluralistic democracy. We ought to say, 
‘What the majority desires here is wrong’” (Nussbaum 2004: 201). Thus, in her account, the 
conclusions of philosophical moral reasoning take priority over democratic decision-making 
when central capabilities are at stake.   
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making “intuitive arguments about what a good outcome is, in the form of an account of a 
minimally decent and just society” (Nussbaum 2004: 197).302 
 Although the debates between Sen and Nussbaum involve vexing theoretical questions, it 
appears we can avoid taking a side and instead strive to incorporate insights from each 
depending on the topic under examination. For instance, since we are interested in attempting to 
respond to ecocide from within a Transitional Justice framework (i.e., a discipline that has long 
endorsed constitutional conventions, reform, and amendments as a means of fostering social 
transformation to overcome grave injustice – which will be discussed further in the final 
chapter), there is a strong justification for employing Nussbaum’s interpretation, which focuses 
on fundamental constitutional entitlement. 
Therefore, there are prudential reasons for preferring Nussbaum’s account, which 
supposedly offers a complete list of capabilities, when considering the constitutional principles 
that citizens can demand of post-ecocide states.303 Nevertheless, favoring Nussbaum’s approach 
when attempting to provide a list of inalienable capabilities that states must afford their citizenry 
is not necessarily a repudiation of Sen’s approach, which may still be the choice method for 
evaluating how individuals and groups are faring more generally. In other words, Nussbaum’s 
approach can provide the minimum thresholds that states must satisfy to be considered just, 
whereas, Sen’s approach can assist in evaluating comparative well-being and justifying social 
policy after those minimum thresholds have been met.   
                                                        
302 Breena Holland succinctly describes Nussbaum’s method as, “Endeavoring to walk a nuanced 
line between ‘informed-desire’ conceptions of the good and intuitive arguments emerging from 
empirically informed reasoning about what it means to lead a good human life, Nussbaum 
specifies a modest ancillary role for people’s desires and preferences” (Holland 2007: 9).   
303 As Robeyns states, “Nussbaum explains her work on capabilities as providing citizens with a 
justification and arguments for constitutional principles that citizens have a right to demand from 
their government” (Robeyns 2005: 105).   
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Ultimately, Nussbaum declares that there are ten Central Human Capabilities (life; bodily 
health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; 
other species; play; and control over one's environment), which states must afford their citizenry 
in order to be just (Nussbaum 2000: 70–77; 2003: 42-43; 2006: 78–81; 2001: 78-81). We will 
proceed by showing how ecocidal states often weaken and destabilize Nussbaum’s Central 
Human Capabilities. 
 
B. Applying Nussbaum’s List of Central Human Capabilities to Injustice of Ecocide  
 
Once again, the goal of this investigation is to specify key social problems that post-
ecocide societies must overcome in order to be just. However, since many of these capabilities 
have already been discussed throughout this work, the present analysis will be brief. 
Furthermore, because of the pivotal role ecological conditions play in enabling all ten of the 
Central Human Capabilities, much of the analysis may seem rather obvious.  
In fact, illuminating scholarship by Holland proposes that “Sustainable Ecological 
Capacity” ought to constitute a “meta-capability” to be added to Nussbaum’s list because such a 
capacity is necessary for all the other capabilities.304 As Holland states, “functioning ecological 
systems create the physical conditions that are necessary for human life, conditions that enable 
the very possibility of human life” (Holland 2007: 6).305  
                                                        
304 Nussbaum seems receptive to Holland’s proposal, stating, “it is important to develop 
anthropocentric positions like Holland’s as effectively as possible” (Nussbaum 2011: 318).  
305 Holland goes so far as to argue that “sustainable ecological capacity” is the only meta-
capability, in that, “unlike social, political, and economic systems, the functioning of ecological 
systems is always necessary for the exercise of human capabilities…[since] it is possible to 
exercise at least some of the central human functional capabilities outside or independent of 
social, political, and economic systems, while it is not possible to exercise the central human 
capabilities outside or independent of functioning ecological systems” (Holland 2007: 6). 
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Holland’s notion of a “meta-capability” is rather confusing, and it is unclear how 
“Sustainable Ecological Capacity” is a capability that is applicable to the “beings and doings” of 
humans’ individual lives.306 We can nevertheless, accept a more modest claim that functioning 
ecological systems are a prerequisite for achieving central human capabilities, in that these 
systems maintain biochemical background conditions necessary for human flourishing. For 
instance, functioning ecosystems facilitate food production, waste absorption, and maintaining 
the appropriate chemical compositions of air and water, which all humans depend on for 
survival.   
Thus, it may seem self-evident or redundant to highlight the negative impact 
environmental harm has on human wellbeing, since functioning ecological systems are necessary 
producers of the conditions that make human life possible. Nevertheless, it is still worthwhile to 
conduct the analysis in order to allow the reader to consider the myriad of ways that ecocide can 
impede the capabilities of autarkic communities, as well as its injurious role in reducing the 
human flourishing of citizens in ecocidal states more generally.  
A further justification for discussing the ways in which ecocide undermines all ten of 
Nussbaum’s Central Human Capabilities is that such an analysis provides support for Holland’s 
conclusion that sustainable ecological capacity is essential for achieving all the capabilities. 
Moreover, it is important to validate such a position, in that it allows this dissertation to argue 
that preserving and restoring ecological functioning ought to be considered the primary aim of 
environmental transformative justice, since ecological functioning produces conditions 
supporting all vital capabilities.   
                                                        
306 A problem with construing “Sustainable Ecological Capacity” as a capability is that unlike 
Nussbaum’s other Central Human Capabilities, which are constitutive of human wellbeing, an 
individual can choose to live unsustainably and nevertheless flourish at a personal-level, as 
evidenced by the prevalent preference for roving imperialist lifestyles in the modern world.    
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1. Life  
 
Nussbaum defines the capacity of “life” as “being able to live to the end of a human life 
of normal length; not dying prematurely, or before one's life is so reduced as to be not worth 
living” (Nussbaum 2011: 77). While there is no metadata regarding the average life expectancy 
of ecocide refugees worldwide (or environmental refugees more generally), there is a relevant 
study from Australia documenting how members of displaced indigenous communities are: two 
times more likely to die as children; three times more likely to die of avoidable causes; seven 
times more likely to die of diabetes; nineteen times more likely to die from rheumatic fever and 
rheumatic heart disease, and their life expectancy is ten to fifteen years less than non-displaced 
Australian aboriginals (Woodman and Grig 2015: 6). In general, the study showed that over 66% 
of displaced indigenous Australians died before 65, compared with under 20% of the general 
population dying before 65 (Australian Government 2011).   
Furthermore, a Canadian study from the Centre for Suicide Prevention revealed that 
indigenous groups who were removed from their land had suicide rates eleven times higher than 
the national average, as compared with no suicides in indigenous groups who remained on their 
own land (Canadian Centre for Suicide Prevention 2003). Another particularly striking case is 
that of the Guarani-Kaiowa indigenous people of southern Brazil, whose suicide rates have risen 
34 times above the national average (between 2005 and 2015) as agribusiness displaced them 
from their ancestral land via the felling of large areas of rainforest (Hershaw 2016).  
Accordingly, these research findings and the examples of ecocide found in our case 
studies empirically demonstrate the impact of environmental dislocation on the lives and life 
expectancy of former autarkic citizens. As Woodman and Grig state, “forcing development on 
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tribal peoples [i.e., autarkic communities] never brings a longer, happier life, but a shorter, 
bleaker existence only escaped in death” (Woodman and Grig 2015: 1). Hence, post-ecocide 
states must strive to return former autarkic citizens to their pre-harm life expectancy and work 
towards making amends for this tragic loss of life.      
 
2. Bodily Health  
 
Nussbaum defines “bodily health” as “being able to have good health, including 
reproductive health; to be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter” (Nussbaum 2011: 77). 
Once again, the treatment of the Guarani-Kaiowa in Brazil paints a vivid picture of how ecocide 
undermines bodily health. As agribusiness spread throughout the southern region of Brazil over 
the past 30 years, the indigenous territory shrunk to such an extent, that currently 12,000 
Guarani-Kaiowa are forced to live in a region that used to sustain three hundred members of the 
tribe (Woodman and Grig 2015: 14). Furthermore, because of the diminishing access to land and 
food, at least 86 Guirani-Kaiowa children have died of malnutrition from 2005-2015 (Hershaw 
2016).      
Moreover, as we have seen, there is a long history of autarkic communities being placed 
on reservations in response to ecocide (e.g., the moving of the Anangu off their ancestral range 
to the Yalata reserve). We can thus rely on the ample empirical evidence illustrating how 
relocating indigenous communities to reservations results in poor bodily health. For instance, in 
the United States, the Office of Minority Health reports that “insufficient access to fresh and 
healthy food options continues to be an issue on at least 60 reservations and this grim fact has an 
inordinate impact on the long-term health outcomes of those residents” (Olif 2017). Case in 
point, in Arizona’s federally recognized Pima reservation, more than half the adults over the age 
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of 35 are obese, which is far higher than the 10% rate of obesity of those living a more traditional 
lifestyle in the Sierra Madre Mountains of Mexico (Schulz and Chaudhari 2015).  
 Additionally, by extrapolating from research regarding displaced indigenous peoples 
more generally, we can surmise that ecocide refugees face health risks even after attempts have 
been made to integrate these populations into the broader society. For instance,  the Australian 
government’s 2011 report offers an extensive list delineating a myriad of ways displacement and 
urbanization harms the bodily health of indigenous citizens: between 2007-2009 urbanized 
indigenous Australians were hospitalized for cardiovascular disease at a rate 1.7 times higher 
than the general population; urbanized indigenous children (between the ages of 0-4) 
experienced respiratory disease at a rate double the general population; 37% of urbanized 
indigenous children were obese before turning two years old; the hospitalization rate of 
urbanized indigenous children from pneumonia was three times the national average, and 
mortality rates for urbanized indigenous adults (age 50-74) were more than double the national 
average  (Australian Government 2011).  
Additionally, with regard to the capability of adequate shelter, half of the documented 
cases of homeless children (age 0-4) in Australian were indigenous, even though they only make 
up 2.5% of the general population (Australian Government 2011: XI).  Accordingly, these 
research findings demonstrate many of the ways in which displacement caused by ecocide can 
undermine autarkic citizen’s bodily health. These and comparable findings delineate the aspects 
of bodily wellbeing post-ecocide states must seek to improve, as well as establish a list of harms 
for which victims ought to be compensated.    
 
3. Bodily Integrity  
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Nussbaum defines “bodily integrity” as “being able to move freely from place to place; to 
be secure against violent assault, including sexual assault and domestic violence; having 
opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for choice in matters of reproduction” (Nussbaum 2011: 
77). Ecocide undermines bodily integrity in that it prevents autarkic citizens from moving freely 
within their ancestral home. Furthermore, as we have emphasized many times, ecocide is often 
precipitated by violent removal of the autarkic communities from their habitat (e.g., the Anangu 
by the Australian government or the Wayúu and Tabaco villagers by the Colombian 
government).  
We have yet to mention ways in which ecocide can lead to sexual assault, rape, and 
domestic violence. Such a result is likely common. As the 2010 U.N. Report on the State of the 
World’s Indigenous Peoples repeatedly expounds, forced relocation often leads to higher rates of 
sexual violence. For instance, in the United States, relocated Native American women are 2.5 
times more likely to be raped or sexually assaulted than the general population (U.N. 2010).  
There are many reasons why ecocide may lead to sexual violence, but it is important to 
emphasize that the lack of socio-economic resources, limited educational opportunities, and 
pervasive disrespect from the wider society all contribute to placing women from impacted 
communities in positions vulnerable to sexual exploitation, trafficking, and prostitution. It is 
clear that there are many ways in which ecocide can undermine autarkic citizen’s bodily 
integrity. Hence, post-ecocide states must strive to ensure all citizens have control over their 
bodies and offer compensation to victims whose right to bodily integrity has been violated.    
 
4. Senses, Imagination, and Thought 
 
Nussbaum defines “senses, imagination, and thought” as:  
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[B]eing able to use the senses, to imagine, think, and reason–and to do these things in a 
‘truly human’ way, a way informed and cultivated by an adequate education, including, 
but by no means limited to, literacy and basic mathematical and scientific training. Being 
able to use imagination and thought in connection with experiencing and producing 
works and events of one's own choice, religious, literary, musical, and so forth. Being 
able to use one's mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of expression with 
respect to both political and artistic speech, and freedom of religious exercise. Being able 
to have pleasurable experiences and to avoid nonbeneficial pain. (Nussbaum 2011: 78) 
 
There are innumerable ways in which ecocide can limit autarkic citizens’ senses, 
imagination, and thought. For instance, a key aspect that we have consistently emphasized is 
how ecocide subverts one of autarkic citizens’ greatest epistemic assets: their knowledge of how 
to sustain themselves within their local habitat, i.e., their habitat learning.  
Furthermore, ecocide bars autarkic citizens from producing meaningful “works and 
events of their own choosing,” in that the environmental destruction makes it impossible to 
engage in many of their cultural, religious, ceremonial, and spiritual practices that are connected, 
to and must be performed within, their ancestral land. For instance, just as the Anangu and the 
Wayúu associated sacred powers with local mountains, the Mescalero Apache Indians of New 
Mexico believe great spiritual forces dwell within the “sacred mountains” and thus their 
ceremonial traditions, prayer, and cultural identity are tied to these mountains (Ball 2000). 
Numerous religions around the world mention deities residing in “sacred groves” (e.g., 
Hinduism, Buddhism, Shintoism, Jainism, Maausk, etc.), which establishes these locales as 
important places of worship and preservation.     
Ecocide may also undermine the broader society’s capacity to imagine new modes of 
sustainable living, change their relationship with nature, and develop more environmentally 
friendly practices and norms, because they will lose the opportunity to witness and learn from 
functioning autarkic communities. Essentially, anytime a way of life is lost, ways of perceiving, 
imagining, and thinking about the world are lost with it. It is thus clear how environmental 
destruction diminishes the capacity of senses, imagination, and thought in ecocidal societies. 
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Accordingly, post-ecocide states must ensure that such harms do not occur moving forward, as 
well as foster opportunities for reestablishing (and if not possible, at least memorializing) lost 
ways of perceiving, imagining, and thinking about the world.    
 
5. Emotions  
 
Nussbaum defines “emotions” as “being able to have attachments to things and people 
outside ourselves; to love those who love and care for us, to grieve at their absence; in general, to 
love, to grieve, to experience longing, gratitude, and justified anger. Not having one’s emotional 
development blighted by fear and anxiety (supporting this capability means supporting forms of 
human association that can be shown to be crucial in their development)” (Nussbaum 2011: 79).  
Hopefully, per the discussion in the preceding chapters, it is clear that autarkic 
communities place great emotional weight on their relationship with their local habitat (e.g., Nez 
Perce viewing the land as their mother or the Karuk and Chinook tribes asserting their identity is 
tied to the local salmon).307 Because of these intimate connections, any harm or destruction of 
these natural entities will undoubtedly create an emotional void and sense of loss within the 
impacted community.308  
Furthermore, we have consistently emphasized how the shock, fear, anxiety, and feeling 
of impotence accompanying the loss of their homeland will likely impede impacted citizens’ 
                                                        
307 Glenn Albrecht describes this emotional state as endemophilia: “the particular love of the 
locally and regionally distinctive in the people of a place” (Albrecht 2019: 199).  
308 For instance, as Kothari explains regarding the threat to the indigenous Sapara people 
resisting oil extractivism in the Amazonian region of Ecuador: “The threat is not only physical – 
the destruction of the forest and water on which the Sapara depend – though that is real enough. 
Perhaps much more insidious, and very difficult for the modern world to understand, is the 
violation of the spirit of the Sapara and all the beings they live with, an attack that could kill 
them psychologically and emotionally even if they survive physically” (Kothari 2019).   
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emotional health and development. As Albrecht states, “The impact of forced relocation of 
indigenous people the world over reverberates as a wave of ‘sickness’ through their cultures to 
the present day” (Albrecht 2019: 30). Accordingly, it should be evident that ecocide represents a 
grave threat to autarkic citizens’ emotional capabilities. The psychic toll caused by 
environmental destruction thus constitutes harms that post-ecocide states must seek to prevent 
and repair, if they are be considered just.    
 
6. Practical Reason  
 
Nussbaum defines “practical reason” as “being able to form a conception of the good and 
to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one’s life (this entails protection for the 
liberty of conscience and religious observance)” (Nussbaum 2011: 79). We have discussed at 
length throughout our analysis of Rawls how ecocidal states undermine autarkic communities’ 
conception of the good and disrespects their way of life.  
For instance, the fact that, in our paradigm cases of ecocide, the environmental 
destruction occurred without the impacted communities’ consent vividly demonstrates the extent 
to which ecocidal states disregard autarkic citizens’ practical reasoning, in that these states do 
not even afford members of these communities the chance to reflect on and plan their own lives. 
Post-ecocide states must therefore strive to overcome these failings by ensuring that their 
autarkic citizenry is afforded the opportunity to plan their lives according to their own 
conception of the good.   
Furthermore, because of growing ecoagnosy (Albrecht’s term describing a state of 
environmental ignorance or indifference to ecology), which is both a cause of environmental 
destruction and a result of eroding local subsistence practices, citizens will have lessened their 
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prudential reasoning abilities with regards to interacting with the natural world.309 As Albrecht 
laments: “It is disturbing to think that the current generation may be less ecologically literate, 
less ecologically attuned, less ecologically aware, and less ecologically emotional than previous 
generations. As a consequence, they may be unable to respond to the enormous risks posed by 
ecosystem distress” (Albrecht 2019: 76). Accordingly, ecocide undermines citizens’ practical 
reasoning by making them less able to plan eco-friendly futures.  
 
7. Affiliation  
 
Nussbaum emphasizes two distinct aspects of the capability of affiliation. First, the 
capability entails that actors are “able to live with and toward others, to recognize and show 
concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; to be able to 
imagine the situation of another (Protecting this capability means protecting institutions that 
constitute and nourish such forms of affiliation, and also protecting the freedom of assembly and 
political speech) (Nussbaum 2011: 79). Secondly, it requires actors “having the social bases of 
self-respect and nonhumiliation; being able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is 
equal to that of others. This entails provisions of nondiscrimination on the basis of race, sex, 
sexual orientation, ethnicity, caste, religion, national origin” (Nussbaum 2011: 79-80). 
With regard to the first component, it should seem obvious that ecocide bars autarkic 
citizens from engaging in various meaningful forms of social interaction, in that the 
environmental destruction makes it impossible to pursue many aspects of their traditional way of 
life. Furthermore, since ecocide destabilizes autarkic citizens’ subsistence practices, the impacted 
                                                        
309 Such an affliction may even metastasize into topophobia, i.e., “the fear of entering a 
biophysical place” (Albrecht 2019: 201).  
 271 
actors are often unable to meet their social obligations and provide for themselves and others.310 
Essentially, ecocide hinders autarkic citizens’ ability to contribute to their community and lead 
meaningful lives with and towards others. Post-ecocide states must therefore end such 
mistreatment, by fostering opportunities for autarkic and former-autarkic citizens to be able to 
live and work together.         
 With regard to the second component, we have mentioned ad nauseum the litany of ways 
ecocidal states undermine autarkic citizens’ social basis of self-respect. We have seen that 
ecocidal states pervasively discriminate against autarkic citizens by engaging in, promoting, and 
allowing activity that destroys their way of life. After the multitude of examples discussed, it 
should be apparent that ecocidal states do not treat autarkic citizens with adequate dignity or 
respect their way of life as equal to that of others. Thus, post-ecocide states must strive to 
overcome these legacies of disrespect, by promoting autarkic citizens’ social basis of self-
respect.        
 
8. Other Species  
 
Nussbaum defines the capability of “other species” as “being able to live with concern for 
and in relation to animals, plants, and the world of nature” (Nussbaum 2011: 80). Ecocide 
obviously ruptures the relationships that autarkic communities have with local animals, plants, 
and the ecosystem more generally. Hence, post-ecocide states must seek to provide opportunities 
for affected citizens to reestablish or at least memorialize these relationships.      
                                                        
310 In Albrechtian terminology ecocide undermines autarkic communities’ sumbiophilia, i.e. their 
love of living together with both other humans and multiple other organisms (Albrecht 2019: 
200).   
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But it is important to emphasize, that while this capability is expressed in anthropocentric 
terms (i.e., it pertains to human relationships with animals, plants, and the natural world), 
Nussbaum has argued that the sphere of justice ought to be extended to encompass sentient and 
agential animals, independent of their connection to humans. As she states, “it seems to me that 
the idea of doing injustice to an animal makes sense in much the way that the idea of doing 
injustice to a human being makes sense: both can experience pain and harm, and both are 
attempting to live and act, projects that can be wrongly thwarted” (Nussbaum 2011: 306).311  
Nevertheless, she maintains that for prudential reasons it is wise to focus policy 
discussions on human-centered interaction with plants, animals, and the natural world because 
there is currently a lack of consensus that “animal capabilities matter for their own sake” 
(Nussbaum 2011: 318). Nussbaum’s recognition of the absence of political agreement on the 
subject of natural entities’ intrinsic value lends support in justifying this work’s decision to frame 
ecocide in purely anthropocentric terms. As Nussbaum states, “since action protecting the 
environment is not a matter on which we can afford to wait, it is important to develop 
anthropocentric positions” (Nussbaum 2011: 318).312  
                                                        
311 Some capabilities scholars have argued that Nussbaum’s expansion of the sphere of justice 
should extend beyond sentient and agential animals to include all life and entire ecosystems. For 
instance, Katy Fulfer argues, “Whereas Nussbaum focuses on similarities between humans and 
nonhuman animals, I focus on our acceptance that justice and dignity emerge out of interactions 
with others, and that humans have a great deal of privilege relative to the nonsentient life we 
make use of and interact with. We also (at least for the sake of argument) accept that justice 
arises in our interactions and relationships with sentient, nonhuman animals. If justice arises in 
these relationships, then it seems likely that justice also arises in relationships with nonsentients. 
Since we relate to some nonsentient life within ecosystems, we can talk about justice emerging in 
those relationships” (Fulfer 2013: 31). In other words, Nussbaum believes the capabilities 
approach can justify animal liberation, whereas Fulfer argues it ought to expand to include 
environmental ethics (i.e., concern for natural entities, such as ecosystems and species) as a 
matter of justice.   
312 Essentially, because of the gravity and urgency of our present ecological crisis, we do not 
have time to wait for political consensus to coalesce around a broadened conception of justice 
that includes the intrinsic value of sentient animals or ecosystems. Hence, while a broadened 
conception of justice would have allowed for innumerable more ways of demonstrating the 
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9. Play 
 
Nussbaum defines “play” as “being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities” 
(Nussbaum 2011: 80). It is reasonable to assume that the psychological toll and material 
deprivation that ecocide causes in autarkic communities likely limits these citizens’ ability to 
play, laugh, and engage in the type of recreational activities that bring them joy.313 Furthermore, 
for many citizens (both autarkic and members of the general population), being able to enjoy 
recreational activities means playing outside, exploring wilderness areas filled with trees, plants, 
animals, and other wildlife, and communing with nature. By destroying natural habitats, ecocide 
directly impedes opportunities for play and recreation, i.e., it diminishes availability of 
environmental goods and proliferates environmental bads. Justice thus requires that such harms 
do not occur in the future and that already impacted citizens are given the chance to return to a 
life in which play and laughter are possible once again.  
 
10. Control Over One’s Environment  
 
Nussbaum emphasizes “political” and “material” aspects of the capability of being in 
“control over one’s environment” (Nussbaum 2011: 80). With regard to the political component, 
she defines the capability as “being able to participate effectively in political choices that govern 
                                                        
injustice of ecocide, it is wise to frame the issue on purely anthropocentric terms. Furthermore, 
there is the methodological benefit of advancing an argument that proffers a strong and 
provocative conclusion by proceeding from weak and uncontroversial premises that most readers 
will accept.   
313 Nevertheless, it is important to note that not all citizens have to take part in play or 
recreational activities as a matter of justice, but they must all be afforded access to such activities 
for a society to be considered just.       
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one's life; having the right of political participation, protections of free speech and association” 
(Nussbaum 2011: 80).  Whereas the material component she defines as “being able to hold 
property (both land and movable goods) and having property rights on an equal basis with 
others; having the right to seek employment on an equal basis with others; having the freedom 
from unwarranted search and seizure. In work, being able to work as a human being, exercising 
practical reason and entering into meaningful relationships of mutual recognition with other 
workers” (Nussbaum 2011: 80-81).  
 Of all the capabilities, it seems most straightforward that ecocide violates autarkic 
communities’ “control over their environment” in both the political and material sense. 
Regarding the political component, since ecocide in our paradigm cases occurred without the 
consent of the impacted communities, it is clear that these citizens were not afforded an 
opportunity to effectively participate in political choices that effect their lives. Thus, post-
ecocide states must ensure that all citizens are granted full political agency and involvement in 
social decision-making processes that may impact their lives.  
Furthermore, regarding the material component, these citizens were not granted the 
ability to hold property on an equal basis with others, in that outsiders were able to confiscate, 
trespass upon, seize, and destroy their land in ways that would never be tolerated, if the autarkic 
communities had acted similarly with the private or public property of mainstream society. For 
instance, there are countless instances of ecocide refugees being assaulted and killed for trespass 
when attempting to return to their ancestral land.314  
                                                        
314 A vivid example of ecocide refugees being killed and abused for trying to return their 
ancestral way of life is currently unfolding in Brazil, as military police kill and violently assault 
“squatters” (indigenous citizens and environmental activists attempting to reestablish subsistence 
communities in the Amazon) at the behest of the “new landowners” (Branford and Borges 2019). 
As Sue Branford and Thais Borges report, “the Amazon has seen three probable massacres in 
twelve days, as violence has exploded in areas of heavy deforestation where the building of large 
dams has brought a capital infusion, sent land prices soaring, and invited land speculation by 
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Hence, justice requires that impacted citizens are compensated for their material losses 
caused by ecocide; which ideally entails returning their ancestral land to its traditional ecosystem 
functioning. But if such an outcome is not feasible, then adequate material conditions may be 
achieved by providing these citizens with the opportunity to reestablish their community in 
similar habitat(s) or by allocating enough material resources to achieve a state in which all their 
Central Human Capabilities can be met.315 Furthermore, moving forward, it is imperative that the 
victimized citizens’ property rights be afforded the same respect, care, and consideration as those 
of any other property holder.   
In conclusion, we have seen how Nussbaum’s Central Human Capabilities provide post-
ecocide states with a list of constitutional entitlements that all citizens ought to be afforded. We 
have delineated the myriad of harms that post-ecocide societies must seek to reconcile and repair 
if victims of ecocide are to receive justice. There still remains, however, the problem of how 
environmental transformative justice is supposed to balance competing capability claims when 
they come in conflict. Fortunately, Nussbaum’s interpretation of the capabilities approach can 
provide helpful guidance on this point.  
 
C. Nussbaum’s Guide to Prioritizing Capability Claims 
 
  Nussbaum’s Central Human Capabilities gain their status of being “central” from the fact 
that these capabilities are not merely instrumental for a flourishing human life but are 
                                                        
land grabbers, loggers and ranchers” (Branford and Borges 2019). Furthermore, at the time of 
writing the Bolsonaro Administration has yet to condemn or comment on the spike in violence. 
Sadly, these kinds of violent reprisals are all too common, as Albrecht documents, “in late 2017, 
164 people had been murdered, in various parts of the world, as they tried to defend special 
places and creatures of this Earth” (Albrecht 2019: 179) 
315 Obviously, a problem with such an approach is that it may be argued that habitats are not 
interchangeable, that one cannot simply substitute one habitat for another. 
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constitutive of such a life. Thus, if the Aristotelean conception of justice is correct, and justice is 
related to human flourishing (as Sen and Nussbaum and other comparative scholars presuppose), 
then, for a state to be just, it must satisfy all essential human capabilities to a minimum threshold. 
As Nussbaum states, violations of these basic capabilities are “a cost of a distinctive sort, one 
that in a fully just society no one has to bear” (Nussbaum 2011: 85).        
 But, as Nussbaum rightly emphasizes, it is not enough to simply provide people with the 
necessary components of a flourishing life, it is important that the citizenry know that these 
capabilities are secured, meaning they are confident that these capabilities will be protected in 
the future (Nussbaum 2011: 96). As Nussbaum states in endorsing recent scholarship by 
Jonathan Wolff and Avner De-Shalit, “security about the future is of overwhelming importance 
in these people's ability to use and enjoy all the capabilities on the list” (Nussbaum 2011: 97).  
 Therefore, an important aspect of the capabilities approach is the need for states to instill 
a sense of security that the basic capabilities will be enjoyed indefinitely. A common tactic for 
achieving this objective is to include the basic capabilities as inalienable entitlements in a written 
constitution – in the concluding section of the dissertation we will discuss the importance of 
constitutional reform in furthering and achieving environmental transformative justice.   
However, as Nussbaum rightly emphasizes, constitutional assurances are meaningless if 
states lack mechanisms for citizens to bring claims that their rights have been violated, as well as 
mechanisms for adjudicating these claims, and mechanisms for providing redress if these basic 
rights have been violated. Nussbaum states, “but a constitution does not enforce itself, and a 
constitution contributes to security only in the presence of adequate access to the courts and 
justified confidence in the behavior of judges” (Nussbaum 2011: 109). Hence, it is important that 
states in the process of pursuing environmental transformative justice enact political, legal, and 
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judicial reform to ensure that their socio-political institutions are capable of adequately 
protecting and enforcing constitutional entitlements.  
 But what happens in situations where it is impossible to deliver a threshold amount of 
each of the ten capabilities? For instance, in tragic circumstances (i.e., when two or more of the 
capabilities codified as basic entitlements in states’ constitutions are unable to be satisfied), 
which capabilities should take priority? For Sen, such tragic situations are irreconcilable (Sen 
2009). He argues we must leave it up to public reason and democratic processes to decide how to 
proceed (Sen 2009). Conversely, Nussbaum thinks that Sen’s endorsement of abdicating 
philosophical reasoning in these sorts of tragic situations is misguided; rather it is during these 
crises that moral reasoning is most useful and necessary. Hence, she defends the view that it is 
possible to rank one tragic state of affairs over another. As she states, “sometimes one choice 
may be clearly better than another in a tragic situation, even though all available choices involve 
a violation of some sort” (Nussbaum 2011: 86).316  
 She argues that recent work by Wolff and De-Shalit offers valuable insights for deciding 
which outcomes are preferable, i.e., which capabilities ought to be prioritized over others in 
tragic situations (Nussbaum 2011: 97). In summary, Wolff and De-Shalit emphasize that, in 
deciding how to proceed in tragic situations, practitioners and theorists must consider the 
“dynamic clustering” effect of promoting or discouraging a capability, i.e., how gaining or losing 
a capability can cause accumulation and reproduction of (dis)advantage (Wolff and De-Shalit 
2007). Accordingly, they argue that social policy can benefit from indexing “fertile functionings” 
(capabilities that, “spread their good effects over several categories, either directly, or by 
                                                        
316 Nussbaum relies on Aeschylus’s play, Seven Against Thebes, to illustrate this point: “For the 
tragic hero Eteocles, it was a horrible wrong to choose to kill his brother, even though the 
alternative, which involved the destruction of the entire city, was clearly worse” (Nussbaum 
2011: 86).  
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reducing risk to the other functionings”) and “corrosive disadvantages” (capabilities that, “have 
negative effects on other functionings”) (Wolff and De-Shalit 2007: 121-122).317   
 Nussbaum endorses Wolff and De-Shalit’s conclusion, arguing that when two or more 
capabilities cannot be satisfied, we ought to prioritize capabilities that promote “fertile 
functionings” and discourage state of affairs that generate “corrosive disadvantages” (Nussbaum 
2011: 98-100).318 For instance, imagine two proposed responses to ecocide: (A) provide ecocide 
refugees with guaranteed basic income, so that they can purchase all their basic needs (food, 
shelter, healthcare, etc.) or (B) provide ecocide refugees the chance to reestablish their traditional 
subsistence practices by restoring (assuming that the degraded habitat can be restored) ecosystem 
functioning in the degraded habitat (we can stipulate that each project costs the same amount of 
social resources, but that there are currently insufficient social resources to enact both policies 
simultaneously).   
Option A seems likely to generate a multitude of “corrosive disadvantages” because 
while ecocide refugees living in such conditions would have enough social resources to satisfy 
their basic needs, they nevertheless would lack important aspects of control over their lives. In 
Sen’s terminology, their well-being freedom would be compromised. For instance, by keeping 
these citizens in alien environments (i.e., settings of which they have a limited understanding and 
in which they have a precarious lack of meaningful social relations), they are likely to lead 
                                                        
317 Nussbaum criticizes Wolff and De-Shalit for causing conceptual confusion by dubbing the 
term “fertile functionings,” since the concept is more readily applied to “capabilities” instead of 
“functionings” (Nussbaum 2011: 98) As she jests, “I fear that alliteration has superseded 
theoretical clarity” (Nussbaum 2011: 98).     
318 Obviously, it will often be an empirical matter regarding which outcomes promote “fertile 
functioning” or “corrosive disadvantages” (Wolff and Deshalit 2007). Thus, it is important to 
build up a body of empirical evidence by repeatedly employing and documenting the success or 
failure of various environmental transformative justice mechanisms. Accordingly, the more 
attempts at achieving environmental transformative justice are pursued, the more well-informed 
practitioners will be in making decisions, and thus the better they will be at promoting the 
desired outcomes of environmental transformative justice.      
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isolated and unfulfilled lives. Furthermore, because it is likely the case that these citizens will be 
unable to integrate and participate in the broader society, they will thus have limited opportunity 
and capacity for influencing social decisions, which in itself poses a risk for their wellbeing. As 
Michael Marmot explains in his book, Status Syndrome, “autonomy and social participation are 
so important for health that their lack leads to deterioration in health” (Marmot 2004: 248). 
 Option B, on the other hand, seems designed to promote a greater convergence of 
advantageous capabilities. For instance, returning ecocide refugees to a functioning ecosystem 
will provide them the opportunity to reestablish self-sufficient subsistence practices, which will 
endow them with greater control over their lives and life prospects, allow them to escape 
conditions in which they exist at the periphery or bottom of the social hierarchy, and foster 
feelings of satisfaction and contentment because they recognize that their life outcomes and 
achievements are in their own hands.       
Thus, we can see how focusing on promoting “fertile functioning” and avoiding 
“corrosive disadvantages” can lead to better social policy. Interestingly, if we accept Holland’s 
conclusion (that sustainable ecological capacity is fundamental to all other capabilities), then 
restoring autarkic communities’ habitat to its traditional ecosystem functioning is a “fertile 
functioning” that promotes all the capabilities on the list.  
  Essentially, if Holland’s conclusion is correct (which seems reasonable, particularly after 
demonstrating that ecocide undermines all ten of Nussbaum’s Central Human Capabilities), then 
protecting and restoring sustainable ecological capacity (at least up to the point where the 
ecological systems have the capacity to sustain the conditions enabling the threshold level of 
Nussbaum’s Central Human Capabilities) is the most fundamental aspect of achieving a just 
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society – in that without such a minimum level of ecological functioning, no other capability is 
possible.319  
Such an insight lends support to our position that the discipline of Transitional Justice 
would benefit from including environmental considerations as relevant matters of concern. If 
sustaining ecological capacity is a necessary meta-component of just societies, then focusing on 
underlying and ongoing environmental issues will assist the discipline in its aim of creating just 
societies in the wake of grave political wrongs. To this end, the concluding sections of this work 
will investigate how Transitional Justice mechanisms can work to promote positive 
environmental outcomes when responding to the injustice of ecocide.  
 Before moving on to explore the ways in which Transitional Justice mechanisms can 
further the aims of environmentalism, it is helpful to summarize the ground gained in the two 
most recent chapters. The last chapter employed a constructivist approach to determine the ideal 
principles of environmental transformative justice and diagnosed why ecocide is impermissible 
in “well ordered” and just societies. Whereas, the first half of the current chapter applied a 
comparative approach to establish how to proceed when enacting environmental transformative 
justice measures, i.e., offer advice for how best to deal with competing justice concerns in post-
ecocide settings.   
 The constructivist approach determined that environmental transformative justice 
requires post-ecocide states to pursue four principle aims: (1) adopt sustainable environmental 
                                                        
319 In fact, if we adopt Holland’s perspective when attempting to determine how best to 
overcome the injustice of ecocide, then it seems clear that allocating social resources to 
ecosystem preservation and restoration are more effective than other policy proposal functioning 
(e.g., forcibly integrating ecocide refugees into the broader society, increasing welfare allocation 
to ensure ecocide refugees basic needs are met). The reason for this stems from Holland’s view 
that sustainable ecosystem functioning positively effects all other vital capabilities; and as such, 
ecosystem preservation and restoration projects would most dynamically generate advantageous 
outcomes. In other words, protective and restorative environmentalist policies would have the 
greatest potential for clustering capabilities that promote and constitute human flourishing.   
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practices – so long as such practices do not violate Rawls’s traditional principles of justice;320 (2) 
respect multiple ecological-economic systems and cultures – so long as they do not violate (1); 
(3) acknowledge and repair past wrongs, and (4) work to restore or construct impacted 
ecosystems and communities (restoration ought to be preferred to construction, if possible – if 
neither is possible greater emphasis must be placed on victims’ reparative compensation in [3]).  
 However, the constructivist analysis offered little guidance in determining how to 
proceed in combatting the injustice of ecocide in the actual world. Hence, even after establishing 
the above ideals, practitioners attempting to enact environmental transformative justice would 
still face application problems, in that it is unclear how to proceed when the principles come into 
conflict. The goal of applying the comparative approach was thus to provide direction regarding 
how to balance the diverse requirements of environmental transformative justice, i.e., to specify 
what outcomes should be prioritized when responding to ecocide.  
To this end, this section first argued that environmental transformative justice should 
proceed in such a way as to promote vital human capabilities (Nussbaum’s list of Central Human 
Capabilities) over other social interests (e.g., economic growth and producing non-vital luxury 
goods). Second, it defended the view that when these central capabilities come in conflict, 
practitioners should prioritize capabilities that generate the greatest clustering (i.e., accumulation 
and reproduction) of advantage. Pursuant to these parameters, the chapter ultimately argued that 
preserving and restoring sustainable ecological functioning is of utmost significance for 
achieving environmental transformative justice, in that such processes produce conditions on 
which all other capabilities depend.      
                                                        
320 The traditional Rawlsian constructivists principles are: (1) respect basic liberties of all 
citizens; (2) respect fair equality of opportunity of all citizens; (3) prioritize the wellbeing of the 
least advantaged, pursuant to the difference principle, and (4) promote the wellbeing of future 
generations, pursuant to the just saving principle.  
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 At this point, the dissertation has offered a full account of environmental transformative 
justice, in that it has specified the context in which it is operative (i.e., after ecocide), determined 
its ideal aims (i.e., the insights of the constructivist approach), offered guidance on how to 
pursue these aims (i.e., the insights of the comparative approach), and specified actors’ 
responsibilities for pursuing these aims (i.e., developed a notion of common but differentiated 
responsibility, by applying Young’s two-tiered model of responsibility to ecocide). The 
concluding section seeks to further support our assertion that environmental transformative 
justice ought to be pursued from within a Transitional Justice framework, by demonstrating ways 
in which Transitional Justice mechanisms (e.g., criminal tribunals, truth commissions, public 
apologies, pardons, lustration, memorialization, reparations, and constitutional conventions) can 
assist in furthering environmental aims (i.e., promoting ecological sustainability, preservation, 
and restoration).  
 
III.  Transitional Justice Mechanisms and Environmental Benefits  
 
 This project has sought to illustrate how certain instances of environmental destruction 
(i.e., ones originating from direct, indirect, or negligent state actors and resulting in the social 
death of non-consenting groups) fall within the purview of Transitional Justice (see 66-77). But 
we have yet to explain the benefits of employing a Transitional Justice framework in responding 
to these environmental injustices. The concluding section will thus demonstrate the ways in 
which Transitional Justice mechanisms can assist post-ecocide societies in coming to terms with 
the injustice of ecocide, i.e., enacting environmental transformative justice.321         
                                                        
321 For an overview regarding the distinction between Transitional Justice and environmental 
transformative justice (see 1).   
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 There is abundant literature canvassing the ways in which Transitional Justice 
mechanisms balance the competing goals of ending hostilities, promoting social stability, 
increasing democracy, dispensing punitive justice to perpetrators, providing reparations to 
victims, establishing the rule of law, memorializing the past, seeking the truth, and transforming 
social structures in transitional settings.322 We will therefore avoid rehashing arguments that 
have been thoroughly discussed elsewhere and instead focus specifically on the ways in which 
Transitional Justice mechanisms can further environmentalist ends (including habitat 
preservation, environmental restoration, and ecological sustainability) when implemented in 
service of justly responding to our paradigmatic and idealized cases of ecocide.323   
This novel analysis will attempt to provide Transitional Justice practitioners insights 
regarding the role played by policies to restore or sustain ecological functioning in the promotion 
of human rights, social transformation, and the diminishment of social suffering.324 However, 
these insights have broad applicability and should not be limited to cases of ecocide, since, as 
illustrated in previous sections, the maintenance, preservation, and restoration of ecological 
                                                        
322 See the International Journal of Transitional Justice that has numerous articles on all of these 
topics. 
323 As such, the analysis in this section offers a final justification for linking environmentalism to 
Transitional Justice.  
324 David Ong’s article, “Prospects for Transitional Environmental Justice in Socio-Economic 
Reconstruction of Kosovo” provides a thorough discussion of the role that environmental justice 
can play in overcoming human rights violations in Transitional settings (Ong 2017). As Ong 
explains, the potential for transitional environmental justice to become a key component of 
Transitional Justice more generally, stems from its ability to: “[A]ct as a means for conceptually 
recasting otherwise inextricable social conflicts in more nuanced terms, such that these 
underlying conflicts can be more practically mediated and eventually reconciled, even if never 
fully resolved. Second, as economic development generally, and socioeconomic reconstruction 
in particular, is now seen as a vital element for the rejuvenation of societies in transition and is 
thus increasingly included within the conceptualization of ‘transitional justice,’ ‘transitional 
environmental justice’ can play a significant role in ensuring that an otherwise unremitting and 
unmitigated focus on economic reconstruction does not result in uneven levels of development 
that either entrench old ethnic and social divisions or create new socioeconomic ones within 
already fragile transitional societies” (Ong 2017: 272).  
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functioning can further central human capabilities, which is an important objective in any 
transitional setting.   
To structure the analysis, we will divide the Transitional Justice mechanisms into four 
broad categories for repairing and reconciling grave historical injustices:325 (1) punitive justice 
mechanisms designed to bring perpetrators of mass atrocities to justice and to punish them for 
the crimes committed (e.g., criminal trials, lustration, sanctions, etc.); (2) reparative justice 
mechanisms designed to redress victims of atrocities for harms suffered, individually and 
collectively, in both material and symbolic ways (e.g., reparations, rehabilitation, 
memorialization, apologies, guarantees of non-repetition, etc.); (3) truth-oriented mechanisms 
designed to allow the society to have a full accounting and documentation of what occurred and 
why by investigating who suffered and how they were harmed, scrutinizing who committed the 
atrocities and how they benefited, and determining the root causes and structures that led to the 
injustice (e.g., truth and reconciliation commissions, reports, education programs, etc.), and (4) 
institutional reform mechanisms designed to transform public institutions and the structure of 
society in order to prevent such atrocities from occurring again and enable society to move 
forward into a brighter future (e.g., change laws, amend constitutions, modify institutions, 
etc.).326                
                                                        
325 It is helpful to recognize that these mechanisms can serve multiple purposes. For instance, 
truth and reconciliation commissions can further the truth-seeking mission by gathering 
testimony from victims and perpetrators, but it can also play a role in the punitive process by 
offering the public a chance to admonish perpetrators; as well as promote rehabilitation by 
providing victims an opportunity to reclaim some of their agency through publicly airing their 
grievances, and it can even further institutional reform by documenting the social institutions that 
are in need of restructuring because of the role they played in facilitating atrocities.    
326 This four-part categorization of Transitional Justice processes is fairly standard in the 
international community, as evinced by the fact that it is endorsed by the United Nations Office 
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the United Nations Peacebuilding 
Commission, and the United States Department of State Transitional Justice Initiative.  
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But before we begin theorizing how these mechanisms designed to repair and reconcile 
grave injustice can further environmental objectives, it is important to emphasize that we are not 
offering a comprehensive guideline or recipe for balancing the various and sometimes conflicting 
goals of Transitional Justice in post-ecocide states.327 Every case of ecocide is different and, as 
such, will each require measures and strategies that fit the specific cultural, economic, political, 
legal, and environmental context.  
In order to effectively deal with the context-specific nature of each harm, it is imperative 
that the transitional process include the participation, involvement, and consultation of local 
actors regarding how best to proceed. In other words, successfully responding to ecocide requires 
seriously engaging with the needs, aspirations, and goals of the impacted communities as a 
means of ensuring stakeholder ownership of the environmental transformative justice process. 
But as we will subsequently discuss, this may prove difficult in cases in which none of the 
victims remains (i.e., the ecocide was so severe that the impacted community has effectively 
disappeared).  
Additionally, it is key to regard environmental transformative justice as a dynamic 
process, in that decisions made and policies enacted will impact the range of future options 
available, influence the efficacy of other decisions, and dictate the need for further involvement. 
In other words, an adequate response must be iterative and flexible, since any policy decision 
will influence other issues and generate unintended consequences in the treatment of the original 
                                                        
327 Transitional Justice scholars have struggled with the prospects of determining a universally 
applicable rubric for pursuing justice in transitional settings since the discipline’s conception. As 
Colleen Murphy explains a central difficulty for theorizing such an account, is that: “The 
appropriate way to conceptualize the relationship between the fundamentally forward-looking 
aim of transformation and the fundamentally backward-looking claims entailed by wrongdoing is 
not immediately obvious” (Murphy 2017: 112).   
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problem, i.e., there is constant and continuous feedback between problem/solution and 
values/objectives.   
Finally, to note: As a first foray into hypothesizing the environmental-upshot of 
traditional Transitional Justice mechanisms, this theorizing begins as tentative and speculative 
due to the lack of empirical evidence from real-world cases to aid in the assessment of the impact 
of implementing such measures. With these caveats in mind, we can now proceed to considering 
the ways in which conventional Transitional Justice mechanisms may promote habitat 
preservation, environmental restoration, and ecological sustainability.  
 
A. Punitive Justice Mechanisms 
 
The need for punitive justice in transitional settings is commonly justified for various 
reasons: as means of retribution (i.e., re-balancing the moral scales by treating perpetrators 
harshly); as a means of deterrence (i.e., discouraging behavior by instilling fear that the 
consequences will be detrimental if the act is performed); as means of imparting a pedagogical 
effect on society (i.e., expressing that through harsh treatment of perpetrators that certain actions 
will no longer be tolerated); as a socio-political means of upholding victims’ rights (i.e., enacting 
punishment on behalf of victims), and as means of signaling a break from the past (i.e., 
repudiating the injustices of the prior regime and enacting punishment, which afford the new 
state an opportunity to (re)establish the rule of law and strengthen civil society). In post-ecocide 
states, punishment of perpetrators can serve all of these purposes. But at present we are 
interested in theorizing how these punitive measures can further environmental aims in 
particular.   
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One of the central punitive mechanisms employed by Transitional Justice is the use of 
trials and criminal punishment.328 Trials focus on specific wrongs that implicate individual 
perpetrators. They involve gathering evidence to prove that perpetrators are responsible for 
wrongs and hold the offenders accountable through rendering verdicts and sentencing the 
wrongdoers to punishment.  
Such juridical processes potentially offer many environmental benefits for responding to 
instances of ecocide. For one, trials provide an opportunity to gain information and establish a 
public record concerning the harm to the ecosystem (e.g., what species were lost, the scope and 
scale of the damage, how the local communities were impacted, etc.). The environmental 
evidence gathered in the course of fact-finding and litigating the criminal cases may unearth a 
rich set of biological, ecological, and anthropological information that might never have been 
discovered, documented, and publicized, absent the legal proceedings. This data could prove 
invaluable in planning how to preserve comparable ecosystems, or it might provide insight on 
guidelines for restoring the affected habitat.  
But beyond the prospects of gleaning relevant environmental information, criminal trials 
and punishment can assist environmental causes by incarcerating or socially isolating actors 
proven to have little respect for nature, thereby restricting their ability to detrimentally engage 
with the natural world. The legal punishment of ecocidal actors can furthermore function as a 
deterrent and pedagogical tool to express to the wider society that wanton disregard for the 
ecological health of habitats which communities rely on for their survival will no longer be 
tolerated.     
                                                        
328 Famous examples of criminal trials in transitional settings include: the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
Trials after WWII; the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and 
Rwanda (ICTR), and cases against Uganda, Congo, and the Central African Republic brought in 
front of the International Criminal Court (ICC).      
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There is, however, a limitation on individual criminal trials in that they focus on specific 
individuals. As discussed, the cases of ecocidal harm we are considering are unlikely to have 
been caused by rogue actors (see 136-138), instead we are predominantly concerned with 
instances of collective action that implicate large swaths of the society. Therefore, while criminal 
trials and punishment are well-suited for holding the authors of injustice (i.e., decision-makers 
who craft, determine, and execute policies (see 140-142)) answerable, they fail to take in to 
account the collective nature of the wrongs we are considering.  
As seen in our case-studies, the ecocidal acts were often legal when undertaken, 
presenting another difficulty in the use of trials. If the laws were not already on record, then it 
seems unjust to hold actors accountable for ‘crimes’ that were not illegal at the time of their 
commission. Since as Murphy explains, “a basic premise of all theories of criminal punishment, 
both the utilitarian and retributive kind, is that punishment should not be ex post facto” (Murphy 
2017: 91).329  
The worry is that if post-ecocide states pursue criminal trials and punishment pursuant to 
laws that were not on record, then it is likely those prosecuted will accuse the state of ex post 
facto application of law, which may undermine the perceived legitimacy of the proceedings and 
hinder the transition.330 Fortunately, Transitional Justice has employed putative measures that 
                                                        
329 The problem with ex post facto prosecution is that it breaches the assurance of prospectivity 
that undergirds the rule of law, which Transitional States are striving to (re)establish. As Lon 
Fuller explains, rule by law is when the, “government says to citizens in effect, ‘These are the 
rules we expect you to follow. If you follow them, you have our assurance that they are the rules 
that will be applied to your conduct.’” (Fuller 1964: 40). However, occasionally in transitional 
settings retroactive laws have been employed, e.g., the French, Danish, and Dutch used newly 
enacted laws with no prior precedent to punish Nazi collaborators (Posner and Vermeule 2003: 
791).      
330 Also, if ecocide came to be respected as the 5th Crime Against Peace throughout the world 
(precisely what this work is arguing should happen), it might weaken concerns over ex post facto 
legitimacy (even in states that had not ratified the ICC or incorporated such legislation 
domestically), because such prosecution might become internationally accepted as an appeal to 
higher preexisting or natural law.  
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may evade these worries and prove effective at holding the state’s decision-making apparatus to 
account.  
For example, lustration (i.e., the mass disqualification of those associated or complicit 
with the wrongdoing from accessing certain public spheres positions).331 Lustration is able to 
avoid some of the legitimacy issues posed by ex post facto application of the law because such 
measures are not necessarily linked to criminal proceedings, in that the termination can be 
framed as an employment decision.  
Basically, the state can rationalize removing agents from relevant civil service and 
political positions by arguing that these agents failed to live up to their duty of care and civic 
responsibility when directing, sanctioning, and permitting ecocidal acts to occur. Additionally, 
lustration has the potential to better express the collective aspects of the wrong in that it could 
shutdown entire agencies (e.g., the environmental protection agency) or remove large swaths of 
agents (e.g., managers of the department of the interior) from positions that might not have been 
directly involved with the commission of the harm, but who nevertheless helped establish the 
background conditions and social context that made ecocidal activity possible. Essentially, 
lustration offers a way of holding state actors to account who are not guilty of ecocide per the 
‘liability model’ but are responsible per the ‘social connection model’ (see 142-149).  
Lustration can serve environmental objectives in a way comparable to criminal trials by 
removing actors who failed to protect and preserve important ecosystems. Furthermore, it signals 
to the wider society that the state takes seriously the importance of preserving the ecological 
                                                        
331 The term ‘lustrate’ historically meant to, “purify ceremonially as a means of removing blood-
guiltiness and cleansing a house,” as such it has consistently been concerned with coming to 
terms with the past” (Cepl 1997: 230). But it became a more commonly recognized political-
contrivance after the widespread purge of government officials that occurred during the 
Revolutions of 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe, which resulted in the end of communist rule 
in the Eastern Bloc -- see Natalia Letki for a thorough analysis of the role that lustration played 
in democratizing Eastern and Central Europe (Letki 2002).   
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health of habitats that communities rely on for their survival.332 One worry is that while the 
mechanism is fitting for holding civil servants, political/public agents, and state actors to 
account, it is ill-suited to displace private citizens from positions in private entities (e.g., 
corporate executives, partners of firms, and sole proprietors of private businesses) without 
triggering the same ex post facto legal concerns at issue in criminal proceedings.   
A prospective punitive mechanism allowing post-ecocide states to target private actors 
and entities could be civil suits designed to dispossess perpetrators of the ill-gotten gains 
received in the commission of ecocidal activity.333 For instance, the state could assist victims in 
bringing tort claims (e.g., negligence, recklessness, wanton conduct, trespass, etc.) targeting 
profits generated by corporate involvement in ecocidal activity. The benefit of employing civil 
suits is that such claims can avoid ex post facto legitimacy issues because at least in the common 
law tradition, ex post facto concerns are limited to criminal statutory law.334  
Alternatively, the state could pursue fines and legal takings (i.e., confiscation of ill-gotten 
assets), but such measures are once again more likely than civil suits to trigger ex post facto 
legitimacy concerns if the initial acquisition and profit occurred legally. However, the benefit of 
such an approach is that states can explicitly mandate the return of specific property (i.e., the 
land or property an impacted community was forced to abandon), which may present a more 
                                                        
332 Adjudicating which habitats satisfy this criterion would be an important component of further 
environmental justice scholarship and practices. 
333 For instance, in 1998-1999 Holocaust survivors settled civil suits against Volkswagen AG, 
Siemens AG, Bayerische Motoren Werke AG, Daimler Benz AG, Leica Camera AG and I.G. 
Farben AG for $5 billion dollars to be paid to the 1.2 million survivors because the companies 
had forced them to work as slave laborers during the war (Buggeln 2014).    
334 For example, in the United States: “Courts consistently find that since statutes are civil in 
nature the Ex Post Facto Clause is not applicable…The standard retort to the laments of 
unjustified punishment is that the Ex Post Facto Clause applies only in a criminal context and 
therefore places no restriction on these civil legislative acts” (Aiken 1992: 324). 
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straightforward remedy to the problem than the monetary damages likely awarded in civil 
cases.335    
Nevertheless, dispossessing private actors of ill-gotten gains through civil trials, fines, or 
takings would undoubtedly further comparable epistemic aims as criminal trials because it would 
require discerning who benefited from ecocide and in what ways. Furthermore, extracting funds 
from actors who have demonstrated a propensity to exploit natural resources would weaken their 
ability to finance other ecocidal projects. Additionally, dispossession would provide similar 
pedagogical effect as criminal trials, punishment, and lustration, in that it too would signal to the 
wider society that the state no longer tolerates the destruction of habitats that communities rely 
on for their survival. Finally, the procured funds could be utilized to finance environmental 
projects, such as conserving comparable ecosystems or working to restore the harmed ecosystem 
to its prior functioning.   
Any punitive measure post-ecocide states may undertake will require imposing a loss of 
liberty on those responsible for the harm. Thus, for punitive measures to be effective, it is 
important that the harsh treatment reflects the perpetrator’s culpability and is proportional to the 
gravity of the harm. It is furthermore imperative that the state be mindful of not overreaching in 
the distribution of harsh treatment. For if too many citizens are censured, then the general 
population may turn against the transitional process before it is complete or, even worse, trigger 
a backlash against these policies, which may lead to further environmental destruction and the 
entrenchment of anti-environmentalist sentiments. With these caveats in mind, we can now move 
on to discussing reparative justice mechanisms.         
                                                        
335 For instance, Germany had to return the artwork and cultural artifacts the Nazi’s had 
plundered in their attempt to create a super museum to reflect Hitler’s personal tastes and 
supposedly glorify the Aryan race (Nicholas 1994: 10-11). More recently after the Persian Gulf 
War the U.N. Security Council forced the Iraqi government to return the cultural property they 
had looted in their invasion of Kuwait (Sandholtz 2008: 122-123).    
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B. Reparative Justice Mechanisms  
 
The need for reparative justice in transitional settings is commonly justified on various 
grounds: as a material and moral corrective (i.e., a process of re-balancing the material and moral 
scales by assisting victims); as a means of rehabilitation (i.e., restoring victims’ sense of agency, 
self-respect, and other capabilities necessary for purposeful self-development); as means of 
imparting a pedagogical effect on society (i.e., fostering social recognition that victims are equal 
citizens deserving of respect and moral consideration as members of the political community); as 
a means of overcoming pervasive structural inequality (i.e., providing aid and support - both 
material and psychological - to ensure that victims’ life prospects are comparable to the rest of 
society), and as means of acknowledging the past (i.e., memorializing the injustice and its impact 
on the victims to preserve public memory, raise awareness of past abuses, apologize, mark a 
break from the past, and help prevent reoccurrence). In post-ecocide states, repairing the harms 
done to victims can serve all of these functions. But at present we are interested in theorizing 
how these reparative measures can further environmental aims in particular. 
For simplicity’s sake, we will divide the Transitional Justice reparative mechanisms into 
two main categories: direct reparation (i.e., material compensation to those who have been 
wronged) and symbolic memorialization (i.e., processes designed to change victims’ and 
societies’ relationship with past wrongs). Reparative justice measures may include a mix of 
material and symbolic benefits to individuals and groups of victims, but we are drawing the 
distinction based on the measure’s central aspiration. For instance, if a group that has suffered 
grave human rights violations receives a small sum from the state that is nowhere near 
commensurate to the harm experienced or the material losses the community endured, then this 
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compensation ought to be viewed as an act of symbolic memorialization in that the allotment 
was intended as a public acknowledgement and apology for past injustice; whereas, if the 
intention behind the payment was to meaningfully assist victims in materially rebuilding their 
lives, then it would constitute a direct reparation (even if the payment proves inadequate for such 
purposes).     
In view of this distinction, we will begin by analyzing the many potential environmental 
benefits of enacting direct reparations. To achieve this aim, we will further subdivide direct 
reparations into three categories: (1) financial restitution (i.e., monetary payments aimed at 
making victims whole);336 (2) “in-kind” compensation (i.e., restoring and returning specific 
entities or objects that victims lost),337 and (3) rehabilitative service 338(i.e., support to assist 
                                                        
336 Examples of financial reimbursement in transitional settings include: Morocco providing 
financial restitution totaling over $100 million dollars to more than 5,000 victims of forced 
disappearances and arbitrary detention from the “Years of Lead” (i.e., the period between 1960-
1990 that saw mass political repression and human rights violations) (Morocco’s Equity and 
Reconciliation Commission Report 2006); beginning in 1991 Argentina began offering financial 
restitution in bonds worth between $220,000 and $256,000 dollars for 7,000 victims of persons 
disappeared in the “Dirty War” (i.e., the period from 1975 to 1983 when the military junta ruled 
the country and terrorized and political dissidents) (Wilson 2005: 788), and Germany in 2000 
began offering financial restitution to those forced into slave labor during the Holocaust, which 
has amounted to close to $5 billion dollars paid to over 1.6 millions victims worldwide (Reiter 
2019).   
337 Examples of “in-kind” compensation in transitional settings include: South Africa’s Land 
Restoration Act of 1994, which compensated victims of apartheid with a right to their land 
disposed after 1913 as a result of racially discriminatory laws or social practices (Atuahene 2010: 
79-80); Australia’s Aboriginal Land Rights Act of 1976, which allowed aboriginal communities 
to file for collective property claims for lands stolen during British conquest and colonization 
(Atuahene 2010: 80), or when German authorities in 2013 discovered a collection of over 1,500 
pieces of Nazi-stolen art valued at $1.35 billion dollars (including works by Picasso, Matisse, 
Renoir, and Chagall) that they vowed to catalog and return to the rightful heirs (Klein 2013).  
338 Vivid examples of rehabilitative service in transitional settings include: “The Historical 
Reparation Fund for the Location and Restitution of Children Kidnapped or Born in Captivity of 
1999,” which offered the Grandmothers of Plaza de Mayo a basic income guarantee of  $25,000 
dollars a month to provide these women with time and resources necessary to searching for and 
recovering disappeared children still missing from Argentina’s “Dirty War” (Lois and Lacabe 
1999); the Inter-American Court’s ruling in the case of Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala, 
which ordered Guatemala to implement development programs related to the enjoyment of 
economic, social and cultural rights (e.g., constructing sewers, supplying intercultural teachers, 
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victims in overcoming impediments resulting from past injustice). For instance, the British 
government in 1995 paid the Anangu peoples $13.5 million dollars as compensation for the loss 
of their land at Maralinga, such payment constitutes financial restitution (Korff 2017). But the 
state also assisted a few survivors (only five to be exact) by providing them medical care to treat 
their illnesses caused by exposure to radiation, which constitutes as a rehabilitative service 
(Korff 2017). Additionally, in 2009 the Australian government returned most of Maralinga to the 
Anangu as a place safe to “walk, build, camp, and hunt” and by 2014 the state had returned all of 
the land including the weapons testing range, such acts constitute “in-kind” compensation (Korff 
2017). Thus, we can see various ways in which direct reparations have been implemented as 
remedies in the cases of ecocide we are discussing. But what are the environmental benefits of 
these measures?    
To begin, a clear environmental upshot of financial restitution, is that such reparative 
measures may channel funds into the hands of groups and individuals who are concerned with 
restoring and preserving natural habitats and protecting ecological functioning; which in turn, 
diverts social-resources away from individuals and groups who may be more inclined to exploit 
nature. A problem, however, is that victims of ecocide may be unable convert monetary 
reimbursement into well-being because their way of life is not connected to or dependent on 
purchasing goods and services from the market system, which would often be the case for former 
autarkic citizens. Furthermore, even if they are able to convert financial gains into welfare, there 
                                                        
establishment of health care centers) as rehabilitative services to the victims of the Plan de 
Sanchez massacre, which resulted in the abuse and murder of over 250 Mayan women and 
children by the Guatemalan military (United Nations Human Rights Office of the High 
Commissioner 2014), and the Lomé Peace Agreement and Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
recommendation to provide, “health care, pensions, education, skills-training and 
microcredit/projects, community and symbolic reparations” but no cash payments as 
rehabilitative services to the victims of the Sierra Leone Civil War (United Nations Human 
Rights Office of the High Commissioner 2014).   
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is still the issue that victims of such grave harms may require massive financial allocation to 
even begin approaching the life that they would have had if they had not been unjustly burdened 
by ecocide.  
One way to avoid the above worries is by instead focusing on “in-kind” resource-
compensation (i.e., providing victims with things that money just cannot buy, such as access to 
ancestral lands). An environmental benefit of such measures is that they will likely require the 
state to undertake environmental “cleanup” projects to repair the damaged ecosystem and restore 
the habitat (at least, close as possible) to its prior functioning before transferring it back to the 
rightful owners. For instance, the British and Australian government attempted to decontaminate 
Maralinga of hazardous radiation three times before it was returned to the Anangu (Korff 2017).  
Thus, the environmental advantage of such “in-kind” compensation measures are obvious 
if successful, in that they would potentially restore the damaged habitat to its prior ecological 
functioning. Sadly, while returning the communities and habitats to their pre-harm condition is 
an optimal reparative outcome, it is likely entirely unfeasible in many instances of ecocide 
because the habitat or community are too far degraded for renewal. Furthermore, the allocation 
of resources to achieve such “in-kind” compensation may prove so drastic, as to begin 
undermining the availability of resources for other pressing societal concerns.     
Accordingly, pursuing rehabilitative services may avoid some of these worries, in that 
attempting to support impacted individuals or groups in overcoming impediments caused by 
ecocide can be conducted in a more gradual, partial, and fragmentary fashion than “in-kind” 
compensation. For instance, the Canadian government’s pledge to assist Cree families by 
providing them helicopter flights to their ancestral hunting grounds, which had become 
inaccessible after the hydroelectric damming projects prevented the rivers from freezing, seems 
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more feasible (while maybe less ideal) than attempting to undo or repair the environmental 
transformation caused by the dams (Olsson, Folke, and Berkes 2004: 82).  
Also, there are ample environmental upshots of delivering rehabilitative services to assist 
autarkic communities’ in continuing their traditional lifestyles (since as we have previously 
discussed, see 44-47, 63-65, 158-164 and 187-190), their subsistence and cultural practices often 
play important ecological roles in their own right (i.e., promoting biodiversity and proper 
ecosystem functioning). Furthermore, providing rehabilitative assistance to autarkic citizens 
aimed at fostering and reestablishing their traditional practices after ecocide, will allow these 
communities to preserve their rich body of knowledge regarding local ecosystems (i.e., their 
habitat learning); which can in turn, provide the general population with access to greater 
environmental information and opportunities to learn eco-friendly practices (see 48-51 and 187-
190). Thus, we can see the myriad of ways that pursuing rehabilitative assistance may further 
environmental objectives.  
However, as stated, a problem with all forms of direct reparations is that their aim of 
making victims whole (i.e., returning victims to the state they would have been in had the 
wrongs never occurred) is likely doomed to fail in the wake of grave injustice, including our 
cases of ecocide. The reasons for pessimism are manifold: (1) the commensurate compensation 
for such grave injustices and injuries may be impossible to calculate; (2) circumstances and 
constraints may make restoring the victims to their prior state impossible, (3) and competing 
justice concerns may make it unjustifiable to pursue making victims whole. For instance, how 
much financial compensation do victims of ecocide deserve for the loss of their way of life and 
connection to their ancestral home? Or how can ecocide refugees be compensated “in kind” if 
restoring their ecosystem is impossible? Should rehabilitative measures be pursued if expanding 
the economy to pay for these services could lead to further environmental destruction? Lastly, 
 297 
how can victims be made whole in the tragic case, in which ecocide was so devastating that the 
impacted community has effectively disappeared (i.e., there are no members left)? These and 
similar questions show the inherent difficulties and limitations of trying to pursue direct 
reparations in response to ecocide.  
Fortunately, Transitional Justice has other reparative mechanisms such as 
memorialization, designed to symbolically respond to grave harms and abandon direct 
reparations’ aim of making victims whole.339 Memorialization measures include the 
establishment of museums, parks memorials, exhibitions, demonstrations, ceremonies, and days 
of remembrance, which are designed to publicly commemorate the victims, raise awareness of 
past abuses, apologize, and help prevent recurrence.340  
Hence, a benefit of memorialization is that unlike reparations, these measures accept that 
the harms of the past can never be entirely corrected, in that they may be forgotten or overcome 
but not undone. As such, memorialization instead aspires to provide victims, perpetrators, and 
society as a whole with opportunities to change their relationship with past wrongs. As Jeffery 
Blustein explains, “memorialization can express moral attitudes of respect for value as well as 
for persons, can embody a commitment to justice and can exemplify virtues like courage and 
                                                        
339 Examples of memorialization in transitional settings include: monuments and annual prayer 
services to commemorate the victims of the Lord’s Resistance Army in northern Uganda 
(Hopwood 2011: 3); the Museum of Memory and Human Rights in Santiago, Chile that 
commemorates the victims and raises public awareness of the human rights violations committed 
under Pinochet’s dictatorship (1973-1990) (Balcells, Palanza, and Voytas 2018), and the 
Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum, which preserved the extermination camp as a research and 
education center and in memory of the 1.1 million people who died there (auschwitz.org).   
340 For a thorough discussion of the role of memorialization in transitional settings, see Jeffrey 
Blustein’s book, Forgiveness and Remembrance: Remembering Wrongdoing in Personal and 
Public Life chapters 4-7 (Blustein 2014).    
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hope…they can implicate a community’s sense of what is integral to its collective identity” 
(Blustein 2014: 12).341  
Furthermore, an additional benefit of memorialization projects is that such measures can 
provide reparations even in cases in which all the victims have disappeared, i.e., the tragic 
situation in which the environmental destruction was so severe, that no members of the 
community remain. Clearly, in such contexts, it is impossible to ‘make victims whole’ in any 
normal sense, but memorialization projects can still aim to preserve the legacy of the ‘vanished 
community’ and ensure that present and future generations acknowledge and never forget their 
loss. 
Nevertheless, a difficulty in such situations is that there are no direct victims available to 
articulate their reparative interests, which as we have emphasized is an important part of the 
environmental transformative justice process. Accordingly, it seems that at best what 
environmental transformative justice can do in such situations is identify and motivate well 
positioned actors to play the role of trustees and guardians representing the interests of the lost 
community throughout the reparative process.342    
 There are already many examples of memorialization in response to environmental 
harms. For instance, Earth Day (a holiday on the first day of Spring in the Northern Hemisphere 
to demonstrate support for environmental protection and celebrate the Earth) began in 1970, in 
                                                        
341 Blustein’s emphasis on the role of memorialization in fostering collective identity is pertinent 
to our conception of environmental transformative justice in that it demonstrates how societies 
can bridge divides between disparate, antagonistic, and hostile communities and build social 
cohesion. As such, acts of memorialization in post-ecocide settings can nurture understanding 
and acceptance that autarkic communities are part of the broader society by identifying autarkic 
interests as pertinent to the collective interest.   
342 The theory of responsibility that we developed in the Second Chapter of the dissertation, can 
offer insights into identifying and motivating appropriate actors to take on the role of guardian or 
trustee for ‘vanished communities’ - based on their connection to the harm or the lost 
community, power to enact social change, or interest in memorializing the injustice or preventing 
ecocide moving forward.  
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response to an oil well blowout off the coast of Santa Barbara, California (Wheeling and Ufberg 
2017). The oil spill spewed over three million gallons of oil and resulted in the death of seabirds, 
seals, dolphins, sea lions, fish and other marine life over an 800 square-mile expanse of the 
Pacific (Wheeling and Ufberg 2017). More recently, Iceland memorialized Okojokull, the first 
glacier lost to climate change in the country, by holding a public ceremony to install a monument 
where the glacier once stood.343  
Another, vivid instance of memorialization after an environmental harm is Alberto 
Banuelos-Fournier’s monolithic memorial sculpture entitled, The Wound, which was 
commissioned by the Galician government in Spain to commemorate the sinking of a structurally 
deficient oil tanker off the community’s coast in 2002 (Varona 2019: 9). The spill is considered 
the worst in the history of Europe and was responsible for spewing close to 80,000 tonnes of oil 
over two-thousand kilometers of the Spanish, Portuguese and French coast (Varona 2019: 7). 
The monolithic statue (the largest in all of Spain) is supposed to commemorate the wounded 
ecological landscape that resulted in the death of over 200,000 seabirds and countless other 
marine life; as well as, acknowledge the thousands of volunteers who helped to clean up the spill 
(Varona 2019 7-9). Interesting, since ecosystem functioning has been reestablished in the region 
and the beauty of the coast has been restored, the monument reminds present visitors of past 
ecological harm, “in this sense, this memorial might function as a time gate to reflect on the 
possibilities of restorative memory” (Varona 2019: 9).  
From these examples we can see that memorialization can play an important role in 
acknowledging the past and raising awareness so that action can be taken in the present to 
                                                        
343 The monument reads: "Ok is the first Icelandic glacier to lose its status as a glacier. In the 
next 200 years, all our glaciers are expected to follow the same path. This monument is to 
acknowledge that we know what is happening and know what needs to be done. Only you know 
if we did it," which succinctly expresses the central aims of memorialization to publicly 
commemorate a loss that should never be repeated (O’Dowd 2019).  
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prevent similar harms in the future. From an environmental perspective symbolic 
memorialization of ecocidal harm could serve to further environmental objectives in a myriad of 
ways beyond decreasing the prospects of such harms reoccurring in the future. For instance, even 
if the impacted habitat cannot be restored, memorialization efforts could focus on preserving 
comparable habitats in other regions or provide special legal status to the flora and fauna that 
once inhabited the area. Such measures could help ensure that these ecosystems and species do 
not go extinct or disappear.  
Additionally, memorialization efforts could include constructing museums, monuments, 
and exhibits to commemorate the lost culture and habitat, which would raise awareness and 
preserve knowledge of eco-social communities that previously flourished in the region. For 
instance, zoological reserves, botanical gardens, and, national parks may serve important 
memorialization functions post-ecocide. While such measures may not directly assist in 
environmental conservation or restoration, they could nevertheless preserve valuable ecological 
information about the lost habitat (e.g., taxonomies of the flora and fauna, food chains, energy 
flows, etc.); which could provide insights into how best to protect or restore other habitats.  
Furthermore, such measures could also offer the general population a chance to reflect on 
their harmful treatment of the environment and present opportunities to teach eco-friendly 
practices. For instance, the victims could be commissioned to offer tutorials, lessons, and 
reenactments in celebration of their traditional autarkic practices. Or there could be days of 
remembrance that could directly further environmental aims by including rituals, such as 
planting a tree or cleaning up green spaces, to commemorate the injustice of ecocide.344    
                                                        
344 As Blustein explains, commemorative rituals can have generative, educative, and regulative 
emotive functions: “Rituals elicit emotions in participants (on an ongoing basis) by drawing their 
attention to emotionally laden events; they teach participants what emotions it is appropriate for 
them to have in relation to certain events; and they regulate the emotions that they elicit or that 
 301 
Hopefully, from this brief discussion, it has become apparent that there is abundant 
potential for engaging in environmentally advantageous acts of memorialization. Hence, we can 
now move on to discussing truth-seeking Transitional Justice mechanisms.         
 
C. Truth-Oriented Mechanisms  
 
The need for truth in transitional settings is commonly justified on various grounds: (1) as 
a means of understanding and reconciling with injustice; (2) as a means of publicly and privately 
acknowledging the past; (2) as a means of establishing and demarcating culpability for wrongs; 
(3) as a means of justifying and motivating the need for social change, and (4) as a means 
educating the public so such harms are less likely in the future. In post-ecocide states, truth-
oriented mechanisms can serve all of these purposes. But at present we are interested in 
theorizing how these measures can further environmental aims in particular. 
Truth-oriented mechanisms in transitional settings can be divided into three 
interconnected processes: (1) truth-seeking (i.e., investigating past abuses); (2) truth-
documenting (i.e., collecting and recording past abuses), and (3) truth-disseminating (i.e., 
reporting on past abuses). Transitional Justice has developed mechanisms to further each of these 
aims. For instance, the standard veridical process in transitional settings involves: first, enacting 
truth commissions and offering amnesty to assist in discovering the truth; then commissioning 
report(s) to document the findings, and finally releasing, publishing, publicizing, and 
broadcasting the information to the general public. We will explore how each of these activities 
may further environmental objectives.  
                                                        
participants bring to the ritual activity by providing channels for their expression. I call the latter 
feature of rituals disciplined emotionality” (Blustein 2014: 207).  
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Truth-seeking mechanisms (e.g., truth commissions and offers of amnesty in return for 
information) generally aim at examining the root causes and patterns of violence.345 In post-
ecocide states this may include establishing a truth and reconciliation commission as a venue in 
which victims can share their experiences with the public and perpetrators can offer information 
and take responsibility for their involvement in the environmental destruction in exchange for 
amnesty from criminal prosecution.  
Furthermore, employing truth-seeking mechanisms can serve reparative purposes, in that 
the process of truth-seeking itself can be a form of reparation, reconciliation, and rehabilitation. 
Accordingly, pursuing truth through these non-juridical institutions could further both punitive 
justice (i.e., by publicly exposing, shaming, and embarrassing perpetrators) and reparative justice 
(i.e., by publicly honoring victims, memorializing their harms, and rehabilitating their sense of 
agency); as well as provide comparable environmental benefits.  
For instance, the act of establishing a truth and reconciliation commission signals to 
society that ecocide is an impermissible wrong, which hopefully diminishes the likelihood of 
reoccurrence by influencing social norms against such practices. Furthermore, motivating those 
involved to divulge information and admit what happened could offer insights into the pervasive 
structures, institutions, norms, and policies that made such harms possible, providing policy-
makers with insights into how society needs to change to prevent similar injustices.  
                                                        
345 Examples of truth-seeking mechanisms include: The South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, which in the wake of apartheid offered amnesty to individuals that fully admitted 
their crimes and proved that they were political motivated, out of 7,112 applicants only 849 were 
granted amnesty (Matthews 2018); Argentina’s National Commission on the Disappearance of 
Persons, which was an institution created immediately after President Alfonsin took office to 
investigate the fate of the disappeared during the “Dirty War” (Crenzel 2008), and the Chilean 
National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation established in 1990 (which the first to use the 
name) to investigate the deaths and disappearances that occurred under Pinochet’s military 
dictatorship (1974-1990).        
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Since, non-juridical truth-seeking mechanisms allow actors to divulge information 
without the threat that such information may be used against them. It is reasonable to assume that 
employing these mechanisms will assist post-ecocide societies in gathering valuable data and 
developing a more complete understanding regarding the environmental harm, than by relying 
exclusively on punitive justice mechanisms that likely suppresses actors’ desire to volunteer 
information.    
A further epistemic benefit of such non-juridical proceedings is that they likely enable 
and encourage a wide segment of society to testify (at least when compared with individual 
criminal trials), in that actors who might not have been directly involved with the commission of 
the ecocide may nonetheless feel obligated and desire to volunteer information regarding their 
role in establishing the background conditions and social context that made ecocidal activity 
possible. Essentially, truth and reconciliation commissions offer means of gaining information 
from actors who would not be prosecuted or implicated in criminal proceedings per the ‘liability 
model’ but who nonetheless were involved per the ‘social connection model’ (see 142-149).  
Moreover, permitting autarkic citizens to testify regarding how they were harmed could 
provide a wealth of ecological information (e.g., detailing the species and populations that were 
lost, the ecological functions that were impacted, the area of the harm, etc.) that might never 
have been discovered, documented, and publicized, absent a venue for victims to share their 
experiences. This wealth of ecological information could prove invaluable in planning how to 
preserve comparable ecosystems, or it might provide insight on guidelines for restoring the 
affected habitat. Likewise, autarkic citizen’s testimony regarding how they were harmed, affords 
these citizens a chance to publicly describe how the environmental degradation impacted their 
way of life; which in turn, would provide the general public an opportunity to learn of alternative 
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modes of subsistence (i.e., more eco-friendly practices) and reflect on ways they might change 
their relationship and treatment of nature.    
Transitional Justice employs two central truth-documenting mechanisms: commissioned 
reports and archives. Both aim at collecting and recording past abuses. The major difference 
between the two is that reports attempt to condense the relevant information gathered from 
criminal proceedings, truth commissions, and other forms of investigation into past abuses into 
succinct narratives (i.e., articulate what happened during the repression/conflict, who committed 
the atrocities, how the victims suffered, and recommend institutional reform so that such 
atrocities do not happen again).346 Whereas archives attempt to unbiasedly catalog and store as 
much of the collected information as possible.347  
In essence, reports are normatively-loaded documents that aim to construct sanctioned 
understandings, narrate accountability, and prescribe appropriate social memory and responses; 
whereas archives are supposed to remain normatively-mute repositories, designed to save as 
much of the unfiltered evidence as possible for future generations. Both approaches have similar 
environmental upshots as truth-seeking mechanisms. Archives however are likely more effective 
in their role at preserving valuable ecological information, while commissioned reports are likely 
better suited to influence social norms, values, and conventions toward diminishing the prospects 
of ecocide reoccurring.  
                                                        
346 For instance, Argentina’s Nunca Mas (“Never Again”) Report provided a detailed account, 
analysis, and description of the treatment of the disappeared during the “Dirty War” it 
successfully identified over 300 secret detention centers and documented 8,961 deaths and 
disappearances (Crenzel 2008: 175).  
347 For example, The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia Archive has 
collected, documented, and preserved a wide range of materials: 3704 shelf meters of physical 
records, 8000 terabytes of electronic records including 45,000 videotapes of proceedings and 
another 5500 videotapes of evidence, nearly 6 million items of articles and still photographic 
evidence, and more than 13,000 artifacts obtained as evidence (Campbell 2012: 4).  
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Lastly, truth-disseminating mechanisms aim to broadcast the veridical information 
gathered in criminal proceedings, truth commissions, commissioned reports, and other forms of 
investigation. States in transition have distributed the information in various methods (e.g., 
publishing reports, radio and television broadcasts, opening museums, and other methods).348 
The environmental benefits of truth-disseminating mechanisms are comparable to those covered 
in our discussion of truth-seeking mechanisms.  
 In cases of ecocide, it is critical that the state employs eco-friendly distributive methods 
as a means of demonstrating that it has reconsidered and reformed its attitude, treatment, and 
relationship with the natural world. A straightforward example of an inappropriate and 
environmentally harmful form of distribution would be if the state unliterally opted to provide 
every citizen with a leather-bound and gold-accented copy of the full commissioned report. 
Producing and distributing such a materially decadent report to all citizens (including those who 
have no interest in reviewing the report) would undoubtedly cause environmental degradation 
and waste. Moreover, the optics surrounding the decision to mass-produce and distribute such an 
item (when less environmentally harmful options were available, e.g., printing it in paper-back, 
removing the gold-trim, making it accessible in a digital-medium, sending copies to only parties 
that have expressed interest, etc.) likely illustrates to the impacted community and the broader 
society that the state has failed to internalize the importance of ecofriendly and sustainable 
practices; has not taken the time to reconsidered how it intends to relate to the natural world, nor 
                                                        
348 For instance, Argentina has kept the Nunca Mas Report continuously in print since 1984 and 
it has become a national best seller with over 300,000 copies sold (Hayner 2001: 34); the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission televised live the first two hours of the human 
rights violation committee hearings and broadcast the remainder of the hearings live via radio, as 
well as, subsequently televising the hearings as hour long episodes from 1996 to 1998 (Thloloe 
1998), and Germany has preserved the Dachau, Sachsenhausen, and Buchenwald extermination 
camps as a means of disseminating information regarding the atrocities of the Holocaust and to 
commemorate the victims.    
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acknowledged the importance of consulting with and listening to the communities that will be 
impacted by its decisions before taking action.  
Nonetheless, it is important to emphasize that the extent of the environmental advantage 
derived from the veridical process will largely depend on how broadly and to whom the 
information is distributed. As such there is a potential tension between the goal of broad 
distribution (which may require more environmentally intrusive methods) and pursuing 
ecofriendly distributive practices (which may hinder broad distribution). How to balance these 
competing distributive concerns will need to be conducted on a case-by-case basis and as such is 
beyond the scope of our analysis.  
Finally, it is imperative that the state be mindful of the fact that disseminating the results 
of truth-gathering mechanisms may lead to social tension and further animosity between groups, 
individuals, and the state. For instance, if the report brings to light previously unknown 
injustices, it may trigger new rounds of hostility or if individuals and groups resent or disagree 
with their portrayal in the report, it might cause them to lash out against the reparative and 
reconciliatory process.  
From an environmental standpoint such hostility is problematic because it may lead 
directly to environmental destruction or undermine the environmental transformative justice 
process. As such, it is vital for the state to be careful in not exacerbating or creating sources of 
hostility during the truth-disseminating process. With this discussion of truth mechanisms 
complete, we may now move on to discussing the environmental benefits of institutional reform 
in transitional settings.   
 
D. Institutional Reform Mechanisms  
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As Murphy succinctly states, “transformation is the key overarching moral aim of 
responses to wrong doing in transitional contexts” (Murphy 2017: 112). But the difficulty is that 
this social transformation must be conducted justly by dealing with the wrongs particular 
perpetrators committed against particular victims. Accordingly, Transitional Justice is concerned 
with the just pursuit of social transformation. Relying on a structural analogy from just war 
theory, Murphy conveys that Transitional Justice has two central aspects: the jus in bello criteria 
validating the need for societal transformation (i.e., the end) and the jus ad bellum criteria 
governing in what way the social transformation is conducted (i.e., the means) (Murphy 2017: 
114-118).349  
By employing Murphy’s structural analogy from just war theory, we can see that the 
punitive and reparative measures already discussed are responsive to jus ad bellum moral 
concerns that wrongdoing generates for both the victims and perpetrators in transitional contexts. 
Whereas, institutional reform mechanisms focus directly on the jus in bello goal of social 
transformation in transitional contexts.   
Essentially, institutional reform mechanisms aim to transform public institutions from 
instruments of oppression into institutions that generate social trust, respect for the rule of law, 
foster hope, further social capabilities, spread acknowledgment of equality and reciprocity 
between moral agents, restore confidence, and strengthen social stability. Institutional reform 
                                                        
349 Murphy relies on the jus ad bellum and jus in bello distinction from just war theory as a 
structural analogy helpful for conceptualizing the complex relationship between the need for 
justice and the pursuit of social transformation in transitional contexts. As Murphy explains: “My 
interest is not in the particular criteria for just war but rather in the widely recognized structure of 
just war theory [i.e., the jus ad bellum and jus in bello distinction]. It is this basic structure that 
offers a useful analogy for theorizing about transitional justice by providing a model for how two 
distinct sets of moral criteria interact to jointly determine the justice of a given subject” (Murphy 
2017: 115).  
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may take the form of amending constitutions, enacting legislation, restructuring institutions, 
increasing civilian oversight and involvement, and providing educational opportunities.  
Most importantly institutional reform must aim to alter the basic structure of society to 
prevent recurrence of injustice. To achieve this, it is vital that the reform measures combat the 
pervasive structural inequities that facilitated and produced the injustice. Thus, it is imperative 
that post-ecocide states end the normalized and collective wrongdoing against autarkic 
communities, by altering the institutional structures and predominant mindsets that persistently 
prioritize roving imperialist interests over autarkic citizens. In other words, post-ecocide states in 
attempting to promote social stability must replace ecocidal social structures with sustainable 
forms of governance that respect peoples’ ability to maintain their traditional relationships with 
habitats and natural entities that they depend on for their wellbeing.  
Fundamentally, for institutional reform to be successful requires achieving two criteria: 
transformation of de jure conditions, which alters the basic institutional structure of society (i.e., 
changing the officially codified and sanctioned legal apparatus) and transformation of de facto 
conditions (i.e., changing the collective hearts and minds of the citizenry). Both kinds of reform 
are intertwined and mutually reinforcing, in that explicitly amending the written constitution, 
enacting legislation, restructuring institutions will undoubtedly affect people’s behaviors and 
attitudes; and conversely, changing the culture and subjective sentiments and mindset of the 
citizenry will undoubtedly spur legal reform. We will begin by focusing on transformative 
mechanisms targeting de jure structures (i.e., constitutional and legal reforms) before moving on 
to those targeting de facto conditions (i.e., educational reform)      
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Constitutional reform is a key mechanism for driving de jure social change in transitional 
settings.350 Constitutions embody the supreme law of a state, establish the formal rules that direct 
and constrain government power, and define the relationship between the government, 
institutions, and individuals. As constitutional scholar, Patrick Monahan states, “a country’s 
constitution is the set of fundamental principles that together describe the organizational 
framework of the state and the nature, the scope of, and the limitations of the exercise of state 
power” (Monahan 1997: 5). Hence, constitutional reform represents an important mechanism for 
changing the political order and basic structure of society. Essentially, since constitutional 
reforms play such a central role in establishing the basic structure of a society, they offer unique 
benefits that other legal and social reform measures lack.  
Over the past few decades, there has been a groundswell of pro-environmental 
constitutional restructurings and amendments. David Boyd’s well-researched book, The 
Environmental Rights Revolution: A Global Study of Constitutions, Human Rights, and the 
Environment, documents the amount of countries that have incorporated “some form of 
environmental protection provisions” in their constitutions; a number which has grown from zero 
in the year 1975, to 147 out of the 193 countries with codified constitutions in 2012 (Boyd 2012: 
76).351 For instance, “the right to live in a healthy environment” is now explicitly recognized in 
ninety-two constitutions, which is remarkable since, as Boyd explains, “no other human right has 
achieved such a broad level of constitutional recognition in such a short period” (Boyd 2012: 
                                                        
350 A well-publicized example of constitutional reform in transitional settings, is the current 
Constitution of South Africa that introduced a preamble that recognizes the injustices of the prior 
Apartheid regime and enumerated a Bill of Rights that guarantees the protection and promotion 
of human rights for all South Africans (Endoh 2015).    
351 Portugal in 1976 was the first country to amend their constitution to protect environmental 
rights. The Portuguese Constitution states: “Everyone shall possess the right to a healthy and 
ecologically balanced human living environment and the duty to defend it,” and it goes on to 
“charge the state” with fulfilling the obligation in eight specific ways (The Constitution of 
Portugal, Article 66).  
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76).352 Furthermore, in over 50 nations courts have interpreted and enforced the constitutional 
right to a healthy and suitable environment (Boyd 2012: 279-280).  
In order to ensure that these environmental constitutional reforms are effective in post-
ecocide contexts, it is necessary that they contain both substantive and procedural elements. The 
substantive component necessitates that the constitutional amendment entitles impacted actors 
(i.e., citizens whose habitats have been intentionally destroyed without their consent) to bring 
claims against perpetrators and the state, whereas the procedural element obligates state actors to 
involve and consult with potentially impacted citizens and communities before enacting policies 
or activities that may affect their environment.  
The substantive components express the right of citizens and communities to maintain 
their traditional relationship with habitats on which they depend. Consequently, it is a violation 
of this right if the state directly, indirectly, or negligently allows these eco-social bonds to be 
broken without the impacted parties’ consent. Such substantive constitutional requirements 
clearly signal that post-ecocide states view ecocidal activity as impermissible in a just society, 
                                                        
352 A benefit of enacting environmental provisions after an instance of ecocide, is that the gravity 
of the harm can motivate support for social reform to prevent such harms from reoccurring. It is 
commonly accepted in Transitional Justice that grave atrocities present important moments for 
enacting social change. Another benefit of enacting constitutional environmental reform in post-
ecocide settings is that, since there is a clear wrong in mind (i.e., the intentional destruction of 
habitats that communities rely on for their survival, which occur without the impacted 
communities’ consent), defining the rights, duties, and obligations necessary to confront the 
problem becomes more feasible. This is beneficial in that environmental constitutional reforms 
are commonly criticized as being perceived as ill-defined, ambiguous, or lacking actionable 
standards. As Erin Daly explains, “The uncertain boundaries of substantive environmental rights 
force courts onto a tightrope when they seek to enforce substantive rights. If they read the rights 
too narrowly, they risk damage to the environment which could have deleterious effects on the 
ecosystem and the dignity and health of the population for generations to come. Over-enforcing 
substantive environmental rights, however, may unduly limit development and economic 
progress that could have benefited the local population and perhaps the nation as a whole” (Daly 
2012: 77). Therefore, constitutional reform that furthers environmental transformative justice 
avoids these worries by stipulating a clearly defined and narrow range of environmentally 
harmful activities that are deemed impermissible in well-ordered, just societies.   
 311 
which would hopefully drive social norms away from tolerating and accepting environmentally 
destructive behavior. 
There are many other environmental benefits of adopting substantive constitutional 
requirements that hold governments accountable for destroying ecosystems vital to peoples’ way 
of life. For one, if such habitats are intentionally harmed, then the impacted actors have 
legitimate grounds for asserting the state is obligated to restore or construct the lost ecosystem 
functioning. Secondly, such measures motivate the state to conduct extensive environmental 
impact analysis before taking action or approving projects and policies that may violate the 
substantive constitutional provision; which in turn, would likely expand environmental 
knowledge, information, and understanding. Lastly, such substantive requirements would 
motivate actors to develop new tools, policies, and procedures to avoid harming the environment 
and violating constitutional provisions.   
The procedural component expresses the right of citizens and communities to access 
information involving state plans, agreements, or policies that may impact their traditional 
relationship with nature, participate in the decision-making process, and have recourse to justice 
if the state fails in these obligations. An environmental benefit of procedural constitutional 
requirements is that they can proactively prevent environmental destruction by giving potentially 
impacted communities the opportunity to express their concerns before environmentally harmful 
activity occurs. Furthermore, the potentially impacted communities can request that the state 
collect and research hypothetical environmental harms that state actors might not have thought to 
consider (e.g., the Cree could have explained that they walk across the frozen rivers to get to 
their traditional hunting grounds).  
In other words, the greater the diversity of actors involved in the decision-making 
process, the better the chances that potentially negative environmental impacts will be brought to 
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light before the project progresses and harm ensues. As actors learn to take advantage of the 
increased opportunity to participate, they will likely become better able and more sophisticated 
in expressing environmental concerns. Lastly, building up a body of complaints and 
documenting the various grievances will likely increase environmental knowledge, information, 
and understanding.    
Boyd has empirically demonstrated that “nations with environmental provisions in their 
constitutions have smaller ecological footprints, rank higher on comprehensive indices of 
environmental indicators, are more likely to ratify international agreements, and made faster 
progress in reducing sulphur dioxides, nitrogen oxides, and greenhouse gases than nations 
without such provisions” (Boyd 2012: 121). There is thus ample empirical evidence supporting 
the claim that enacting pro-environmental constitutional reforms (regardless of if they are 
substantive or procedural) will lead to positive environmental outcomes in post-ecocide states.353   
Enacting legislation and restructuring institutions to promote environmentally-friendly 
social transformation will undoubtedly have many of the same environmental benefits of 
constitutional reform. Furthermore, constitutional amendments impact national legislation, 
influence judicial decisions, constrain legal enforcement, shape governmental institutions, and 
dictate social policy. As such, pursuing constitutional change offers unique benefits that other 
legal and social reform measures lack. 
 Thus, at present we can refrain from analyzing these reform mechanisms in their own 
right beyond stipulating that it is important they aim at the following: giving people true freedom 
and opportunity to engage with habitats and natural entities central to their purposeful self-
development; signaling that the state considers activities undermining these eco-social 
                                                        
353 Although it is always important to be mindful of the fact that correlation does not equal 
causation.   
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connections to be grave wrongs; fostering widespread recognition of habitat preservation as a 
key element of a just society, and, finally, reducing environmental degradation in order to 
provide all segments of the population with a practicable chance at flourishing.         
Regarding the social transformation of de facto conditions, we have already discussed 
how punitive, reparative, and truth-oriented mechanisms each play an important pedagogical role 
in changing the hearts and minds of the citizenry in transitional settings. For instance, truth and 
reconciliation hearings, criminal trials, museums, public memorials, and monuments represent 
informal educational spaces that provide citizens opportunities to learn about, interpret, and 
reconcile with the past. Formal educational programs also play a vital part in directly 
encouraging de facto social transformation in transitional contexts.354 As Michelle Bellino, Julia 
Paulson, Elizabeth Worden succinctly explain, “At the most basic level, the goal of never again 
requires knowledge of the past and commitment to ensuring that it is not repeated. This 
obligation to (and of) future generations makes education essential to transitional justice” 
(Bellino, Paulson, Worden 2017: 317).  
We will therefore discuss how formal educational programs can promote environmental 
benefits in post-ecocide societies. Since, as Lynn Davies states, “Transitional Justice approaches 
in education are distinctive, potent, and impactful, and, while tremendously challenging, they can 
shift education from being part of the problem to being part of the transition to a more peaceful 
society” (Davies 2017: 1). To successfully further de facto social transformative, educative 
                                                        
354 “The Shared Education Program” in Northern Ireland is a clear example of a formal education 
measures designed to change hearts and minds by disrupting hostile narratives and diminishing 
animosity between antagonistic groups (e.g., Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland) in 
transitional settings. The program sought to overcome the lack of progress in integrating schools 
and communities in the country by allowing: “Students to travel and share classes for certain 
core curricular areas. Evaluations show that early fears that this arrangement would lead to 
greater sectarian violence have been unfounded. Students enjoyed the activities and meeting 
students from other areas” (Davies 2017: 9) 
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programs must satisfy what Davies calls the “dual gaze” of looking back to understand the past 
abuses and looking ahead to ensure that they never reoccur (Davies 2017). 
Firstly, in order to prevent reoccurrence, it is imperative that the state undertake mass 
public education programs to ensure the general public understands how these mechanisms 
work, why they are being implemented, and what they aim to achieve. Since transitional justice 
processes involve implementing novel and complex procedures and mechanisms, there is a 
strong likelihood that fear of the unknown and resistance to change will cause the measures to 
draw criticism, face opposition, and lose legitimacy, unless there are procedures and programs in 
place to engender broad understanding regarding the transitional policies. For instance, in order 
to prevent backlash against environmental laws and policies that may force citizens to change 
their daily consumptive and productive behaviors, it is imperative that the state explain why 
promoting more sustainable social practices is necessary for preventing unjust ecocidal harms.  
Formal educative programs can aim to mass (re)educate the general public into 
internalizing environmental values by offering narratives of the past that legitimize or 
delegitimize particular experiences, practices, beliefs, and attitudes. For example, post-ecocide 
states could strive to educate the populace regarding the valuable social contributions autarkic 
communities provide the general public through preserving biodiversity, promoting agroecology, 
and maintaining ecological health. Conversely, post-ecocide states could strive to educate the 
public regarding the harms of roving imperialism by illustrating how continuing such a way of 
life would potentially lead to eco-social collapse.   
Additionally, the state might mandate curriculum changes requiring the purging of old 
curricula employing environmentally harmful ideologies and materials and replacing them with 
eco-friendlier and environmentally informed perspectives and lessons. Such curriculum changes 
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would require hiring, training, and professionally developing teachers to become competent 
purveyors of pro-environmental information.  
Former autarkic citizens in many cases would be ideal candidates for providing such 
services, in that they could offer instruction in their way of life, as a means of promoting 
ecofriendly practices and explaining how previous (and current) social practices were (and are) 
causing environmental harm. Courses of this kind could offer hands-on activities and 
opportunities to educate the general public regarding their local environment, by using learn-by-
doing approaches aimed at fostering tangible skills and developing tools and methods for 
interacting with nature in more sustainable, nourishing, and meaningful ways.  
These formal education procedures would hopefully radically alter the public’s 
relationship with their environment, which obviously has the potential to produce innumerable 
and far-reaching environmental benefits. Hence, we have seen how the institutional reform 
mechanism of de facto social conditions can improve post-ecocide societies’ relationship with 
nature, by transforming cultures once predicated on environmental destruction into cultures that 
embrace and celebrate ecological sustainability.     
 
IV. Conclusion  
 
The preceding discussion has attempted to make clear the environmental benefits of 
employing Transitional Justice mechanisms in response to ecocide. The discussion has hopefully 
further illuminated the potential intersections between the goals of Transitional Justice and 
environmentalism, by demonstrating how promoting the reparative and reconciliatory aims of 
Transitional Justice can further environmental sustainability, habitat restoration, and ecological 
conservation – and vice versa.  
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 An additional benefit of situating responses to ecocide within the Transitional Justice 
framework is derived from the framework’s focus on collective harms to peoples, communities, 
and groups. Transitional Justice recognizes that repairing, correcting, and remedying only 
individual grievances is inappropriate and inadequate for overcoming pervasive political 
injustices, since the pertinent harms under consideration stem from social policies perpetrated 
against specific groups.   
Essentially, to combat systems of oppression that target and impact individuals because 
they are members of a particular group demands that a just response take seriously the group-
level nature of the harm. Such an insight is helpful in supplementing liberal conceptions of 
justice designed to articulate societies’ negative and positive obligations to citizens as 
individuals. For example, Sen and Nussbaum emphasize that a just society is one that allows 
individuals to develop certain capabilities.  
By utilizing Transitional Justice mechanisms designed to overcome group-level harms, 
environmental transformative justice is able to effectively respond to wrongs committed against 
communities, i.e., it can repair and reconcile injustices to autarkic communities at a group-level. 
For instance, memorialization projects in transitional settings (e.g., establishing museums, parks, 
memorials, exhibitions, demonstrations, ceremonies) are generally designed to help the 
community as a whole, instead of assisting particular members beyond their connection to the 
group. The same holds true in a post-ecocide context, as the environmental transformative justice 
goal of restoring or constructing an ecosystem does not simply aim at aiding specific citizens but 
rather seeks to reestablish a way of life for the betterment of the entire eco-social community. 
In the concluding pages, I wish to raise some difficulties for the theory of environmental 
transformative justice presented throughout this work. The intention is to highlight areas for 
future scholarship, while further clarifying the concept.  
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One worry is that the model of ecocide presented is overly narrow, in that it does not 
apply to many important cases of environmental degradation. For instance, because the 
environmental destruction must be caused intentionally, it excludes inadvertent environmental 
harms produced by industrial production and consumption (e.g., islands sinking beneath the sea 
because of climate change, algae blooms toxifying lakes because of fertilizer runoff, wildfires 
fires resulting from inappropriate forest management, avalanches triggered by extractive mining, 
etc.).  
However, it is possible to partially overcome this objection by demonstrating how many 
of these harms can be framed to fit within our conception of ecocide. For example, if there is a 
pervasive, reoccurring, and recognized connection between an activity and an environmental 
harm, then it can be argued that continuing to perform the activity is tantamount to intentional 
environmental destruction. If an industrial process results in emissions that degrades surrounding 
habitats, and it is well established that the factory’s activities are directly causing the harm, then 
one can reasonably maintain that continuing the process, even if the factory owners do not desire 
the harm, nonetheless constitutes intentional environmental destruction. Therefore, if the state 
engages in, promotes, or continues to allow these harmful activities, directly resulting in the 
destruction of habitats that communities are dependent upon for their wellbeing, and the activity 
occurs without the communities’ consent, then cases such as this would constitute instances of 
ecocide per our criteria.  
A harder case for expanding our conception of ecocide would be an instance in which a 
state is involved in an activity that might not necessarily lead to the destruction of an autarkic 
community’s habitat, but there is a well-founded worry that it could. An example that illustrates 
this point could be a case in which a state is involved in or approves the construction of a 
pipeline adjacent to an autarkic community’s habitat (e.g., the United States government’s 
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approval of the Dakota Access Pipeline adjacent to the Sioux Tribal Nation’s Standing Rock 
Indian Reservation).  
In such a scenario, it is by no means inevitable that the pipeline will result in an oil spill 
or leak contaminating the community’s water supply or irreversibly degrading the land, but there 
is a realistic chance that it could. Consequently, it is harder to argue that the construction of the 
pipeline constitutes ecocide (pursuant to our framework) because the potential for environmental 
harm is not as direct or immediate as in the ‘industrial process’ example mentioned in the 
preceding paragraph. Essentially, the difficulty stems from the fact that it is difficult to justify 
that building the pipeline is tantamount to an act of intentional environmental destruction when 
the environmental harm does not invariably follow from the activity.   
Whereas, if the scenario is amended slightly and the state is building the pipeline through 
(instead of adjacent) to the autarkic community’s habitat, then it is much easier to justify 
classifying such activity as ecocidal. The reason for this difference derives from the fact that the 
construction of the pipeline itself causes environmental degradation to the autarkic community’s 
habitat, independent of the prospects of oil spills or leaks. Consequently, per our framework, the 
Canadian government’s approval of TC Energy’s Coastal Gaslink pipeline through 
Wet’suwet’en Nation’s unceded territory in British Columbia constitutes ecocide and should not 
be permitted in a well-ordered, just society.  
Despite the attempt to expand the concept of ecocide (as defended above), one may still 
object that the conception is still exceedingly narrow, in that the operative harm triggering 
environmental transformative justice is the “social death” of a community, instead of the 
environmental destruction in-and-of-itself. As stated previously, we must accept such a criticism 
and admit that this framework offers an inherently anthropocentric conception of ecocide (unless 
it can be shown that other species besides humans are capable of a comparable cultural loss). 
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Nevertheless, the expectation is that by recommending an initial step towards altering 
contemporary society’s perception of humanity’s place within nature, there will be a 
proliferation of openings, opportunities, and forums for challenging anthropocentric prejudices.   
Essentially, this work maintains that focusing on the need for environmental 
transformative justice after ecocide (i.e., instances of intentional environmental destruction 
responsible for causing social death) will provoke, guide, direct, and awaken awareness and 
understanding of humans’ impact on the environment and the impact of the environment on 
humans, i.e., recognize the complex, dynamic, imbedded, and mutually-constructing relation of 
man-to-nature and nature-to-man (Moore 2015). As previously stated, there are prudential 
reasons for focusing on a human-centric conception of ecocide, in that the lack of consensus 
regarding the value of plants, animals, ecosystems, makes it politically unrealistic to defend more 
eco-centric positions at a time when substantive change is needed urgently.  
As we have seen, potential criticisms of the theory of environmental transformative 
justice involve concerns pertaining to its scope, i.e., how broadly the criteria of ecocide can be 
stretched.355 This is unsurprising since the work has focused on delineating the paradigmatic 
                                                        
355 Some might even object that our conception of ecocide is too broad and argue that the context 
of environmental transformative justice may include cases in which no injustice transpired. For 
instance, a situation in which state-sponsored environmental alteration is pursued without the 
impacted community’s consent, but that nevertheless promotes and expands the community 
members’ objective wellbeing, in that it expands their freedom and functioning despite 
undermining their subjective agency. For instance, there could potentially be a situation in which 
a community subsists on meager resources cultivated from an already environmentally degraded 
habitat. If the state intervenes to “cleanup” the area without consulting the impacted community, 
one may argue that this change to the environment satisfies our definition of ecocide, since it 
“destroys” the local habitat and irreversibly alters the community’s way of life. For an example 
of this dynamic, see James McCarthy’s analysis of the Wise Use movement in the Western 
United States, in which local communities opposed the imposition of federal regulations to 
preserve their land because of fears that such policies would undermine their traditional way of 
life (McCarthy 2002). One may question if it is unjust for such an imposition to occur without 
the community’s consent? And does environmental transformative justice require “re-degrading” 
the environment to return it to its “pre-cleanup” functioning, if that is what the community 
desires? Nevertheless, how such cases fit within our framework would requires far greater 
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cases of ecocide, meaning there was little analysis pertaining to how the theory would apply in 
contexts where not all the criteria are met. The hope is that presenting core cases of ecocide will 
best capture the injustice, which in turn, will provide the most compelling normative justification 
and greatest prospect of building consensus regarding the need for pursuing environmental 
transformative justice in comparable settings.   
If this project were to prove successful, and environmental transformative measures 
began to be implemented, then a body of knowledge would gradually accrue offering empirical 
insights regarding the successes and failures of various methods for responding to ecocide. As 
this information grows, and environmental transformative justice is steadily refined, then the 
practical insights can inform and offer guidance regarding how to best deal with various other 
kinds of eco-social disturbances.  
Accordingly, this project suggests that pursuing environmental transformative justice 
provides an opening for (re)examining and (re)conceptualizing our practices, habits, values, 
norms, and priorities towards nature. Enacting reparative and reconciliatory activities in post-
ecocide settings represent an opportunity for progressively departing from current destructive 
and exploitative treatments of nature, thereby achieving and promoting sustainable stewardship 
and a healthier relationship with nature. But it is important to keep in mind that this project was 
intended to be only a starting point along the difficult path of moving society away from the now 
                                                        
analysis than can be offered in these concluding pages. But it seems at least plausible that per our 
conception of ecocide that the answer is to both questions is “yes,” which many may find rather 
strange. However, per our theorization of environmental transformative justice, the most 
important insight that such examples highlight, is that states should not intervene in ways that 
radically alter peoples’ way of life without gaining their informed consent. Such a principle 
would have likely prevented environmental destruction in most of the cases of ecocide we 
examined. Essentially, state impositions are unjust when they fail to respect citizens’ agency. 
Therefore, it is likely that injustices can be avoided if the state effectively explains and 
demonstrates that the proposed policy is to the community’s benefit to gain their consent. But if 
the community still does not agree to the project, then the state’s obligation is to leave them 
alone.    
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dominant roving imperialist culture and toward a more sustainable and eco-friendly relationship 
with the natural habitats on which we depend for our survival.   
Lastly, one may object that this project overemphasizes the role of the state and overly 
depends on it for responding to ecological harms. It is important to accentuate that there is 
nothing in this project that forecloses individuals, communities, groups, and institutions from 
pursuing countless other environmentally friendly activities. The focus on the state stems from 
the fact that ecocide as defined involves some level of state oppression (e.g., direct, indirect, 
negligent, see 66-77). Hence, the central aim of environmental transformative justice is to 
transition ecocidal states to ecofriendly states (i.e., ones that no longer engage in, promote, or 
tolerate ecocidal activity). This does not, however, mean that only state actors have a role to play 
in the environmental transformative justice process. It is exceedingly likely, for a litany of 
reasons (e.g., it is profitable, it is how things have operated in the past, etc.), that the state policy-
makers and bureaucrats will not want to end their involvement in ecocidal activity on their own 
accord.   
In these contexts, a key aspect of overcoming ecocide will be concerned actors 
advocating, campaigning, and pressuring the state to begin the environmental transformative 
justice process and to maintain efforts overtime. As has been argued, pursuing environmental 
transformative justice requires that all actors who are socially connected to ecocidal practices 
(i.e., those who benefit from or take part in them) have a responsibility to engage in collective 
political action to change social structures causing ecocide (see 152-155). Although 
environmental transformative justice has a state-focused goal, the success of transitioning to an 
ecofriendly state depends on the contribution and involvement of many non-state 
actors. Responsibility for furthering environmental transformative justice is diffuse and 
occasions all peoples and communities to play a role in combating ecocide. 
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The notion of political responsibility employed is capacious because the kind of change 
envisioned is ambitious. The dissertation argues for a radical shift not only in the social relations 
between people but in society's relation to the natural world. It demands we recognize ecological 
harms as a social harms and ecological benefits as social benefits. Environmental transformative 
justice may appear as a daunting socio-political undertaking, yet hopefully this work has shown 
that it is one which is entirely in our power to achieve. 
Thus, my dissertation has provided an effective access point to theorizing the injustice of 
environmental degradation, in that ecocide presents a clear and direct connection between harms 
to the environment and harms to citizens, to which the conceptual tools of political philosophy 
may be readily applied. Furthermore, from a strategic perspective, halting/preventing these 
intentional and direct acts of environmental destruction may have an impact on more 
theoretically elusive (i.e., many people would not agree that consumers in their everyday actions 
of buying products are committing acts of injustice) causes of environmental harm (i.e., harms 
caused indirectly and unintentionally via vast structural processes).  
 In other words, the form of environmental degradation easier for us to diagnose as unjust 
has an impact on these other more elusive kinds of harmful practices. For example, instead of 
attempting to establish the injustice of consumers buying bottled water (a highly discussed 
environmental harm), we would focus on the injustice of beverage companies being allowed to 
commit ecocide, such as Nestlé extracting millions of liters of water from Six Nations treaty 
land, daily, absent the consent of the Six Nations (Shimo 2018). Thus, halting ecocidal activity 
offers an effective and morally justifiable access point for diminishing/forcing changes in 
powerfully harmful industries, which will undoubtedly result in eco-friendly ‘ripple effects’ 
throughout post-ecocidal societies.   
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